Inglis v. Medway Pines Stables, 2020 NSSC 97
Opinion
SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Inglis v. Medway Pines Stables, 2020 NSSC 97 Date: 2020-03-12 Docket: Hfx No. 449087 Registry: Halifax Between: Janet Susan Inglis Plaintiff v. Medway Pines Stables, a Registered Partnership and Livia Mueri and Markus Mueri Defendants
Summary Judgment Decision Judge: The Honourable Justice Christa M. Brothers Heard: May 15, June 5 and September 6, 2019, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Decision: March 12, 2020 Counsel: Ansley Simpson on behalf of Robert Carter Q.C., for the Plaintiff Melanie Comstock and Noah Entwisel, for the Defendants Overview [ 1 ] Companies which facilitate customers’ participation in inherently risky activities have long relied upon releases and waivers to protect themselves from legal claims. While riding a horse at the defendants’ stable, the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries caused by the defendants’ negligence. The defendants claim that a release signed by the plaintiff bars her claims. They seek
summary judgment on the evidence pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 13.04. For the following reasons, I conclude that I should not, in the circumstances of this motion, embark on a contractual
interpretation exercise in respect of this Release. Background [ 2 ] The defendants were in the business of providing horseback riding lessons and trail rides to customers. The plaintiff claims to have suffered injuries during a trail ride on November 5, 2011. The defendants say a release bars her claim. [ 3 ] The defendants bring this
summary judgment motion on the basis of an “Assumption of Risks, Release of Liability, Waiver of Claims, and Indemnity Agreement” (the “Release”), signed by the plaintiff on September 1, 2011, when she, for the first time, attended the defendants’ stables to participate in a trail ride with her two daughters and their friend. The defendants argue that the Release bars the plaintiff’s claim.
They say she voluntarily assumed the physical and legal risks of horseback riding by signing the Release on September 1, 2011, and maintain that the Release applies to all subsequent rides at their stables, including the ride on November 5, 2011. [ 4 ] The parties filed extensive materials on this motion. The plaintiff filed three briefs and the defendants, four. In addition, both parties filed solicitors’ affidavits enclosing discovery evidence. Neither party objected to the filing of evidence in this fashion and neither sought a party affidavit for the purpose of cross-examination.
The matter was heard over three days. The original date for the hearing was a half-day scheduled for May 16, 2019. The motion continued on June 5 and then September 6, 2019. [ 5 ] During the first appearance, on May 16, 2019, the plaintiff sought to amend her pleadings to add claims of gross negligence and battery. The motion was adjourned, and resumed on June 5, 2011, for oral arguments but the defendants consented to the amendment, and the hearing resumed on September 6, 2019, with the amendments included. A Consent Order was issued on October 3,
2019. [ 6 ] The only time the plaintiff signed a release at the defendants’ stable was when she, her daughters and their friend went for a trail ride on September 1, 2011. The plaintiff does not deny that when she signed the document she knew it was a waiver. [ 7 ] The plaintiff’s daughters were subsequently enrolled in riding lessons at the defendants’ stable. On November 5, 2011, they were to participate in lessons. It was a windy day, which caused the roof of the covered riding arena to become noisy, disturbing the horses and making it difficult to conduct riding lessons.
Because of the inclement weather, one of the defendants, Ms. Mueri, suggested that they take a trail ride. The plaintiff agreed to change plans and she and the children agreed to a trail ride. During the ride, she fell and was allegedly injured. [ 8 ] There is a disagreement apparent in the discovery excerpts as to whether the plaintiff’s daughter screamed, causing the plaintiff’s horse to buck, or whether the wind and the resulting noise from the roof caused the horse to throw the plaintiff from her saddle. The plaintiff claims she was injured in the fall, fracturing her pelvis and tailbone.
She says the defendants were at fault. She also alleges that the defendants moved her against her protestations, thereby committing a battery upon her. Issues [ 9 ] The issue before the court can be summarized simply: Is the defendant entitled to
summary judgment on evidence? Positions of the Parties [ 10 ] The defendants argue that
summary judgment should be granted on the basis of the Release, which, they argue, bars the plaintiff’s action in its entirety. The defendants say the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of horseback riding on November 5, 2011, by reason of the Release, which she had signed some two months earlier. They argue that there is no evidence of unconscionability, duress, or inequality of bargaining power. Consequently, they say the Release should bar the plaintiff’s claim.
Furthermore, the defendants say there is no evidence that the plaintiff was mistaken as to the nature of the Release, or that she was induced by fraud or misrepresentation to sign it. [ 11 ] The crucial point regarding the Release is the scope of its application. The defendants submit that the Release remained in effect on the date of the plaintiff’s fall, November 5, 2011, despite having been signed on September 1 of that year.
They point, in particular, to the following wording as an express indication that the plaintiff was releasing all claims of negligence from the time of the signing of the Release, on September 1, 2011, and after: I have read and understand this agreement and I am aware that by signing this agreement, from this day forward , I am waiving certain legal rights which I, my child, my heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators, assigns and/or representatives may have against the releasees. [Emphasis Added] [ 12 ] The defendants say this means that the Release applies in perpetuity to any contractual or commercial relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants, including any subsequent trail rides.
The defendants argue that the wording of the Release is clear and, while they did not explain that it applied to all future interactions, this is nevertheless apparent on the face of the Release. [ 13 ] The plaintiff says she did not know that the Release was intended to apply to every future occasion when she attended the stables, and further says no one brought this to her attention, either when she signed it, or when she returned on November 5. She argues that the Release is not clear on its face, and says the defendants’
interpretation is inconsistent with her experience with other releases, with her experience with this particular stable, and with the wording of the Release. In addition, she argues that the Release does not apply to acts of gross negligence and battery. The Test for
Summary Judgment on Evidence [ 14 ] This motion for
summary judgment on evidence is brought pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 13.04, which provides: 13.04
(1) A judge who is satisfied on both of the following must grant
summary judgment on a claim or a defence in an action: (
a) there is no genuine issue of material fact, whether on its own or mixed with a question of law, for trial of the claim or defence; (
b) the claim or defence does not require determination of a question of law, whether on its own or mixed with a question of fact, or the claim or defence requires determination only of a question of law and the judge exercises the discretion provided in this Rule 13.04 to determine the question.
(2) When the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and the absence of a question of law requiring determination are established,
summary judgment must be granted without distinction between a claim and a defence and without further inquiry into chances of success.
(3) The judge may grant judgment, dismiss the proceeding, allow a claim, dismiss a claim, or dismiss a defence.
(4) On a motion for
summary judgment on evidence, the pleadings serve only to indicate the issues, and the subjects of a genuine issue of material fact and a question of law depend on the evidence presented.
(5) A party who wishes to contest the motion must provide evidence in favour of the party’s claim or defence by affidavit filed by the contesting party, affidavit filed by another party, cross-examination, or other means permitted by a judge.
(6) A judge who hears a motion for
summary judgment on evidence has discretion to do either of the following: (
a) determine a question of law, if there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial;
(
b) adjourn the hearing of the motion for any just purpose including to permit necessary disclosure, production, discovery, presentation of expert evidence, or collection of other evidence. [ 15 ] The test on a motion for
summary judgment on evidence was articulated by Fichaud, J.A. in Shannex Inc. v. Dora Construction Ltd., 2016 NSCA 89 : [33] The amended Rule 13.04 frames, but does not materially change Burton ’s tests. On the first test, instead of the former Rule’s “genuine issue for trial”, the new Rule 13.04(1) speaks of a “genuine issue of material fact, whether on its own or mixed with a question of law”. On the second, the amended Rule 13.04(3) repeats the former Rule 13.04(2), that the judge may grant judgment, dismiss a proceeding, and allow or dismiss a claim or defence.
These provisions remain consistent with Justice Saunders’ formulation in Burton . [34] I interpret the amended Rule 13.04 to pose five sequential questions: • First Question: Does the challenged pleading disclose a “genuine issue of material fact”, either pure or mixed with a question of law? [Rules 13.04(1), (2) and (4)] If Yes, it should not be determined by
summary judgment. It should either be considered for conversion to an application under Rules 13.08(1)(
b) and 6 as discussed below [paras. 37-42], or go to trial. The analysis of this question follows Burton ’s first step. A “material fact” is one that would affect the result. A dispute about an incidental fact - i.e. one that would not affect the outcome - will not derail a
summary judgment motion: 2420188 Nova Scotia Ltd. v. Hiltz , para. 27, adopted by Burton , para. 41, and see also para. 87 (#8). The moving party has the onus to show by evidence there is no genuine issue of material fact. But the judge’s assessment is based on all the evidence from any source. If the pleadings dispute the material facts, and the evidence on the motion fails to negate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, then the onus bites and the judge answers the first question Yes. [Rules 13.04(4) and (5)] Burton , paras. 85-86, said that, if the responding party reasonably requires time to marshal his evidence, the judge should adjourn the motion for
summary judgment.
Summary judgment isn’t an ambush. Neither is the adjournment permission to procrastinate. The amended Rule 13.04(6)(
b) allows the judge to balance these factors. • Second Question : If the answer to #1 is No, then: Does the challenged pleading require the determination of a question of law, either pure, or mixed with a question of fact? If the answers to #1 and #2 are both No,
summary judgment “must” issue: Rules 13.04(1) and (2). This would be a nuisance claim with no genuine issue of any kind – whether material fact, law, or mixed fact and law. • Third Question: If the answers to #1 and #2 are No and Yes respectively, leaving only an issue of law, then the judge “may” grant or deny
summary judgment: Rule 13.04(3). Governing that discretion is the principle in Burton ’s second test: “Does the challenged pleading have a real chance of success?” Nothing in the amended Rule 13.04 changes Burton ’s test. It is difficult to envisage any other principled standard for a
summary judgment. To dismiss summarily, without a full merits analysis, a claim or defence that has a real chance of success at a later trial or application hearing, would be a patently unjust exercise of discretion. It is for the responding party to show a real chance of success. If the answer is No, then
summary judgment issues to dismiss the ill-fated pleading. • Fourth Question: If the answer to #3 is Yes, leaving only an issue of law with a real chance of success, then, under Rule 13.04(6)(a): Should the judge exercise the “discretion” to finally determine the issue of law? If the judge does not exercise this discretion, then: (1) the judge dismisses the motion for
summary judgment, and (2) the matter with a “real chance of success” goes onward either to a converted application under Rules 13.08(1)(
b) and 6, as discussed below [paras. 37-42], or to trial. If the judge exercises the discretion, he or she determines the full merits of the legal issue once and for all. Then the judge’s conclusion generates issue estoppel, subject to any appeal. This is not the case to catalogue the principles that will govern the judge’s discretion under Rule 13.04(6)(a). Those principles will develop over time. Proportionality criteria, such as those discussed in Hryniak v. Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87, will play a role. A party who wishes the judge to exercise discretion under Rule 13.04(6)(
a) should state that request, with notice to the other party. The judge who, on his or her own motion, intends to exercise the discretion under Rule 13.04(6)(
a) should notify the parties that the point is under consideration. Then, after the hearing, the judge’s decision should state whether and why the discretion was exercised. The reasons for this process are obvious: (1) fairness requires that both parties know the ground rules and whether the ruling will generate issue estoppel; (2) the judge’s standard differs between
summary mode (“real chance of success”) and full-merits mode; (3) the judge’s choice may affect the standard of review on appeal. [ 16 ] The following comment on the nature of
summary judgment from Coady v. Burton Canada Co ., 2013 NSCA 95 , is instructive: [22] In my respectful opinion this process has become needlessly complicated and cumbersome.
Summary judgment should be just that.
Summary. "Summary" is intended to mean quick and effective and less costly and time consuming than a trial. The purpose of
summary judgment is to put an end to claims or defences that have no real prospect of success. Such cases are seen by an experienced judge as
being doomed to fail. These matters are weeded out to free the system for other cases that deserve to be heard on their merits. That is the objective. Lawyers and judges should apply the Rules to ensure that such an outcome is achieved. [ 17 ] Similarly, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Lameman, 2008 SCC 14 , the court commented on the purpose of
summary judgment: 10 The
summary judgment rule serves an important purpose in the civil litigation system. It prevents claims or defences that have no chance of success from proceeding to trial. Trying unmeritorious claims imposes a heavy price in terms of time and cost on the parties to the litigation and on the justice system. It is essential to the proper operation of the justice system and beneficial to the parties that claims that have no chance of success be weeded out at an early stage. Conversely, it is essential to justice that claims disclosing real issues that may be successful proceed to trial. 11 For this reason, the bar on a motion for
summary judgment is high. The defendant who seeks
summary dismissal bears the evidentiary burden of showing that there is "no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial" [ 18 ] I am mindful of these comments in applying the Shannex analysis. Genuine Issue of Material Fact [ 19 ] The defendants have the onus of satisfying me that
summary judgment is a proper question for consideration. In order to do so, the defendants bear the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. If they fail, the motion for
summary judgment must be dismissed. In Hatch Ltd. v. Atlantic Sub-Sea Construction and Consulting Inc ., 2017 NSCA 61 , the Court noted that this determination does not allow the motion judge to draw inferences or weigh evidence: 23 The role of the motions judge on a
summary judgment motion is to determine whether the challenged claim discloses a genuine issue of material fact (either pure or mixed with a question of law). The onus is on the moving party to show there is no genuine issue of material fact. If it fails to do so the motion is dismissed. A material fact being one that would affect the result. 24 The motions judge must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to support the pleading, but he/she cannot draw inferences from the available evidence to resolve disputed facts. 25 This prohibition on weighing evidence was addressed by Saunders, J.A. in Coady . After discussing the law of
summary judgment in Nova Scotia, he provides a list of principles, including: [87] . . . 10.
Summary judgment applications are not the appropriate forum to resolve disputed questions of fact, or mixed law and fact, or the appropriate inferences to be drawn from disputed facts. 11. Neither is a
summary judgment application the appropriate forum to weigh the evidence or evaluate credibility. [ 20 ] In Burton, supra , speaking for the majority, Saunders, J.A., made the following comments about the first stage of the analysis at para 42: At this point a
summary of the analytical framework may be helpful. In the first stage the judge’s focus is concerned only with the important factual matters that anchor the cause of action or defence. At this stage the relative merits of either party’s position are irrelevant. It is only if the judge is satisfied that the moving party has met its evidentiary burden of showing there are no material factual matters in dispute that the judge will then enter into the second stage of the inquiry. The focus of that stage is not – as the judge put it here – to see if the “undisputed facts ... give rise to a genuine issue for trial”.
That is a misstatement of the test established in Guarantee . Instead, the judge’s task is to decide whether the responding party has demonstrated on the evidence (from whatever source) whether its claim (or defence) has a real chance of success. This assessment, in the second stage, will necessarily involve a consideration of the relative merits of both parties’ positions. For how else can the prospects for success of the respondent’s position be gauged other than by examining it along with the strengths of the opposite party’s position?
It cannot be conducted as if it were some kind of pristine, sterile evaluation in an artificial lab with one side’s merits isolated from the others. Rather, the judge is required to take a careful look at the whole of the evidence and answer the question: has the responding party shown, on the undisputed facts, that its claim or defence has a real chance of success? [ 21 ] The plaintiff’s claim in relation to the Stable and the individual defendants is framed in negligence, gross negligence, and battery.
When assessing whether there are genuine issues of material fact, it is important to keep in mind which alleged facts are relevant to the claims being advanced. [ 22 ] What is a material fact? This question has been answered in various cases, including 2420188 Nova Scotia Ltd. v. Hiltz , 2011 NSCA 74 , where the court stated: 27. The disputed fact under Stage 1 must be “material”, ie. essential to the claim or defence. A dispute over an incidental fact will not derail a
summary judgment motion at Stage 1. [ 23 ] In Burton, supra, Saunders, J.A., described material facts as “important factual matters that anchor the cause of action or defence”. In Shannex , Fichaud, J.A., described a “material fact” as “one that would affect the result.” [ 24 ] Based on the evidence before the court, there are many facts in issue with regards to the claims in negligence, gross negligence and battery.
The parties have contrary recitations of the facts with regards to the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, including what and who caused the plaintiff to fall, and how and why certain actions were taken or not taken after her fall. The question is whether there are any material facts in dispute regarding the Release.
[ 25 ] The defendants argue that there are no material facts in dispute in relation to the Release or that any disputes of fact that do exist are not material. They say the only material facts are: 1. Whether the release was signed by the plaintiff on September 1, 2011; and, 2.
Whether the plaintiff’s claim is within the scope of that release. [ 26 ] The defendants argue that the first question is a question of fact while the second is a question of mixed law and fact. [ 27 ] With respect to the Release, the plaintiff claims there are contradictions between her discovery evidence and that of the individual defendant, Livia Mueri, which require a trial judge to undertake credibility assessments and make findings of fact. The plaintiff says the following facts are in dispute: The circumstances surrounding the signing of the Release, including: 1.
What was said to the plaintiff when she signed the Release? 2. Did the plaintiff read the release? 3. Did the plaintiff understand the significance of the Release? 4. Were onerous provisions of the Release emphasized to the plaintiff? [ 28 ] The plaintiff argues that she has a real chance of showing that the defendants misrepresented the risks through Livia Mueri, who on discovery stated that it was industry standard practice not to alert people to all of the risks associated with horseback riding.
Additionally, the plaintiff argues that because of the quickness with which she signed the Release, it should have been apparent to the defendants that she did not intend to be bound by its terms. The plaintiff says there was misrepresentation of the intended effect of the Release, as disclosed by the circumstances in which it was signed. In particular, she was not informed on either occasion that the Release was intended to apply to future activities. [ 29 ] This
summary judgment motion is not as simple as the defendants claim. Whether or not the current claim falls within the scope of the Release is a multi-faceted question which requires consideration of the surrounding circumstances to make findings of fact. The Release [ 30 ] The specific terms of the Release on which the defendants rely must be considered and interpreted in the context of the document as a whole and in the context of the communications and expectations of the parties at the time it was signed.
The Release reads as follows: ASSUMPTION OF RISKS, RELEASE OF LIABILITY, WAIVER OF CLAIMS, AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT BY SIGNING THIS DOCUMENT YOU WILL WAIVE CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO SUE PLEASE READ CAREFULLY MEDWAY RIVER STABLES, MILL VILLAGE NS TO: ____________________________________________________________ Referred to in this agreement as the “Provider” AND TO: ALL PROPERTY OWNERS (PRIVATE, FEDERAL, PROVINCIAL, REGIONAL AND MUNICIPAL) On my behalf, and on behalf of any minor children participating in these activities, for whom I am legally responsible, I agree to the following: ASSUMPTION OF RISKS I am aware and understand that activities involving these horses involve many risks, dangers and hazards, including but not limited to the following: 1.
Horses which are powerful and potentially dangerous animals, may change their behavior at any time and may, without warning, jump, run wildly, buck, kick, bite, or step on people or things;
2. Horses may collide with other horses or objects or trip, stumble or fall even if being led, ridden or driven, or attended to; 3. Negligence (which means, in general terms, a failure to exercise ordinary or proper care) of other riders or drivers my or my child’s own failure to ride safely, within my or my child’s ability or within designated areas and trails; 4. Equipment may fail; 5. Weather conditions can change and can sometimes be dangerous; 6. The nature of the terrain can change and has certain risks associated with it including, but not limited to, exposed natural objects, trees, streams and creeks; 7.
The activities can sometimes be in remote areas and injuries or illness may occur and it may be a considerable distance to doctors, hospitals, or any other type of assistance; and, 8. Negligence on the part of A PROPERTY OWNER AND/OR THE PROVIDER OR THEIR STAFF. I am also aware that the risks, dangers and hazards referred to above exist throughout the trail, stable, practice and other areas and many are unmarked.
I understand and acknowledge that no amount of caution, experience or instruction can eliminate all the risks involved and I freely accept and fully assume all such risks, dangers and hazards and the possibility of personal injury, death, property damage and damages or less resulting there from.
INITIALS ____ RELEASE OF LIABILTY, WAIVER OF CLAIMS AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT In consideration of the Provider providing me or my child with their horse or sleigh riding or carriage driving and other services and permitting my or my child’s use of their equipment, and other facilities and the Property Owners providing me or my child with the use of their property (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Services”), I hereby agree as follows: 1.
TO WAIVE ANY AND ALL CLAIMS that I or my child have or may have in the future have against a Property Owner or the Provider, and their directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, and volunteers (all of whom are hereinafter collectively referred to as “THE RELEASEES”) from any and all liability for any loss, damage, injury or expense that I or my child may suffer, or that my or my child’s, next of kin may suffer as a result of my or my child’s use of the services or due to any cause whatsoever INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE, BREACH OF CONTRACT, OR BREACH OF ANY STATUTORY OR OTHER DUTY OF CARE INCLUDING ANY DUTY OF CARE OWNED UNDER THE “OCCUPIERS LIABILTY ACT” ON THE PART OF THE RELEASEES. 2.
TO HOLD HARMLESS AND IDEMNIFY THE RELEASEES from any and all liability for any damage to the property of or personal injury to any third party resulting from my or my child’s use of the services: 3. This Agreement shall be effective and binding upon my or my child’s heirs, next of kin, executors, administrators, assigns and representatives in the event of my or my child’s death or incapacity; 4. This agreement shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the province of ________ NOVA SCOTIA_______ ; and, 5.
Any litigation involving the parties this Agreement shall be brought within the Province of ______NOVA SCOTIA_______. INITIALS ____ PROTECTIVE HEAD GEAR & RIDING BOOTS 1. Proper riding footwear is required by all persons, regardless of age, participating in any horse related activities. 2. ALL MINORS (Horse back riders under ___18___ years of age) are required to wear protective head gear in the form of a high impact helmet and proper footwear. 3. IT IS HIGHLY RECOMMENDED THAT ALL HORSE BACK RIDERS OF ANY AGE WEAR A HIGH IMPACT HELMET. 4. I (we) decline to wear a helmet(s). INITIALS ___ 5.
I (we) decline to wear riding boots. INITIALS ___ In entering into this Agreement, I am not replying upon any oral or written representations or statements made by the Releasees other that what is set for in this Agreement. I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT AND I AM AWARE THAT BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, FROM
THIS DAY FORWARD, I AM WAIVING CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS WHICH I, MY CHILD, MY HEIRS, NEXT OF KIN,EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, ASSIGNS AND/OR REPRESENTATIVES MAY HAVE AGAINST THE RELEASEES. Signed this ____________________ day of _______________, 20_________.
Name Date of Birth Signature of Customer Date Witness ______ ___________ ___________________ ________ ________ ______ ___________ ___________________ ________ ________ ______ ___________ ___________________ ________ ________ ______ ___________ ___________________ ________ ________ THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE COMPLETED IN FULL, SIGNED DATED, AND WITNESSED BEFORE ANY ACTIVITYWITH HORSES MAY BE UNDERTAKEN … [31] The plaintiff has raised misrepresentation and lack of consensus ad idem as reasons the Release does not apply, both of whichthe caselaw recognizes as reasons to relieve a party from being bound by a release in certain circumstances.
In addition, the plaintiff saysshe did not read the Release. The fact a person does not read a release is not enough to prevent its application. However, courts haveacknowledged that a party seeking to rely on a release may, in certain circumstances, be required to draw a party’s attention to certainterms. [32] In Tilden Rent-a-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), (ON CA), 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (C.A.), Dubin, J.A. stated atparagraph 33: In modern commercial practice, many standard form printed documents are signed without being read or understood.
In many cases theparties seeking to rely on the terms of the contract know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract does not representthe true intention of the signer, and that the party signing is unaware of stringent and onerous provision which the standard formcontains.
Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such terms should not be able to do so in theabsence of first having taken reasonable measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and, in the absence of suchreasonable measures, it is not necessary for the party denying knowledge of such terms to prove either fraud, misrepresentation or non estfactum. [33] Similarly in Karroll v.
Silver Star Mountain Resorts Ltd. (1998), (BC SC), 33 B.C.L.R. (2d) 160 (B.C.S.C.),McLachlin, C.J.S.C. (as she then was) stated, at paragraph 26: It follows that Miss Karroll is bound by the release unless she can establish: (1) that in the circumstances a reasonable person would haveknown that she did not intend to agree to the release she signed; and (2) that in these circumstances the defendants failed to takereasonable steps to bring the content of the release to her attention. [34] To determine whether a plaintiff is bound by an exclusion clause the following three questions must be asked, as set out inTercon Contractors Ltd. v.
British Columbia (Ministry of Transportation and Highways, 2010 SCC 4: 1. As a matter of
interpretation does the exclusion clause apply to the circumstances? 2. Was the exclusion clause unconscionable at the time the contract was made? 3. Should the court nevertheless refuse to enforce the valid exclusion clause because of the existence of an overriding public policy? [35] In assessing whether an exclusion clause applies, further guidance is contained in Chamberlin v. Canadian PhysiotherapyAssociation, 2015 BCSC 1260. The court acknowledged that an
interpretation must be consistent with the expectations of the parties. Simply put, the surrounding circumstances existing at the relevant time of the execution of the Release must be considered by the court: [56] In addressing this first line of inquiry, Finch C.J.B.C. in Keefer Laundry v. Pellerin Milnor Corporation, 2009 BCCA 273 atpara. 59 adopted the following remarks of Geoff R. Hall in Canadian Contractual
Interpretation Law, 2ed, (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis,2012), at para. 7.10: A release is a contract, and the general principles governing the
interpretation of contracts apply equally to releases. However, there isalso a special rule which is superadded onto the regular ones. This rule comes from London and South Western Railway v. Blackmore, an1870 decision of the House of Lords. The rule in London and South Western Railway holds that a release is to be interpreted so that itcovers only those matters which were specifically in the contemplation of the parties at the time the release was given. The rule allows
the court to consider a fairly broad range of evidence of surrounding circumstances in order to ascertain what was in fact in the specificcontemplation of the parties at the relevant time, and it is not uncommon for a significant amount of extrinsic evidence to be examinedwhen the rule is applied. However, like the law of contract
interpretation generally, the scope of permissible extrinsic evidence does notextend to evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions; such evidence is strictly inadmissible. [Emphasis in Chamberlin] [57] In Karroll v. Silver Star Mountain Resorts Ltd. (1988), (BC SC), 33 B.C.L.R. (2d) 160 (S.C.), a decisionthat predated Keefer Laundry, McLachlin C.J.S.C. (as she then was) framed the issues as twofold: whether the terms of the release arebroad enough to encompass the claims brought by the plaintiff against the defendants; and whether the plaintiff is bound by the terms ofthe release.
The first issue is concerned with the construction of the terms of the contractual waiver and thus aligns with the first line ofinquiry described by Binnie J. in Tercon. The second issue addresses the question of whether the signing party read and understood therelease. It arises in light of the special rule that applies to the
interpretation of releases as described by Hall in Canadian ContractualInterpretation Law.
In this context, McLachlin C.J.S.C. opined at para. 24 that: [24] … there is no general requirement that a party tendering a document for signature to take reasonable steps to apprise the partysigning of onerous terms or to ensure that he reads and understands them. [58] To this general rule, however, McLachlin C.J.S.C. identified the following three exceptions: 1. where the document was signed by a plaintiff in circumstances in which it was not his or her act (non est factum); 2. where the agreement was induced by fraud or misrepresentation; and 3. where the party seeking to enforce the document knew or had reason to know that the signing party was under a mistake as to itsterms. (See: Karroll, at paras. 18 and 24.) [59] In my opinion, the first two exceptions to the general rule do not apply to the present case.
The third, however, is relevant.In Karroll at para. 25, McLachlin C.J.S.C., described the circumstances in which the third exception might arise as follows: [25] Many factors may be relevant to whether the duty to take reasonable steps to advise of an exclusion clause or waiver arises. Theeffect of the exclusion clause in relation to the nature of the contract is important because if it runs contrary to the party’s normalexpectations it is fair to assume that he does not intend to be bound by the term.
The length and format of the contract and the timeavailable for reading and understanding it also bear on whether a reasonable person should know that the other party did not in factintend to sign what he was signing. The list is not exhaustive.
Other considerations may be important, depending on the facts of theparticular case. [Emphasis added.] [60] Consequently, it is only where the party tendering the document for signature knew or ought to have known that the signingparty was not consenting to the terms in question that the obligation arises to take reasonable steps to advise the signing party of thedetails and implications of the waiver. To use the language of Hall in Canadian Contractual
Interpretation Law, the party tendering thedocument must have been reasonably satisfied that the waiver, including any onerous terms, were in the specific contemplation of thesigning party at the time the document was signed. [36] When considering these principles, there is disagreement about the circumstances in which the Release was signed. [37] The plaintiff stated on discovery that on September 1, 2011, Livia Mueri, an owner of the stables handed her the Release andtold her that she needed to sign and initial it in the appropriate places. She said that Ms. Mueri “did not review” the Release with her.
On discovery, the plaintiff first testified that she probably did not read the Release, but later acknowledged that she scanned it. As areason for not reading the release she said, “because as a parent of two children, I’ve probably signed a hundred waivers, and like mostparents, you just glance at it and put your initials on it and sign it”. The plaintiff recognized that there are risks associated with ridinghorses, and that on prior occasions at other locations where her daughter rode horses she had signed waivers. She did not dispute that sheunderstood the concept of a waiver.
She has a Bachelor of Education and acknowledged that horseback riding is a risky endeavor andthat she would have expected to sign a release. [38] At discovery, the plaintiff also said she scanned the Release on September 1, 2011, but said she would not have read everyportion of the Release, saying that it was hard to see and she did not have her glasses on. She agreed that she did not advise anyone ofthese difficulties, and that she had not asked anyone to read the Release to her. [39] The last
section of the Release was read to the plaintiff. She acknowledged signing the document on September 1, 2011, butexplained at p. 49-50: A. Yes, and it was also my understanding that when I signed the waiver that day, it was for that day. [40] In response to this the following exchange took place. Q. And, you just indicated that you thought that that waiver would only apply for that first visit. A. Mm-hmm. Q. So you’re saying that you thought that you could then return to that horse stable … A. Yes. Q. … and ride and it wouldn’t apply on any future occasions.
A. No, because that was a one-time thing. I assumed that if we ever went back to there we would be signing waivers again for each time that we went to that stable for a trail ride.
Because any other place that I’ve gone, like, Get Air, for riding … be on a trampoline, when you go in and you sign a waiver for your child. [ 41 ] The plaintiff further said it was her understanding that when her daughters took lessons a separate agreement was being entered into for the stable to provide the lessons, with a single waiver signed for all of the lessons, which she described as “entering into an agreement for a certain period of time”. In addition, the exchange on discovery continued at page 55: Q. But then you went back and you were in an accident, taking … A. Two months later. Q.
Right, doing a trail ride and there was a standing waiver on file with Medway. Is that correct? A. If you say so. I wouldn’t have understood that it was a standing waiver. Q. So you thought that day you were riding waiver-free, that she changed her policy and wasn’t going to require any waivers or agreements? A. No, she said we were going to do everything at the end. I hadn’t paid for my ride because it was a … the girls were covered but I wasn’t because I hadn’t signed up for lessons. Q. Okay. A. I pre-paid for them but not for myself. [ 42 ] Further on page 58: Q.
And you’re indicating to me that you don’t know or didn’t feel that that release was applicable on the day of your trail ride. A. No. Q. It was applicable for your first trail ride but not for your second trail ride. A. That’s what I felt, yes, because I hadn’t entered into any kind of agreement with her that I was going to be returning to ride and the intention that day, initially, was not for me to be on a horse. Q. But when you provide a statement to the adjuster who was investigating the claim back at the time you indicated that you indeed read the waiver, the release. A.
I never signed that statement because when it was sent to me it was not half of what I said. So I never signed that because it was not an accurate statement. Q. Okay. So it wasn’t accurate that you read the statement. A. As I said, I probably would have scanned it but I certainly did not stop and read every single line of the waiver, no. [ 43 ] With regards to the extent or reach of the Release, the plaintiff said at page 159 of the discovery: A. And I did not come away with the impression that it was a waiver that lasted the rest of our lives at all. … A. Yes, but my understanding, a waiver doesn’t last forever.
So I just didn’t understand that that meant from the date that I signed it for the rest of all our lives. Q. And it wasn’t forever. It was two months. It was two months later within the period of time where you were taking your daughters to that (inaudible). A. Yes, but I did explain to you that I … it was my understanding that you signed a waiver every time that you went to an activity like this. [ 44 ] On November 5, 2011, the plaintiff did not sign a new Release, and there was no exchange of payment before the trail ride began.
In addition, there was no evidence that the defendants reminded the plaintiff about the conditions in the waiver that had been signed two months earlier, on September 1, 2011. [ 45 ] Ms. Mueri, a partner and operator of the stables, gave evidence concerning the circumstances of the signing of the Release. In her discovery at page 72, Ms. Mueri said that she asked the plaintiff to read and sign the Release and explained the option to wear a helmet and riding boots. There is no mention of the duration of the Release: A.
Any time they come to the door and first thing before they even make it far in the barn it was, “here’s a waiver, please sign it.” … A. I said - - I every time said, “please read it. Read it.” There is a box on the waiver that specifically states if you don’t want to wear a
helmet and you don’t want to wear boots you have to initial extra. … A. So for sure I went through it. I said, “you know, here’s the waiver. Please read this. But on the back of it says, “if you are an adult over eighteen, you’re not required to wear a helmet. I absolutely recommend it because you never know what can happen with horses.”. … A. “And if you don’t have – want to wear proper footwear, then you have to sign off on that as well.” So everyone got the whole spiel about helmets. [ 46 ] And further at page 110: Q. Under – Witness – can you confirm whether or not those are your initials. KM? A.
The witness is my sister. Q. Is your sister? So, did you go through this document with Ms. Inglis on September 1 st ? A. Yes. Q. And is there a reason why your sister would sign as a witness and not you? A. I just assumed that she had to be like a - - you need a third party witness so that’s why. But she just happened to be there and she could say I was there too. But I did go through it with her. Q. Did you read it to her? A. No, I asked her to read it. … A.
And I - - so I asked her to read the whole thing and I told her that she should initial where I “x”d this box and then I clearly went through the second page where it says the part about the helmet and the boots. … A. Because that was part of my policy to explain to everybody, “if you’re over eighteen you don’t have to wear a helmet but it’s recommended.” And then you want under eighteen has to otherwise they have to sign separately so I do recall very clearly reading that out. … A. Like saying that to her that you know “we wear helmets because you never know with horses. … A.
And there was no hesitation on her to sign it. Q. Okay. But the rest of it you left her to read and to - - and to do - - - A. Um-hmmm. Let her know that if she had any questions to ask me. … A. And she just signed it. … [ 47 ] Further at p. 112: A. No. I just said, “read - - please read this.” … A. “And let me know if you have any questions.” Q. Okay. And did you - - did you see her sign it or - - - A. Yes. Q. You saw her sign this one.
A. Yeah. Q. Okay. Did she have any questions? A. No. There was no hesitation. Q. When you - - was it standard practice just to inform your clients to read the waiver and then you know sign afterwards aside fromyou what just explained. A. Yes [48] When one reviews the limited amount of evidence provided to me on this
summary judgment – exclusively in the form ofexcerpts from discovery - there appear to be several disputes about the circumstances in which the Release was signed, and, in particularwhat the parties understood it to mean. [49] There is no dispute as to the timing of the signing of the Release or of the trail ride on which the plaintiff was allegedly injured. The Release was signed on September 1, 2011, and the trail ride on which she claims she was injured was on November 5, 2011. Adispute includes whether the Release applies to the ride taken on September 1, 2011 only or whether it applies to every other ride theplaintiff took or may take at the stables into the future.
Interpretation [50] The
interpretation of a Release is governed by the principles of
interpretation of contracts generally. In Creston Moly Corp. v.Sattva Capital Corp 2014 SCC 53, the court made it clear that contractual
interpretation involves issues of mixed fact and law. In Bankof Nova Scotia v. A MacKenzie’s Auto Mart Inc., 2010 NSCA 81, the court stated: AMCI Export Corp., supra, makes clear that which is well-known; it is not the function of the Chambers Judge on an application forsummary judgement to determine matters of fact or mixed law and fact which are in dispute. Matters of controversy are to be left forresolution at trial. [51] The plaintiff says the Release is ambiguous.
She says it is unclear whether it applies to events which occurred on the day it wassigned (as the plaintiff argues) or to all contracted interactions between the plaintiff and the defendants going forward into the future (asthe defendants maintain)? For the following reasons, I conclude that the Release is not clear on its face: 1.
In the first section, the following words might support the claim that the Release applies to the future use of the defendants stables:“TO WAIVE ANY AND ALL CLAIMS that I or my child have or may have in the future…” However, does this mean the Releaseapplies if there is an event on the day the Release is signed and damages are not discovered until later, or does it encompass allinteractions and events that occur in the future? This is not clear on the face of the Release. 2. The last
section of the Release includes the words “From THIS DAY FORWARD”. Does this refer to any negligence, committedon the day the Release is signed, or does it mean any claim for negligence, whenever committed that day or in the future, is waived? 3. While the defendants assert that the Release extends in perpetuity, there is a
section in the same document for the customer toindicate whether they are refusing a riding helmet and boots. The decision as to whether or not to wear a helmet could obviously changeeach time a customer attends the stable. The option to decline the use of helmets and riding boots would, in the context of the wholeRelease, suggest it might be signed every time the customer is riding, since a customer could change their minds about the use of suchitems, or decide based on the specific activity they were doing that day.
In other words, whether a rider used a helmet or riding bootscould conceivably change each time the rider rode. 4. The plaintiff’s daughters are apparently covered by the Release, but the plaintiff was nevertheless later asked to sign a new Releasefor their riding lessons. 5. The release later signed for the plaintiff’s daughter Rebecca, included an additional
section pertaining to her specific healthconditions. [52] All of these evidentiary issues point to a dispute as to the scope of the Release, and as to the circumstances in which it wassigned. As stated in Murray v. Bitango (1996), 1996 ABCA 182 , 184 A.R. 68 (C.A.) at paragraph 24: Where a defendant seeks to avoid liability on the basis that a plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of the defendant’s negligence, thedefendant must establish that the plaintiff knowingly assumed that risk and waived any legal right of action arising from that risk. [53] The question is whether this Release, in the context of all of its wording, including the
section concerning protective head gearand riding boots, clearly applies to the contractual relationship that was entered into on November 6, 2011, that is the trail ride. Surrounding Circumstances [54] The factual matrix will need to be considered to properly interpret the Release. In Sattva, the court discussed the importance ofthe surrounding circumstances, at paragraphs 47 and 50: Regarding the first development, the
interpretation of contracts has a evolved towards a practical, common-sense approach notdominated by technical rules of construction. The overriding concern is to determine “the intent of the parties and the scope of theirunderstanding”… to do so, a decision-maker must read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammaticalmeaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract. Consideration ofthe surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual intention can be difficult when looking at words on their own,because words alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning…
… …Contractual
interpretation involves issues of mixed fact and law as it is an exercise in which the principles of contractual
interpretation are applied to the words of the written contract, considered in light of the factual matrix. [ 55 ] Reviewing the surrounding circumstances and considering the factual matrix does not permit the court to change the words of a contract, but is intended to provide objective evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the time a contract was executed. [ 56 ] It would be wholly inadequate for me to attempt to interpret the Release with the evidence currently before me.
The defendant says the Release governs their relationship with the plaintiff from the time the Release was signed on September 1, 2011, and continuing in perpetuity. The plaintiff says this was never her understanding. In addition, the parties disagree as to whether the Release covers claims of gross negligence and battery. [ 57 ] It may be that a Release which will govern the parties’ relationship for all time, with no end date, is the type of provision which should properly be brought to a party’s attention; maybe it is not.
This requires a trial. [ 58 ] In addition, if there is any ambiguity, a court can look to parol evidence to resolve that ambiguity. In Ryan v. Yakubov , 2014 NSSC 54 , Wood, J., as he then was, stated at paragraph 17: There is no doubt that if a contract is ambiguous, parol evidence maybe admitted to assist in
interpretation. In the context of a motion for
summary judgment on evidence, this would usually be fatal since the weighing of that evidence should be left to the trial judge. Subsequent to the argument of the motions in this case, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal had the opportunity to consider this issue in Sinclair v. Fierro , 2014, NSCA 5 . That case involved an action on a promissory note where
summary judgment on evidence was granted by the motion judge. On appeal, the Court accepted the argument of the appellant that there were potential alternative
interpretations which could be given to the document which therefore created an ambiguity. [ 59 ] Consequently, the Court concluded that an ambiguity could only be resolved by resorting to extrinsic evidence from the parties and their representatives, an issue which required a trial. This gave rise to a material fact in dispute or mixed fact and law. [ 60 ] Given the ways in which this Release could be interpreted on its face, the parties’ evidence will need to be heard and weighed at a trial, whether or not the Release is ambiguous. [ 61 ] In Sinclair v.
Fierro , supra , the Court commented upon the effect of any ambiguity on the face of a contract at paragraph 43: This ambiguity means that extrinsic evidence of the parties’ agreement should be considered to assist with the
interpretation of the 2010 Note. I express no view how that ambiguity would be resolved. Each case is factually unique, and the circumstances of Fierro v. Sinclair differ from those in Albert Pearl and the other cases cited by Falconbridge . [ 62 ] In Sinclair v. Fierro , supra , the dispute was over the application of a 2010 promissory note. Mr. Fierro maintained that the note was unambiguous and bound Mr. Sinclair personally, and that recourse to extrinsic evidence was unnecessary. Mr.
Sinclair argued that the 2010 promissory note bound his corporate entity and not him personally. [ 63 ] The threshold issue was whether there was ambiguity in the wording of the promissory note as to whether Mr. Sinclair was personally liable. If so, then extrinsic evidence of the underlying agreement would be required to resolve the ambiguity. The question was whether there was only one possible
interpretation of the agreement. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was more than one possible
interpretation of the promissory note, given the words “the undersigned joint and severally promised to pay” and the fact that only one signature appeared above the typed name of the appellant. As such, extrinsic evidence of the parties’ agreement was necessary. As a result,
summary judgement could not be granted. [ 64 ] The court went on to explain in Sinclair v. Fierro , supra , at paragraph 54 : In my respectful view, the judge erred in law by ruling that there was no ambiguity in the 2010 note and, therefore, no dispute of material fact. Mr. Fierro has not satisfied his burden under the first stage of the test for
summary judgment on the evidence under Rule 13.04. This means that the second stage is not engaged, and there is no interlocutory inquiry to be made whether Mr. Sinclair’s defence has a real change of success. The matter should go to trial, and it will be for the trial judge to assess the merits of Mr. Fierro’s claim and Mr. Sinclair’s defence [ 65 ] Similarly, in the matter before this court, it is obvious that there is a factual dispute as to whether or not the Release was intended to apply to all other occasions where the plaintiff may attend and ride at the stables.
This dispute relates to a material fact or at the very least a question of mixed fact and law which requires a trial to determine the
interpretation of the Release. [ 66 ] The
interpretation of this Release faces similar difficulties on
summary judgment to that found in Basker v. Inverness County (Municipality), 2013 NSSC 345 . In that case, the
interpretation of a Lease was in dispute. As in Basker , supra , the parties advanced widely divergent views of its
interpretation. I refer to the comments of Coady, J. at paragraph 21 : …it will be necessary for a trial judge to explore the evidence leading up to the agreement to determine whether Ceilidh shares liability with the Municipality. While Ceilidh’s exposure may seem tenuous, I am precluded from weighing that evidence in this proceeding. Consequently, Ceilidh’s application for
summary judgment is dismissed. [ 67 ] The same reasoning applies in this case. The
interpretation of the contract requires consideration of the surrounding circumstances and requires an exercise involving questions of mixed law and fact. There is a material dispute of fact as to the surrounding circumstances leading up to the Release being signed and what it was meant to apply to. [ 68 ] Despite the evolution of the test on
summary judgment, the case of Globex Foreign Exchange Corp. v. Launt , 2011 NSCA 67 ,
is still relevant and in particular the comments of by Farrar, J.A. are apt: 15 In conducting the requisite analysis the clear directions of this court on a number of occasions bear repeating. It is not thefunction of the Chambers judge on a motion for
summary judgment to determine matters of fact or mixed law in fact which are indispute…. 16 The Court’s role is limited to assessing the threshold of whether a genuine issue exists for trial. The evaluation of credibility, theweighing of evidence and the drawing of factual inferences (accept in limited circumstances) are functions reserved for the trial judge. [Emphasis Added] [69] The defendant relies upon caselaw which suggests that a Release in such circumstances should be given effect and the claimdispensed with. These cases involved decisions after trials, or after
summary trials in such jurisdictions as British Columbia, wheresummary trial procedures allow fact-finding. This is not my role on
summary judgment, as it is currently constituted in Nova Scotia. While such decisions as Trimmeliti v. Blue Mountain Resorts Limited, 2015 ONSC 2301, Dyck v. Manitoba Snowmobile Association, (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 589, Vanhooydnonk v. Jonker, 2009 ABQB 8, Arif v. Lee, 2016 ONSC 4579, and Loychuk v.Cougar Mountain Adventures Ltd., 2012 BCCA 122, may possibly assist the defendant at trial, they are of limited application on thismotion. [70] There are also issues concerning the
interpretation of the Release as it applies to the claims of gross negligence and battery. Neither term appears on the face of the Release. These are additional questions of
interpretation which require trial. [71] Whether these claims are barred by the Release requires an
interpretation of a contract which has already been found to requirea trial. I will not embark on an analysis of the gross negligence and battery claims being barred by the Release in the face of materialfacts in dispute as to the surrounding circumstances and the
interpretation of the Release. [72] I am not satisfied that the defendants have met the burden of showing either that there is no material fact in dispute regardingthese claims, or that there is no issue of law. Conclusion [73] In conclusion, there is a dispute as to the nature and extent of the Release. The Release is ambiguous concerning the temporalreach of its provisions. Does it apply going forward to all contractual relations between the plaintiff and the defendants, in perpetuity? Is the Release only applicable the day its signed in relation to the provision of services provided that day?
There is a need for theRelease to be interpreted in context. [74] I conclude that there is a material issue of fact or of mixed fact and law respecting the construction of the Release. Thecontractual
interpretation of the Release requires a consideration of the context, that is, the surrounding circumstances of its execution. This will be necessary whether or not it is ambiguous on its face. Such an endeavor, contractual
interpretation in light of a factualdispute and potential ambiguity, cannot be described as
summary. That is not to say that contractual
interpretation could never be dealtwith on a
summary judgment motion, but it cannot be dealt with in this particular case. [75] Accordingly, the motion for
summary judgment on evidence is dismissed. Next Steps [76] Civil Procedure Rule 13.08 indicates the next steps after a failed motion for
summary judgment on the evidence. The Rulerequires a judge dismissing a motion to take certain steps as soon as is practical after the dismissal. The parties should address theirrespective positions on this rule and next steps in writing within 45 days. At the very least, a date assignment conference should be heldexpeditiously to set trial dates. [77] If the parties are unable to agree on costs within 30 days, I will consider submissions either in person or in writing as the partieschoose. Brothers, J.
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