A.M. v. R.I., 2022 NSSC 46

Supreme Court of Nova Scotia (FAMILY DIVISION) Citation: A.M. v. R.I. , 2022 NSSC 46 Date: 20220211 Docket: Halifax No. SFHMCA-102180 Registry: Halifax Between: A.M. Applicant v. R.I. Respondent Library Heading Judge: The Honourable Justice Samuel Moreau Heard: September 27, 28 and 29, 2021 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Decision: February 25, 2022 Subject: Custody, Decision making, Supervised parenting time, Child support, Motion to strike, Credibility.

Summary: Application by the mother to vary existing order with respect to the issues of custody, parenting time and child support. The father motioned to strike portions of the mother’s Affidavit evidence and also portions of the witness, J.M.’s evidence. Issues:

(1) Has there been a material change in circumstances since the making of the August 17, 2017, Order?

(2) If there has been a material change in circumstances what parenting arrangement is in the child’s best interest? Result: Father granted sole custody, mother to have supervised parenting time. Mother to have a psychological assessment with parental component completed prior to filing any future variation application. THIS INFORMATION SHEET DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE COURT'S DECISION. QUOTES MUST BE FROM THE DECISION, NOT THIS LIBRARY SHEET. SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia FAMILY DIVISION Citation: A.M. v. R.I. , 2022 NSSC 46 Date: 20220211 Docket: Halifax No. SFHMCA-102180 Registry: Halifax Between: A.M. Applicant v. R.I.

Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Samuel Moreau Heard: September 27, 28 and 29, 2021 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Release: February 11, 2022 Counsel: A.M., Self Represented Christopher Robinson, for the Respondent By the Court: Introduction [ 1 ] This matter involves a Notice of Variation Application filed by A.M. on June 30, 2020. [ 2 ] Pursuant to

section 37 of the Parenting and Support Act, RSNS 1989, c. 160 , A.

M. seeks to vary the Order issued by Justice Beryl MacDonald on August 17, 2017. [ 3 ] A.M. and R.I. are the parents of the child, J., born in 2012. [ 4 ] A.M.’s claims concern the issues of custody, parenting arrangements, child support (table amount, retroactive variation and termination of child support), summer access, a claim under section 46(4) of the Maintenance Enforcement Act, SNS 1994-95, c. 6 , for relief from payment of child support arrears and costs. [ 5 ] The Respondent, R.I., opposes A.M.’s claims and as per his Response to Variation Application filed October 26, 2020, seeks changes to the parenting arrangements and parenting time provisions of the August 17, 2017 Order. [ 6 ] For ease of reference, I shall refer to A.M. as “the mother” and R.I. as “the father” throughout this decision.

History of Proceedings [ 7 ] A review of the prior proceeding before Justice MacDonald and subsequent actions is helpful in contextualizing the current application. [ 8 ] In August, 2016, the father commenced an application under the then Maintenance and Custody Act regarding parenting time and to prevent relocation of the child, J. [ 9 ] The mother, J.’s primary parent at the time, wished to relocate with the child to California, U.S.A. [ 10 ] The father wanted to become more involved in J.’s life and so opposed the child’s relocation to California. [ 11 ] Initially the father sought a specified parenting time schedule.

This was opposed by the mother. As the matter proceeded the father decided to seek primary care of J. [ 12 ] The trial was heard by Justice MacDonald on June 14 th , 16 th , and 21 st , 2017. Justice MacDonald’s decision dated June 21 st , 2017, granted custody of J. to the father. [ 13 ] Her detailed parenting plan appended as

Schedule “A” to the Order issued August 17, 2017, sets out the parenting arrangements. [ 14 ] Income in the annual amount of $30,000 was imputed to the mother. She was ordered to pay child support in the guideline amount of $252 on the first day of each month, commencing October 1 st ,

Section 7 expenses were to be paid on a proportional basis. [ 15 ] As per a subsequent Order of Justice MacDonald issued October 20, 2017, the mother was ordered to pay costs to the father in the amount of $20,000 on or before November 10, 2017.

The award of costs was inclusive of an earlier cost award in favour of the father in the amount of $200 following a motion hearing on May 10, 2017. [ 16 ] Shortly thereafter, on January 12, 2018, the mother filed a Notice of Variation Application requesting a change in custody, parenting arrangements and child support as contained in the August 17, 2017 Order. [ 17 ] Days later, on January 18, 2018, the father filed a Notice of Variation Application requesting a change to the parenting plan as contained in the August 17, 2017, Order. [ 18 ] Prior to October, 2018 there were six court appearances. [ 19 ] A hearing was scheduled for October 9, 2018.

[ 20 ] During the motion hearing held on October 2 nd , 2018 (Motion to Adjourn), Justice MacDonald granted an Order to Adjourn the hearing scheduled for October 9 th , 2018 (as requested by the mother) without day. [ 21 ] Paragraph 2 of the Order to Adjourn issued October 23 rd , 2018, states as follows: 2.

If A.M. requests a hearing to be scheduled she must file a Motion for Directions to which she must attach the following: • A detailed affidavit containing relevant facts upon which she intends to rely including information describing: - where she has been living since the Order was issued; - what has been her source of income since the Order was issued; - what impediments, if any, are there to her crossing the US Canada border; - if she is requesting a change to custody and primary care, sufficient facts to indicate there has been a material change in circumstance that may justify a change to the custodial and primary care provisions of the Order; - a detailed plan for her parenting time if primary care is not changed, including where her parenting time will be exercised, how the child will travel, how travel will be paid for, the assurances she will put in place to give confidence the child will returned to R.I’s care; - a detailed plan for R.I.’s parenting time if primary care is changed; • a properly certified or attested document confirming the Order was registered in California; • affidavits from any witnesses who have relevant information to provide; • an updated Statement of Income attaching documents to confirm her total annual income since the date she last filed a Statement of Income with the court. [ 22 ] A motion hearing was held before Justice Forgeron on March 1 st , 2019, in relation to a new Motion for Interim Relief filed in February 2019.

The father sought an Order permitting the child to travel outside Canada with him from March 17 to 26, 2019. The mother opposed the father’s request. [ 23 ] The Interim Order (Family Proceeding) issued by Justice Forgeron on March 11, 2019 permitted the child to travel with the father to the country of Peru for the purposes of vacation, without the mother’s consent. [ 24 ] In July , 2019, the mother filed a Notice of Application pursuant to

section 41 of the Parenting and Support Act . The mother was directed to comply with paragraph 2 of the October 9 th , 2018 Order to Adjourn. In March, 2020, the mother filed a Motion for Directions. [ 25 ] Conferences were held before this Court on June 17 and July 3 rd , 2020. A case management conference was held before Justice Forgeron on October 2 nd , 2020. [ 26 ] During the conference held on November 2 nd , 2020, the matter was scheduled for trial to be held on March 17 to March 19, 2021, inclusive.

Filing deadlines were provided. [ 27 ] In March, 2021, the trial was adjourned to September, 2021, due to the resurgence of the Covid 19 pandemic and Court policies regarding same. [ 28 ] A motion hearing was held on June 18, 2021, in relation to the father’s ex parte motion seeking an order to have J. returned to his primary care as per the August 17, 2017, Order. [ 29 ] The Ex Parte Interim Order issued by this Court on June 18, 2021, contained the following provisions: 1. The child, J.R.I.M., born July 25, 2012, shall be retuned to the care and custody of the Applicant, R.I., forthwith. 2.

The child, J.R.I.M., born July 25, 2012, shall not be removed from the Province of Nova Scotia without the written consent of the Applicant, R.I., or by further order of this Court. 3. The Respondent, A.M.’s access with the child, J.R.I.M., born July 25, 2012, shall be supervised pending further order of the Court. 4. The child, J.R.I.M., born July 25, 2012, shall return to his school, and shall not be removed from same school without the written consent of the Applicant, R.I., or by further order of the court.

ENFORCMENT 5. All constables and Peace officers, including members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Halifax Regional Police are hereby authorized to do all such acts as may be necessary to enforce the terms of this Order and they have full power and authority to enter upon any lands and premises to enforce this order. [ 30 ] On June 22, 2021, the Court granted the relief sought in a Notice of Motion filed on May 31, 2021, that then counsel for the mother be removed as her solicitor of record.

The Order issued September 2 nd , 2021, confirms same. [ 31 ] During the conference held on August 25 th , 2021, the mother filed a Notice of Intention to Act on One’s Own. [ 32 ] The mother sought to have a report authored by Dr. D.S. dated April 21, 2021, admitted as expert opinion evidence in the trial scheduled for September 27 and 28, 2021. The mother’s request was declined as she had not complied with Civil Procedure Rule 55. The mother also sought the admittance of a report on parent alienation.

The Court’s ruling was as per the former request. [ 33 ] The matter was scheduled for conference on September 10, 2021 to address the mother’s request for an order granting interim suspension of the Nova Scotia Maintenance Enforcement Program’s enforcement actions against her regarding outstanding child support arrears owing to the father and her request for clarification of her parenting time. [ 34 ] On September 10, 2021, the father opposed the mother’s request for suspension of M.E.P.’s enforcement efforts.

The mother’s parenting time was one of the issues to be considered at trial. [ 35 ] The mother’s request to appear via video conference for the trial was denied. The mother resides within the Halifax Regional Municipality and provided no adequate reason for this request. [ 36 ] The mother indicated a motion to include audio evidence during the trial would be made. [ 37 ] On September 16, 2021, the mother filed a Notice of Motion to include audio evidence during the trial.

Via correspondence to the parties dated September 20, 2021, this motion was denied, as the filing deadlines had long passed. [ 38 ] Also on September 16, 2021, the mother filed correspondence with the Court requesting that two individuals appear via video conference during the trial as her “legal advisors”. These individuals were not identified as legal counsel. Via correspondence to the parties dated September 23 rd , 2021, this request was denied. [ 39 ] On September 20, 2021, the mother provided correspondence to the Court requesting the addition of three witnesses.

In my preliminary comments on September 27, 2021, I denied the mother’s request to add these late witnesses, as doing so would have been prejudicial to the father. [ 40 ] The flurry of last minute motions and requests made by the mother is indicative of the manner in which she represented herself both prior to and during the trial. [ 41 ] The trial was originally scheduled for two days (September 27 and 28, 2021). On September 28 th , it became apparent that a third day (September 29, 2021,) was required. [ 42 ] Including the parties, the Court heard evidence from four witnesses in total.

The mother’s mother, J.M. appeared as a witness for the mother and J.’s godmother, D.A., appeared as a witness for the father. [ 43 ] All direct evidence was by way of Affidavit. The in court appearances were for the purposes of cross-examination and summations. Motion to Strike [ 44 ] The father has motioned that I strike and therefore not consider several portions of the mother’s direct evidence and also that of the witness, J.M. [ 45 ] The father’s motion is encapsulated within his legal counsel’s correspondence to the Court dated September 22, 2021.

During the preliminary stages of the proceeding, counsel for the father confirmed the motion and relief sought as set out in the aforementioned correspondence. [ 46 ] The mother confirmed receipt and review of counsel’s correspondence and indicated preparation of a written response to the motion, which she subsequently provided. [ 47 ] Given the manner in which this matter evolved (previous adjournment due to the Covid 19 pandemic) and the obvious time constraints, I decided to proceed with the trial and to subsequently consider the parties written submissions in relation to the father’s motion to strike, prior to contemplating and providing my analysis of the evidence. [ 48 ] In Kahrmann v.

Kurylak, 2021 NSSC 67 , Justice Rowe examined the civil procedure rule and jurisprudence dealing with motions to strike and provides guidance on the principles to be considered in my analysis of the parties submissions. [ 49 ] At paragraphs 8, 9 and 11, she states: [8] Civil Procedure Rule 39.04(1)(2) and (5) provides as follows:

39.04 Striking part or all of affidavit

(1) A judge may strike an affidavit containing information that is not admissible evidence, or evidence that is not appropriate tothe affidavit.

(2) A judge must strike a part of an affidavit containing either of the following: (

a) information that is not admissible, such as an irrelevant statement or a submission or plea; (

b) information that may be admissible but for which the grounds of admission have not been provided in the affidavit, such ashearsay admissible on a motion but not supported by evidence of the source and belief in the truth of the information. and

(5) A judge who strikes parts, or the whole, of an affidavit must consider ordering the party who filed the affidavit to indemnifyanother party for the expense of the motion to strike and any adjournment caused by it. [emphasis mine] [9] Davison, J., in Waverley (Village Commissioners) v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Municipal Affairs) 1993 NSSC 71 ,[1993] NSJ No 151, articulated a set of principles concerning affidavit evidence that continue to guide jurists considering motions tostrike affidavit evidence.

They are at paragraph 20: [20] It would be helpful to segregate principles which are apparent from consideration of the foregoing authorities and I wouldenumerate these principles as follows: 1. Affidavits should be confined to facts. There is no place in affidavits for speculation or inadmissable [sic] material. An affidavitshould not take on the flavour of a plea or a summation. 2. The facts should be, for the most part, based on the personal knowledge of the affiant with the exception being an affidavit used inan application.

Affidavits should stipulate at the outset that the affiant has personal knowledge of the matters deposed to except wherestated to be based on information and belief. 3. Affidavits used in applications may refer to facts based on information and belief but the source of the information should be referredto in the affidavit. It is insufficient to say simply that "I am advised". 4. The information as to the source must be sufficient to permit the court to conclude that the information comes from a sound sourceand preferably the original source. 5.

The affidavit must state that the affiant believes the information received from the source. … [11] The Waverley principles were more recently referenced by Justice Fichaud in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. CNHCapital Canada Ltd. 2013 NSCA 35. Fichaud, JA, at paragraphs 80-86 of the decision demonstrated a nuanced and contextualizedapproach when considering motions to strike affidavit evidence, when, as is also the situation before this Court, objections are raised onthe basis the evidence is argumentative, speculative, or irrelevant: [80] I have quoted the statements in the affidavits of Messrs.

Bayne and Tucci [above, para 67(a)] that the identity of the other partyto the subordination is “essential” to the Bank. At the hearing before the motions judge, CNH Capital Canada objected that thesestatements were inadmissible. The motions judge dismissed the objection and allowed those paragraphs to stand as evidence. In theCourt of Appeal, CNH Capital Canada’s Notice of Contention challenges the admissibility of the statements on two bases. [81] First: CNH Capital Canada says that the statements are a “submission” or “plea” which must be excluded under CivilProcedure Rule 39.04(2): 39.04

(2) A judge must strike a part of an affidavit containing either of the following: (

a) information that is not admissible, such as an irrelevant statement or a submission or plea; CNH Capital Canada submits that Rule 39.04(2) codifies Justice Davison’s statement in Waverley (Village Commissioners) et al. v.Nova Scotia (Minister of Municipal Affairs) et al. (1993), 1993 NSSC 71 , 123 N.S.R. (2d) 46: [20] It would be helpful to segregate principles which are apparent from consideration of the foregoing authorities and I wouldenumerate these principles as follows: 1. Affidavits should be confined to facts. There is no place in affidavits for speculation or inadmissible material.

An affidavit should nottake on the flavour of a plea a summation. [82] I agree with Justice Davison’s statement from Waverley. But I disagree that the challenged statements in the affidavits ofMessrs. Bayne and Tucci are a “submission” or “plea”. What is objectionable under Rule 39.04(2)(

a) is a conclusory statement thatembodies or assumes a point of law. Whether, how, and the degree to which Ford Credit’s identity was important to the Bank arequestions of fact, as I have explained earlier (para 63). [83] CNH Capital Canada submits the impugned statements are objectionable because they address “the very conclusion that CIBCasks the Court to draw” - i.e. the importance of identity to the Bank. I disagree that this renders the evidence inadmissible. If theevidence addresses a fact - and here it does - it does not become inadmissible just because the evidence is targeted and the fact is

central. The impugned evidence is no more objectionable, in this respect, than is the affidavit of Mr. Trudelle, (quoted above, para 12)which says, in paras 12 and 13, “[f]rom June 30, 1991, onward I provided my services as a seconded employee to the Partnership” and“[a]t all material times it was my understanding I was acting on behalf of the Partnership”. Mr. Trudelle’s statements directly addressthe very conclusion CNH Capital Canada asks the Court to draw on the “authority” issue. [emphasis mine] [84] CNH Capital Canada observes that the statements in the affidavits of Messrs.

Bayne and Tucci do not contain particulars orexamples to bolster or corroborate their statements of what was “essential” to the Bank. The absence of particulars may, or may not,affect the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial judge. But the statements remain evidence of a fact, and embody neither aconclusion of law, nor a submission and plea. [85] Second: CNH Capital Canada submits that the impugned paragraphs are evidence of irrelevant subjective intention. CNHCapital Canada’s factum summarizes its point: 53.

To conclude on this point, CNH Capital submits that the identity exception to the undisclosed principal rule only applies when as amatter of contractual

interpretation the identity of the parties is vital to the parties. Since there is no express term on this allegedly vitalpoint in the ICA, the Court must examine the circumstances surrounding the contract. This is an objective exercise. What CIBCconsidered essential is not admissible as part of this inquiry. [Emphasis in factum] In oral argument to this Court, CNH Capital Canada’s counsel cited the parol evidence rule to support the exclusion of the statements inthe affidavits. [86] I respectfully disagree. Earlier (para 59) I quoted the principles from Fridman’s, Canadian Agency Law.

Under what ProfessorFridman describes as the “Personality” qualification, the questions will include whether the Bank had “personal reasons” to contract with“Ford Credit”, whether the Bank was “relying on something personal” and whether that factor “induced” the Bank to contract with FordCredit, to the exclusion of others. No doubt the wording of the Inter-Creditor Agreement, and an objective examination of thecircumstances surrounding that contract will play a significant role in the analysis.

But internal Bank evidence also is relevant towhether the Bank was “relying” on, or “induced” by “personal reasons”. [emphasis mine] [50] The father motions that the following be struck from the evidence in this proceeding: 1. the mother’s Affidavit sworn on February 16, 2021, marked as Court Exhibit 14, paragraphs 5, 7 and 10 (see Appendix A). 2.

The mother’s Affidavit sworn on August 30, 2021, marked as Court Exhibit 1, paragraphs 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21,22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31, 34, 36, 37, 51, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 99, 100, 103, 106, 107, 108,110, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138(H), 138(J), 138(L), 138(N), 138(U), 138(W), 138(Y), 138(FF),138(GG), 138(MM), 138(PP), 142 (see Appendix B). 3.

The mother’s Affidavit sworn on September 3rd, 2021, marked as Court Exhibit 2, paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 20, 21, 22 ,23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47 ( see Appendix C). 4. The Affidavit of J.M. sworn on February 21st, 2021, marked as Court Exhibit 3, paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 (see AppendixD). 5. The Affidavit of J.M. sworn on August 30, 2021, marked as Court Exhibit 4, paragraphs 6, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 (seeAppendix E). Issues 6. Has there been a material change in circumstances since the making of the August 17, 2017, Order? 7.

If there has been a material change in circumstances, what parenting arrangement is in the child’s best interest? Material Change in Circumstances [51] Section 37(1) of the Parenting and Support Act states: Powers of court 37

(1) The court, on application, may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending, prospectively or retroactively, a support order oran order for custody, parenting arrangements, parenting time, contact time or interaction where there has been a change in circumstancessince the making of the order or the last variation order. [52] In the oft cited Supreme Court of Canada decision, Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, the Courtstates:

A) The Threshold Condition: Material Change [10] Before the court can consider the merits of the application for variation, it must be satisfied there has been a material change in thecircumstances of the child since the last custody order was made. Section 17(5) provides that the court shall not vary a custody or accessorder absent a change in the "condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child". Accordingly, if the applicant is unable toshow the existence of a material change, the inquiry can go no farther: Wilson v. Grassick (1994), (SK CA), 2 R.F.L.(4th) 291 (Sask. C.A.).

[11] The requirement of a material change in the situation of the child means that an application to vary custody cannot serve as anindirect route of appeal from the original custody order. The court cannot retry the case, substituting its discretion for that of the originaljudge; it must assume the correctness of the decision and consider only the change in circumstances since the order was issued: Baynes v.Baynes (1987), (BC CA), 8 R.F.L. (3d) 139 (B.C.C.A); Docherty v. Beckett (1989), (ON CA), 21R.F.L. (3d) 92 (Ont. C.A.); Wesson v.

Wesson (1973), (NS SC), 10 R.F.L. 193 (N.S.S.C.), at p. 194. [12] What suffices to establish a material change in the circumstances of the child? Change alone is not enough; the change must havealtered the child's needs or the ability of the parents to meet those needs in a fundamental way: Watson v. Watson (1991), (BC SC), 35 R.F.L. (3d) 169 (B.C.S.C.). The question is whether the previous order might have been different had thecircumstances now existing prevailed earlier: MacCallum v. MacCallum (1976), 30 R.F.L. 32 (P.E.I.S.C.).

Moreover, the change shouldrepresent a distinct departure from what the court could reasonably have anticipated in making the previous order. "What the court isseeking to isolate are those factors which were not likely to occur at the time the proceedings took place": J. G.

McLeod, Child CustodyLaw and Practice (1992), at p. 11-5. [13] It follows that before entering on the merits of an application to vary a custody order the judge must be satisfied of: (1) a change inthe condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child and/or the ability of the parents to meet the needs of the child; (2) whichmaterially affects the child; and (3) which was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge whomade the initial order. [53] In Qu v.

Calvesbert, 2020 NSSC 83, Justice Jollimore was asked to vary the parenting arrangements in relation to an 8 year oldchild. At paragraphs 3, 4, 7 and 8 she provides the following: [3] Before I vary a parenting order, I must be satisfied that there’s been a change in the condition, means, needs or othercircumstances of the child which has occurred since the date of the order being varied: Divorce Act, subsection 17(5).

In making anyvariation to a parenting order, I’m to consider only the best interests of the child as determined with regard to that change. [4] The threshold requirement of a material change was further developed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Gordon v.Goertz, (SCC). At paragraph 13, then-Justice McLachlin was specific in identifying the three requirements that mustbe satisfied before I can vary a parenting order.

The requirements are: 1. there must be a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of the child, or the ability of the parents to meet the child’sneeds; 2. the change must materially affect the child; and 3. the change was either not foreseen or could not have been reasonably contemplated by the judge who made the initial order. [7] The second requirement is that the change must materially affect Alyssa. We focus on material change for three reasons. 1. First, all parenting applications, including variation applications, are determined on the basis of the child’s best interests.

A materialchange means the order is no longer in the child’s best interests and must be changed so that it is in the child’s best interests. 2. Second, identifying what the material change is allows me to formulate a new parenting arrangement that reflects the child’s bestinterests in the new circumstances. 3.

If there is no material change, the current order is still in the child’s best interests and I have no authority to change the order. [8] Only if the three threshold requirements are met may I embark on the fresh inquiry into Alyssa’s best interests: Gordon v.Goertz, paragraph 49, at point 2; Salah, 2014 NSCA 36at paragraph 2. [54] As referenced, the subject Order in this matter, the Order of Justice MacDonald issued August 17, 2017, contains a detailedparenting plan appended as

schedule “A”. Paragraph 1 of same parenting plan under the heading “custody” reads as follows: 1.

The Father must have custody of the child, meaning the Father has the sole authority to make decisions that have significant or longlasting implications for the child or that impose responsibilities on a parent – for example, decisions about physical or mental health,dental care, physical and social development, counseling, education, choice of child care provider and enrollment in recreationalactivities. [55] Paragraph 2.1 states that unless agreed between the parents, child care transitions shall take place at J.’s school or child careprovider. [56] At paragraph 3.1 the mother’s parenting time is set out as being every second weekend from Friday after school until Mondaymorning when the child must return to school or to the child care provider and during the off weeks or weeks in which the mother doesnot have weekend parenting time, each Wednesday after school to Friday morning with the child being returned to school or to the childcare provider.

[ 57 ] The evidence establishes that since the making of the August 17, 2017, Order, the mother resided in California, U.S.A. from October, 2017 to March, 2019, and on several occasions her actions led to significant disruptions in the father’s care and authority as contemplated in the Order, and has ultimately resulted in her parenting time being supervised, pending further Order of the Court. [ 58 ] I reference the following: - In or about October, 2017, the mother moved to California, U.S.A. She was not employed and for a period was in a relationship with a person described as her fiancé.

The mother did not inform the father of her relocation to California. He learned of same through social media postings. Paragraph 1.24 of the Parenting Plan as contained in

Schedule “A” of the August 17, 2017, Order states as follows: Change of Residence 1.24 If either parent is contemplating a residential move:

a) The Father must provide the Mother 90 days’ notice of his intention to change his and the child’s residence and, if that move will significantly impact the Mother’s parenting time, he must not change his residence until she and the Father have agreed in writing upon any parenting time changes required because of that move or, if no agreement can be reached, a court order about the parenting time changes has been granted . b.) The Mother must provide the Father 90 days’ notice of her intention to change her residence and, if that move will significantly impact her parenting time with the child, she must not change her residence until she and the Father have agreed in writing upon any parenting time changes required because of that move or, if no agreement can be reached, a court order about the parenting time changes has been granted.

The mother did not provide the father with the ordered notice of intention to relocate and as such changes were not made to her parenting time arrangements. Subsequently the father facilitated virtual contact between J. and the mother. He attempted to follow a schedule, however the mother often did not follow the schedule. In November, 2017, the father sought professional assistance from child psychologist, D.B., regarding communication between J. and both parents. During some virtual conversations the mother discussed adult topics with J..

The mother refused to follow D.B.’s recommendations regarding communication with the child. The mother’s relationship ended and she moved back to Nova Scotia in March, 2019. I accept the mother’s move back to Nova Scotia was not motivated by a desire to be close to J. but that she could no longer remain in the U.S. ; as her relationship had ended, she had no means or ability to live there and M.E.P. had suspended her passport due to non-payment of child support.

She returned to Canada via land crossing because of her passport situation. - On January 16, 2018, the Principal at J.’s school informed the father that the mother had removed the child from school during that school day. The mother, resident in the U.S.A. at this time, had returned to Nova Scotia for a visit. The mother did not respond to the father’s attempts to contact her. The father contacted the police who performed a wellness check. The mother confirmed the child would be returned to school the following day. The school contacted the father on the following day advising the child was not in attendance.

Ultimately the father required the assistance of legal counsel in order to seek redress. - In April, 2021, the mother and maternal grandmother, J.M., took the child to the mother’s family Physician, Dr. M.L., without consulting, let alone securing the father’s consent. The child’s family physician is Dr. D.B. The mother sought an ADHD diagnosis and referral from Dr. M.L. I am satisfied the child was in good health during this period and the visit to Dr. M.L. was singularly motivated by the mother’s desire to secure an ADHD diagnosis and referral for an assessment.

I also accept the father learned of the Doctor’s visit from the child and not the mother or maternal grandmother. The father subsequently requested the relevant files from Dr. M.L. and discovered that the mother had taken the child to Dr. D.S. in order to have an assessment completed. Upon consultation with Dr. D.S. it was brought to the father’s attention that an assessment of the child had indeed been completed upon the mother’s request at the cost of $3,000. Dr.

D.S. was unaware that the assessment was completed without the father’s knowledge and/or consent, and also of the mother’s true intent in having the assessment done. As mentioned earlier the mother unsuccessfully attempted to have Dr. D.S.’s assessment entered into evidence in this proceeding as expert opinion evidence. - During the weekend of June 11 th , 2021, the mother had a parenting time visit with the child. On June 13 th , 2021, she informed the father that J. would be staying with her until further notice. The mother did not take the child to school on June 14, 2021.

The father was subsequently informed by the school Principal that the mother requested the child complete the remainder of the school year via online learning. The father requested police assistance in order to have J. returned to his care and custody. The police informed the father that they were unable to return the child to his care. The child was not in attendance at his soccer practice session on June 15, 2021.

On June 17, 2021, the father filed an Emergency Application with the Court on an Ex Parte basis seeking among other relief, immediate return of the child to his care and custody in accordance with the August 17, 2017, Order. [ 59 ] On June 18, 2021, this Court issued an Ex Parte Interim Order containing the provisions as set out in paragraph 29 of this decision. [ 60 ] The mother’s move to California and actions as delineated are among a number of others as contained in the evidence which confirms a material change in circumstances since the making of the August 17, 2017 Order. [ 61 ] I am satisfied there has been a change in the condition, means, needs or circumstances of J., which materially affects him and which could not have been reasonably contemplated by Justice MacDonald. [ 62 ] I find that as a result of the material change in circumstances affecting J., I must now embark on a fresh inquiry into the parenting arrangements best for him.

Positions of the Parents [63] The mother seeks primary care and decision making authority. She requests that “the court give J. and I no less than six monthstogether with no contact with” the father.

She requests that the father be ordered to participate in therapy related to family violence.Following the therapy and a six month period of no contact the father would have parenting time every second weekend from Friday at7pm to Sunday at 7pm. [64] With regard to the financial component, the mother seeks a reduction of all outstanding child support arrears to nil and “if thecourt has the authority to forgive the previous costs award that that be done”.

I confirm the Judicature Act, RSNS 1989, c 240, does notvest me with the authority to provide the relief sought by the mother regarding the previous award of costs against her. [65] The mother seeks other forms of relief which have already been addressed either prior to the trial or in the preliminary stages.She also seeks costs. [66] The father requests that he maintain primary care and residence of the child.

He requests that the parenting time arrangement bevaried to include the mother having supervised parenting time through the Veith House Supervised Access program; that the mother notbe permitted to communicate, engage, interrupt or change the child’s service providers; that the mother not be permitted to remove thechild from his school, camps or any of his service providers without the father’s permission; that the outstanding child support arrearsowing by the mother not be forgiven and she continue to be ordered to pay child support and

section 7 expenses based on her imputedincome as per the August 17, 2017 Order and that the mother be ordered to participate in a Psychological Assessment with ParentalComponent. The father seeks costs. Best Interests Analysis [67] In Boutilier-Robar v. Robar, 2012 NSSC 279, Justice Forgeron aptly reviews the precepts of the best interests test and thejurisprudence which has evolved and expanded the analysis of this principle.

At paragraphs 36 and 37 she writes: [36] The best interests’ principle has been described as one with an inherent indeterminancy and elasticity: MacGyver v.Richards (1995), (ON CA), 22 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.), paras. 27-29. The test is a fluid concept that encompassesall aspects of a child, including the child's physical, emotional, intellectual, and social well being. The court must review the plans ofrival claimants and chose the course which will best provide for the healthy development of the child. In Foley v. Foley (1993) (NS SC), 124 N.S.R. (2d) 198 (N.S.

S.C.), Goodfellow, J. provided a series of factors for courts to consider and balance indetermining the child’s best interests. Courts typically examine such factors when assessing competing parenting plans. [37] Further, in making this decision, the court must review the burden of proof and credibility principles. In F. H. v.McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, Rothstein J. confirmed that there is only one standard of proof in civil cases - that is, proof on a balance ofprobabilities. In every civil case, the court must scrutinize the evidence when deciding whether it is more likely than not that an allegedevent occurred.

The evidence must not be considered in isolation, but must be based upon its totality. The evidence must always be clear,convincing, and cogent to satisfy the balance of probabilities' test. [68] Section 18 (6) of the Parenting and Support Act sets out the legislated factors I am to consider in determining J.’s best interests. [69] The factors as provided in Foley v. Foley

(1993) CanLII 3400 (NSSC), are largely congruent with the legislated factors. [70] Section 18(6) Factors: (

a) the child’s physical, emotional, social and educational needs, including the child’s need for stability and safety, taking into accountthe child’s age and stage of development; The August 17, 2017, Order granted custody of J. to the father. In my commentary examining material change in circumstances, Iprovided occurrences in which the mother’s conduct can be reasonably described as questionable and no doubt disruptive to the child.Based on the totality of the evidence the current custodial arrangement remains essential to J.’s physical, emotional and educationalneeds and also to his need for stability and safety. (

b) each parent’s or guardian’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parentor guardian; The evidence demonstrates the efforts made by the father to ensure the child maintain a relationship with the mother despite the mother’sabsence from the Province of Nova Scotia for an extended period. Given the evidence put forth by the mother, her attempts tocharacterize the father in a very negative light throughout the trial and the fact she seeks to cease contact between the child and father fora 6 month period (with no plausible reason(

s) articulated) if granted custody, it is an understatement to say I am not confident of themother’s willingness to support maintenance of the child’s relationship with the father. (

c) the history of care for the child, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional, social and educational needs; As noted the father has had primary care and residence of the child since August, 2017.

(

d) the plans proposed for the child’s care and upbringing, having regard to the child’s physical, emotional, social and educational needs; Upon evaluating the evidence as it relates to this factor, I am left with the very frank conclusion that the mother’s plan is at best not fully deliberated or thought out. The father’s plan bears no concern. (

e) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage; The father is of Egyptian heritage and practices the Islamic faith. He has acquainted the child with his religion, culture and also with the Arabic language. The father wishes to have the child develop an equal proficiency in the English, French and Arabic languages. In J.’s future years such linguistic skills would be of great benefit to him. I accept the father has striven to maintain the child’s connection with the mother’s cultural heritage. The evidence confirms the mother has denigrated the father’s religion and cultural background. (

f) the child’s views and preferences, if the court considers it necessary and appropriate to ascertain them given the child’s age and stage of development and if the views and preferences can reasonably be ascertained; J. is 9 years old. Age wise he is on the cusp (from a chronological perspective) of consideration regarding his views and preferences. In this instance I do not consider it necessary nor appropriate to ascertain his views and preferences. (

g) the nature, strength and stability of the relationship between the child and each parent or guardian; I am satisfied J. has a strong and stable relationship with the father, and a bond with the mother. However, I question whether the mother’s conduct since the making of the last order has seemingly strained that bond. (

h) the nature, strength and stability of the relationship between the child and each sibling, grandparent and other significant person in the child’s life; Based on the sum of the evidence, I conclude J. has good and secure relationships with his maternal grandmother, J.M. and the father’s partner D.M.. I note his relationship with J.M., is very much informed by the mother. The mother and maternal grandmother reside in the same home. (

i) the ability of each parent, guardian or other person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate on issues affecting the child; and The father has demonstrated his ability and willingness as it pertains to this factor. I am satisfied he has acted appropriately in communicating with or attempting to communicate with the mother on issues affecting the child. Unfortunately the evidence demonstrates that I cannot say the same about the mother.

j) the impact of any family violence, abuse or intimidation, regardless of whether the child has been directly exposed, including any impact on (

i) the ability of the person causing the family violence, abuse or intimidation to care for and meet the needs of the child, and (ii) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require co-operation on issues affecting the child, including whether requiring such co-operation would threaten the safety or security of the child or of any other person. This factor is not applicable. The mother asserts she has been a victim of family violence perpetrated by the father. There is no evidence to corroborate the mother’s assertions or consider them to be credible.

Credibility [ 71 ] The mother’s credibility is a relevant issue in this matter.

Her responses on cross-examination to any number of topics, including, but not limited to; her having the child see various medical professionals without the father’s knowledge and/or consent, previous criminal code charges, efforts to obtain employment and employment prospects, previous comments made in relation to the father’s culture and religion, her disruptive actions with respect to the child’s service providers, etc. were self serving, often times vague, often times evasive, at various junctures sanctimonious and were of minimal to zero probative value to me as trier of fact. [ 72 ] Like wise, the mother’s cross-examination of the father produced little to no evidence of probative value given her manner of questioning and in most instances the particular questions, which were clearly designed and intended to characterize the father in a very negative light before the Court.

Indeed, the mother’s cross-examination of the father demonstrated her deep seated animosity toward him and her unsubstantiated perspective that the father’s goal is to punish her and prevent her from having a relationship with J.. [ 73 ] At paragraph 38 of Boutilier-Robar v. Robar supra, Justice Forgeron states: [ 38] Credibility impacts upon burden of proof. In Baker-Warren v. Denault , 2009 NSSC 59 (N.S. S.C.), this court reviewed the

factors to be considered when making credibility determinations, at paras. 18 to 20. These factors were approved in Hurst v. Gill, 2011NSCA 100, at para. 16. I have applied this law. [74] In Baker-Warren v. Denault, 2009 NSSC 59, Justice Forgeron offers the following guidance in assessing the credibility ofwitnesses: [18] For the benefit of the parties, I will review some of the factors which I have considered when making credibility determinations. It is important to note, however, that credibility assessment is not a science.

It is not always possible to “articulate with precision thecomplex intermingling of impressions that emerge after watching and listening to witnesses and attempting to reconcile the variousversions of events:” R. v. Gagnon 2006 SCC 17, para. 20. I further note that “assessing credibility is a difficult and delicate matter thatdoes not always lend itself to precise and complete verbalization:” R. v. R. E. M. 2008 SCC 51, para. 49. [19] With these caveats in mind, the following are some of the factors which were balanced when the court assessed credibility:

a) What were the inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness’ evidence, which include internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistentstatements, inconsistencies between the witness’ testimony, and the documentary evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses: Re:Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283(S.C.);

b) Did the witness have an interest in the outcome or was he/she personally connected to either party;

c) Did the witness have a motive to deceive;

d) Did the witness have the ability to observe the factual matters about which he/she testified;

e) Did the witness have a sufficient power of recollection to provide the court with an accurate account;

f) Is the testimony in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would find reasonablegiven the particular place and conditions: Faryna v. Chorney (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R 354;

g) Was there an internal consistency and logical flow to the evidence;

h) Was the evidence provided in a candid and straight forward manner, or was the witness evasive, strategic, hesitant, or biased; and

i) Where appropriate, was the witness capable of making an admission against interest, or was the witness self-serving? [20] I have placed little weight on the demeanor of the witnesses because demeanor is often not a good indicator of credibility: R v.Norman (1993) (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 295 (C.A.) at para. 55. In addition, I have also adopted the following rule,succinctly paraphrased by Warner J. in Re: Novak Estate, supra, at para 37: There is no principle of law that requires a trier of fact to believe or disbelieve a witness's testimony in its entirety.

On the contrary, atrier may believe none, part or all of a witness's evidence, and may attach different weight to different parts of a witness's evidence.(See R. v. D.R., [1966] 2 S.C.R. 291 at 93 and R. v. J.H. supra). [75] The mother’s evidence contains several inconsistencies. I need not recount each. The most concerning to me are those inrelation to the child’s education and her involvement of him with various medical professionals. The mother’s motive is clear. Shewishes to have custody of J. and based on the totality of the evidence, will seemingly go to any lengths to achieve that goal.

The mother’sremarks during summations are of minimal assistance to me as much of her commentary referenced information not in evidence. The Evidence of J.M. and D.A. [76] J.M.’s evidence mirrors that of the mother’s in relation to J.’s academic standing and maturity. The mother has resided in J.M.’shome since January, 2020. I am left with the impression that prior to the mother’s return from California, J.M. and the father were ableto co-ordinate and co-operate as it relates to J. J.M. spent many years as an educator and tutored J. for some time.

The mother’s returnchanged the dynamic in the relationship between the father and J.M. That relationship became informed by the mother’s view of thefather. [77] On September 9th, 2021, J.M. filed a Notice of Motion for Interim Relief (Family Proceeding) seeking interim decision-making responsibility and/or custody of J. and also indicated a claim with respect to interim parenting time and contact time orinteraction. Her Notice of Motion for Interim Relief is marked as Court Exhibit 23.

Filed with other documents in relation to J.M.’sNotice of Motion for Interim Relief (Family Proceeding) is a document titled Amended Emergency Application and Motion for AccessRights as J.’s grandmother. This document is marked as Court Exhibit 24 and is reproduced below: Amended Emergency Application & Motion for Access Rights as J.’s Grandmother Good Afternoon Nova Scotia Family Court,

I am submitting this applications for access rights to my grandson, J., aged 9. I am requesting that the application be consolidated with my daughter’s application, A.M., before the court for the upcoming trial proceedings M. v. I.– 102180 I am seeking access to my grandchild one weekend every month, 1 -week summer block access, and 2 days during the Christmas holiday period.

I am seeking permission from the court to include 2 expert assessments at the upcoming trial proceedings in compliance with Rule 55, ADHD\Adjustment Disorder Report as well as the Parental Alienation Report/Child Abuse report & include the expert witnesses to be a part of the upcoming trial proceedings, on September 27th, and 28th.

I am seeking the court approve these expert witnesses the day before a conference laying out the dates for the hearing/trial for my application before you, I will enclose the ADHD/Adjustment Disorder Report herewith, and will have the Parental Alienation/Child Abuse report early next week for submission at that time. I am enclosing the CV’s of the experts preparing the Parental Alienation Report. [ 78 ] I submit it is entirely reasonable to conclude that J.M.’s motion filed September 9, 2021, was another, albeit cumbersome attempt by the mother to have the reports (Dr.

D.S.’s assessment and the Parental alienation report) I previously excluded (during the August 25 th , 2021, conference), form part of the evidence in this proceeding. [ 79 ] After careful assessment of the evidence in total, in conjunction with considerations of credibility and on a balance of probabilities, I assign no weight to J.M.’s evidence. [ 80 ] D.A. and her spouse, J.A. are J.’s godparents. The mother and J. resided with the godparents for a period of time prior to the making of the last order.

The godparents provided care for J. when the mother travelled to the U.S. from January to May, 2016, for extended periods. D.A. and J.A. provided support to the mother and J. in the manner or fashion required. They even arranged and funded the cost for J. to attend preschool. I accept their motivation was to help the mother whom they viewed as a parent requiring assistance. On cross-examination the mother attempted to depict D.A. as betraying her trust. D.A.’s viva voce evidence was presented in a straight forward and forthright manner.

My conclusion is that her singular motivation was/is to support whatever is best for J.. Child Support and

Section 7 Expenses [ 81 ] As per the August 17, 2017 Order, income in the annual amount of $30,000.00 was imputed to the mother. She was ordered to pay child support based on the Provincial Child Support Guideline table amount which is $252 per month commencing October 1, 2017. She was also ordered to pay $55.00 per month as her contribution to special or extraordinary expenses (childcare) which on a proportional basis equates to 27.2 percent. The mother holds a bachelors degree and previously had a successful career in real estate.

I am satisfied there has been no material change in circumstances regarding the mother’s state of affairs (from August 17, 2017) which led Justice MacDonald to impute income to her in the amount stated. I note the guideline amount in the August 17, 2017, Order was based on the 2011 tables.

Conclusion [ 82 ] Since the issuing of the August 17, 2017, Order, the mother’s conduct and manner in which she has chosen to be involved in J.’s life has only served to establish and constantly fuel the high level of acrimony between these parents. [ 83 ] The mother’s lack of insight and inability to recognize and take responsibility for her own actions is concerning. The evidence clearly demonstrates her efforts to cause friction and discredit the father at every opportunity.

During closing summations, counsel for the father aptly observed it would appear that the mother’s strategy is to tear down and discredit the father to the point where she becomes the only viable option. In my estimation the mother has employed a scorched earth approach in attempting to achieve her goal of gaining custody of J.. Her modus operandi is akin to one taken in the competitive sporting arena rather than a matter such as the present case. [ 84 ] In Hustins v.

Hustins, 2014, NSSC 185 at paragraph 51 , addressing a high conflict parenting situation, Justice Beaton offered: [51] There is little the Court can do to assist these parties with their fundamental problem, which is an absence of ability to cooperate. Rather, the Court’s primary focus must be the child. While the Court should be reluctant to unduly “empower” one parent over the other the parenting arrangement going forward needs to reduce the opportunities for conflict between the parents.

Based on the evidence before me I am satisfied it is in J.’s best interests for the Mother to have ultimate decision making authority over J. The evidence satisfies me that historically the Father has been unable to put J.’s best interests before his own preferences or views.

Even when the Father has come to the preferred decision by ultimately agreeing to recommendations made to him concerning the best interests of J., his agreement has only been secured after much delay and/or difficulty that has negatively impacted J. [ 85 ] The father requests I order that the mother’s parenting time be supervised and her contact with J. remain as such pending the completion of the mother’s participation in a “Psychological Assessment with Parental Component”, and the results/recommendations of same.

[86] In many high conflict family court matters, some parents often adopt certain position(

s) for the sole purpose of opposing theother parent, (without any articulable justification) and do so out of pure animus or contempt for the opposing parent. In this case I amsatisfied the father’s stated requests are not based on such motivations but borne out of the occurrences of the past four years as relates tothe mother’s involvement with the child. [87] In J.T. v. M.W., 2017 NSSC 118 at paragraph 16, Justice Forgeron provides the following synopsis when conducting asupervised access analysis: [16] In addition, the following legal principles have emerged from case law, including the decisions of Young v.

Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); Abdo v. Abdo (1993), (NS CA), 126 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (N.S.C.A.); Bellefontaine v. Slawter, 2012 NSCA 48(N.S. C.A.); and Doncaster v. Field, 2014 NSCA 39(N.S.C.A.): • The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges that access should be denied or restricted, although proof of harm need not beshown.

Proof of harm is but one factor to consider in the best interests test. • The right of the child to know and to be exposed to the influence of each parent is subordinate in principle to the child's bestinterests. • The best interests test is a positive and flexible legal test which encompasses a wide variety of factors, including the desirability ofmaximizing contact between the child and each parent, provided such contact is in the child’s best interests. • The court must be slow to extinguish or restrict access.

Examples where courts have extinguished access include cases whereaccess would place the child at risk of physical or emotional harm, or where access was found to be contrary to the child’s best interests. • An order for supervised access is seldom seen as an indefinite or long term solution. • Access is the right of the child; it is not the right of a parent. • There are no cookie-cutter solutions.

Courts must examine the unique needs of each child and craft an order that protects andenhances that child’s best interests. [88] In this decision I have described and commented on several instances in which the mother’s actions directly impacted J.. [89] I find various aspects of the mother’s conduct to be highly concerning. The effects on J. will be more impactful as he growsolder. I find the evidence confirms it is in J.’s best interest that his contact with the mother be supervised. The case law affirmssupervised access is not a long term solution. D.S. v.

R.T.S., 2017 NSSC 155. [90] In addition to the legislated factors in section 18(6) of the Parenting and Support Act, I have considered the sum of the factorsprovided by Justice Goodfellow in Foley v.

Foley, supra, in particular; assistance of experts, such as social workers, psychologists,psychiatrists, etcetera and the interim and long range plan for the welfare of children. [91] I find it is in J.’s best interest that the mother participate in and complete a psychological assessment with parental componentfor the following reasons: - since the making of the last court order the mother’s overall conduct calls into question her reasoning and judgment as relates tothe child and his best interests; - since the making of the last order the mother’s overall approach with respect to and manner in which she has dealt with the child’sservice providers is at the very least concerning and requires examination by a qualified professional; - the mother’s lack of insight with respect to her conduct and behaviour and the impact of same on the child; - the mother’s characterization of the father, including but not limited to her denigration of his culture and religion; and - the mother’s repeated disregard for and consistent breaching of the terms of the parenting plan as set out by Justice MacDonald inthe August 17, 2017, Order. [92] I order that the results of same assessment (including the assessor’s recommendations) be provided to the father and the Courtprior to or in conjunction with any future variation application(

s) made by the mother as a result of the order flowing from this decision. [93] After carefully reviewing the evidence, applicable legislation and caselaw, including the factors enunciated in Foley v. Foley,supra, I have determined and find it is in J.’s best interest that the August 17, 2017 Order be varied as follows:

- The father shall have sole custody of J., and he shall also have sole authority with respect to any and all decisions regarding J.. - The mother shall have supervised parenting time with J. through the Veith House supervised access program. - The mother shall fully participate in and complete a Psychological Assessment with Parental Component. - If the mother requests that a hearing be scheduled with respect to varying any provision of this order she must first file with the father and the Court the following: An original copy of the completed Psychological Assessment with Parental Component including any and all recommendations made by the assessor, and a Motion for Directions to which she must attach the following: • a detailed affidavit containing relevant facts upon which she intends to rely including information describing: - where she has been living since the Order was issued; - what has been her source of income since the Order was issued; - what impediments, if any, are there to her crossing the US Canada border; - if she is requesting a change to custody and primary care, sufficient facts to indicate there has been a material change in circumstance that may justify a change to the custodial and primary care provisions of the Order; - a detailed plan for her parenting time if primary care is not changed, including where her parenting time will be exercised, how the child will travel, how travel will be paid for, the assurances she will put in place to give confidence the child will be returned to the father’s care; - a detailed plan for the father’s parenting time if primary care is changed; - J. shall not be removed from the Province of Nova Scotia without the written consent of the father or by Court Order. - J. shall not be removed from his school, camp(

s) or any third party service providers without the written consent of the father or by Court Order. - The mother shall not communicate with, engage, interrupt or change any of the child’s service providers, including, but not limited to the areas of education and health. - The father shall have final signing authority and the right to apply for a passport for J. without the need to obtain the mother’s consent and/or signature.

The father shall also have final signing authority with respect to any document regarding J. relating but not limited to the issues of education and health. - J. may travel with the father outside the Province of Nova Scotia and outside Canada without the mother’s consent. - Based on an annual imputed income of $30,000 the mother shall pay child support to the father in the guideline amount of $258 per month commencing October 1 st , 2021 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter. - For the purpose of paying special or extraordinary expenses the father’s income is $105,456.48 and the mother’s is $30,000. - The total monthly amount with respect to special or extraordinary expenses is $409.33.

Commencing October 1 st , 2021, and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter the mother shall pay on a proportional basis 22.1% of the said amount which is $90.46 per month.

- The total cost of the Mount Saint Vincent University Day summer camps is $198.67.

The mother shall pay the amount of $43.90 to the father, which represents her proportional share of this one time special or extraordinary expense. - No later than June 1 st of each year, the mother must provide the father with a copy of her Income Tax Return for the previous year, completed with all attachments, even if the return is not filed with the Canada Revenue Agency, or the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and also provide all Notices of Assessment and/or Reassessment prepared by the Canada Revenue Agency for that return, or the equivalent from the IRS, immediately after the notice is received.

Director of Maintenance Enforcement - All maintenance payments must be made payable to R.I.. - The payments must be sent by A.M. to the Office of the Director of Maintenance Enforcement, PO Box 183, Stn. Main, New Waterford, NS B1H 4N9, while the order is filed for enforcement with the Director. - A court officer must send the current designated addresses of the parties, and a copy of this order, to the Office of the Director of Maintenance Enforcement in accordance with

section 9 of the Maintenance Enforcement Act . - Both parties must advise the Office of the Director of Maintenance Enforcement of any change to their address, within ten (10) days of the date of the change, under section 42(1) of the Maintenance Enforcement Act .

Enforcement - A requirement to pay money by the terms of this order that is not enforced pursuant to the Maintenance Enforcement Act may be enforced by execution order, or periodic execution order. - The sheriff must do all things as are necessary to enforce this order and, to do so, may exercise any power of a sheriff permitted in a recovery order or an execution order. - All constables and peace officers are to do all such acts as may be necessary to enforce the terms of this order and they have full power and authority to enter upon any lands and premises to enforce this order. [ 94 ] Counsel for the father shall prepare the Order. [ 95 ] Written submissions regarding costs may be made subsequent to the issuance of the Order.

Samuel C. G. Moreau Appendix A: The mother’s Affidavit sworn on February 16, 2021 Paragraph 5 – this paragraph shall be struck. It contains inadmissible hearsay and the information sources in support of the paragraph (Exhibit ‘A’) are not consistent with the contents of the paragraph. Paragraph 7 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 10 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Appendix B: The mother’s Affidavit sworn on August 30, 2021 Paragraph 9 – this paragraph shall not be struck. However, I shall consider the weight , if any, to be given to this paragraph in the absence of any corroborating evidence. Paragraph 12 – this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant. Paragraph 13 – this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant. Paragraph 14 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant. Paragraph 15 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant.

Paragraph 16 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant. Paragraph 19 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant. Paragraph 20 – this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 21 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 22 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 23 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion, argument and speculation.

Paragraph 24 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 25 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 27 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 31 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses opinion. Paragraph 34 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses speculation, argument and opinion.

Paragraph 36 - this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses speculation, argument and opinion. Paragraph 37 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay. Paragraph 51 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses opinion. Paragraph 53 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay. Paragraph 66 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes child hearsay and expresses speculation and argument. Paragraph 67 – this paragraph shall not be struck.

However, I shall consider the weight, if any, to be given to this paragraph in the absence of any corroborating evidence. Paragraph 68 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 69 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 70 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 79- this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 80 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 81 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 82 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 83 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 84 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 85 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 86 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 87 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 88 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 89 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 90 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 92 – this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses argument. Paragraph 99 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 100 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 103 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 106 – the sentence “I continue to be alienated from his life” shall be struck from this paragraph as the impugned sentence expresses opinion and argument with no credible corroborating evidence. The other portions of the paragraph shall remain. Paragraph 107 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 108 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 110 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 120 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 121- this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 122 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument and portions of the paragraph are irrelevant. Paragraph 123 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 124 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 130 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 131 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument.

Paragraph 132 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 134 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 135 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 136 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 137 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(H) – this paragraph shall be struck as a portion is irrelevant and the paragraph expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(J) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(L) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 138(n) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(u) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(w) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(y) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(ff) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(gg) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument.

Paragraph 138(mm) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 138(pp) - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 142 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Appendix C: The mother’s Affidavit sworn on September 3 rd , 2021 Paragraph 4 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 6 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 7 – this paragraph shall be struck as it is irrelevant and expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 8 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 10 – this paragraph shall not be struck. However, I shall consider the weight, if any, to be given to this paragraph in conjunction with my analysis of the admissible evidence. Paragraph 16 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 20 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 21 – this paragraph shall be struck as the correspondence between counsel should be viewed on a without prejudice basis, settlement discussion.

Also, the paragraph expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 22 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 23 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 24 – this paragraph shall not be struck. However, I shall consider the weight, if any, to be given to this paragraph in conjunction with my analysis of the admissible evidence. Paragraph 26 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

I note in the mother’s written submissions (response to the father’s written submissions with respect to his Motion to Strike), she references paragraph 25. The father notes no objection to paragraph 25 in his written submissions. I am satisfied the mother’s written submissions with respect to this paragraph contains a typographical error. Paragraph 27 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 28 – this paragraph shall be struck as portions are irrelevant and it expresses speculation, opinion and argument.

Paragraph 29 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. During the August 25, 2021, court appearance the mother sought to have a report authored by Dr. D.S. dated April 21, 2021, admitted as expert opinion evidence. The mother’s request was denied as she had not complied with Civil Procedure Rule 55 (as referenced earlier in this decision). The same report is included in this Affidavit at exhibit “u” appended to paragraph 29. As noted this paragraph (29) and the exhibit referenced (exhibit “u”) are struck for the reasons as stated.

Paragraph 30 - this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 31 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes double hearsay and expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 32 – this paragraph shall be struck as the Affidavit referenced was entered as Court Exhibit 4, part of the direct evidence of the witness, J.M. Paragraph 34 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 38 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 40 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Paragraph 41 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and speculation. Paragraph 42 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay. Paragraph 43 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses speculation and opinion. Paragraph 45 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 46 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 47 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes hearsay and expresses speculation, opinion and argument. Appendix D: The Affidavit of J.M. sworn on February 21 st , 2021 Paragraph 7 – this paragraph shall not be struck. However, I shall consider the weight, if any, to be given this paragraph in the absence of any corroborating evidence and in conjunction with the admissible evidence. Paragraph 8 – this paragraph shall not be struck. However, I shall consider the weight, if any, to be given this paragraph in the absence of any corroborating evidence and in conjunction with the admissible evidence.

Paragraph 10 – this paragraph shall not be struck. However, I shall consider the weight, if any, to be given this paragraph in the absence of any corroborating evidence and in conjunction with the admissible evidence. Paragraph 11 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion. Paragraph 12 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion. Appendix E: The Affidavit of J.M. sworn on August 30, 2021 Paragraph 6 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses speculation and argument. Paragraph 16 - this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.

Paragraph 18 – this paragraph shall be struck as it includes child hearsay and expresses opinion and arguments. Paragraph 19 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion.

Paragraph 20 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion. Paragraph 21 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument. Paragraph 22 – this paragraph shall be struck as it expresses opinion and argument.