Wolfson v. Wolfson, 2022 NSSC 25

SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: Wolfson v. Wolfson , 2022 NSSC 25 Date: 2022-01-26 Docket: SFH No. 1201-071176 Registry: Halifax Between: Louis Wolfson Petitioner v. Jennifer Wolfson Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Theresa M.

Forgeron Heard: November 22, 2021, in Halifax, Nova Scotia D e cision: January 26, 2022 Counsel: Kim Johnson for the Petitioner, Louis Wolfson Richard Bureau and Ryan Christen for the Respondent, Jennifer Wolfson By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] This decision will determine ancillary issues arising from the divorce decision reported as Wolfson v Wolfson , 2021 NSSC 260 .

In that decision, I asked the parties for further submissions on the: • Security, interest rate, and pay-out details to apply to the $4,548,134 equalization transfer; • Quantum of spousal support; • Process to apply to s.7 expense payments; and • Details of the appropriate health and life insurance provisions. [ 2 ] Written submissions were received on October 21, October 26, and November 8, 2021. In addition, oral submissions were presented during a court appearance held on November 22, 2021. [ 3 ] For his part, Mr.

Wolfson seeks to immediately pay the equalization transfer and asks that the court rehear the support issues because he will have less income after paying the equalization transfer, while Ms. Wolfson will have more income. In his post-trial submissions, Mr. Wolfson initially asked to bifurcate the maintenance and property issues. He later asked to lead further evidence on the maintenance issues, noting that the court was not functus . [ 4 ] In contrast, Ms. Wolfson seeks an immediate payout of the $1 million s. 13 payment, with the balance of $3,548,134 due in 2030 after spousal support payments cease. Ms.

Wolfson seeks security and interest on the outstanding balance. Further, Ms. Wolfson opposes Mr. Wolfson’s request to relitigate the support issues because they were already decided. Issues [ 5 ] In this decision, I will determine the following issues: • What are the appropriate ancillary orders for the equalization payment? • What are the appropriate orders for support?

• What process applies to the payment of s. 7 expenses? • What order should issue for health insurance coverage? • Should a further order issue on the division of home furnishings and personal property? Analysis [ 6 ] What are the appropriate ancillary orders for the equalization payment ? Position of Mr. Wolfson [ 7 ] Mr. Wolfson asks the court to order an immediate payment of the equalization transfer. An immediate payment will forgo the need for interest and security and will result in a clean-break between the parties. Mr.

Wolfson indicates that an immediate transfer will have fewer business repercussions for the companies. Mr. Wolfson made numerous other factual assertions in his submissions that are not in evidence . Factual assertions not entered as evidence cannot be considered for the purposes of this decision. Position of Ms. Wolfson Payment Date [ 8 ] Ms. Wolfson seeks an immediate payment of $1 million, with the balance to be paid in 2030. Ms. Wolfson states that the court awarded $1 million pursuant to her s. 13 unequal division claim, and that Mr.

Wolfson has sufficient property to make that payment without disturbing the corporate holdings. [ 9 ] In the alternative, Ms. Wolfson is open to receiving two payments of $500,000 each – one on January 31, 2022, and the other on July 1, 2023. Or, as a third option, Mr. Wolfson can assume the Inglis Street mortgage, date of separation balance, and line of credit to offset a portion of the $1 million equalization payment. [ 10 ] Although initially contemplated as a less preferred option [i] , Ms.

Wolfson states that an immediate transfer of the entire equalization payment should not be ordered for reasons including the following: • Deferring payment is in keeping with the court’s decision and is reflective of the fact that the companies were intended to fund the parties’ eventual retirement. • Imposing security and an interest rate allows the matter to be resolved in short order as opposed to having further appearances and protracted court proceedings which, of necessity, will involve more expert evidence. • Mr.

Wolfson intends to treat an immediate payment of the equalization transfer as a means to reduce the quantum of child and spousal support by arguing that his annual income will be substantially less than the $660,000 found by the court in the divorce decision, while Ms. Wolfson’s income will be more than the $55,000 the court imputed to her. Interest Rate [ 11 ] Ms. Wolfson proposes two separate interest payments. First, she proposes that 5% be charged against the $1 million unequal division payment, commencing on September 3, 2021, the date of the divorce decision.

She states that an interest rate of 5% is appropriate because the unequal division relates to property personally held. Ms. Wolfson references the Interest on Judgments Act , RSNS 1989, c 233 and s. 41 of the Judicature Act , RSNS 1989, c 240 . [ 12 ] Ms. Wolfson proposes that an annual interest rate of 11.5% be applied to the balance of the equalization payment that is due. Ms. Wolfson notes that the court has the authority to make such an order: Nolet v Nolet, [1985] NSJ No 527 (SC AD) . Ms.

Wolfson suggests that 11.5% is the appropriate interest rate for the following reasons: • The equalization payment of $3,548,134 represents Ms. Wolfson’s share of the corporate real property holdings.

As such, an interest rate similar to that paid by the companies in the commercial context is appropriate. • Trial evidence indicates that since 2010, the companies paid various rates of interest on mortgages - 3% (1834 Robie Street); 4.15% (2834 Windsor Street); 7% (1840 Robie Street); 8.45% and 10% (6190 Jubilee Road); 8.55% (1949 Oxford Street) and 18% (2759 Windsor Street; 5320 Tobin Street; 2966 Windsor Street; and 6241 Almon Street). Ms.

Wolfson notes that these rates do not consider the interest charges paid to private lenders. • 11.5% is a compromise between the rate set out in the Interest on Judgments Act and the commercial rates that the companies pay. Security [ 13 ] Ms. Wolfson proposes a blanket mortgage on the corporate properties or a mix of a mortgage and life insurance as security for the unpaid balance of the equalization transfer. She suggests that the starting point be the properties that were recently renovated. She also requests life insurance to ensure her interest is protected. In this regard, Ms.

Wolfson seeks to be named irrevocable beneficiary and authorized to communicate with the insurance provider to confirm that status.

Summary of Ms. Wolfson’s Position [ 14 ] Ms. Wolfson seeks an immediate payment of $1 million, with a 5% interest charge payable from the date of the divorce decision. Further, she seeks the balance of $3,548,134 to be paid in 2030, secured by a mortgage on the corporate properties or a mix of a mortgage and life insurance coverage. She asks that an annual interest rate of 11.5% be imposed. She wants co-operation so that tax

planning experts can be utilized. [ 15 ] In support of Ms. Wolfson’s submissions, counsel made some factual assertions that were not based on trial evidence; they are not considered for the purposes of my decision. Decision [ 16 ] At paras 299 to 301 of the divorce decision, I state as follows: [299] Based on this equalization schedule, Mr. Wolfson is required to transfer the sum of $4,548,134 to Ms. Wolfson. Two questions emerge. First, when will Ms. Wolfson be paid? Second, how will Mr. Wolfson reimburse Ms. Wolfson? [300] In response to these questions, I do not require Mr.

Wolfson to immediately transfer the equalization payment to Ms. Wolfson for two reasons: • The corporate funds were intended as a retirement vehicle. Ms. Wolfson’s access to these funds can thus be delayed, provided there is suitable security and interest. Parties do not ordinarily access retirement funds until they are closer to retirement age. This factor, however, must be balanced against Ms. Wolfson’s right to control and manage her own assets. • The longevity of the companies must be considered.

I note, however, that in many Canadian jurisdictions, business assets are divided and support paid without the collapse of either the “goose” or its “golden egg.” Nevertheless, Ms. Wolfson’s equalization transfer can be paid out through a combination of lump sum and periodic payments, which can be timed to coincide with the cessation of maintenance. [301] Further, I agree that a creative solution is necessary. I therefore order Mr. Wolfson to provide security to Ms. Wolfson in the amount of the equalization payment.

Security may include a combination of matrimonial and business assets, personal and real property, and life insurance. An appropriate interest rate must also apply until the equalization transfer is paid in full. In the absence of agreement, the parties are to file their proposals on the security, interest rate, and pay-out details no later than September 21. [ 17 ] I find that an immediate transfer of the equalization payment is preferable because it offers a clean break with respect to the property issues. Such a payment, however, is subject to my findings set out in the divorce decision. Therefore, if Mr.

Wolfson wishes to proceed with an immediate transfer of the entire equalization payment, he will transfer $4,548,134 to Ms. Wolfson no later than March 24, 2022. No interest is payable if the equalization transfer is paid in full by March 24, 2022. As stated in my decision, the equalization payment is net of taxes and disposition costs, and is payable by Mr. Wolfson to Ms. Wolfson. The equalization transfer is not payable by any of the companies. [ 18 ] In the event that Mr. Wolfson does not transfer the equalization payment to Ms. Wolfson by March 24, 2022, then the following provisions are effective: • Mr.

Wolfson will transfer $1 million to Ms. Wolfson by March 24, 2022. Mr. Wolfson has sufficient equity in the matrimonial assets that he is retaining to fund such a payment. The balance of $3,548,134 will be paid in two equal installments, after the spousal support obligation ceases, with one installment due on March 30, 2030 and the other on March 30, 2031. • Commencing September 3, 2021, and as a term of the mortgage covenants, Mr. Wolfson must pay simple interest at a rate of 8% on the $3,548,134 until it is paid in full.

I have authority to order that an equalization payment be secured by an interest bearing mortgage. • No payment of principal or interest will become due or payable until the equalization is paid out, such that one-half is payable on March 30, 2030, and the balance on March 30, 2031. • Mr. Wolfson must provide registerable security for the outstanding equalization payment. Security will attach to the following properties: 88 Shaw Island Road; 2759, 2810, and 2966 Windsor Street; and 6241 Almon Street. Ms. Wolfson is responsible for the drafting and registration of the mortgages. Mr.

Wolfson must co-operate and execute all necessary documents on his own behalf and on behalf of the companies to ensure completion of this provision. • Mr. Wolfson will name Ms. Wolfson as irrevocable beneficiary of $6 million in life insurance [ii] . This amount will act as further security for the unpaid equalization transfer and accumulating interest. In addition, Mr. Wolfson must provide the insurance provider with an authorization to communicate and supply Ms. Wolfson with all particulars related to her designation, premium payments, and notifications in the event of policy lapses. Ms.

Wolfson, however, is not to double recover. She will not receive an amount greater, from the security instruments or life insurance or both, than granted in my decisions. Ms. Wolfson is required to reimburse Mr. Wolfson’s estate, or his designates, any excess amount which she receives. The amount of life insurance will be adjusted as the equalization and interest payments are made. • Ms. Wolfson is not required to release her interest in the matrimonial homes until Mr. Wolfson’s obligations are fulfilled, including the removal of Ms.

Wolfson from the mortgage and lines of credit as provided in my decision. • The court retains jurisdiction to determine any issues arising from the implementation of these provisions. [ 19 ] My jurisdiction to order security and interest is found in ss. 15 and 16 of the Matrimonial Property Act , RS, c 275: 15 On an application for the division of matrimonial assets, the court may order (

a) that the title to any specified property granted by the court to a spouse be transferred to or held in trust for that spouse for such period, or absolutely, as the court may decide; (

b) the partition or sale of any property;

(

c) that payment be made out of the proceeds of a sale ordered under clause (

b) to one or both spouses, and the amount thereof; (

d) that any property forming part of the share of either or both spouses be transferred to or held in trust for a child to whom a spousemust provide support; (

e) that either or both spouses give such security, including a charge on property, that the court orders, for the performance ofany order made under this Section; (

f) that one spouse pay to the other spouse such amount as is set out in the order for the purpose of providing for the division of theproperty, and make such other orders and directions as are ancillary thereto. 16

(1) Either spouse may apply to the court for the determination of any question between the spouses as to (

a) the ownership or right to possession of any particular property; (

b) whether property is a matrimonial asset or a business asset, except where an application has been made and not determined or an order has been made respecting the property under this Act. Powers of court under subsection (1)

(2) Where an application is made under subsection (1), the court may (

a) make a declaration as to the ownership or right of possession in the property; (

b) make a declaration as to whether the property is a matrimonial asset or a business asset; (

c) where the property has been disposed of, order that a spouse pay compensation for the interest of the other spouse; (

d) order that the property be partitioned or sold; (

e) order that either or both spouses give such security, including a charge on property, that the court orders, for theperformance of any order under this Section, and may make such other orders and directions as are ancillary thereto. R.S., c. 275, s. 16. [Emphasis added] [20] In Nolet, supra, MacDonald, JA held that the power to make ancillary orders includes the authority to affix an interest chargeto a deferred payment secured by way of mortgage: 9 In my opinion the power to make ancillary orders permits a court to order that payment by one spouse to another be postponedand that such debt be secured by way of mortgage or other charge. It is my further opinion that the

section cloaks the court withjurisdiction to affix an interest charge to such deferred debt payment. What the rate of interest should be will vary from case to casedepending on the circumstances. In some cases the facts may be such that no interest at all should be charged. In other cases a rateapproaching ten per cent might be considered appropriate. I would not think that the facts of any case would justify an interest rate equalto the going commercial mortgage rate. [21] This power was reaffirmed in Sampson v Sampson, 1999 NSCA 136, where Bateman, JA noted: [17]

Section 11 is most commonly used only on interim applications. The more conventional, and perhaps preferable approach whena final division is sought, is to fix ownership of the matrimonial home as between the parties pursuant to s. 15. If postponement of saleof the home is a desirable end, the Court can grant to the non-owner spouse a mortgage back in a fixed amount, bearing interest or not,depending upon the circumstances (Nolet v. Nolet (1985), (NS CA), 68 N.S.R. (2d) 370 (N.S.C.A.)). [22] In addition, I must comment on two other queries raised in the post trial submissions. First, Ms.

Wolfson raised a sub-issue overthe transfer of her preferred shares in LSC Leasing Inc., which provides management services to the rental properties operated throughPeppermint Properties. None of the rental properties are owned by LSC Leasing Inc. The divorce decision, including the amount of theequalization payment, is based on the best evidence available at the time. In the trial decision, I held, at paras 88, 89, 111 and 112, that inthe absence of other evidence as to value, the value of Mr.

Wolfson’s common shares in the 11 companies that owned the rentalproperties was based on the property appraisals less long-term debt and disposition costs. As such, there was no value ascribed to any ofthe shares in LSC Leasing Inc. Thus, Ms. Wolfson’s preferred shares would also have a nil value, based on trial evidence. [23] Second, although it would likely be beneficial for both parties to co-operate with tax planning experts, I am not inclined togrant such an order. I question my jurisdiction to do so. I also question the feasibility of such an order. It would likely engender furtherlitigation.

Unfortunately, I cannot force parties to be reasonable if they are otherwise inclined. [24] What are the appropriate orders for support? Position of Mr. Wolfson [25] In his post-trial submissions, Mr. Wolfson initially asked to bifurcate the support issues from the property matters. He lateramended this request. He now seeks to submit new evidence on the issue of support, both child and spousal, noting that the court is not

functus. Mr. Wolfson states that the immediate payment of the entire equalization transfer was not contemplated and will greatly impactthe amount of spousal and child support. Mr. Wolfson states that once the equalization payment is made, his annual income will be lessthan $660,000, while Ms. Wolfson’s income will be substantially more than $55,000. He therefore wishes to relitigate the support issues. Position of Ms. Wolfson [26] In contrast, Ms.

Wolfson seeks monthly spousal support of $13,914, which figure represents the mid to high range of theSpousal Support Advisory Guidelines, given the parties’ incomes of $660,000 and $55,000, as found in the divorce decision. Ms.Wolfson states the monthly amount of $13,914 is an appropriate quantum of spousal support. She references the divorce decision and theevidence confirming the pre-separation standard of living. She notes that Mr. Wolfson usually provided her with about $12,000 monthly,on a tax-free basis, in the form of visa payments and monetary transfers.

The grossed up amount of $12,000 is about $21,239, fromwhich child support of $7,324 is deducted, leaving the sum of $13,914 as spousal support. [27] Ms. Wolfson further notes that a strong compensatory claim is associated with a spousal support quantum on the higher end ofthe SSAG: Kalkman v Beveridge, 2018 NSSC 122 at para 148. [28] Moreover, Ms. Wolfson seeks to adjust the commencement date for the payment of child and spousal support because of para476 of the divorce decision, which states in part: …. Confirmation that no further retroactive support order is granted provided Mr.

Wolfson continued to pay all debt and expenses as he hadprior to the trial. Otherwise, the date for the payment of child and spousal support will be adjusted. Mr. Wolfson is responsible for allpost-separation incurred debt as provided in my decision. [29] Ms. Wolfson states that Mr. Wolfson stopped paying the debt and providing other monies once the trial ended. Mr. Wolfsonneither denied nor admitted this claim. No evidence was called since the trial was concluded. [30] Ms.

Wolfson also seeks to have the spousal support order secured by life insurance to represent the global amount of the timelimited spousal support obligation. She states that the global amount equals $1,274,000. Ms. Wolfson proposes that the amount of lifeinsurance coverage be reduced each year based on the amount of spousal support paid. Decision Bifurcation and Additional Evidence [31] I will deal with each of Mr. Wolfson’s requests. First, I will not order bifurcation. A request to bifurcate must be filed before atrial commences and not after a decision is rendered. [32] Second, I will not continue the trial.

In so ruling, I recognize that I am not functus: McMullin-Mullin v Henley, 2013 NSCA85; MacDonald v MacDonald, 2010 NSCA 34; Burke v Sitser, 2002 NSCA 115. I also recognize that I have the discretionary authorityto withdraw, modify, or even reverse my decision, because the CRO has yet to issue. However, this authority is not unlimited, as “ acourt should be most reluctant to exercise and should only do so in an exceptional case”: para 7, Burke v Sitser, supra, quoting fromLunenburg v.

Bridgewater Public Service Commission (1983), (NS CA), 59 NSR (2d) 23 (SC AD), quotingFruehauf Trailer Co. case, (NB CA), [1955] NBJ No 13 (SC AD). [33] I have determined that this is not an exceptional case. It is not appropriate to continue the trial by permitting fresh evidence forthe following reasons: • Some of the proposed new evidence does not yet exist because it will include more expert opinion involving accounting, financial,and investing matters.

Before the expert opinion can be produced, further disclosure must be exchanged and analyzed - not anuncomplicated task in the context of this complex case. • The fact that Ms. Wolfson sought a substantial equalization transfer was not a shrouded secret. Ms. Wolfson’s position wasrevealed well in advance of trial. If Mr. Wolfson wanted the property issues determined before support issues were finalized, he couldhave made a motion to bifurcate. He did not. Instead, both parties led extensive evidence on the support issues, including detailed expertopinion. • The trial should be finalized.

The parties separated in January 2018. The divorce trial was held over various days in 2020 and 2021.A decision was rendered in September 2021. Further delay is not warranted. • Delay is not in the best interests of the children. Mr. Wolfson suggests that the child and spousal support issues remain in limbountil the fresh evidence is produced and a further trial held. There is no support order in place. Support orders are required for the benefitof the children. [34] Should there be a material change in circumstances, then Mr. Wolfson can file an application to vary.

A variation application isthe appropriate forum in which to address material changes. The divorce decision did not contemplate Ms. Wolfson immediatelyreceiving all of the equalization payment. [35] Further, after the CRO issues, we will know which option Mr. Wolfson selected for the payment of the equalization transfer.After the CRO issues, we will also know how Ms. Wolfson spent or invested the equalization payment she received. For example, Ms.Wolfson may choose to pay down debt. Trial evidence indicates that Ms. Wolfson is wary of debt. Or, Ms. Wolfson may choose topurchase a summer home.

Trial evidence indicates that she regretted no longer having a summer home. Or, Ms. Wolfson may choose toinvest in registered investments to the extent available to her, a business venture, or the stock market. Ms. Wolfson will be in a position to

make financial choices after she receives all or a portion of the equalization transfer. Once these choices are made, the court will be in a position to view their impact on the quantum of support. All of this will be determined after the CRO issues. All of these factors confirm that a variation application is the appropriate venue to address any material changes in circumstances. Spousal Support Amount [ 36 ] I grant Ms. Wolfson’s request for a monthly payment of $13,914 in spousal support based on the stated incomes of the parties and my factual findings, as reviewed in the divorce decision. Ms.

Wolfson proved a high compensatory claim. Spousal support is payable by Mr. Wolfson from September 2021 onward, although the commencement date can be adjusted in the event Mr. Wolfson did not continue to pay all debt and expenses as he had prior to the trial as noted in para 476 of the divorce decision. Absent agreement, a motion can be filed. The court retains jurisdiction pursuant to para 476 of the divorce decision. Life Insurance Coverage [ 37 ] The spousal support obligation will be secured by life insurance in the amount of $500,000. I reduced the amount suggested by Ms.

Wolfson, given the tax free status of life insurance proceeds and the fact that life insurance proceeds, if owed, will be paid out in a lump sum. [ 38 ] Mr. Wolfson must name Ms. Wolfson as irrevocable beneficiary of $500,000 in life insurance. Mr. Wolfson must authorize the insurance provider to communicate and supply Ms. Wolfson with all particulars related to her designation, premium payments, and notifications in the event of policy lapses.

The amount of life insurance required will be reduced by $62,500 commencing January 1, 2023 and continuing yearly thereafter. [ 39 ] What process applies to the payment of s. 7 expenses? Position of Mr. Wolfson [ 40 ] Mr. Wolfson sought to defer this issue based on his submission that additional evidence should be filed on the support issues. Position of Ms. Wolfson [ 41 ] Ms. Wolfson states that based on the incomes of the parties, after the spousal support payment is considered, Mr. Wolfson is responsible for 69% of the s. 7 expenses, while she is responsible for 31%. [ 42 ] Ms.

Wolfson proposes that she pay the s. 7 expenses and thereafter be reimbursed by Mr. Wolfson. Ms. Wolfson said that she typically assumed this role during the marriage. She proposes that Mr. Wolfson will have seven days to reimburse her after presentation of invoices. Late payments should be subject to an interest payment of 5% and the reimbursement of any banking charges associated with the late payment, such as those related to insufficient funds. [ 43 ] Ms. Wolfson notes the detailed list of expenses which were approved as shared s. 7 expenses in para 444 of the divorce decision.

She expresses clarification on some of the expenses and, in particular, with extracurricular activities. She suggests that both parties consent before a child is enrolled in an extracurricular activity. If there is consent, then the activity expenses, including registration, equipment, clothing, and tournament related expenses will be shared. Otherwise, the party enrolling the child will be responsible for the expense and transportation related to the activity. Decision [ 44 ] The parties opted to participate in a shared parenting arrangement.

As such, they must co-operate and co-parent using all reasonable means, while adopting a child-centric approach. Co-operation and co-parenting extends to the processing of s. 7 expenses. [ 45 ] Based on the trial evidence, Ms. Wolfson was generally responsible for obtaining the children’s supplies and registering them for activities. However, the trial evidence confirmed that after separation, Mr. Wolfson usually paid for the private school tuition and many of the Bar Mitzvah expenses. [ 46 ] Going forward and to avoid duplication, Ms.

Wolfson should generally acquire the following s 7 expenses and obtain reimbursement from Mr. Wolfson: • School supplies. • Camp Kadimah expenses and camp supplies. • Agreed upon extracurricular activity expenses, including registration, equipment, clothing and tournament expenses. • Medical and dental expenses after insurance reimbursement. • Synagogue membership. • ½ of the cost of the Waegwoltic family membership. [ 47 ] Going forward and to avoid duplication, Mr. Wolfson should generally pay for the private school tuition and obtain reimbursement from Ms.

Wolfson. [ 48 ] Further, I direct that both parties must consent before a child is enrolled in an extracurricular activity. If there is consent, then the activity expenses, including registration, equipment, clothing, and tournament related expenses will be shared. Otherwise, the party enrolling the child will be responsible for the expense and transportation related to the activity.

[ 49 ] Mr. Wolfson is responsible for 69% of the s. 7 expenses while Ms. Wolfson is responsible for 31%. The party incurring the s. 7 expense will provide confirmation of the expense, such as an invoice, to the other party. The other party must reimburse the paying party within seven days. If issues develop over a lack of prompt payment, then the order may have to be revisited. [ 50 ] What order should issue for health and dental insurance coverage? Position of Mr. Wolfson [ 51 ] Mr. Wolfson did not make submissions on this issue. Position of Ms. Wolfson [ 52 ] Ms.

Wolfson seeks to continue the same health and dental coverage that existed during the marriage. Ms. Wolfson states that she will pay any associated deductibles relating to her health and dental coverage. In the alternative, she seeks notice in the event that she must find alternate coverage. Decision [ 53 ] Mr. Wolfson will continue health and dental coverage for the children and Ms. Wolfson for so long as the plan will allow or is otherwise ordered. Ms. Wolfson will pay the deductibles for her coverage. Should Mr. Wolfson’s health and dental plan not permit Ms. Wolfson’s continued coverage, Mr.

Wolfson will provide Ms. Wolfson with confirmation from the insurance provider and two months notice, if possible, to secure an alternate plan. [ 54 ] Should a further order issue on the division of home furnishings and personal property? [ 55 ] Ms. Wolfson seeks further directions related to the timing and details of the division of household chattels as stated in para 294 of the divorce decision. [ 56 ] Mr. Wolfson notes that there is no new evidence to support such an order. [ 57 ] I agree with Mr. Wolfson.

If, despite the detailed provisions of the divorce decision, the parties are unable to reach agreement on the dates and other details to implement the process described or if other questions cannot be reasonably resolved, a further motion hearing will be scheduled once the moving party files the requisite documents.

Conclusion [ 58 ] This decision addresses the ancillary issues arising from my divorce decision, including details surrounding the payment of the equalization transfer, the quantum of spousal support, life insurance coverage, the payment of s. 7 expenses, and health insurance coverage. [ 59 ] Now that these issues are resolved, it is imperative that the CRO be prepared. Ms. Johnson is to provide a revised CRO to Mr. Bureau by February 2, 2022. Mr. Bureau must respond by February 8, 2022.

If there is no agreement as to form, counsel are to provide me with their respective draft orders by February 14, 2022, together with a cover letter outlining the disputed paragraphs, with references to my decisions to support their positions. [ 60 ] The parties must also prepare costs submissions in the absence of agreement. Written costs submissions should be provided by March 18, 2022 with response submissions by March 25, 2022. A separate costs order will issue. Forgeron, J. [i] Post-Decision Submissions of Ms. Wolfson; October 21, 2021; pp 19 – 21. [ii] Mr.

Wolfson has Sunlife insurance with a face amount of $20 million and other policies with Manulife and CBIA with a face amount of $1,250,000.