Steven Andrew Partridge Applicant v. Deanne Madeline Bain Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Elizabeth Jollimore, 2022 NSSC 125

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation , Partridge v. Bain , 2022 NSSC 125 Date: 20220509 Docket: SFH1201-069513/SFHD-100737 Registry: Halifax Between: Steven Andrew Partridge Applicant v.

Deanne Madeline Bain Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Elizabeth Jollimore Heard: November 22- 24, 2021, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision: March 28, 2022, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Release: May 9, 2022 Counsel: Michael Owen, for the Steven Partridge Deanne Bain, self-represented Revised Decision – The text of the original decision has been corrected according to the attached erratum, dated May 18, 2022 By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] Steven Partridge and Deanne Bain have already had a hearing to determine whether Ms. Bain has any claim to Mr. Partridge’s business.

This current decision deals with the characterization, valuation, and division of their assets under the Matrimonial Property Act , R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 275 .

[ 2 ] Through a series of conferences, the parties agreed that I did not need to deal with certain assets, so, aside from recording the agreements I’m not dealing with those in any way. Those assets, or in a couple of cases, debts that are owed between them, are outlined in

Schedule A [1] being sent to the parties. [ 3 ] In terms of my decision this afternoon, first, I’ll resolve the issues of characterization: Mr. Partridge wants to exclude certain property from division as business assets under clause 4(1) (

e) of the Matrimonial Property Act . In this context I’ll also address Ms. Bain’s claims relating to debts. [ 4 ] Second, I’ll address the valuation of items. [ 5 ] Third, I’ll deal with the division of property. Ms. Bain wants an unequal division of property under subsections 13 (d), (

e) or (

f) of the Matrimonial Property Act , which would exclude her pre-marriage pension and RRSP contributions from division. [ 6 ] There is a property and debt allocation chart which displays the ultimate result as it relates to the assets and debts I must address and that will be the

Schedule B provided to you. Characterization - Mr. Partridge’s claim to exclude business assets [ 7 ] All assets are presumed matrimonial under the Matrimonial Property Act : subsection 4(1) . [ 8 ] The contested assets are: a. A 20-foot tandem cargo trailer, b. A 1972 ½ ton Chevrolet truck, c. Real estate at 6017 Highway 215, Kempt Shore, d. A 2007 Chevrolet 2500 Silverado, e. The contents of three 40-foot storage containers at Ostrea Lake Cross Road, and f. A camper. [ 9 ] I don’t need to determine the characterization of the 20-foot tandem cargo trailer and the 1972 ½ ton Chevrolet truck. In her

section 18 claim, Ms. Bain agreed that the 20-foot tandem cargo trailer was a business asset: exhibit 15, paragraph 42. She also agreed that the 1972 ½ ton Chevrolet truck was not a matrimonial asset: Exhibit 17, paragraph 148. [ 10 ] Since Mr. Partridge claims the other assets are excluded, he bears the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that they fall into an excluded category. Real estate at 6017 Highway 215, Kempt Shore [ 11 ] Mr. Partridge bought this property in 2012 when a prospective purchaser assigned his agreement of purchase and sale to Mr. Partridge. According to Mr.

Partridge, this was done in error and the agreement was to have been assigned to his numbered company. Mr. Partridge says he paid $1 for the assignment, and he paid the legal fees associated with the transaction. The numbered company was incorporated months after the assignment was made. [ 12 ] The deed from the vendor to Mr. Partridge’s numbered company was signed in October 2014. The house on the land was used to

store tools and seasonal equipment, according to Mr. Partridge. A seasonal worker lived there. The worker paid no rent, but maintained the property, did repairs, and maintained the tools and equipment stored there. [ 13 ] David Riel worked for Mr. Partridge’s company. In cross-examination, he confirmed that the Kempt Shore property was used as the business’s office: construction supplies were stored there, and meetings were held there. [ 14 ] Ms. Bain says Mr. Partridge bought the property “solely” by private sale as a rent-to-own, and the down payment was financed with matrimonial funds.

She said that the property was later transferred to the numbered company without her knowledge. [ 15 ] I am satisfied that the property was initially acquired at no personal cost to the parties: the assignment was transferred to Mr. Partridge for $1. Subsequent costs were paid by Mr. Partridge’s business. The property has never had any use but for the business. I exclude it from division as a business asset. 2007 Chevrolet 2500 Silverado [ 16 ] Mr. Partridge gave evidence that the Silverado was “heavily used by [his] business during the marriage.” [ 17 ] In her November 2017 affidavit, Ms.

Bain said that the Silverado was bought in 2014 for $18,112 using matrimonial funds. She provided the receipt from the cash purchase. She said that it was “driven predominantly by Steven and occasionally by myself.” [ 18 ] Mr. Partridge never contradicted Ms. Bain’s evidence that the purchase was financed with matrimonial funds. His evidence that the truck was “heavily used” by his business isn’t enough to satisfy the requirement in s. 2(

a) that it be “primarily used or held for or in connection with a commercial, business, investment or other income-producing or profit-producing purpose”. I find the 2007 Chevrolet 2500 Silverado is a matrimonial asset. Three 40-foot storage container contents [ 19 ] In her affidavit of June 15, 2019, Ms. Bain said that business assets were, at the date of separation, stored in the 3 larger and 1 small shipping container. I find that the contents of the 3 40-foot storage containers are business assets and excluded from division. Camper [ 20 ] According to Mr.

Partridge, his company took the camper as security for a debt it was owed. The camper was to come with registration and permits but when these were not provided, the camper was returned, and the debt was written off. [ 21 ] Mr. Partridge admits that he and Ms. Bain used the camper while it was in the company’s possession. Ms. Bain didn’t challenge this evidence. [ 22 ] The camper is not an asset available for division: if it was, it would be an asset of the business. Debts [ 23 ] Through the various conferences, the parties agreed that there were 4 disputed debts – debts which Ms. Bain claimed were matrimonial.

The disputed debts are:

a. CIBC Visa of $340, b. CIBC Credit Line of $2,146, c. PC MasterCard of $682, and, d. Insurance premiums from November 2015 to December 2017 for the Harley Davidson motorcycle of $1,019.46. [ 24 ] The first 3 debts were incurred before the separation, while the last debt followed the separation. [ 25 ] Typically, a matrimonial debt is one which was incurred for the family’s benefit or an ordinary household debt.

I wasn’t provided with information that would let me know what expenses were charged to the credit cards, so I can’t tell whether they were ordinary household costs or if they were incurred for the family’s benefit. These debts are not shown to be matrimonial. [ 26 ] For debts incurred after separation, the test is whether the debt was necessary to meet basic living needs or to preserve matrimonial assets. The insurance premiums on the motorcycle were necessary to preserve that asset and I find the premiums are a matrimonial debt, to be equally divided between the parties. [ 27 ] In her brief, Ms.

Bain raised a fifth debt: she says she paid utilities at 9400 Highway 7, Head of Jeddore, after the separation. This debt isn’t itemized in any of her Statements of Property, and she has not provided receipts or invoices from the creditor companies or proof of payment. I reject this claim. Valuation [ 28 ] There values of nine items are disputed.

The items are: a. the camper, b. the 1972 Chevrolet ½ ton truck, c. the 20-foot tandem cargo trailer, d. the contents of the three 40-foot storage containers at Ostrea Lake Cross Road, e. the boat and accessories, f. the 1997 Skandic skidoo, g. the 2007 Chevrolet 2500 Silverado, h. household contents, and i. Ms. Bain’s jewelry. [ 29 ] I’ve already determined that the camper, the 1972 Chevrolet ½ ton truck, the 20-foot tandem cargo trailer, and the contents of the three 40-foot storage containers are excluded assets, so I don’t need to know their value. [ 30 ] Ms. Bain sold the boat and accessories. Mr.

Partridge accepted the amount she received as their value. [ 31 ] Neither party said the skidoo had any value. Mr. Partridge said its motor seized and it’s worthless. I have no other evidence upon which to determine a value. It has no value, and it will remain with Mr. Partridge. [ 32 ] Mr. Partridge says that the 2007 Chevrolet 2500 Silverado has a value of $3,000. Ms. Bain gave the vehicle a value of $5,350 from the 2015 Black Book. I have no basis for the value assigned by Mr. Partridge, so I prefer the Black Book value. Mr. Partridge will retain it.

[33] Mr. Partridge believes the household contents have been divided. Ms. Bain disagreed and provided a list of items which she saidweren’t divided. She arranged to have these items appraised. The appraisal noted that 21 items were “disposed of”, “not seen”, “gone”or “business”. The remaining items were valued at $6,548. [34] According to Mr. Partridge, in the early days after the separation, Ms. Bain made multiple trips to the home to remove items shewanted. These items were not identified or appraised. [35] In January or February of 2016, Ms. Bain provided a list of further items she wanted.

These items were not appraised. By the timeshe provided this list of items, there was little of any value that remained in the house. The list includes few large items, like the kayaksand life jackets, but is mainly comprised of small items such as food from the freezer, a bird feeder, cupboard items, a jacket, canningand craft materials, and a popcorn maker, for example. [36] Within 30 days of my decision, Mr. Partridge will create a list of household contents in his possession. He will divide that list intotwo lists of items having roughly equal value which he will give to Ms. Bain. Ms.

Bain will have first choice of which list of items shewants to own and will tell Mr. Partridge her choice, within 14 days of receiving the lists. She will keep her list of items, and Mr.Partridge will keep the other ones. She must collect her items within a further 14 days of identifying her choice to Mr. Partridge. Shemay choose the time and date when she collects her items. She may be accompanied by 1 person when she does this. Anything shedoesn’t collect will belong to Mr. Partridge. [37] Ms. Bain must follow exactly the same procedure for the household contents in her possession. Mr.

Partridge will have first choiceand he is bound by the same timelines as Ms. Bain. Anything Mr. Partridge doesn’t collect will belong to Ms. Bain. [38] Once divided in this way, each can do whatever they want with the items they own. If the parties do not meet these deadlines, thehousehold contents will remain as currently divided. [39] In terms of jewelry, the parties agreed that Ms. Bain’s wedding ring and inherited jewelry weren’t matrimonial assets, but all otherjewelry was.

In the absence of any evidence about the value of jewelry, I order the parties to follow the same process for its division as Ihave ordered for the division of household contents. Ms. Bain’s claim for an unequal division of her pre-marriage pension and RRSP contributions [40] When the parties married, Ms. Bain had worked at Hanscomb Limited for 12 years. Her employer contributed to her pensionthroughout this time. She did not. Ms. Bain says that as of December 31, 2015, the pension’s total value was $167,931 and the valueattributable to the period of the marriage was $74,559. [41] Ms.

Bain also contributed to RRSPs before this marriage. She says she began to invest in RRSPs in 1994 and had contributed$60,504.50 before the marriage. She says she contributed $39,880.50 to the RRSPs during the marriage. [42] All personal property acquired before and during the marriage are matrimonial assets, according to subsection 4(1) of theMatrimonial Property Act. Pensions are a matrimonial asset, according to the Supreme Court of Canada in Clarke, (SCC). [43] Our Court of Appeal said that pension benefits earned before and during the marriage are a matrimonial asset and subject to primafacie equal division.

They may only be unequally divided in accordance with

section 13 of the Matrimonial Property Act, according tothe Court of Appeal in Morash, 2004 NSCA 20. Mr. Partridge relies on this statement of the law. [44] Under

section 13, I may divide matrimonial assets (like pensions and RRSPs) unequally only where I am satisfied that an equaldivision would be unfair or unconscionable having regard to the factors that are listed in

section 13. The Court of Appeal has said, onvarious occasions, that judges are to avoid “a weighing of the respective contributions of the parties to the acquisition of matrimonial

assets,” for example, Young, 2003 NSCA 63 at paragraph 15. [45] Similarly, the Court of Appeal says that I must have strong evidence showing that in all the circumstances an equal division wouldclearly be unfair and unconscionable on a broad view of all the relevant factors: Thomas v. Harwood (1981), (NSCA), 22 R.F.L. (2d) 167 at page 169, per Justice MacKeigan. [46] Ms. Bain relies on the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision in Connolly, 1999 NSCA 173, where the Court of Appeal upheld adecision to exclude 10 years of pre-marriage pension contributions.

These contributions were made before a 16-year long secondmarriage where there were no children. [47] The obvious difference between Morash and Connolly is Mr. Connolly’s successful argument under

section 13 for an unequaldivision of property, relying on subsections 13(d), (

e) and (f). Ms. Bain relies on these same subsections in support of her claim tounequally divide her pre-marriage pension and RRSP contributions. Does the length of cohabitation support an unequal division of Ms. Bain’s pension and RRSP? [48] Subsection 13(

d) is not a basis for unequally dividing Ms. Bain’s pension and her contributions to her RRSP. In 2010, JusticeBateman explained that “The length of the marriage, as a factor relevant to unequal division, is more commonly considered where themarriage is of unusually short duration.”: Leigh v.

Milne, 2010 NSCA 36, at paragraph 41. [49] The Court of Appeal has endorsed this principle since 1984, when it upheld Justice Hallett’s decision in Briggs (1984), (NS SC), 64 N.S.R. (2d) 40 (T.D.) where His Lordship said: [Subsection 13(d)] is normally only to be considered if the period of cohabitation was of very short duration as it could be unfair undersuch circumstances to divide matrimonial assets unequally if one of the parties had brought substantial assets into the marriage and theother had brought virtually nothing. [50] This marriage was 10 years long. It was neither “unusually” short nor “very” short.

The duration of the marriage is not anappropriate basis for unequally dividing Ms. Bain’s pension and her RRSPs contributions. Does the date and manner of Ms. Bain’s acquiring her pension and RRSP support its unequal division? [51] Ms. Bain’s pensionable service began on June 17, 1993. Her pension was financed by employer contributions, not by contributionsfrom Ms. Bain. She and Mr. Partridge began to cohabit in 2004 and they married in 2005. Employer contributions continued to Ms.Bain’s pension throughout the marriage. [52] Ms.

Bain says that as of December 31, 2015, the pension’s total value was $167,931 and of this, $74,559 related to the period ofthe marriage. Contributions were financed by Ms. Bain’s employer, so the couple was not deprived by Ms. Bain’s contribution to herpension. [53] CRA records show Ms. Bain contributed $60,504 to her RRSP before the parties married. After tax, these contributions have avalue of approximately $42,353. I have discounted the RRSP contributions by 30%, following the example of Justice Hallett in Gomez-Morales, (NS CA). [54] According to Mr.

Partridge, he contributed approximately $115,000 that he realized from the sale of his home in Kelowna to thepurchase of the matrimonial home in Nova Scotia.

[55] Each party brought financial assets worth over $100,000 to this marriage. Mr. Partridge’s pre-marriage assets were invested in thematrimonial home. This difference in their contributions is not so significant as to merit an unequal division of matrimonial assets. There is no equity in excluding Ms. Bain’s pre-marriage assets - her pension and RRSP contributions - where Mr. Partridge’s are shared. [56] The date and manner of the acquisition of assets does not support an unequal division of assets. Does Ms. Bain’s indirect contribution to Mr.

Partridge’s business support an unequal division of her pension and RRSPs? [57] I’ve already decided that Ms. Bain didn’t make a sufficient contribution to support a claim under

section 18 of the Act: 2019 NSSC232. [58]

Section 18 deals with direct contributions to a business, so my earlier decision doesn’t preclude Ms. Bain from advancing a claimfor an unequal division under

section 13(f), which is where I consider indirect claims to a business. [59] An unequal division based on subsection 13(

f) requires that Ms. Bain’s assumption of “any housekeeping, childcare or otherdomestic responsibilities for the family” have impact on Mr. Partridge’s “ability to acquire, manage, maintain, operate or improve abusiness asset”. [60] Mr. Partridge operated a business in Kelowna. When he moved to Nova Scotia, he brought his tools and equipment with him andused these to start his business here. The couple had no children together. Ms. Bain worked long hours for her employer, which wouldleave her with little time to perform tasks that would have an impact on Mr. Partridge’s ability to develop his business. [61] Ms.

Bain performed services, but I find these were insufficient to make an equal division of matrimonial assets unfair orunconscionable, recognizing that unconscionable means shockingly unfair. There is nothing shockingly unfair about an equal division ofassets in these circumstances. The parties’ agreements [62] There are 3 pieces of real estate. The parties agreed on their values through a series of conferences.

I have reduced the value ofeach property by notional disposition costs of 5% (plus applicable HST), by real estate commission, and by legal fees of $1,150, inaccordance with Justice Goodfellow’s decision in Clancey, 1990 NSSC 2602. [63] I have also deducted the balance of the encumbering debt, using the known amount as close as possible to the date of separationbecause each party has effectively had control of, and paid expenses for, property that he or she has retained since separation.

This wasan effective division of the property and so I use the debt at that date based on Simmons, (NS SF), 2001 NSSF 35,principle 4. 1 Roywell Drive [64] The parties agree that a home at 1 Roywell Drive is a matrimonial asset and worth $200,000. Ms. Bain has title to this home, andshe will retain it. She has controlled it. [65] Until 2010, tenants at the Roywell Drive property paid monthly rent of $1,000 and all the utilities. Since 2010, Ms. Bain rentedthis home to her mother for $400 each month, and Ms. Bain paid all the utility costs. Ms.

Bain admitted that her mother’s rent was“substantially below market.” Based on the previous tenant’s rent, Ms. Bain has foregone rent of approximately $43,200 by rentingRoywell Drive to her mother since separation. Ms. Bain hasn’t shared any of the rent she received from her mother with Mr. Partridge. [66] While her mother occupied the property, Ms. Bain paid the mortgage, maintenance, upkeep, and other costs of Roywell. She asksthat Mr. Partridge reimburse her for one-half of the property’s post-separation expenses of $20,263.

[ 67 ] Because Ms. Bain received all the financial benefit from Roywell (which she chose to reduce by reducing the rent) I dismiss her request for reimbursement of post-separation expenses. [ 68 ] When the parties separated, Roywell was mortgaged. The best evidence I have of the amount owing is a mortgage payout statement showing the balance of $80,861.29 on May 13, 2015 – approximately 6 months before separation. Using this date prefers Ms.

Bain because, if the mortgage was being paid in the usual course, the balance would have been lower at the actual date of separation. [ 69 ] The mortgage came due for renewal on August 15, 2015. When she renewed the mortgage, Ms. Bain increased the debt to a total of $210,000. This was without Mr. Partridge’s participation - as if the property wasn’t a matrimonial asset. Ms.

Bain has not provided evidence that the additional mortgage funds were used for matrimonial purposes, so I use the mortgage figure of $80,861 in determining the property’s value. 9400 Highway 7 [ 70 ] The parties agree that 9400 Highway 7 is a matrimonial asset worth $300,000. Mr. Partridge has lived in this home since separation, and he’s paid all associated costs. The parties agree that Mr. Partridge keeps this home. I’ve discounted this by disposition costs. Its mortgage was $53,040 at separation. 9291 Highway 7 [ 71 ] The 2 vacant lots at 9291 Highway 7 have an agreed value of $60,000.

I’ve discounted this by disposition costs. This property is unmortgaged. It will remain with Ms. Bain. Financial assets [ 72 ] The parties in their conferences agreed on the values of the RRSPs. However, since this was done, Ms. Bain has re-organized her RRSPs and made additional contributions (in unknown amounts). This has made it difficult to determine the current value of the RRSP contributions that existed in December of 2015. [ 73 ] The most current evidence I have of Ms. Bain’s RRSPs dates from June 30, 2021, when they had a value of $213,182.58.

Six and a half years earlier, at separation, they had a value of $99,161.34. Ms. Bain testified that she contributed $24,000 to her RRSP after the separation. That means that approximately $90,000 of its current value is attributable to growth. Of the value I can trace, the $99,161.34, approximately 83% relates to pre-separation contributions, while roughly 17% relates to post-separation contributions. This assessment may be weighted in Ms.

Bain’s favour because I don’t know the date of her post-separation contributions. [ 74 ] Adding 83% of the $90,000 in growth ($74,700) to the separation date value of $99,161.34, allows me to estimate the current value of Ms. Bain’s pre-separation contribution at $173,861.34. She must transfer one-half of this amount ($86,930.67) to Mr. Partridge by tax-free interspousal roll-over under section 146(16) of the Income Tax Act within 45 days of my decision. [ 75 ] There is no evidence that Mr. Partridge has contributed to or made withdrawals from his RRSP since separation. Mr. Partridge will transfer to Ms.

Bain one-half of his current RRSP contributions by tax-free interspousal roll-over under section 146(16) of the Income Tax Act within 45 days of my decision. [ 76 ] Ms. Bain remained at Hanscomb Limited until 2017 – 2 years after the separation. Her unchallenged evidence was that her pension had a value of $167,931 at separation. When Ms. Bain left Hanscomb Limited she moved her pension to CIBC in 2018 and, in 2020, to Investia Financial Services.

The most recent information available at the time of trial showed the locked-in retirement fund (her pension) had a value of $259,061.86, roughly 5 ½ years after the separation. [ 77 ] I order that Ms. Bain transfer $121,245 from the Locked-in Retirement Account to Mr. Partridge within 45 days of my decision.

This transfer must be made to a locked-in retirement vehicle because it’s coming from a locked-in retirement vehicle. [ 78 ] Ms. Bain owes Mr. Partridge $24,000 from a previous costs order. He may deduct this, dollar for dollar, from the amount he owes Ms. Bain. [ 79 ] Each party will execute, within 45 days, all documents provided to them that give effect to this decision. [ 80 ] Each must have the other removed from all debts encumbering the properties that they are retaining. [ 81 ] Overall, in terms of the Schedules that you will receive, the effect of the first

Schedule is that Ms. Bain owes Mr. Partridge $10,818.89 and that Mr. Partridge owes Ms. Bain $597.60 in American funds for an American funds bank account. That’s based on, again, the access of the values and the division that they agreed through the series of conferences, case management that the parties took

part in. [ 82 ] The second

Schedule is the one that outlines my decision and the mathematical calculations that I have made. It shows that between the three pieces of real estate (less mortgages, sales commissions, and legal fees), the boat, trailer and outboard motor, the motorcycle, the skidoo, the Silverado, and the insurance premiums that Ms. Bain claimed as a debt, the net value of all those properties and debt is $409,009.54. I’ve ordered an equal division, which means each party is entitled to $204,504.77. This would mean that Mr. Partridge owes Ms. Bain $40,435.23. This amount is reduced by the $10,848.89 that Ms. Bain owes him from the agreed property division in

Schedule “A”. Then, that is further reduced by $24,000.00 for the costs award so that Mr. Partridge owes Ms. Bain $5,586.34 and $597.60USD. [ 83 ] The Schedules follow. It will likely be necessary for those Schedules to be at hand, Mr. Owen, in terms of preparing a Corollary Relief Order. ______________________________ Elizabeth Jollimore, J.S.C.(F.D.) Halifax, Nova Scotia

Schedule A – Items the parties agreed upon 2000 GMC 2500 Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $100 for his interest. 2002 Volkswagen Jetta Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $50 for his interest 2009 Volkswagen Jetta Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $5,580 for his interest. 1997 Harley Davidson Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $4,500 for his interest.

RBC US Savings Account **8693 – $1,159.20 Mr. Partridge retains Mr. Partridge to pay Ms. Bain $579.60USD RBC Savings Account **9155 - $662 Mr. Partridge retains Mr. Partridge to pay Ms. Bain $331 RBC Chequing Account ** 7429 Mr. Partridge retains Excluded from division because acquired after separation RBC TFSA ** 1858 - $1,011.64 Mr. Partridge retains Mr. Partridge to pay Ms. Bain $505.82 PC Savings account ** 8648 - $1,291 Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $645.50 PC TFSA ** 1856 – $2,842 Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $1,421 RBC Savings Account ** 1561 - $1,184 Ms. Bain retains Ms.

Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $592 RBC Savings Account ** 0741 - $667 Ms. Bain retains Ms. Bain to pay Mr. Partridge $333.50 Assurance Life of Canada $4,000 policies Each party retains 1 policy Insurance premiums of $967.17 (216.87 and 750.30) Mr. Partridge agreed to fully reimburse these amounts to Ms. Bain Household service accounts of $569.12 Mr. Partridge agreed to fully reimburse these amounts to Ms. Bain

Schedule B Matrimonial asset Mr. Partridge Ms. Bain 9400 Highway 7, Head of Jeddore 300,000 Less mortgage (53,040) Less sales commission (17,250) Less legal fees (1,150) 1 Roywell Drive 200,000 Less mortgage (80,861) Less sales commission (11,500) Less legal fees (1,150) 9291 Highway 7, Head of Jeddore 60,000 Less sales commission (3,450) Less legal fees (1,150) Boat, trailer, and outboard motor 3,200 1983 Harley Davidson 11,000 1997 Skandic Skidoo 0 2007 Chevrolet 2500 Silverado 5,380 Harley Davidson insurance premiums (1,019.46) 244,940 164,069.54

Equal shares of $409,009.54 = $204,504.77, so Mr. Partridge owes Ms. Bain $40,435.23. This is reduced by the $10,848.89 (from

Schedule A), to $29,586.34. Mr. Partridge continues to owe Ms. Bain $579.60 USD. SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Partridge v. Bain , 2022 NSSC 125 Date: 20220509 Docket: SFH1201-069513/SFHD-100737 Registry: Halifax Between: Steven Andrew Partridge Applicant v. Deanne Madeline Bain Respondent ERRATUM Judge: The Honourable Justice Elizabeth Jollimore Heard: November 22- 24, 2021, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Oral Decision March 28, 2022, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Release May 9, 2022 Counsel: Michael Owen, for the Steven Partridge Deanne Bain, self-represented Erratum Date: May 18, 2022 Erratum: 1. Paragraph 61, the word “unequal” corrected to “equal”.