R. v. Aldred, 2013 ONCJ 122
Opinion
COURT FILE No.: Central East 12-1110 DATE: 2013·03·08 Citation: R. v. Aldred , 2013 ONCJ 122 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN — AND — CHRISTOPHER ALDRED Before Justice C.M. Harpur Heard on January 29 and February 8, 2013 Reasons for Judgment released on March 8, 2013 Gregory Barker ..................................................................................................... for the Crown The defendant Christopher Aldred ...................................................................... on his own behalf HARPUR J.: (
i) Overview and Issue [ 1 ] The narrow issue in this case is whether Mr. Aldred was in care or control of a motor vehicle on February 26, 2012 immediately prior to his arrest by P. C. Christie Cummings at 5:29 p.m. that day. [ 2 ] Trial proceeded on January 29 and February 8, 2013 on the charges of impaired care or control, care or control with excess blood alcohol and, consequently, breach of a keep the peace term in a probation order. Mr. Barker for the Crown called the arresting officer, P. C. Cummings, and the qualified breath technician, P. C. Guy Peters. Mr.
Aldred, who represented himself, testified and called the evidence of his mother, Marie Aldred. Mr. Aldred conceded the fact of impairment in his ability to operate a motor vehicle when seen behind the wheel of his mother’s car by P. C. Cummings on February 26, 2012 and did not dispute having a truncated blood alcohol concentration of 240 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood at that time. He also took no issue with his being subject to a probation order containing a keep the peace and be of good behaviour term. (ii) The Crown’s allegation of care or control by Mr.
Aldred’s operation of a motor vehicle [ 3 ] The Crown urges me to accept the evidence of P. C. Cummings to the effect that she saw Mr. Aldred finishing his parking of his mother’s motor vehicle in the driveway of his mother’s home on Poole Street in Midhurst as she, P. C. Cummings, came onto Poole Street from St. Vincent Street. Mr. Barker suggests that the officer’s evidence establishes that she saw Mr. Aldred drive into the driveway and park. This, he notes, is in contradiction to Mr.
Aldred’s eventual evidence that he did not operate his mother’s vehicle at any time on February 26, 2012 and, rather, that he was only in it momentarily that late afternoon, with its engine off, trying with the muscle power of one leg to rock it free of the snow pile on which it was stuck. [ 4 ] Mr. Aldred’s version of events concerning his operation of his mother’s car received some support from the testimony of his mother. Mrs. Aldred corroborated her son’s evidence that it was she who drove him from her home to and from The Locker Room Sports Bar that afternoon. Mrs.
Aldred said she returned with him to her home and pulled into the driveway, intending to drop off Mr. Aldred and proceed to the animal shelter she manages in Barrie to tend some ill cats. She said she pulled in behind Mr. Aldred’s truck and became stuck. She said she tried to extricate the car using the engine but couldn’t do so. She said she turned the car off, left the keys in the ignition, got into her other car and drove to the animal shelter. She said she assumed Mr.
Aldred would remove the keys and lock the car but that she did not expect him to use her car since he is only able to drive his own which is fitted with an interlock device. [ 5 ] Considering the evidence of P. C. Cummings, Mr. Aldred and Mrs. Aldred, while I retain a strong suspicion that Mr. Aldred did drive Mrs. Aldred’s car on the evening of February 26, 2012 and was seen doing so by P. C. Cummings, I am not satisfied to the necessary standard of proof that he did so.
[6] P. C. Cummings fairly acknowledged in her evidence that the movement of the car which she observed as she cameonto Poole Street was minimal. She used a number of expressions in describing this aspect of what she observed, among them thefollowing: “ just parking at the end of the driveway”; “I saw it pulling in and stopping”; “it was in the process of stopping”; “it wasmoving enough to notice the lights”; “I saw the ending motions”; and “he was in the midst of parking”. Mr. Aldred said he was rockingthe car, to an amplitude of an inch or two only, when P. C. Cummings arrived. Although Mr.
Aldred conceded to Mr. Barker that themotion of the car he was creating with his foot would be “barely perceptible” (and, thus, his evidence might be seen as in conflict withthat of P.C Cummings, which I regarded as reliable), there exists a possibility, not entirely far-fetched, that his rocking of the car, not thefinal stages of its being driven, is what the officer saw. [7] The Crown’s theory that Mr. Aldred was seen parking the car in the driveway involves either (
i) Mr. Aldred havingdriven himself home from The Locker Room, contrary to the evidence of both Mr. Aldred and his mother, or (ii) Mr. Aldred havingoperated the car to extricate it from the snow after he was dropped off by his mother and she had left, contrary to Mr. Aldred’s evidence.The first branch of the theory derives some force from the fact that, as Mr. Aldred and his mother acknowledged, she at no time prior totrial approached the police to disclose that she, not Mr. Aldred, was the person who drove home from The Locker Room. This silenceexists notwithstanding Mrs.
Aldred’s knowing, by the end of the day on February 27, 2012 and her attendance at her son’s bail court, thatthe Crown intended to identify Mr. Aldred as the driver. Mrs. Aldred testified that she was very concerned about the false charge but wasnervous and upset by it and by other unpleasant factors in her life at the time. She also said that Mr. Aldred seemed to be dealing with thecharge adequately with his then-retained lawyer. [8] Mr.
Aldred’s explanation for his mother’s reticence was that he did not want her involved and did not expect thatanything she said to the police would alter the prosecution. “Once I got in the car, I knew I was out to dry”, was the way Mr. Aldred putit. [9] I found neither of these explanations for Mrs. Aldred’s failure to tell the police about her involvement to be compelling.In the venerable phrase of O’Halloran, J. in Faryna v. Chorney (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.), neither was“in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities” of the situation. Nonetheless, I cannot say that I regarded Mrs.
Aldred’s failure tocome forward as altogether undermining her or Mr. Aldred’s credibility about who drove home from The Locker Room. [10] As indicated, I also retain a doubt arising from Mr. Aldred’s testimony concerning the central point in time in thedriveway and whether he only rocked, not drove, the car when there. (iii) The Crown’s allegation of care or control by Mr. Aldred’s foot-propelled rockingof the motor vehicle [11] I turn then to Mr. Barker’s alternative argument that, even on Mr. Aldred’s version of his actions, he was in care orcontrol. [12] Mr.
Aldred said his mother’s car was stationery in the driveway once his mother turned it off and got out. He said heexited the passenger side and went and sat in the driver’s seat. His intention, he said, was to rock the car to free it from the snow onwhich it was stuck, back it up slightly, and thus be able to back his interlock-equipped truck out and around it for work the followingmorning. He said he was unaware, as he sat, that the keys were in the ignition, but he did not dispute that this was so. He said the carlights were off (contrary to P. C.
Cummings’s testimony) but that he used his right foot on or about the brake pedal and may haveactivated the brake lights. He said he left the driver’s door open, used his left foot for propulsion, kept his right in the vicinity of thebrake, and tried to rock the car free. He said it moved no more than one or two inches. He said he was still attempting to move the carwhen P. C. Cummings arrived at the foot of the driveway. He said he had no intention of operating his mother’s car, that she was awareof his interlock driving restriction and that she would not allow him to operate her car.
He said that, in any event, he knew better than toviolate his driving disqualification resulting from a conviction under
section 253 C.C. in 2011. [13] Mr. Aldred said that, in retrospect, he should have tried to free the car by pushing it at the front end but that he did not doso for fear of it rolling backward onto Poole Street. He said the car became stuck in the snow close to the street end of the drive, a drivewhich accommodated two vehicles and in which his truck was already parked. [14] P. C. Cummings’s testimony contradicted Mr. Aldred’s as to whether the lights of Mr. Aldred’s car were on and,arguably, as to the extent of the motion of Mr. Aldred’s car which she observed. P.C.
Cummings’s observations were not susceptible toweakness through consumption of alcohol that evening and her evidence is to be preferred. However, as indicated, I am not prepared toreject Mr. Aldred’s testimony as to the extent of, or cause for, the motion of his mother’s car. His testimony can be reconciled, if barely,with P.C. Cummings’s evidence. [15] Thus, the issue of Mr.
Aldred’s criminal liability becomes whether his sitting in the driver’s seat trying to rock the carbackward for approximately two feet constituted care or control. [16] Although not its primary argument, the Crown relies on the presumption of care or control when one is proven to occupythe driver’s seat of a motor vehicle, as set out in section 258 (1)(
a) C.C.. Given Mr. Aldred’s description of his position in his mother’scar when trying to extricate it, the presumption would apply, in my view, absent Mr. Aldred establishing that he did not occupy the seatfor the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion. [17] Mr. Aldred submits that, given his one-foot-in-and-one-out position behind the wheel of the car, he cannot be said to have“occupied the seat or position ordinarily occupied by a person who operates a motor vehicle” so as to give rise to the presumptiondescribed in s. 258(1)(
a) C.C.. Mr. Barker responds by reference to R. v. Hatfield (ON CA), [1997] O.J. No. 1327 inwhich the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected, as follows, a similar argument based on the fact that the driver’s seat occupied by theaccused was fully reclined:
In my view the
summary conviction appeal court was correct in determining that, as a matter of law, the presumption provided for bys. 258(1) applies in this case. The language of the
section requires that the accused occupy the seat ordinarily occupied by the driver. Inthis case, the appellant was in the driver's seat. On the plain language of the section, the presumption is therefore triggered. The factthat the seat was fully reclined does not, in my view, negate the application of the presumption. In R. v. Toews the Supreme Court ofCanada said at p. 28: I would agree that to occupy the seat ordinarily occupied by the driver within the meaning of s. 237(1) one need not be sitting straight upwith hands on the steering wheel and in all respects be ready to drive.
The fact that some movement or adjustment of position might berequired to enable a person to take the steering wheel and drive the car will not necessarily be such a departure from the occupation ofthe driver's seat that it will deprive the Crown of the right to rely on the presumption. [18] Here, the steps required to enable Mr. Aldred to “take the steering wheel and drive the car”, in the sense of directing itsmovement if it could move, were no more significant than the repositioning of the reclined seat required in Hatfield.
Thus, thediscrepancy from ordinary occupation is, similarly, not enough to deprive the Crown of reliance on the presumption. [19] I accept that Mr. Aldred has rebutted the presumption that he occupied the driver’s seat for the purpose of operating hismother’s car, in the sense of starting its engine and moving it by way of engine propulsion. That does not, however, determine thepersistence of the presumption. Section 258 (1)(
a) C.C. raises the presumption where the accused occupied the driver’s seat “for thepurpose of setting the vehicle in motion”, not only where occupation is for the purpose of engine-propelled operation. “Set in motion” is,inferentially, a concept distinct from and broader than the concept of operation. [20] Although not dealing expressly with these words of the Criminal Code provision, several court decisions have applied thepresumption of care or control even where the vehicle in the driver’s seat of which the accused was found was incapable of engine-propelled operation: R. v.
Saunders [1967] 1 S.C.R. 284; R. v. Maslek [2004] O.J. 2770 (S.C.J.); R. v. Smith [2004] O.J. 57 (S.C.J.); R. v.Danji [2005] O.J. 917 (O.C.J.). [21] Here, with some reluctance given Mr. Aldred’s creditable self- representation at trial, I see no basis to find that Mr.Aldred did not occupy the driver seat of his mother’s car to put it in motion. He has fairly acknowledged that that is precisely what hewas attempting to do, albeit by leg power, only for a short space within the driveway and in an effort that was doomed to fail.
Thesequalifications are certainly mitigating but do not prevent his actions from falling within the scope of s. 258(1)(
a) C.C.. As the SupremeCourt said in Saunders, “these provisions of the Code manifest the determination of Parliament to strike at the very root of the evil, towit, the combination of alcohol and automobile, that normally breeds this warrant of danger which this preventive legislation was meantto anticipate”. Given the anticipatory purpose of s. 258(1)(
a) C.C. it may reasonably be regarded as targeting a proven attempt by animpaired person to put his car in motion, whether he can effect this result or not. [22] Accordingly, I find Mr. Aldred guilty of the three charges he is facing. [23] Were it not for Mr. Aldred’s admission of his occupying the driver’s seat of his mother’s car to put it in motion by way offoot power, I would not regard care or control proven, despite Mr. Barker’s vigorous submission to the contrary. [24] One piece of evidence tendered by Mr. Aldred was his receipt from the police-summoned towing company which tookaway Mrs. Aldred’s car.
The document corroborates the evidence of both Mr. Aldred and his mother that Mrs. Aldred’s car was stuckfast; the receipt lists, among other expenses, “winch out of snow – $30”. I find that the car was immovable in the driveway at the pointwhen Mr. Aldred was seen sitting in it, apart from the one to two inch rocking which Mr. Aldred was able to accomplish by foot power.The car was entirely within the house driveway, that is, not blocking the sidewalk or Poole Street. R. v.
Wren (ONCA), [2000] O.J. 756 (O.C.A.) has established that, absent proof of an attempt to put a vehicle in motion, “an accused will have care orcontrol of an inoperable vehicle if that vehicle in the hands of an impaired person has the potential to create some danger”. On thisrecord, I find that no such potential has been proven to exist. The car could not move as Mr.
Aldred sat in it and I am not satisfied that thesteps he was taking at this point in respect of the car’s fittings were taken with a view to his operating the car prior to the followingmorning, nor that they created anything beyond the mere possibility that he might do so. On this last point I am guided by the decision ofDuncan, J. in R. v. Ross 2007 ONCJ 59 , [2007] O.J. 619 (O.C.J.) which dealt with the related issue of the potential for changedintention.
He said this: “The potential for changing intention is just as real as the potential of doing something that causes the vehicle to be unintentionally set inmotion. On the other hand, there must be some limit to the role that future possibilities can play. The man drinking in his living roommight decide to drive to the store for cigarettes or pizza. Is he, for that reason, in care or control? A compromise between these two extremes was formulated by Whittmann A.C.J. in R. v. Ogrodnick.
Following a thorough review of thelaw, the court concluded that the mere possibility of the accused, while still unfit, changing his mind and deciding to drive is not asufficient basis for liability. Rather, the Crown must establish a probability, not mere possibility – a “concrete and tangible risk [ofchanging one’s mind] and deliberately setting the vehicle in motion”. [25] Here, Mr. Barker suggested that Mr. Aldred’s initial, unsuccessful efforts to move the car pointed to the likelihood oflater, successful efforts to dislodge it. He submitted that the situation would then exist in which an impaired Mr.
Aldred would haveavailable to him an operable car. In my view, to posit these things, together with an ongoing intention by Mr. Aldred to operate hismother’s car, is more speculation than probability. [26] Mr. Barker made reference to R. v. Burton [2000] O.J. 1781 (S.C.J.) and the following dicta of Durno, J. in support of hisposition: “A person having consumed excess alcohol performing some acts involving the vehicle’s equipment provides, in itself, sufficientevidence of the potential for danger.
Where no such acts have been undertaken the Crown would be required to lead evidence of whatwould be required to put the vehicle in motion”.
[27] On its face, the first of these principles from Burton would appear to encompass Mr. Aldred’s situation. However, thefacts in Burton involved a fully-operational vehicle with its engine running, not one which was immovable. Moreover, I do not takeDurno, J.’s reasons to say that, where an impaired accused has engaged in
an act involving his vehicle’s fittings, an irrebuttablepresumption arises that there is potential danger, such that evidence of what would be required to put the vehicle in motion becomesirrelevant. In Burton, no evidence was led by the defence as to the steps required to put the vehicle in motion and, thus, the presumptiondescribed by Durno, J. persisted. Here, evidence was led as to the substantial impediments – literally – to causing Mrs. Aldred’s vehicleto move or otherwise constitute a danger. [28] Mr. Barker also relied on R. v. Boudreault 2012 SCC 56 , [2012] S.C.J.
No. 56 (S.C.C.) in urging a finding ofrealistic risk of danger to persons or property. Again, I regard the authority as distinguishable. The judgment expressly identifies the factsas involving “a motor vehicle with nothing to stop the accused from setting it in motion” and “a present ability to drive while impaired”.That circumstance does not exist in Mr. Aldred’s case. Released: March 8, 2013 Signed: “Justice C.M. Harpur” Justice C.M. Harpur, O.C.J.
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