R. v. Douale, 2013 ONCJ 436
Opinion
COURT FILE No.: 12-01084 Region of Durham Citation: R. v. Douale , 2013 ONCJ 436 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent — AND — Warsame DOUALE Applicant Reasons for Dismissing the s. 11(
b) Charter Application Before Justice Susan C. MacLean Heard on July 3, 2013 Parties notified of outcome of Application on July 18, 2013 Reasons for Ruling released on July 29, 2013 Trial continues on September 3 and 27, 2013 Mr. Michael Malleson..................................................................... for the Crown/Respondent Mr. Michael Engel......................................................................... for the Defendant/Applicant MacLean S.C., J.: [ 1 ] The Defendant/Applicant, Warsame Douale, submits that his rights pursuant to
section 11(
b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been infringed and he has applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) . The Application was heard two months prior to trial on July 3, 2013. On July 18, 2013 the parties were advised that this Charter Application is dismissed, and that my Reasons for doing so would be released within a few weeks. For the following reasons, I dismiss this Application and direct that the trial proceed as scheduled.
Overview of the Case and Complexity of Issues [ 2 ] Warsame Douale was arrested by the Ontario Provincial Police on June 2, 2012 and charged with two offences: 1) impaired care or control and 2) having the care or control of a motor vehicle while he was over 80 mgms. The matter could not be reached on the first trial date of April 24, 2013 and it is now scheduled to be heard on September 3 and 27, 2013. The total delay from the offence date until the trial is to be completed is 15 months and 25 days, and this length of time warrants an inquiry by the Court.
A chart summarizing the history of the dates and how the delay in this case is attributed can be found in Appendix A at the conclusion of these Reasons. A detailed analysis of these issues appears below under the sub-heading “History of Dates in the Proceedings and How the Delay in this Case is Attributed”. The prejudice suffered by Mr. Douale is considered under a separate heading. [ 3 ] According to the materials filed in support of applications being brought at trial as well as discussions with Counsel during submissions, the following information is known about the trial issues. Mr.
Douale was involved in a serious, single motor vehicle accident on Highway 401 when he claims that he fell asleep at the wheel. The vehicle rolled several times, eventually coming to rest on its roof. After extricating himself from the wreckage, he remained at the scene and awaited the arrival of the police. It is the Crown’s position that this accident was caused because Mr. Douale was impaired by alcohol. At the roadside Mr. Douale admitted he was the driver of the vehicle. Based on the officer’s observations he administered an Approved Screening Device which Mr.
Douale failed, providing grounds for the breath demand for the Intoxilyzer. Mr. Douale was read his Rights to Counsel at the scene and believed that
his lawyer was in bed, so he said he did not want to call him. Once he got back to the police station he spoke with Duty Counsel beforeproviding the breath samples. After providing those samples he was charged with Over 80 mgms. I do not know yet what the breathreadings were. He was also charged with Impaired Care or Control. [4] For the trial, the Defence has filed a significant amount of material in support of three Applications to exclude evidence for allegedviolations of Mr. Douale's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Firstly, it is argued that s. 7 was breached whenhe made statements at the roadside admitting that he was the driver, which he claims he felt compelled by statute to provide to thearresting officer. It is argued that without this admission that the officer would not have had grounds to make the breath demand. Secondly, is argued that his s. 8 rights were violated since the breath samples were obtained without a warrant and without reasonablegrounds for the demand. There is a third Application alleging that Mr. Douale's s. 10(
b) rights to counsel were infringed with respect tohis right to counsel of choice, and that the provision of Duty Counsel was not sufficient to constitute a waiver of this right. If any ofthese rights are found to have been breached, there will be the additional issue of determining whether pursuant to s. 24(2) the evidenceshould be excluded. [5] I do not know how many police witnesses will testify. Given the nature of the Charter applications, the Defendant may testify onthe Charter Applications. If they are dismissed, the accused may also testify on the trial with respect to the impairment issue. [6] Up until July 3, 2013 when this s. 11(
b) Application was argued, both the Crown and Defence had estimated that the trial would take one day. On July 3rd, after I reviewed the issues to be litigated at trial, including the three Charter Applications, the Crown and Defenceagreed that they had underestimated the time which will be required to try this matter. It was agreed that the time estimate should bedoubled, and that this matter will now take approximately two full days, including submissions and Charter rulings as well as finalsubmissions and Judgment, should the Charter Applications be dismissed.
Given the issues to be litigated and the length of timerequired to do so, this is not a simple matter and it has some complexity to it. The Principles to Apply in Relation to s. 11(
b) of the Charter [7]
Section 11(
b) of the Charter provides that “any person charged with an offence has the right … to be tried within a reasonable time.”In R. v. Morin (SCC), [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the primary purposeof the provision is the protection of the rights of the accused to security of the person, liberty and a fair trial. Speaking for the majority,Justice Sopinka stated at paragraph 28 that: The right to security of the person is protected in s. 11(
b) by seeking to minimize the anxiety, concern and stigma of exposure to criminalproceedings. The right to liberty is protected by seeking to minimize exposure to the restrictions on liberty which result from pre-trialincarceration and restrictive bail conditions. The right to a fair trial is protected by attempting to ensure that proceedings take place whileevidence is available and fresh. Justice Sopinka also recognized a secondary societal interest that is protected by
section 11(b), namely, that those accused of crimes bebrought to trial and dealt with according to law. In assessing delay, the Court must consider society’s interest in having the guilt orinnocence of its members adjudged on the merits of the case. There is a “collective societal interest in ensuring that those whotransgress the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law”. As the seriousness of the offence increases so does thesocietal demand that the accused be brought to trial. (See Morin, supra, at paragraph 30) [8] It is settled law that when a violation of s. 11(
b) has been established that a stay of proceedings is the minimum remedy. JusticeArbour in R. v. Bennett (ON CA), [1991] O.J. No. 884 (O.C.A.) observed that “a judicial stay of proceedings is themost powerful remedy available to sanction the infringement of the constitutional rights of an accused under s. 24(1) of the Charter” (atparagraph 43) and continued at paragraph 44 that, Both at common law and under the Charter, stays of proceedings for abuse of process have been granted sparingly, and only in the“clearest of cases”.
A stay is tantamount to an acquittal in that it effectively brings the proceedings to a final conclusion in favour of theaccused… By granting a stay, the Court, in effect stands between the accused and the state to prevent what otherwise would be a justresolution, on the merits of an allegation of criminal conduct. [9] The purposes of s. 11(
b) and the principles to be considered in addressing it are well summarized by Justice Durno in paragraphs 23to 28 of R. v. Sychterz, [2005] O.J. No. 2722 as follows: 23 The purpose of s. 11(
b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice, not avoid trials on the merits: R. v. Morin, (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, 71 C.C.C.(3d) 1 at p. 24 (S.C.C.). In R. v. Qureshi, Khan and Giavorpoulos (ON CA),[2004] O.J. No. 4711 (Ont. C.A.), Laskin J.A. summarized the legal framework for s. 11 (
b) applications. The
section aims to protect theindividual rights of the accused, as well as the rights of society. It protects three individual rights: the accused's right to security of theperson, by minimizing the anxiety and stigma of criminal proceedings; it protects the accused's right to liberty, by minimizing the effectsof pre-trial custody or restrictive bail terms; and it protects the accused's right to a fair trial, by ensuring that the proceedings occur whileevidence is fresh and available, citing Morin. 24
Section 11(
b) also seeks to protect two societal rights. First, it protects the public's interest in having laws enforced, by havingthose who break the law tried quickly. Promptly held trials increase public confidence. Second, s. 11(
b) seeks to protect the public'sinterest in having those accused of crimes dealt with fairly, citing R. v. MacDougall, (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45, 128C.C.C.(3d) 483 (S.C.C.) at p. 496. As the seriousness of the offence increases, so does the societal demand that the accused be broughtto trial: Morin, p. 13.
25 The determination of whether s. 11(
b) has been infringed requires the court to balance the individual and societal goals with thelength and causes of the delay. The
section is framed in terms of reasonableness, not whether the delay was of a desirable length: R. v.Seegmiller, (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 5004 (Ont. C.A.) (QL) para. 30, leave to appeal refused, [2005] S.C.C.A. No.64. 26 Courts have refrained from creating limitation periods for certain types of offences, leaving judges to exercise judgment, havingregard to the factors noted below. The exercise was described by Sopinka J. in Morin as follows: The general approach to a determination as to whether the right has been denied is not by the application of a mathematical formula butrather by a judicial determination balancing the interests which the
section is designed to protect against the factors which eitherinevitably lead to delay or are otherwise the cause of delay. As I noted in Smith, supra [R. v. Smith (SCC), [1989] 2S.C.R. 1120, 52 C.C.C.(3d) 97], "[i]t is axiomatic that some delay is inevitable. The question is, at what point does the delay becomeunreasonable. 27 While the trial judge may not be required to specifically mention that she or he has considered society's interest in the prosecutionproceeding, it must be clear from the reasons that that vital consideration has been taken into account.
The failure to do so is an error inprinciple: Kovacs-Tatar, para 5; Qureshi, para. 41. 28 Four factors are to be considered: the length of the delay; waiver of time periods; reasons for the delay, including inherent timerequirements, actions of the accused, actions of the Crown, other reasons for the delay, and; prejudice to the accused: Qureshi, supra atpar 10. [10] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Batte (2000), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 498 at paragraph 55 confirmed that determining an issue ofthis kind is not a mathematical exercise.
The length of delay begins from the date of the charge to the scheduled date of the trial (seeMorin, supra). The decision as to whether s. 11(
b) has been infringed by that delay is not to be made “by the application of amathematical or administrative formula but rather by a judicial determination balancing the interests which the
section is designed toprotect against factors which either inevitably lead to delay or are otherwise the cause of delay.” Some delay is inevitable. The questionis when is it unreasonable? That question as to whether the Defendant was tried within a reasonable time is to be determined byconsidering and balancing the following factors (see Morin at paragraph 31): 1. the length of the delay; 2. waiver of time periods; 3. the reasons for the delay, including (
a) inherent time requirements of the case; (
b) actions of the accused; (
c) actions of the Crown; (
d) limits on institutional resources; and (
e) other reasons for the delay; 4. prejudice to the accused. [11] All prosecutions have certain inherent time requirements which lead to delay; these include the first appearance, retainingcounsel, disclosure, and the resolution meeting. This period is to be considered neutral. Inherent time requirements may be extended incases that are more complex. The actions of the parties that cause delay may also be relevant. (See Morin at paragraphs 33 to 46). Inthe Ontario
Summary Convictions Appeal case of R. v. Sychterz, [2005] O.J. No. 2722 at paragraph 74 the appellate court indicated thatany delays due to activities such as obtaining disclosure, retaining counsel, attending resolution meetings and Judicial pre-trialconferences, should be allocated as part of the inherent time requirements of the case. [12] The inherent time requirements of a case must include a consideration of whether adequate time was set aside for the trialin the first place. This is very important in considering Mr.
Douale’s Application, because even if the trial had commenced on April 24,2013, it would not have been completed that day and one additional day of trial time would have been required. A additional delay ofsome sort would have been inevitable, since the new 2-day estimate of trial time was not arrived at until I discussed the matter with bothCounsel on July 3, 2013. This case was never judicially pre-tried because Counsel had estimated it as requiring only one day.
Had alonger estimate been forecast, a judicial pre-trial would have been mandatory in Durham Region. [13] The issue of inadequate trial time being estimated by Counsel was addressed by Justice Laskin in R. v. Qureshi, [2004]
O.J. No. 2004 (O.C.A.) in paragraph 27 as follows: [27] The trial judge failed to account for the inherent time requirements of the case in four ways. His failure to do so is reviewableon a standard of correctness. See R. v. Chatwell (1998), (ON CA), 122 C.C.C. (3d) 162 at para. 10 (Ont.C.A.)… (ii) The second error relates to counsels’ time estimate for the preliminary inquiry. The Crown first estimated the preliminary would lastthree days, but later revised his estimate downward to accord with that of defence counsel.
When the lawyers appeared on April 16,1999, to set a hearing date, they all agreed the preliminary would take three-quarters of a day. They fixed September 9, 1999. As the trial judge recognized, three-quarters of a day proved to be a “gross underestimate”. However, the trial judge did not properlycharacterize the consequences of the underestimate. Here, the judgment of Doherty J.A. in Allen at p. 348 is controlling.
There, mycolleague makes two points relevant to this appeal: the inherent time requirements can include adjournments required to findadditional court time when the initial time estimates proved inaccurate and these inherent time requirements are consideredneutral.
In making these points, Doherty J.A. emphasized that when a case is not completed within the time estimated, itscontinuation must recognize the legitimate demands of other cases in the system on both counsel and the court: … When the preliminary hearing did not finish on September 9, 1999, it was adjourned to October 27, 1999, then further adjourned for twomore hearing days on February 17 and 18, 2000, – to this point a total period for the preliminary of five and one-quarter months.
Ideally,as this court said in Satkunananthan, once a preliminary hearing goes beyond its estimated time all participants should try toschedule its completion as soon as possible, preferably on consecutive days. That did not happen here. Thus, part of the five andone-quarter months should be assigned to institutional delay. Consistent with Allen, however, part of the period should also be characterized as neutral, part of the inherent time requirements of thecase.
I would assign two months to institutional delay and three and one-quarter months to the inherent time requirements of the case. [Emphasis added by the Court] [14] This issue was addressed again by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Tran 2012 ONCA 18 , 2012 ONCA 18: 56 The following comments from para. 27 of R. v. Allen (ON CA), (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (Ont. C.A.), areparticularly helpful: When addressing s. 11(b), one must consider the inherent time requirements needed to get a case into the system and to complete thatcase: R. v. Morin, supra, at p. 16.
Those time requirements can include adjournments necessitated by the need to find additional courttime when initial time estimates prove inaccurate: R. v. Hawkins reflex, (1991), (ON CA), 6 O.R. (3d) 724 at 728(C.A.), aff'd, (SCC), (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 64 (S.C.C.); R. v. Philip reflex, (1993), (ON CA), 80C.C.C. (3d) 167 at 172-73 (Ont. C.A.). The inherent time requirements needed to complete a case are considered to be neutral in the s.11(
b) calculus. The recognition and treatment of such inherent time requirements in the s. 11(
b) jurisprudence is simply a reflection ofthe reality of the world in which the criminal justice system operates. No case is an island to be treated as if it were the only case witha legitimate demand on court resources. The system cannot revolve around any one case, but must try to accommodate the needsof all cases.
When a case requires additional court resources the system cannot be expected to push other cases to the side andinstantaneously provide those additional resources. 57 In this case, in my view, half of the four-month adjournment period should be allocated to the inherent time requirements of thecase and half should be allocated to institutional delay. 58 The trial was not completed within the originally allocated time frame plus the better part of an extra day made available by thecourt because the defence underestimated the trial time by more than a full day.
When it became clear that the trial would not finishwithin the originally estimated time-frame, the court made a full extra day available within three days (September 16, 2010) and offeredtwo additional continuation dates within two weeks (September 30, 2010 and October 1, 2010). Unfortunately, neither of those dateswere available to counsel. 59 When it appeared likely that the extra time made available on September 16, 2010 would be insufficient to complete the trial, theCrown made an additional day available (September 28, 2010) by re-prioritizing other cases.
Defence counsel had said this day wasavailable only a few days previously but this was no longer the case by September 16, 2010. The court also offered two half days withina month of September 28, 2010 (October 18 and 28, 2010) and another full day within a month after that (November 22, 2010). Defencecounsel were unable to make themselves available.
60 Although the number of additional dates offered by the Crown and the court between September 16, 2010 and November 22, 2010was limited, the challenges involved in rescheduling a case in the Ontario Court of Justice in the Greater Metropolitan Toronto Area oncea trial judge has become seized of the matter are not insignificant. Where an additional full day is required, a delay of one to two monthsis not unreasonable for an out-of-custody matter provided reasonable efforts are made. [Emphasis added by the Court] [15] As my colleague, Justice J. De Filippis observed in R. v.
Singh (unreported, June 7, 2013, OCJ): The final sentence in paragraph 60 of Tran suggests that if a trial is not completed as scheduled, a continuation of up to one day shouldbe scheduled within one to two months. As matters are presently organized in Durham Region, this presents a significant challenge forthe Court; out of custody cases are scheduled many months in advance and if not completed in the estimated time, it is difficult to find afull day within 60 days to continue the matter. Moreover, many experienced Defence counsel also book cases months in advance andmay experience similar difficulties.
In any event, as Tran recognizes, a system of one case per judge is not feasible. In a busyjurisdiction such as this one, courts are routinely overbooked to ensure that resources are efficiently used when trials do not proceed asscheduled – as can happen, for example, due to illness of a witness, counsel, or the judge. Tran also underscores the importance ofaccurate estimates of trial length. [16] Defence Counsel argues on behalf of Mr.
Douale that part of the delay in this case was the refusal of the Crown toprovide materials relating to the Approved Screening Device [see further discussion about this disclosure request under “History ofDates” below]. The Crown argues that it made timely disclosure of all relevant material, and on a principled basis, declined to providethe remaining materials as being irrelevant while also inviting Defence Counsel to bring an application for disclosure before the trialjudge if he disagreed. When looking at delayed disclosure it is important to consider the comments of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R.v.
Kovacs-Tatar (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4756 (O.C.A.). At paragraph 47 it clearly states that a Court maydetermine that Counsel has not acted reasonably in insisting that he or she receive all disclosure before setting a trial date. The Court ofAppeal indicated that while there is a continuing obligation on the Crown to make disclosure, the Crown is not obliged to disclose everylast bit of evidence before a trial date is set. The Defence does not give up any “Stinchcombe rights” by agreeing to set a trial date. [17] Those principles apply in this case to the issue of Mr. Douale.
The trial date was capable of being and was in fact setwith that final disclosure issue relating to the Approved Screening Device remaining outstanding. That type of issue could be sorted outin the interim and if necessary be resolved, as suggested by the Crown to Mr. Engel, by bringing a disclosure application prior to trialbefore the assigned trial judge.
No such application has been brought in this case. [18] The Crown on this Application argues that some delay should be deducted between the set date and trial dates in Mr.Douale’s case to account for the availability of Counsel and the time required to prepare for trial.
In Tran, supra, at paragraph 32, theOntario Court of Appeal cautioned that in considering when institutional delay should commence the Court should be mindful about theavailability of Counsel and the time required to prepare for trial: 32 Second, parties should not be deemed automatically to be ready to conduct a hearing as of the date a hearing date is set.Counsel require time to clear their
schedule so they can be available for the hearing as well as time to prepare for the hearing.These time frames are part of the inherent time requirements of the case. Institutional delay begins to run only when counsel areready to proceed but the court is unable to accommodate them. See Morin, at pp. 791-2, 794-5, 805-806. See also Lahiry, at paras.25-37, citing Morin, R. v. Sharma, (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 814, R. v. M.(N.N.) (2006), (ON CA),209 C.C.C. (3d) 436 (C.A.), Schertzer, R. v. Meisner (2003), 57 W.C.B. (2d) 477 (Ont. S.C.), and R. v.
Khan, 2011 ONCA 173, 277O.A.C. 165. … 38 Turning to the approximately eight-month delay between the judicial pre-trial and the commencement of the trial, once again, thetrial judge failed to take account of the time required for counsel to clear their calendar and prepare. Defence counsel did not puttheir first available dates for even a two-and-a-half day trial on the record when target trial dates were set at the judicial pre-trial.
Theywere not available for the early trial dates offered by the court in March 2010; nor were they available on dates offered in early August.A little more than two months later, on March 31, 2010 at the pre-trial continuation, defence counsel did not have a single day availablein April or May to conduct the s. 11(
b) Charter motion. Although this is entirely understandable in terms of counsel's busyschedules, institutional delay does not begin to run until counsel are in a position to proceed with the trial. 39 Because of defence counsel's failure to put their first available trial dates on the record at the judicial pre-trial in January 2010, it isdifficult if not impossible to determine exactly how the delay between the pre-trial and the commencement of the trial should beallocated. In the circumstances, and in the light of defence counsel's unavailability on March 31, 2010 for a one-day s. 11(
b) motion inApril or May 2010, it is unrealistic to assume that they could have co-ordinated their calendars to
schedule even a two-and-a-half-daytrial within even a few months of the pre-trial date.
40 It must also be remembered that counsel had to prepare and serve their various Charter motions and make time to preparefor trial. In all the circumstances, I would attribute no more than three months of this eight-month time frame to institutional delay. [Emphasis added by the Court] [19] The Court in R. v. Lahiry, 2011 ONSC 6780 , [2011] O.J. No. 5071 (Ont.S.C.), (which case was cited withapproval by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Tran, supra), had also advised at paragraphs 27 and 34, that Courts should deduct some timefor the preparation of a case for trial from systemic delay.
Justice Code, referring to Morin, supra, stated as follows: 27 In other words, Sopinka J. allocated about one month as time for counsel to prepare and make themselves available for trial,after setting the trial date. Sopinka J.'s judgment in R. v. Sharma (1992), (SCC), 71 C.C.C. (3d) 184 at pp. 193-4(S.C.C.) is to the same effect. The entire period, from the set date appearance to the trial date in that case, was just under twelve months.However, Sopinka J. held that only nine months was systemic delay.
He deducted three months because systemic delay runs "from thetime when the parties were ready for trial" and he was not prepared to infer that they were immediately ready and available fortrial when setting the trial date. … 34 Finally there is no place for fictions when seeking to prove Charter violations. It is rarely true that counsel is immediatelyavailable for trial, when setting a date. Whenever counsel take on a new case they complete various preliminary steps during theintake period.
Once they have taken these steps and are ready to set a date for trial, they need to set aside sufficient time in theircalendars to prepare the new case for trial and to then conduct the trial. If the case is lengthy and complex, or if counsel are verybusy, it may be some considerable period of time before counsel are ready for trial.
To use a simple hypothetical, if counsel has no timein his/her calendar to prepare a new case for trial and to then try it until ten months in the future, and the earliest date that the Court hasavailable for the trial is twelve months in the future, then systemic congestion in the Court is the cause of only two months of delay. Theother ten months is delay that the accused needs, for entirely beneficial reasons, in order to allow his/her counsel of choice to preparethe case for trial and to accommodate it in an otherwise busy calendar.
It is good and necessary delay that would have occurred inany event, even if the Court had earlier available dates. It is a fiction to characterize this kind of useful delay as unwarranted orunreasonable or prejudicial. [Emphasis added by the Court] [20] In considering any period of delay, the Court must be mindful that any waiver of delay must be clear and unequivocal. Consent to a trial date without any comment or explanation may amount to waiver but not if it merely acknowledges the inevitable. TheApplicant, Mr.
Douale Defendant did not expressly waive any delay in this case. [21] When considering the actions of an accused person, “this aspect of the reasons for the delay should not be read as puttingthe "blame" on the accused for certain portions of delay. There is no necessity to impute improper motives to the accused in consideringthis factor.
Included under this heading are all actions taken by the Accused which may have caused delay.” The court is concernedwith actions of the Accused which are voluntarily undertaken. “Actions which could be included in this category include change ofvenue motions, attacks on wiretap packets, adjournments which do not amount to waiver, attacks on search warrants, etc.” The Courtsdo not suggest that an accused should sacrifice all preliminary procedures and strategy, however if an accused chooses to take suchaction it will be taken into account in determining what length of delay is reasonable: see Morin, supra, at paragraph 39.
In the case ofMr. Douale, for example, there were three adjournments sought by Defence Counsel who was making continuing efforts to attempt topersuade the Crown to provide disclosure of Approved Screening Device records, which the Crown had clearly advised weeks earlierthat it would not give. [22] Lack of urgency on behalf of an Applicant can be demonstrated by repeated adjournments of a matter which prolong thehearing (even where those adjournment requests are reasonably sought by Counsel).
These adjournments can be attributed to either theinherent time requirements of the case or to the actions of the accused or Defence Counsel that fall short of waiver: See R. v. Qureshi (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4711 (Ont.C.A.) at paragraph 29. A Court can determine that these unwaived timeperiods are not excessive in the circumstances (see paragraph 37 in Qureshi as an example). An inference adverse to the Applicant maybe made when he or she does not seek to expedite the proceedings.
See paragraph 40 of Qureshi. …throughout the many court appearances in this case, defence counsel and their clients never inquired about earlier dates and did notseek to expedite the proceedings. Overall, the record shows that the respondents demonstrated little concern about the slow pace of thelitigation. [23] The time period for delay due to the limitation of institutional resources starts to run when the parties are ready for trialbut cannot be accommodated by the system.
In this regard, Justice Sopinka noted that “[I]t is appropriate for this Court to suggest aperiod of institutional delay of between 8 to 10 months as a guide to Provincial Courts.” (Morin, para 55). The guidelines are not to betreated as limitation periods. The application of these guidelines will be influenced by the absence or presence of actual prejudice; thatis, additional prejudice beyond that inherent in any delay. [24] In Tran, supra, at paragraph 63 it was noted that: The Morin guideline for delay in the Ontario Court of Justice is eight to ten months.
However, the guideline is just that: a guideline,not a limitation period. Deviations of several months in either direction can be justified by the presence or absence of prejudice:Morin, at p. 807.
[Emphasis added by the Court] The Law with Respect to the Issue of Prejudice [25] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Tran, supra, noted at paragraph 23 that: One of the two main purposes of s. 11(
b) of the Charter is the protection of an accused's rights under the Charter to security of theperson, liberty and a fair trial. An accused will suffer actual prejudice where the accused can demonstrate that the delay in bringing acase to trial has impaired one of those rights. Prejudice may be inferred where the delay between arrest and trial is simply too long. [26] In R. v. K.G., 2009 ONCA 131 the Ontario Court of Appeal cited with approval its earlier decision in R. v. Qureshi (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4711 (O.C.A.) at para. 14: Two kinds of prejudice are relevant [on a s. 11(
b) application]. First, the court may infer prejudice from the delay itself and is morelikely to do so the longer the delay. On the other hand, an accused’s action or inaction that shows a desire to avoid a trial on the meritsmay negate any inference of prejudice from the delay itself. Second, the accused or the Crown may lead evidence to show eitherprejudice or an absence of prejudice. [27] The right to security of the person (guaranteed under
Section 11(
b) of the Charter) “seeks to minimize the anxiety,concern and stigma of exposure to criminal proceedings” (see Morin, supra at paragraph 28). The Courts recognize that the prejudicessuffered by all accused persons by virtue of pending criminal accusations include stigmatization of the accused, loss of privacy, stressand anxiety resulting from a multitude of factors, including possible disruption of family, social life and work, legal costs, anduncertainty as to the outcome and sanction (see s R. v. Mills, (1986), (SCC), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.) at 538 to 539and R. v.
Askov, (1990), (SCC), 59 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.) at 455 to 456). [28] Prejudice to the accused can be inferred from prolonged delay. “The longer the delay the more likely that such aninference will be drawn.” Prejudice can occur from adverse impact of the delay upon the accused’s ability to provide full answer anddefence. Prejudice can result from an ongoing restriction on the accused’s liberty, through pre-trial custody or release conditions. (seeMorin, supra at 23 to 24) [29] Specific prejudice is that which is beyond what is typically expected when a Defendant is faced with an offence.
In R. v.Kovacs-Tatar, (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4756 (O.C.A.) at paragraphs 32 to 33, the Court indicates that “the focusof prejudice under s. 11(
b) is the prejudice flowing from a situation ‘prolonged’ by delay rather than the mere fact of being charged witha criminal offence”. The Court further indicates at paragraph 37 that the Defendant bears the responsibility of taking the initiative toalleviate the prejudice (quoting Justice Arbour in Bennett, (1991), (ON CA), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 449 at 478 (O.C.A.): An accused who claims prejudice, beyond the prejudice common to most accused and inferred from any delay, is claiming anentitlement to a speedier trial than other accused in apparently similar circumstances.
The only way for the system to accommodate thatclaim is to hear it expressed. There comes a point…where an accused who is suffering from a special prejudice from the delay of histrial must bring his or her plight to the attention of the prosecuting authorities and the courts. [30] The significance of actual or additional prejudice was highlighted in R v Malcolm [2008] O.J. No. 4665 at paragraphs 33-34. In that case Justice MacDonnell made the following observations: 33 The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the minimum remedy for a violation of s. 11(
b) is a stay of proceedings: R. v. Rahey, (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, per Lamer J., at p. 614. Identifying the precise point at which, by reason of delay, societyloses the right to have serious charges determined on their merits and an accused becomes entitled to what is tantamount to a
summaryacquittal is a difficult and case-specific exercise. Some guidance, however, may be derived from the Supreme Court’s generaljurisprudence in relation to when a stay of proceedings will be appropriate. The Court has made it plain that this “drastic remedy” is aweapon of “last resort”, to be employed only in the clearest of cases: see, e.g. R v O’Connor (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411,103 C.C.C. (3d) 1. A stay granted for delay should not be seen as an exception to those principles but rather as a particular application ofthem.
This suggests that the threshold for a violation of the right should be commensurate with the remedy that such a violationcommands. Combining a low threshold for a violation with an automatic award of a stay would be inconsistent with the balancing that is a necessary component of the process of defining constitutional rights: see, e.g., Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada (5th),Carswell, 2007, at pp. 53-55; 64-65; R. v. Edwards, (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, per LaForest J., concurring, atparagraph 68. 34 Given that the primary purpose of s. 11(
b) is to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial, liberty, and security of the person,the primary focus of the inquiry into whether the right has been infringed should be on whether the accused has suffered any real andsubstantial prejudice to one or more of those interests. In the absence of such proof “the basis for the enforcement of [s. 11(b)] isseriously undermined”: R. v. Morin, supra, at paragraph 61; R. v. Cranston et al, 2008 ONCA 751, at paragraph 73.
A failure toapproach the analysis in this manner risks trivializing a constitutional right and eroding public confidence in the proper administration ofjustice. [31] In K.G., supra, in examining the facts of that case the Court of Appeal gives some guidance to trial courts as to how tocharacterize certain forms of prejudice. The elderly accused was facing historical sexual offence cases alleged to have occurred some 30
to 34 years before his arrest. He suffered from post-polio syndrome resulting in numerous health complications that made it difficult for him to travel in the winter. With respect to prejudice, the Court of Appeal concluded that (at paragraphs 38 to 43 and 47 to 48): 38 The respondent’s physical disability and the particular stress that causes for him when he is required to travel in the winter months does not arise as the result of the criminal charges he faces, nor does it arise from any delay in bringing those charges to trial.
These particular difficulties would be present even if K.G. had been tried in December 2005, shortly after the charges were laid. It does not give rise to actual prejudice.
In reading the trial judge’s reasons as a whole, I accept the Crown’s submission that the trial judge did equate the respondent’s “travel prejudice” with the effects of being charged with serious criminal offences, and in so doing improperly found that actual prejudice flowed from the delay. 39 Clearly there is evidence that the fact of these charges has caused stress to the respondent and has been a source of friction between him and his wife, a fact true of anyone facing serious criminal charges. Institutional delay does not cause this stress – it can only at best prolong, or exacerbate it.
The respondent was prescribed medication for stress shortly after his arrest. On his evidence, only the amount he took increased when the case was adjourned. In other words, his need for medication to deal with the stress did not arise out of the delay – at best it was somewhat exacerbated by it. 40 No issue of delay was raised before October 22, 2007. The real delay about which complaint is made amounts to some two and one-half months – from October 22, 2007 to January 7, 2008.
Although the respondent mentions the continued stress of having these charges outstanding against him for this further period of time, again, it must be noted that he did not avail himself of the earlier dates offered at the time the matter was adjourned to December 3, 2007. 41 In my view, the trial judge placed too much weight on the finding of prejudice, given that the contentious delay was primarily confined to this one short period. 42 In so far as the respondent’s liberty interest is concerned, there was minimal interference in this case.
The respondent was released on his Promise to Appear for both court and fingerprinting and gave an undertaking to attend court in Elliot Lake on November 15, 2005. The respondent was to advise the investigating officer of any change of address, abstain from communicating with the complainant J. H. and to abstain from alcohol or other intoxicants, except as prescribed. The respondent filed a designation of counsel and accordingly did not personally appear – nor was he required to – on several of the occasions when his case was spoken to.
He was not incarcerated, had no curfew and was not subject to any reporting requirements. 43 There is no evidence, nor is it contended, that the delay has in any way impacted on the respondent’s fair trial rights in the sense that evidence has been lost or witnesses become unavailable because of delay. ... 47 Any prejudice to the respondent by reason of the delay here was slight.
In the circumstances it is appropriate that the guideline as expressed in Morin be applied to reflect this fact. 48 In the absence of any real prejudice beyond that experienced by all accused persons, and the important public interest in a trial on the merits, I am of the view that the delay in this case was not unconstitutional. [ 32 ] The issue of prejudice was also examined in Nadarajah , 2009 ONCA 118 , released by the Ontario Court of Appeal on February 6, 2009. On the issue of prejudice Justice Goudge wrote at paragraph 29: 29 The application judge found that the appellant had not established prejudice.
While the appellant tendered no evidence of prejudice to his defence, his affidavit recited anxiety and stress, and adverse effects on his education and his ability to attend family events due to the delay. While this constituted some prejudice, it could not be said to be more than modest. For five months of the delay, the appellant was incarcerated on other charges.
Up until that happened, the terms of his release permitted him to continue his education and participate in family events to some degree, albeit with some inconvenience to himself and those required to accompany him. [ 33 ] In Nadarajah the Court found that there was only “modest” prejudice and concluded that there was no unreasonable delay in spite of the fact that the charges (which were serious and involving some complexity) had taken 33.3 months in total to get to trial in the Superior Court. Of the total delay 12.6 months of the 23.3 months in the Ontario Court and 6.4 of the 10 months in the Superior
Court was attributed to Crown or institutional delay. In concluding that the delay in the Ontario Court was “only modestly in excess of the guidelines set for institutional delay” it is apparent that the limited prejudice to the Appellant was an important factor (see paragraph 32): [32] I conclude that, in all the circumstance of this case, the application judge was correct in his ultimate assessment. The delay was not unreasonable. This was not the simplest of cases. It necessarily involved multiple accused. The charges were serious.
The delay in the Ontario Court is only modestly in excess of the guidelines set for institutional delay by the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Superior Court that guideline was not exceeded at all. And the appellant could be said to suffer only limited personal prejudice. In my opinion, the appellant’s s. 11(
b) rights were not violated. This ground of appeal must be dismissed. [Emphasis added by the Court] [ 34 ] Prejudice may be inferred from the length of delay and, at some point, may be such that a stay of proceedings is required without proof of actual prejudice. However, most cases in which
section 11(
b) of the Charter is engaged are not of this kind; rather they invite a balancing of the delay and prejudice. In such cases, evidence of actual prejudice, suffered because of the delay, is important. Proof of significant actual prejudice will inevitably lead to stricter adherence to the guidelines. Where such proof is lacking the basis for enforcement of the Charter right is undermined. The purpose of the right is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice, not to avoid a trial on the merits.
History of Dates in the Proceedings and How the Delay in this Case is Attributed [ 35 ] As indicated earlier in these Reasons, a chart summarizing the allocation of delay in this case can be found in Appendix A at the end of this Ruling. [ 36 ] Mr. Douale was arrested on June 2, 2012 and the information was sworn to on June 13, 2012. These 11 days do not affect delay since the time starts to run from the date the information is sworn. [ 37 ] The First Appearance in court was on June 28, 2012, 15 days after the information was sworn.
These 15 days are part of the usual inherent time required for a case so they are neutral. [ 38 ] By the first court appearance on June 28, 2012 [Exhibit 2.1 transcript], Mr. Douale had already consulted with his Defence Counsel, Michael Engel, (although he did not fully retain him to represent him for the trial until late October to November 1 st of 2012). On June 28 th , Ms. Barbara Bristol appeared as agent for both the Defendant and his lawyer and filed a Designation Form. Disclosure was picked up and the matter was adjourned for 3 weeks to July 19, 2012 to allow Defence Counsel to review disclosure.
This is part of the inherent time requirements of the case and is considered neutral time. [ 39 ] It is important to examine the correspondence in relation to disclosure when considering the reasons for delay in this case. On July 13, 2012, Defence Counsel wrote two letters to the Crown requesting additional disclosure [see Exhibit 1 Affidavit of Warsame Douale, Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Affidavit]. In the first letter he requested six items consisting of things such as maintenance and calibration logs, usage logs for six weeks, etc. relating to the Alcotest 7410 Approved Screening Device used in Mr. Douale's case.
The second letter requested 9 items relating to things such as maintenance records and logs, etc. for the Intoxilyzer 8000C used for Mr. Douale's case, as well as “a sample of the standard alcohol solution lot used in relation to the tests pertaining to this accused”. The Crown responded in a very timely fashion by letter on July 18, 2012 [See Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Mr.
Douale, Exhibit 3 to the Affidavit], that they had already sent the Intoxilyzer disclosure by Can Par, that they were looking further into the sample of the alcohol standard, and that the Crown would not provide the requested materials relating to the Approved Screening Device on the basis that it was not relevant to the arresting officer’s state of mind [which would be relevant to his grounds for the breath sample demand] when relying upon the results. The Crown sent a follow-up letter on July 20, 2012 [see Exhibit 3, Respondent’s Application Record at Tab 4] advising Mr.
Engel that a sample of the standard alcohol solution lot was being held at the Whitby O.P.P. station for him to pick up. Defence Counsel did not respond to any of these letters until August 20, 2012 [see Exhibit 1 Affidavit of Mr. Douale Exhibit 4 to the Affidavit] presumably because he was on vacation for some of this time period (see paragraphs below). In that letter Mr. Engel renewed his disclosure request for the Approved Screening Device materials being sought, however made no reference to the materials already provided or the sample alcohol standard being held by the O.P.P. Again, in a very timely way, Mr.
Stephens on behalf of the Crown responded the very next day in a letter dated August 21, 2012 [see Exhibit 1 Affidavit of Mr. Douale Exhibit 5 to the Affidavit] once again explaining why the Crown was taking the position that it was not obligated to disclose the Approved Screening Device materials being sought. He also invited Defence Counsel to
schedule a trial date as well as a Disclosure Application in front of the trial judge to litigate the issue in dispute. Mr. Stephens stated, “We seek to have a trial set in this matter as early as possible.” Mr. Engel responded promptly to Mr. Stephens’ letter on August 23, 2012 [see Exhibit 1 Affidavit of Mr. Douale Exhibit 6 to the Affidavit] advising that he did not intend to bring a Disclosure Application prior to trial as it would put his client to additional expense.
He suggested that he might apply instead for the readings to be excluded at trial based on the Crown’s refusal to provide the data being sought. No such application has been brought. Mr. Stephens responded once again on August 24, 2012 [see Exhibit 6] and elaborated on why the Crown was taking its position in refusing to provide the materials with respect to the Approved Screening Device. On November 23, 2012 Mr. Stephens also wrote to Mr.
Engel [see Exhibit 3 Respondent’s Application Record at Tab 5] reminding him that the sample alcohol standard was still waiting for him at the Whitby O.P.P. station and this if it was not picked up by January 23, 2013 that it would not be kept any longer. It was finally picked up by Mr. Engel on January 7, 2013 [see Exhibit 3 Respondent’s Application Record at tab 6]. [ 40 ] On July 19, 2012 [Exhibit 2.2 transcript], Ms. Bristol appeared once again on behalf of the client and Mr. Engel.
She requested an additional 3 weeks delay to August 9, 2012 because Defence Counsel had requested further disclosure relating to the maintenance and calibration of both the Approved Screening Device and Intoxilyzer Instrument, and claimed to be waiting for the Crown’s response. Mr. Saliwonchyk for the Crown advised the Court that he believed that the response had already been sent to Mr. Engel indicating that the Crown would not be providing the data from the Intoxilyzer or anything dealing with the Approved Screening Device. Ms. Bristol advised the Court that Mr.
Engel was away on holidays, so he might not have seen the Crown’s response on these
issues. The Crown requested that a “shorter adjournment would be helpful in moving this along”. The Justice of the Peace granted the Defence request for 3 weeks, adjourning the matter to August 9, 2012, to review the response sent out by the Crown. These 21 days might be seen as Defence delay, but this time period is more properly considered as part of what was required for Defence and Crown Counsel to exchange and review correspondence concerning the disclosure requests for the records with respect to the Approved Screening Device and Intoxilyzer.
This delay is due to the nature of the case and the type of disclosure being sought and thus is properly considered to be part of the inherent time requirements of the case which I consider it to be neutral time. [ 41 ] On August 9, 2012 [Exhibit 2.3 transcript], Ms. Bristol appeared once again on behalf of both Mr. Engel and Mr. Douale. She advised the Justice of the Peace that Mr. Engel was still waiting for disclosure and requested that the matter be adjourned again until August 29, 2012. Mr. Engel’s instructions to Ms.
Bristol dated August 9, 2012 were, “I’m waiting for further disclosure in this case relating to some maintenance/calibration that I have requested and the Crown has agreed to provide.” Ms. Kennedy for the Crown advised that her brief indicated that the additional disclosure which the Crown was agreeing to provide [the Intoxilyzer records, etc.] had already been sent out by CANPAR courier directly to Mr. Engel on July 18, 2012, and should have been with Defence Counsel already. Ms. Bristol advised that Mr. Engel had been away on vacation for part of July so perhaps the materials were waiting for him in his office.
Ms. Bristol indicated she would follow up with Defence Counsel about the disclosure that afternoon. As indicated above, Mr. Engel did not respond to the Crown’s letter of July 18, 2012 until August 20, 2012. The Justice of the Peace granted the Defence request to adjourn the matter to August 29, 2012. In spite of the ongoing issues about some of the disclosure (in particular with respect to the records relating to the Approved Screening Device), the Crown had provided all that they were agreeing to provide approximately 3 weeks before this date.
The Crown had taken a principled approach in refusing to provide the remaining disclosure relating to the Approved Screening Device as not being relevant to the arresting officer’s grounds. If the Defence was concerned about delay, a trial date should have been set on August 9 th , and any disagreement between the Crown and Defence about disclosure should have been the subject matter of an application before the Trial Judge in advance of trial. As indicated above, no such application has been brought.
It is my view that the Defence should have been ready to set the trial date by August 9, 2012, and therefore I attribute the 20 day delay from August 9 to 29, 2012 to the Defence. [ 42 ] August 29, 2012 [Exhibit 2.4 transcript] was the third time that Mr. Engel requested an adjournment relating to the additional disclosure which he was seeking concerning things such as records for the Approved Screening Device. Ms. Bristol appeared again on behalf of both Mr. Engel and their client. She advised the Court that, “My understanding is that Mr.
Engel is involved in ongoing correspondence with the Crown in this case, regarding disclosure, etc., as he puts it. He’s asking for September 12 th , when he’ll be here to deal with this matter personally.” Mr. Boodoosingh, on behalf of the Crown, advised the Court that the Crown was in a position to set a trial date.
In spite of the Crown’s indication, and without giving any reasons [although the inference is clearly for the reasons indicated by the Defence because he told the Clerk to note the reason as “Crown pre-trial” which is required to set a trial date], the Justice of the Peace adjourned the matter as requested by the Defence to September 12, 2012. In my view, this 14 day delay is clearly attributed to the Defence for the same reasons as indicated for the delay from August 9 to 29, 2012. [ 43 ] September 12, 2012 [Exhibit 2.5 transcript] was the very first time that the Defence Counsel, Mr.
Engel, appeared personally for his client and was also the first time that Warsame Douale ever appeared in person on his charges. It was also the first time that the Defence was ready to set a date for trial. The earliest date offered by the Trial Coordinator was April 19 th , however, Mr. Engel was not available until the second date offered of April 24, 2013 [see Exhibit 7.1 Trial Coordinator’s Record of Court Dates Offered]. This trial was set “with or without Counsel” [see Exhibit 2.5 transcript at page 3 lines 3 to 4].
A good part of this time period of 7 months and 12 days (224 days) from set date to trial is attributed to institutional/systemic delay; however, for reasons discussed below, some time period must be deducted from that delay for issues relating to the retainer of Counsel and trial preparation. [ 44 ] On September 12, 2012, Mr. Engel advised the Court that he had not yet been fully retained for trial but expected to be by late October to early November [see Exhibit 2.5 transcript page 3, lines 5 to 10] and that he would be able to confirm that on the next court date requested of November 1, 2012. Mr.
Engel advised the Court that he was waiting for disclosure which was data with respect to the Intoxilyzer; however, it appears that this had already sent to him on July 18, 2012. Perhaps he was referring to the sample of the standard alcohol solution that he had requested and which had been waiting to picked up from the O.P.P. since July 20, 2012 (as noted above, a reminder letter was sent to Defence Counsel about this on November 23, 2012 indicating that if it was not picked up by January 23, 2013 it would not be kept any longer; Defence Counsel finally picked it up on January 7, 2013). Mr.
Engel also advised the Court that by November 1, 2012 he hoped to retrieve the balance of the disclosure that the Crown had agreed to provide [see Exhibit 2.5 transcript at page 3, lines 4 to 10].
This supports the Crown’s argument that the Defence was not in fact ready for trial until after November 1, 2012 since all of the disclosure that the Crown was agreeing to provide had already been provided in July or could be picked up at any time (the standard alcohol solution). [ 45 ] The Crown argues that some time should be deducted from the time period between September 12, 2012 to April 24, 2013 as time which would be required for Defence Counsel to be retained and to prepare for the trial, including the writing of Charter Applications and complying with the Notice requirements.
In other words, the time between the trial date being set and when Defence Counsel would be truly “ready for trial”. On September 12, 2013 the trial date was set “with or without Counsel” because Mr. Engel had not yet been fully retained for trial. The November 1, 2012 [Exhibit 2.6 transcript] appearance was for the Defence to confirm that Mr. Douale had in fact retained Mr. Engel for the trial date. On November 1, 2012 this was confirmed by Ms. Bristol, who once again appeared as agent for both Mr. Engel and Mr. Douale pursuant to the Designation filed.
There is no additional delay caused by this appearance, but it is important nevertheless, because this was the first date that Mr. Engel was prepared to go on the record to represent Mr. Douale for his trial. I conclude that Mr.
Engel would not have been in a position to represent his client at a trial before this date (he would not be “truly ready” for trial), therefore, I attribute the 50 day period from September 12 to November 1, 2012 as inherent/neutral time. [ 46 ] While I might also consider deducting an additional 51 days or more between the set date and trial as inherent/neutral time (to reflect the estimated time for Defence Counsel to prepare for trial including the writing of Charter Application materials and complying with Notice timelines), the record is not clear to me as to when Mr.
Engel would have been “truly ready” for trial and how much preparation time would be required. The record before me is silent as to how much work Mr. Engel had done to prepare for trial between the set-date and the date when he was fully retained for trial on November 1 st . It would normally be the Applicant’s burden to
provide that information. Since this period of time does not add to any delay, and because I am already deducting time from set-date to retainer-date, I will consider this time to be institutional/systemic delay, for this case only , because even if I do so, this case still remains within the Morin guidelines for delay in the Ontario Court of Justice. This should not , however, be taken as a precedent for other cases, because in similar circumstances in another case, I might well characterize it as neutral/inherent time as suggested by Justice Code in the case of R. v.
Lahiry , supra, and the Ontario Court of Appeal in Tran , supra. If I were to deduct preparation time in addition to the retainer time, I would have deducted an additional 7 weeks and treated that as neutral time. This would be based on the three weeks that Mr. Engel indicated (during oral submissions) that it would take him to prepare the trial Charter Application materials in this case, plus 30 days to comply with the Notice provisions for service on the Crown. [ 47 ] On April 24, 2013 [Exhibit 2.7 transcript], the day set for Mr. Douale's trial, the matter could not be reached.
The matter appeared before Justice Devlin, who was sitting on the last day of a three-day fraud trial. The Crown, Mr. Malleson, had alerted Justice Devlin on the first day that Mr. Douale's trial was scheduled for the third day and he had made efforts to see if another court would open up to take the trial, unfortunately without success. The matter had been moved to Justice Devlin’s court from another courtroom which had to be cancelled when it was discovered that a newly appointed Judge would be out of Province at a new judges’ educational program [see Exhibit 5]. This was not known at the time that Mr.
Douale's trial was originally scheduled. There is no evidence before me as to when the cancellation of that judge was first known by the Trial Coordinator’s office. It was hoped that another courtroom’s list would collapse and that Mr. Douale's trial could be moved there. Unfortunately that opportunity never arose. [ 48 ] By the afternoon of April 24 th it was apparent that Mr. Douale's trial could not be accommodated, so Defence Counsel attended at the Trial Coordinator’s office to obtain a new trial date. He returned with a date of September 18, 2013. It is important to note that when the Crown, Mr.
Malleson, became aware of this being the first date offered by the Trial Coordinator, that he very kindly offered to make attempts to look for an earlier trial date if Defence Counsel, Mr. Engel, would be willing to forward his available trial dates starting from the week after April 24 th . The Crown advised Justice Devlin that “I believe there’s a very good chance that I could find a trial date earlier than this, and bring the matter forward”. Mr. Engel responded, “Well, I’ll leave it for my friend, it’s not for me to hunt and search for the earliest date.
I came here prepared to deal with it today”. [See Exhibit 2.7 transcript at page 5 lines 4 to 15]. On this Application Mr. Engel advised that when he made that statement that he was frustrated with what had occurred that day. [ 49 ] When Justice Devlin was told about the September 18 th date she was concerned that there was no note from the Trial Coordinator reflecting that they had been made aware of there being a Charter s. 11(
b) concern. She was also concerned that this date had been arrived at without any input from the Crown. As a result of this she sent both of the lawyers back to speak to the Trial Coordinator together to look for earlier dates. In an attempt to minimize delay, the Crown offered to double-book courts on May 1 and 13, 2013, however, the Trial Coordinator did not offer those dates to Defence Counsel. The first date that the Trial Coordinator could offer was June 28, 2013 [see Exhibit 7.2 Trial Coordinator’s Record of Court Dates Offered].
Justice Devlin was advised of the June 28 th date but was informed that while both Crown and Defence lawyers were available that the Defence could not accept it because Mr. Douale, who is a student, “has an exam that date” (stated without any qualification) [see Exhibit 2.7 transcript at page 7, line10]. Justice Devlin clearly relied on Mr. Douale's claim that he had an exam on June 28 th when setting the next available date and added a note to that effect in red ink on the Trial Coordinator’s Record of Dates Offered [See Exhibit 2.7 at page 8, lines 13-26 and Exhibit 7.2].
For that reason alone, the new trial date was scheduled for September 3, 2013, the next date offered by the Trial Coordinator. I attribute the delay from April 24, 2013 to June 28, 2013, the earliest date offered, to institutional/systemic delay. [ 50 ] Based on the evidence as described in the paragraphs below, I attribute the delay from June 28, 2013 when the trial would have proceeded but for the exam issue, to September 3, 2013, the next date offered, to the Defence. This is because Mr. Douale did not in fact have an exam on the June date.
Defence and Crown Counsel and the witnesses were all available on the June date, and it would have proceeded then but for Mr. Douale's claim that he had an exam that day. [ 51 ] Exhibit 1 is the Affidavit of Warsame Douale dated May 30, 2013 in support of this s. 11(
b) Application. Paragraph 10 of his Affidavit states in part, “Although I was offered one date in late June earlier than the present rescheduled date of September 3, 2013, I was unfortunately unable to accept that because I was concerned about a conflict with my continuing education. I had enrolled in a course at George Brown that was scheduled to run from the end of April to the end of June. Although I didn’t know the final date of the course in June, I expected that I’d be writing one of my four exams that day.
I have attached as Exhibits my offer of enrolment and payment for the course as well as the actual timetable which I was provided at the first day of school on April 29 th .” [ 52 ] While the Affidavit indicates only that Mr. Douale “expected” he would be writing one of four exams June 28, 2013 when Justice Devlin was advised of that conflict, nowhere in Mr. Douale's Affidavit does it advise the Court on the s. 11(
b) Application, that he did not in fact have an exam on June 28, 2013. Although he initially claimed that he only found out his exam
schedule in June, during cross-examination on July 3, 2013, Mr. Douale admitted that by the time he swore his Affidavit on May 30, 2013 (one month after his courses had commenced), he knew that he had no exam on June 28 th . [ 53 ] Sometime after June 3, 2013 when the Affidavit was served on the Crown’s office, the Crown, Mr. Malleson, made inquiries of George Brown College to determine if the Defendant, Mr. Douale, in fact had an exam scheduled for June 28, 2013. Exhibit 3 is the Respondent’s Application Record. At tab 3 is an e-mail sent from Mr. Malleson to Mr. Engel.
The Defence has agreed that its contents can be treated as admitted facts [see Exhibit 4]. To summarize, Mr. Malleson found out three things: 1) that Warsame Douale never had an exam or any other educational commitment with George Brown College on June 28 th , 2) that he would have known the “end date” for any course when he signed up for it, and 3) that course calendars could be checked online or by telephoning George Brown College. Mr. Douale knew all of this information by the time he testified before me on July 3, 2013. In light of what Mr. Malleson had discovered, Mr.
Douale had to explain why he had claimed to have an exam on June 28, 2013. [ 54 ] When Mr. Douale testified on this Application he was cross-examined on his May 30, 2013 Affidavit. Exhibit 8 to Mr. Douale’s Affidavit [see Exhibit 1] is an Offer of Classroom Training dated February 9, 2013 confirming that Mr. Douale was registered
for a class that started on April 29th and ended on June 21, 2013. Mr. Douale had paid $452 for his course and the receipt from George Brown College dated March 5th is Exhibit 9 to his Affidavit. Mr. Douale testified that he assumed that an exam would take place in theweek after the course ended because he hadn’t taken a course with George Brown before. In Cross-Examination he agreed that all of hisexams were in fact completed by the end-date of the courses, April 21, 2013 and not the week following that. Exhibit 10 to Mr. Douale'sAffidavit is his curriculum for the hours and weeks of his courses.
He received this on the first day of classes on April 29, 2013. Itshows the dates for his courses as April 29 to June 21. Mr. Douale testified that he did not how to check a course calendar online. He gave evidence that even if he had phoned George Brown on April 24th to find out about his exams, in his experience it takes a week for them to respond after leaving a message on voicemail. In Cross-Examination Mr. Douale testified that on April 24th he had told Mr.Engel that he “probably” had an exam that day and that he did nothing to correct the situation when Mr.
Engel told Justice Devlin that hedid have an exam that day. Mr. Douale never contacted his lawyer to bring the matter forward once he found out about his true exam schedule. He said he didn’t know he should do that. Even if an honest mistake had been made about the exam on April 24th, the Defence did nothing to correct the error that had been made or bring the matter forward once it was discovered to see if the June 28th date was still available. The facts of this case are very different from those where Defence Counsel cannot proceed on a single earlierdate offered by the Court: see R. v.
Godin 2009 SCC 26 , [2009] S.C.J. No. 26 (S.C.C.) at paras. 21-23; and R. v. Barnes [2003]O.J. No. 3217 (O.C.J.) at paras. 6 and 11. In those cases the Court was considering Counsel’s busy
schedule and not the accused’s,especially in circumstances as here where the accused provided incorrect information to the court about his availability. For all of these reasons, I attribute the delay from June 28 to September 3, 2013 to the Defence, because the matter would have proceeded on June 28th but for Mr. Douale's misstatement about his exam. [55] The s. 11(
b) Application was scheduled at some time after April 24th for July 3, 2013. On July 3rd, I had a detaileddiscussion with Crown Counsel, Mr. Malleson, and Defence Counsel, Mr. Engel, about the anticipated trial issues in this matter asoutlined earlier in these Reasons. The case had been never been judicially pre-tried and was estimated by both lawyers to take 1 fullday.
As indicated earlier, it became readily apparent during our discussions that due to the issues to be litigated, that the original trialestimate was woefully inadequate, and that instead of the one day set aside for trial on September 3, 2013 that it would likely take two full days of trial time to complete this matter. This had never been discussed or recognized by anyone before July 3rd.
I attended withboth lawyers at the Trial Coordinator’s office where it became apparent that it would be very difficult to find a second day of trial withina date proximate to the first trial date since our courts are now fully booked to March of 2014. The Trial Coordinator did offer to adddates on July 19 and 24, 2013, but these were not available to Defence Counsel who would be on vacation from July 19 to August 9,2013 (which I accept is a very reasonable basis upon which to decline those dates).
In order to minimize any further delay I gave up aChambers (Non-Preside) Day on September 27, 2013 for the second day to continue the trial [See Exhibit 7.3 Trial Coordinator’s Recordof Court Dates Offered]. Given that both Crown and Defence Counsel significantly underestimated the time required for this trial whenit was first set, I consider the time from September 3 to 27, 2013 (24 days) to be neutral time. This was conceded by Defence Counselduring submissions.
Claims of Specific Prejudice Suffered by the Applicant [56] The Applicant, Warsame Douale, filed an affidavit in support of this Application and as indicated above, testified. In hisAffidavit, he claims that in addition to the usual inferred prejudice that he has suffered the following actual/specific prejudice: On April 24, 2013 I appeared for trial as scheduled at 9:30 in #403 court. Given that a whole day had been set aside for the hearing Iexpected my case to be the only matter on the docket.
Another case was being heard however so counsel and I waited all morning hopingthat some other court would open up and we can at least start the case. This was particularly important since I understood from counselthat the Crown was late in responding to our Charter materials and that he was, in the absence an explanation for the breach, not inclinedto consent to their application to abridge the time for service. I have attached as an Exhibit Mr.
Engel’s correspondence with the Crownexpressing his position on delay. … Over the past year that this proceeding has hung over my head, with yet another 3 months left before this case is finally expected toproceed, I have experienced considerable stress. On top of countless, sleepless nights I have also experienced anxiety during the daywhich seems to be increasing as the trial date finally draws near. I feel as if my life is “on hold”. As I’ve waited for this trial to come Ifeel very unsettled. I have dreams of becoming a journeyman, the key word "journey'.
I’ve been doing my apprenticeship for three years after receiving mywelder fitter diploma and I still have two and a half more years to go to achieve my dream of securing my Red Seal licence that wouldallow me to work anywhere in Canada or even the world. I have particular concerns about my driving privileges in the event that I don’twin the case.
In order to advance to the next year it takes 1700 hours of work and school and without a driver’s licence I don’t knowwhat I could possibly do in the line of work because I have to be able to drive to wherever the job is, which could be as far east asPeterborough and as far north as Barrie. Because of this outstanding trial I have also postponed financing a car because I am worried that if the case doesn’t wind up in myfavour I’ll get stuck with payments for a vehicle I won’t even be able to drive. For the time being I’ve relied on company vehicles whichlimits my employment options.
Apart from personal anxiety I also have concerns about caring for my family. I live at home with my mother and support her because of her inability to work due to poor health. She is 55 and presently recovering from breast cancer. She relies on my income to help pay the monthly household bills. In addition to my concerns about the prospects of losing my licence, I have experienced real and present losses due to the delay in this case. My education has suffered because the school that would better teach my trade and better equip me for my Red Seal exam, which has a 80% success rate, is located in Oakville.
Without a car it is almost impossible to attend five days a week so I have to settle with a course closer to home at George Brown. That’s certainly more convenient but the problem is that this school only has a 60% success rate on Red Seal exams and I need a minimum of 70% to pass. I have also missed several work days going to court dates and meetings with Mr. Engel at his office to discuss the case. Consequently, I haven't even taken a sick day even when I am ill or a vacation from work due to concerns that if I take too many days off I could get fired. My personal relationships have also suffered.
Last year before I was charged I had plans to ask my girlfriend to marry me but lately we have been seeing less and less of each other because we both live so far away so we decided to break up earlier this year. Needless to say, my legal fees have also been substantial and just when I thought I had them under control I now have to deal with the additional cost associated with the second trial date I now face this coming September. Apart from the emotional turmoil that I have endured over the past year awaiting trial, Mr.
Engel informs me that my right to full answer and defence has also been potentially compromised. He has explained to me for instance that in the event that I choose to testify I can expect that my powers of recollection will be challenged due to the significant passage of time since the arrest. [ 57 ] As directed by the appellate authorities, it is important to distinguish between specific prejudice suffered as a result of delay in bringing the matter to trial, from that caused by the fact of being charged. [ 58 ] I do not doubt that Mr.
Douale has experienced the usual inferred stresses as a result of these charges and that they have been aggravated by delay. There is no doubt that delay also negatively affects witnesses’ memories. I also accept that on April 24 th when the trial could not be reached that it made Mr. Douale anxious and that the stresses of having these charges outstanding for a longer period of time have added strain on Mr. Douale. I accept that there is increased prejudice where a trial is not reached on the first trial date due to overbooked courts: see R. v. Jaramillo [2002] O.J.
No. 4435 (O.C.J.) at para. 24 ; and Barnes, supra, at paras. 3 and 6. Further, I accept that there are increased legal costs when delay occurs, including the costs of bringing this Application. It is important to keep in mind, however, that many of his legal costs for a two day trial would have been sustained even if the trial had been held sooner. [ 59 ] I am sympathetic to the fact that Mr. Douale has had his personal relationships suffer as a result these offences, and that he has made decisions about his education based on the possibility that he might lose his license if convicted.
I conclude, however, that those issues arise as a result of being charged, and not because of any delay in having the charges come to trial. The impact of the legal proceedings on Mr. Douale’s family, job, education plans, and income stream was inevitable and has little to do with delay. Result [ 60 ] I conclude that the delay in this case did not compromise the fairness of the trial or materially affect the Applicant’s liberty or security of the person. There is an important societal interest in having these offences tried on the merits.
I conclude that at the most, only 8 months of the total 15 months and 25 days of delay is allocated to institutional/systemic delay. If I were to deduct an additional 7 weeks of preparation time, the total systemic delay would be only 6 months and 1 week. This case, therefore, meets the Supreme Court of Canada’s Morin, supra, guidelines of 8 to 10 months of acceptable delay for trials in the Ontario Court of Justice. As a result, I am of the view that the delay in this case is not unconstitutional. In all of the circumstances, and in spite of any prejudice suffered by Mr.
Douale (real or inferred), I am not persuaded that the Applicant has satisfied me that
section 11(
b) has been infringed or that these charges should be stayed. This Application is dismissed and the trial will continue as scheduled. Released on: July 29, 2013 Signed: “Justice S. C. MacLean”
Appendix A –
Summary of Allocation of Delay in R. v. Warsame DOUALE Period: Duration: Attributed to: Reason: June 2, 2012 to June 13, 2012 11 days [0 attributed] Inherent/Neutral Time from arrest to information being sworn. No time allocated. June 13, 2012 to June 28, 2012 15 days Inherent/Neutral Time from information being sworn until First Appearance. Defence Counsel partially retained. June 28, 2012 to July 19, 2012 21 days Inherent/Neutral Time needed for Defence Counsel to review disclosure. Also to write for additional disclosure concerning the Approved Screening Device and Intoxilyzer.
July 19, 2012 to August 9, 2012 21 days Inherent/Neutral Defence Counsel on vacation for part of this time. Time also needed for Defence Counsel to review and respond to the Crown’s response regarding additional disclosure being sought. August 9, 2012 to August 29, 2012 20 days Defence Defence Counsel sought an adjournment to review disclosure which had in fact already been provided by the Crown on July 18, 2012.
August 29, 2012 to September 12, 2012 14 days Defence This was the third request by the Defence to adjourn the matter to seek disclosure which the Crown had by July already made clear it would not provide. NOTE: the alcohol standard solution requested by Defence on July 13, 2012, which the Crown offered to provide in a letter dated July 20, 2012, and reminded the Defence about in a second letter on November 23, 2012 was not in fact collected by the Defence at the O.P.P. station until January 7, 2013.
Total time from Set date to First Trial date: September 12, 2012 to April 24, 2012 224 days (7 months and 12 days) – see breakdown below Institutional/Systemic AND Inherent/Neutral Delay needed by the system to accommodate this trial. Less time attributed to Inherent/Neutral time for retainer of Counsel and preparation for Defence to be “truly ready” for trial [see break-down below] Period: Duration: Attributed to: Reason: September 12, 2012 November 1, 2012 50 days Inherent/Neutral Time between set date and appearance when Defence Counsel confirmed he had been retained for trial and was “truly ready” for trial.
November 1, 2012 to December 22, 2012 51 days [NOTE: these 51 days are already included in the next total of 175 days
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