R. v. Ormston, 2013 ONCJ 437
Opinion
COURT FILE No.: 11-A11828 Region of Durham Citation: R. v. Ormston, 2013 ONCJ 437 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Respondent— AND — Janet ORMSTON Applicant Reasons for Dismissing the s. 8 Charter Application Before Justice Susan C. MacLean Heard on May 28 and 29, 2013 Reasons for Ruling delivered on August 7, 2013 Ms. Melissa McCormick................................................................. for the Crown/Respondent Mr. Paul Lewin.................................................................................. for the Accused/Applicant MacLean S.C., J.: [1] The Accused/Applicant, Janet Ormston, submits that her rights pursuant to
section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights andFreedoms were infringed when the police searched Jeanette Nolan's cell phone (after Ms. Nolan was arrested on drug charges on April19, 2011) and they found text messages that Ms. Ormston had sent to Ms. Nolan that day. The Crown relies on these text messages asevidence that Janet Ormston was trafficking in crack cocaine and that Jeanette Nolan purchased drugs from her that day. Janet Ormstonhas applied for the exclusion of those text messages from the evidence at this trial pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter. One of themain issues is whether Ms.
Ormston has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages found on the cell phone of anotherperson. A related and significant issue is whether the cell phone was in fact searched for a permissible purpose incident to the arrest ofJeanette Nolan. [2] The evidence on this Charter Application was heard on May 28 and 29, 2013. Due to the complexity of the issues to bedetermined, transcripts were ordered, and written submissions were filed by both parties in July.
Counsel had advised me that theyestimated that an additional 1½ days would be required to complete this trial if this Application were to be denied. Out of concern to minimize any potential s. 11(
b) delay, on May 29th I requested that Crown and Defence Counsel speak to the Trial Coordinator toschedule targeted dates for this trial to continue (which could be vacated if this Application was granted). Today I was informed that, pursuant to my direction, continuing trial dates on September 30th and October 1, 2013 have been scheduled. [3] For the following Reasons, I dismiss this Application and find that the text messages are admissible in evidence at this trial. Ialso direct that the trial continue on the dates scheduled.
Overview of the Case [4] Janet Ormston was arrested by the Durham Regional Police Service and charged with two counts of trafficking in cocaine,however, on the first date of trial the Crown withdrew one count that related to April 15, 2011, leaving one count of trafficking to betried relating to April 19, 2011. [5] Based on the decision of Justice Nordheimer in R. v. S. M. 2012 ONSC 2949 , [2012] O.J. No. 2833 (Ont.S.C., sitting
as a trial judge), the Crown in this case conceded that Janet Ormston has standing to argue a Charter breach in relation to messages that she sent but which were found on Jeanette Nolan's cell phone which was seized incident to Ms. Nolan’s arrest. Since the issue of standing was not litigated before me, this Ruling should not be considered as having determined the issue of whether the sender of text messages has standing in circumstances where the police find those messages on someone else’s cell phone.
The Evidence in this Case [ 6 ] The parties filed an Agreed Statement of Facts with the Court that is Exhibit 1 on this Application (at this point in the trial these are admitted facts for the purpose of the Charter voir dire only). It reads as follows: “An investigation began into Ms. Ormston in April 2011 when officers received information that she was trafficking cocaine in the Durham Region. The officers received this information prior to April 15, 2011. The Durham Region Drug Enforcement Unit began conducting surveillance on Ms. Ormston on April 15, 2011.
They had an address that they believed was her residence. That address was 26 Salmon Way in Whitby. They believed that she was employed by GM Canada. There were 2 days of surveillance prior to the date in question. Officers conducted surveillance on April 15, 2011. On April 19, 2011, a briefing took place in relation to the investigation into Ms. Ormston at 22:15 and ended at 22:18. Officers again set up surveillance and located her vehicle outside of GM. At 22:40, Ms. Ormston is observed attending at the vehicle, and is followed into the Whitby area, and ultimately back to 26 Salmon Way.
At 23:09 she is observed leaving the residence at 26 Salmon Way, getting into her vehicle, and she is subsequently followed through the Whitby area. She is observed attending at that Kiss’n Ride located at Mary Street, west of Garden and is ultimately followed to a parking lot in the area of 580 Mary Street. During the course of the officers’ surveillance in this matter, Ms. Ormston is observed to be the only occupant in the vehicle that she is operating. While she is in the area of 580 Mary Street, officers observe a white female exit a blue Honda, attend at Ms.
Ormston's vehicle, and ultimately enters on the front passenger side of Ms. Ormston's vehicle. After a brief meeting, the parties separate and drive out of the lot. Both vehicles are followed by members of the Drug Enforcement Unit. Ms. Ormston is followed back to the 26 Salmon Way address. The driver of the Honda was followed and a traffic stop was initiated at Garden Street and Rossland Road in the Town of Whitby. The female, later identified as Jeanette Nolan, was directed out of the vehicle, arrested for possession of a controlled substance and searched incident to arrest.
A small vial with white residue was found on her person in her right jacket pocket. Ms. Nolan’s vehicle and purse were also searched. Inside Ms. Nolan's purse, officers located a crack pipe and steel wool. It should be noted as well that Ms. Nolan was searched in more detail at the police station and was found to be concealing ½ a tablet of Oxycontin in her bra. A further search of the area where Ms. Nolan was directed out of the vehicle ultimately yielded 2.1 grams of crack cocaine. This substance was located by the driver’s door of Ms. Nolan's vehicle, on the paved road. A passenger was also in Ms.
Nolan's vehicle at the time of the traffic stop. A male, later identified as Mark Monkman, was also arrested for possession of a controlled substance and searched incident to arrest. Officers located on his person a piece of steel wool, as well as $100.00 in cash. Based on the arrest of Ms. Nolan, as well as other factors relating to the investigation, the Drug Enforcement Unit applied for a search warrant for 26 Salmon Way. The warrant was ultimately granted, and entry was gained in the early morning hours of April 20, 2011.
While conducting the search, officers find inside the unit: (1) $1,200.00 in the master bedroom in the top drawer of a night stand at the end of the bed; (2) $200.00 in the master bedroom in the north dresser, top drawer; (3) $1,795.00 in the master bedroom in the northwest dresser in the 6 th of 8 drawers in a pants pocket; (4) $1,480.00 in the master bedroom in the northwest dresser in the 6 th of 8 drawers in the crotch area of a pair of pants;
(5) A green LG Cell Phone with a phone number of 289-987-4296 on the kitchen counter;
(6) A black LG Cell Phone with a phone number of 289-987-0935 on the kitchen counter;
(7) A Blue Pontiac G5 was located in the driveway, which was the vehicle Ms. Ormston had been observed in earlier in the
investigation;
(8) Cheques in the name of Maurice Emil located in the master bedroom in the top drawer of the armoire;
(9) A photo of Ms. Ormston and an adult male was located in the master bedroom on top of a long dresser;
(10) Sandwich bags with one that had been ripped in the kitchen in the bottom drawer to the left of the stove;
(11) A Starfrit digital scale on the kitchen counter; and
(12) A Diamond Serious A04 digital scale in the kitchen on the counter beside the microwave. Officers also located in the course of their search a quantity of male clothing in the master bedroom.” [ 7 ] Det. Cst. Dave Davies of the Durham Regional Police Service also testified on this Charter Application. He has been employed as a police officer since 1999 and is a member of the Drug Enforcement Unit. His duties in relation to this investigation commenced on April 19, 2011 around 22:15 hours. He was part of the surveillance team observing the activities of Janet Ormston.
They believed she was trafficking in cocaine and she was their primary target. Det. Cst. Davies was eventually assigned to go with a separate surveillance team following Jeanette Nolan, who was believed to be Janet Ormston's customer. He was one of four officers who participated in a traffic stop of a blue Honda with license plate BJFV 868 and the arrest of Ms. Nolan. Det. Cst. Davies arrested the passenger, Mark Monkman at 23:39 hours while another officer arrested the driver, Jeanette Nolan. Det. Cst. Davies searched Mr. Monkman and located money in his right front pocket.
In the same pocket he located white residue in a container and steel wool. [ 8 ] At some point Det. Cst. Davies was assigned to be the exhibits officer for this investigation. At the police station officers were attending with articles found at the scene and turning them over to him. The Honda motor vehicle had also been seized. Det. Cst. Davies had personally seized from Mr. Monkman $100.00 cash, steel wool, and a container with white residue. The items seized by other officers included the crack cocaine located on the roadway by Det. Cst.
Williamson, a “drug-kit” which had been located in the car, a clear cylinder with a red cap located in Ms. Nolan's jacket, and half of an “Oxy 60” Oxycontin tablet found when Jeanette Nolan was searched at the police station by a female officer. The crack cocaine weighed 2.1 grams and Det. Cst. Davies placed it in a sealed envelope to be sent to Health Canada for analysis. Continuity of the crack cocaine is conceded for this trial. [ 9 ] At the Oshawa police station Det. Cst. Davies also received a cell phone with phone number 905-903-2916 from Det. Cst.
Thomson who told him that it had been found on the driver’s seat of the vehicle (which Det. Cst. Davies knew had been driven by Jeanette Nolan). Det. Cst. Davies clearly believed that it was Jeanette Nolan's cell phone. Additional admitted facts were placed before me with respect to Det. Cst. Thomson’s evidence to the effect that: he was one of the officers who searched Ms. Nolan's car and he found the cell phone on the driver’s seat and seized it; he did not examine the cell phone; he turned the cell phone over to Det. Cst. Davies but did not instruct him to do anything with the cell phone. [ 10 ] Det. Cst.
Davies testified that he conducted a “tertiary” search of the phone. He used the word “tertiary” several times in his evidence but later clarified that he meant a “cursory”, very quick search of the phone. I am satisfied that he misspoke and does in fact understand what is meant by the word “cursory”. He did not consult with any other officer before searching the cell phone. He was looking for evidence of the meeting and the drug transaction that he believed had occurred between Janet Ormston and Jeanette Nolan. The evidence before me does not disclose the time at which Det. Cst.
Davies received the phone from Det. Cst. Thomson, the time at which the searched commenced or how long it took to conduct his cursory search of it. From the totality of his evidence, however, I conclude that the search was done shortly after he received the cell phone and that the search was in fact brief and cursory as he looked for the specific information described. [ 11 ] Jeanette Nolan's cell phone was already turned on when it was provided to Det. Cst. Davies and it was neither locked nor password protected. He testified that he accessed what he was looking for on the cell phone “very easily”.
He went into the system part of the phone associated to a SIM card or processor inside the phone which identified the phone number for that cell phone as 905-903- 2916. He did not get the name associated with that cell phone number. Det. Cst. Davies also went into the Contacts list of the cell phone and located “Janet” and the phone number 289-987-4296. Although it did not list Janet Ormston’s surname he believed that this was in fact her cell phone number.
The officer also went through the menu function to acquire text messages and “saw that there was evidence relating to the meeting and I obtained those text messages specifically only for the meeting. There was other messages that were in the context which I did not record because it was not relevant to our investigation…” [see Transcript, May 28, 2013, page 29 line 1 to page 30 line 5] [ 12 ] Det. Cst. Davies was specifically looking for, and found what he believed to be text messages relating to the meeting between Janet Ormston and Jeanette Nolan that had taken place on April 19, 2011.
There were other text messages interspersed with the messages exchanged between Janet Ormston and Jeanette Nolan that he read to see if they were relevant. He “discarded” them as not being involved in the investigation (he did not delete them), and did not document or record them in any way. He does not know how many other text messages he read because he did not document them. Det. Cst. Davies believed that only the messages with the name “Janet” were relevant as being connected to the meeting with Janet Ormston that day.
He only read those messages commencing at 7:01 p.m. because it was more related to the time of the meeting and he did not look to see if there were any messages from Janet Ormston earlier that day. He believed that Janet Ormston had only one phone number that Jeanette Nolan knew. I accept that Det. Cst. Davies specifically ignored other unrelated text messages, did not search the cell phone for any images or photographs, and sought only to locate those text messages which related to the meeting between Janet Ormston and Jeanette Nolan. [ 13 ] Det. Cst.
Davies believed that when he searched Jeanette Nolan's cell phone contents that he had the right to do so pursuant to a search incident to the arrest of Ms. Nolan. He believed that he could do a cursory search of a cell phone that was case specific, relating to messages sent prior to a drug buy meeting that would provide a context for why they were meeting, when the meeting occurred, etc. He would look for messages that might provide evidence relating to the investigation including evidence against
both the purchaser and the person selling the drugs. To me this is simply common sense, because the evidence against the purchaser would normally be the identical evidence against the seller (as messages are exchanged about the drug buy). He also believed that it was also lawful to obtain text messages specific to the police investigation that might assist in other parts of the investigation. When he searched the cell phone there was no urgency. Det. Cst. Davies knew no other officer had done it yet so thought he should search it.
He never thought about obtaining a search warrant to examine the cell phone’s contents. [ 14 ] In cross-examination Det. Cst. Davies agreed that Janet Ormston was the target of the police investigation and that he had also been part of a surveillance team watching her on an earlier date. When Det. Cst. Davies was searching Ms. Nolan's cell phone he was thought that he would find evidence that could be used against both Jeanette Nolan and Janet Ormston. Det. Cst. Davies made no notes about why he searched the cell phone.
He believed that the search of Jeanette Nolan's cell phone text messages would assist in the investigation against Ms. Nolan by knowing what drugs she had ordered from Janet Ormston, to confirm that she had picked up the drugs from Ms. Ormston and to provide context for the meeting. It would also help with the police investigation of the trafficking by Janet Ormston. Contrary to his earlier evidence, it is important to note that at the end of his cross-examination, Det. Cst.
Davies agreed with the suggestion that when he searched Jeanette Nolan's cell phone he did it for the sole purpose of gathering evidence against Ms. Ormston [see Transcript May 29, 2013 page 19 lines 20 to 29]. This answer is examined in greater detail commencing at paragraph 33 below. [ 15 ] While Det. Cst.
Davies completed his initial cursory search of Jeanette Nolan's cell phone shortly after receiving it, before he could make any written record of the relevant text messages, he was assigned to other important duties that had him back out on the road until 4:00 a.m. (because his unit was short-handed he had to assist with duties such as obtaining a search warrant for Janet Ormston's residence). When he returned to his next shift at 12:00 p.m., he first had to search Janet Ormston's motor vehicle at the Durham Regional Police Property Bureau in Courtice before returning to his desk.
It was only at that time that he first had the opportunity to type out the text messages that he had already found the night before. It appears that he did not search for nor find any additional evidence on the cell phone at that time. [ 16 ] Det. Cst. Davies typed the text messages exchanged between Jeanette Nolan and Janet Ormston verbatim into a Word document/chart (see Exhibit
A) as he was reading the messages directly off of the cell phone (he did not capture the screen image in any other way).
I have summarized the sender/receiver part of this chart to simplify it, but have reproduced the contents of the text messages verbatim: 7:01 p.m. sent from Jeanette Nolan’s cell phone: I have that for u 7:03 p.m. sent from Janet Ormston's cell phone: Yahoo shit im at w2ork can I see u at 10:30 p.m. 7:23 p.m. sent from Jeanette Nolan's cell phone: We will not spend it this time hun 7:25 p.m. sent from Janet Ormston's cell phone: In Oh good thanku I will call u at 10:30 p.m. 10:03 p.m. sent from Jeanette Nolan's cell phone: How much do I owe 10:04 p.m. sent from Janet Ormston's cell phone: 120 10:04 p.m. sent from Jeanette Nolan's cell phone: k 10:21 p.m. sent from Jeanette Nolan's cell phone: make it 2 hb instead of one whole pls 10:25 p.m. sent from Janet Ormston's cell phone: k cool 11:27 p.m. sent from Jeanette Nolan's cell phone: here in visitors at back [ 17 ] Det.
Cst. Davies testified in cross-examination that he believed the permissible purposes of a search incident to arrest are “to assist in an investigation, to collect evidence, to put it in context” and that “obviously case law changes and new things come out, new practices exist and we change our ways with case law” [see Transcript May 28, 2013 page 47 lines 17 to 30]. He advised that the evidence must be evidence that “can be” used at the arrestee’s trial, but that it doesn’t have to be.
[18] Det. Cst. Davies has believed these to be the purposes of a search incident to arrest since he first started policing in 1999and he is “comfortable” with his practices in this regard. Det. Cst. Davies testified that he received training on this issue at the OntarioPolice College when he first became an officer, and later at Osgoode Hall when learning about search warrant drafting (which includedsearch incident to arrest as part of the proper grounds when writing an information to obtain a search warrant).
He attended druginvestigation courses three or four years ago that taught him that search incident to arrest is to obtain evidence that could be used at thearrestee’s trial. He has also had on-the-job training because it comes up a lot in police work. He has learned from more experiencedofficers and it is all “situational because every investigation is unique”. [see Transcript May 29, 2013 pages 3 and 4] He has also learnedby being involved in court cases. Det. Cst. Davies has not heard of the R. v. Caslake (SCC), [1998] S.C.J. No. 3(S.C.C.) decision which deals with search incident to arrest.
He does not know if the law regarding search incident to arrest arose fromcaselaw or the Criminal Code. [19] Det. Cst. Davies testified that, “when we arrest people or charge people or investigate people and lay charges againstthem, once we arrest them, if we find evidence relating to them or others, we will seize it and bring it before the Court as evidence” [seeTranscript May 29, 2013 page 9 lines 27 to 31].
He believes that the evidence seized does not have to be evidence on the arrestee’s trial. [20] The officer also disagreed that reading text messages is like listening in on a conversation “because I'm acting in goodfaith and I'm doing a [cursory] search to support my investigation and I was very case specific in what I was obtaining” [see TranscriptMay 29, 2013 page 11 lines 15 to 22]. Det. Cst. Davies did agree eventually, however, that text messages are like a digital conversationbut he continued to firmly maintain his belief that reading them is not the same as listening in on a spoken conversation.
He explainedthat he uses the messages as investigative tools and it is very case specific [see Transcript May 29, 2013 page 12 line 25 to Page 13 line12; Page 13 line 30 to Page 14 line 12; Page 14 lines 31-32]. [21] During cross-examination the officer struggled with coming to an understanding that spoken conversations and textmessages are comparable in terms of being private communications.
He disagreed that it’s an “intrusive invasion of privacy to look atprivate communications contained in text messages” [see Transcript May 29, 2013 page 17 lines 27 to Page 18 line 4; and Page 18 line27 to Page 19 line 11]: “Because I feel that in text messages once they’re sent from one phone to another, all their rights are gone. They’ve gone to anotherphone you don't know who’s the carrier of the other phone…you’re only relying on two phone numbers if you’re communicating withtwo people.
You know once it’s gone, it’s gone, it’s into another phone, you’re relying that the person on the other end has that phoneand sending it back and forth as a two-way conversation.” [see Transcript May 29, 2013 page 19 lines 1 to 11] [22] It is clear from this evidence that Det. Cst. Davies believes that the reasonable expectation of privacy for the sender isdiminished once a text message has been sent to another person’s cell phone, because it depends on what the receiver does with it. [23] There was no other evidence called on this Application although Jeanette Nolan did testify on the trial proper.
TheApplicant, Janet Ormston, elected not to testify on this voir dire. I am mindful that she is not required to testify and that the Crown bearsthe burden of proof on this Application because there was a warrantless search of the cell phone. The Law with Respect to Search Incident to Arrest [24] The Applicant argues that when searching Jeanette Nolan's cell phone, that Det. Cst. Davies was acting outside thepermissible scope of search incident to arrest.
It is argued that, based on his final answer in cross-examination, that the officer’s solepurpose in searching the cell phone was to gather evidence against Janet Ormston rather than against the arrestee, Jeanette Nolan. [25] To be reasonable under s. 8 of the Charter, a search must be authorized by law, the law itself must be reasonable, and thesearch must be carried out in a reasonable manner.
A warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable, so in those circumstances theCrown has the burden of showing that the search was, on the balance of probabilities, reasonable. [26] In Caslake, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada clarified the law with respect to the common law power of the police toconduct a search incident to arrest. This was considered in the context of an inventory search of the accused's motor vehicle following anarrest. Search incident to arrest is an exception to the ordinary requirements for a reasonable search.
The police do not need reasonableand probable grounds to conduct a search on this basis, however, they must subjectively have some reason related to the arrest forconducting the search at the time the search is carried out, and that reason must be objectively reasonable. The right to search arisesfrom the fact of the arrest, which in itself must arise from either an arrest warrant or reasonable and probable grounds to arrest. For thistype of search to be legal, the arrest must also be legal and the search must be truly incidental to that arrest.
The Court discussed theobjective and scope of a search incident to arrest and clarified the permissible purposes for such a search. The police must not onlyobjectively search within the permissible scope but also turn their mind to this scope before searching. [27] In Caslake the Court concluded that while the motor vehicle in that case could in fact have been searched incident toarrest, that since the stated purpose of the search was to inventory the contents of the motor vehicle that it fell outside the boundaries ofthe legitimate purposes of search incident to arrest.
The evidence discovered in the motor vehicle was not, however, excluded under a s.24(2) analysis because, applying the pre-Grant 2009 SCC 32 , [2009] S.C.J.
No. 32 (S.C.C.) factors the Court concluded that:1) the evidence was non-conscriptive and would have no effect on the fairness of the trial; 2) the breach was not serious, there was a lowexpectation of privacy in the area searched, the police acted in good faith and had reasonable and probable grounds, all of whichfavoured admission of the evidence; and 3) since the prosecution had no case without the evidence, that the exclusion of it would have amore serious impact on the repute of the administration of justice than admitting it. [28] Chief Justice Lamer, in writing for the majority in Caslake, at paragraphs 14 to 25 clarified the scope of search incident toarrest:
14 In Cloutier [ (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.)], L'Heureux-Dubé J. also recognized the potential breadth ofthis police power. She held that the court must balance the state's interests in law enforcement and the protection of the policeagainst the arrested person's interest in privacy in order to determine whether a search was a reasonable and justifiable use ofthe police power. She then set out three important limits on the power to search incident to arrest (at p. 186): 1. This power does not impose a duty. The police have some discretion in conducting the search.
Where they are satisfied that the lawcan be effectively and safely applied without a search, the police may see fit not to conduct a search. They must be in a position to assessthe circumstances of each case so as to determine whether a search meets the underlying objectives. 2. The search must be for a valid objective in pursuit of the ends of criminal justice, such as the discovery of an object that maybe a threat to the safety of the police, the accused or the public, or that may facilitate escape or act as evidence against theaccused.
The purpose of the search must not be unrelated to the objectives of the proper administration of justice, which would bethe case for example if the purpose of the search was to intimidate, ridicule or pressure the accused in order to obtain admissions. 3. The search must not be conducted in an abusive fashion and in particular, the use of physical or psychological constraint should beproportionate to the objectives sought and the other circumstances of the situation.
If all three of these conditions are met, and the arrest itself is lawful, the search will be "authorized by law" for the purposes of s. 8 of theCharter. In the case at bar there is no allegation that the arrest was unlawful or that the search was abusive. Rather, the problem in thiscase is that the objective and scope of the search exceeded its permissible limits. C. The Scope of Search Incident to Arrest 15 Since search incident to arrest is a common-law power, there are no readily ascertainable limits on its scope.
It is therefore thecourts' responsibility to set boundaries which allow the state to pursue its legitimate interests, while vigorously protecting individuals'right to privacy… 16 Scope can also refer to temporal limits on the power of search, which are at the core of the case at bar…In my opinion, the Courtshould be reluctant to set a strict limit on the amount of time that can elapse between the time of search and the time of arrest. 17 In my view, all of the limits on search incident to arrest are derived from the justification for the common law power itself:searches which derive their legal authority from the fact of arrest must be truly incidental to the arrest in question.
The authority for thesearch does not arise as a result of a reduced expectation of privacy of the arrested individual.
Rather, it arises out of a need forthe law enforcement authorities to gain control of things or information which outweighs the individual's interest inprivacy…This means, simply put, that the search is only justifiable if the purpose of the search is related to the purpose of thearrest. … 19 As L'Heureux-Dubé J. stated in Cloutier, the three main purposes of search incident to arrest are ensuring the safety of thepolice and public, the protection of evidence from destruction at the hands of the arrestee or others, and the discovery ofevidence which can be used at the arrestee's trial.
The restriction that the search must be "truly incidental" to the arrest means that thepolice must be attempting to achieve some valid purpose connected to the arrest. Whether such an objective exists will depend onwhat the police were looking for and why. There are both subjective and objective aspects to this issue. In my view, the policemust have one of the purposes for a valid search incident to arrest in mind when the search is conducted.
Further, the officer'sbelief that this purpose will be served by the search must be a reasonable one. 20 To be clear, this is not a standard of reasonable and probable grounds, the normal threshold that must be surpassed beforea search can be conducted. Here, the only requirement is that there be some reasonable basis for doing what the police officerdid…The police have considerable leeway in the circumstances of an arrest which they do not have in other situations. At thesame time, in keeping with the criteria in Cloutier, there must be a "valid objective" served by the search.
An objective cannot bevalid if it is not reasonable to pursue it in the circumstances of the arrest.
21 In my view, it would be contrary to the spirit of the Charter's s. 8 guarantee of security against unreasonable searches or seizures toallow searches incident to arrest which do not meet both the subjective and objective criteria. This Court cannot characterize a searchas being incidental to an arrest when the officer is actually acting for purposes unrelated to the arrest. That is the reason for thesubjective element of the test.
The objective element ensures that the police officer's belief that he or she has a legitimate reason tosearch is reasonable in the circumstances. 22 Requiring that the search be truly incidental to the arrest means that if the justification for the search is to find evidence, theremust be some reasonable prospect of securing evidence of the offence for which the accused is being arrested.
For example, whenthe arrest is for traffic violations, once the police have ensured their own safety, there is nothing that could properly justify searching anyfurther (see Belnavis, supra). … 24 The temporal limits on search incident to arrest will also be derived from the same principles. There is no need to set a firmdeadline on the amount of time that may elapse before the search can no longer said to be incidental to arrest…. 25 In
summary, searches must be authorized by law. If the law on which the Crown is relying for authorization is the common lawdoctrine of search incident to arrest, then the limits of this doctrine must be respected. The most important of these limits is that thesearch must be truly incidental to the arrest. This means that the police must be able to explain, within the purposes articulated inCloutier, supra (protecting the police, protecting the evidence, discovering evidence), or by reference to some other valid purpose, whythey searched. They do not need reasonable and probable grounds.
However, they must have had some reason related to thearrest for conducting the search at the time the search was carried out, and that reason must be objectively reasonable. Delayand distance do not automatically preclude a search from being incidental to arrest, but they may cause the court to draw anegative inference. However, that inference may be rebutted by a proper explanation. [Emphasis added by the Court] [29] The parties in this case agree that the law with respect to search incident to arrest has not changed since Caslake. [30] In R. v. Fearon 2013 ONCA 106 , [2013] O.J.
No. 704 (O.C.A.) the Court refers to the decision of JusticeTrafford in R. v. Polius [2009] O.J. 3074 (Ont.S.C.) with respect to what amounts to a “cursory” search of a cell phone incident to arrest(see paragraphs 50 to 51 of Fearon): 50 Trafford J. discussed the notion of a "cursory" inspection of an item seized as incident to arrest, at para. 41 of his reasons: In my view, the power to SITA [i.e., search incident to arrest] includes a power to conduct a cursory inspection of an item todetermine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe it may be evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made.
However,any examination of an item beyond a cursory examination of it is not within the scope of the power to SITA. Using other words,the evidentiary value of the item must be reasonably apparent on its face, in the context of all of the information known by thearresting officer. Where the purpose of a SITA is to find evidence of the crime, the standard governing the manner and scope of thesearch is a "... reasonable prospect of securing evidence ...". See R. v. Caslake, supra, at para. 21.
The police "... must be in a position toassess the circumstances of the case so as to determine whether a search meets the underlying objectives ..." of the SITA. See Cloutier v.Langlois, supra, at paras. 60-62. [Emphasis added by the Court] [31] In this case I must examine whether the search of the cell phone was for any of the purposes permitted by the commonlaw doctrine of search incident to arrest and whether it was limited to a cursory search.
Was the Search of Jeanette Nolan's Cell Phone Incident to HerArrest? [32] As indicated earlier, the police arrested Jeanette Nolan for possession of drugs because their surveillance observations ledthem to believe that she had purchased them from Janet Ormston. Upon stopping the vehicle which Jeanette Nolan was driving, 2.1grams of crack cocaine were located on the road by her driver’s door. Upon search incident to arrest at the scene the police located asmall vial with white residue in her jacket pocket and a crack pipe and steel wool were located in her purse and her cell phone on thedriver’s seat.
This information was known to Det. Cst. Davies before any search of Jeanette Nolan's cell phone was conducted. At thepolice station ½ of an Oxycontin tablet was found on her person. It is not clear from the evidence whether Det. Cst. Davies knew thisbefore the cell phone search. No issue has been taken with respect to the legality of Jeanette Nolan's arrest or the lawfulness of thesearch incident to arrest, apart from the search of her cell phone at the police station.
[ 33 ] As indicated earlier, the only issue raised by the Applicant is whether Det. Cst. Davies was searching Jeanette Nolan's cell phone for a permissible purpose as authorized pursuant to the search incident to arrest power. The Defence argues that the sole reason that the officer searched the cell phone was to look for evidence against Janet Ormston and that it was not related in any way to a search for evidence against the person under arrest, Jeanette Nolan. I do not agree with the Defence submissions on this point. [ 34 ] I accept that Det. Cst.
Davies honestly believed that he had the right to conduct a cursory search of the cell phone pursuant to a search incident to the arrest of Ms. Nolan, for text messages that might provide evidence relating to the investigation, including evidence against both of the persons whom he believed were involved with purchasing drugs (Jeanette Nolan) and selling them (Janet Ormston). He honestly believed that it was also lawful to obtain text messages specific to the police investigation that might assist in other parts of the overall investigation. [ 35 ] Det. Cst.
Davies agreed at the end of a lengthy cross-examination that went into a second day (during which the officer was obviously confused about Defence Counsel’s questions at many points) that when he searched Jeanette Nolan's cell phone he did it for the “sole purpose” of gathering evidence against Ms. Ormston: Q. Officer I’m going to suggest to you that this investigation right from the beginning, right to the very end was all about Janet Ormston? And when you search Ms. Nolan’s phone, you did that for the sole purpose of gathering evidence against Ms.
Ormston, just like you were instructed to do at the briefing, gather evidence against Ms. Ormston? A. Yup. Q. I’m correct? A. Yup. Q. Okay, all right, thank you officer those are all my questions. [See Transcript May 29, 2013 page 19 lines 20 to 31] [ 36 ] The Defence submissions rely upon this single answer to found its argument that this was the only purpose that Det. Cst. Davies had for searching the cell phone. I find, however, that it is completely unfair to the totality of Det. Cst. Davies’ evidence to view this answer in isolation. In other parts of his evidence it is clear that Det. Cst.
Davies was searching Ms. Nolan's cell phone for evidence that could be used against both Jeanette Nolan and Janet Ormston. As described earlier, I accept the officer’s evidence that he believed that the search of the text messages would assist in the investigation against Ms. Nolan by: 1) knowing what drugs she had ordered from Janet Ormston; 2) to confirm that she had picked up the drugs from Ms. Ormston; and 3) to provide context for the alleged drug transaction meeting that had taken place between Janet Ormston and Jeanette Nolan.
It would also obviously help with the police investigation of the trafficking by Janet Ormston if they could find messages that Jeanette Nolan had bought drugs from Janet Ormston. As indicated earlier, it is simply common sense that evidence against the purchaser might also provide evidence against the seller of the same drugs. The following portions of Det. Cst. Davies' evidence are important in coming to these conclusions: Examination-in-Chief “A. I was doing a [cursory] search of the phone ‘cause it hadn’t been completed.
I – as part of the investigation I was looking for conversation that was related specifically with the meet and the transaction that had occurred…” [see Transcript May 28, 2013 page 29 lines 1 to 7] … “Q. What was the practice in terms of searching phones that are seized as offence-related property in your unit at that time? A. Ah we just did [cursory] searches only case specific, so if we had an incident similar to this one.
If we had a meeting and we arrested the customer, we would look into the phone only specifically to the times that the meeting occurred and the times of the arrest, that’s all we would record. In this case…there was actually some text messages that had been sent previously to the meeting that gives the context of…why they were meeting and when the meeting occurred and so forth.” [see Transcript May 28, 2013, page 31 lines 12 to 22] … Cross-Examination
“Q. Officer you were telling us about the practice in your unit if a customer’s arrested, the times of meeting and the times of arrest you might look – go into a cell phone to determine those things Did I understand you correctly? A. Yeah. Q. Okay and that would be I take it to try and gain information about the seller, potentially evidence that could be used against the seller? A. Like it’s related to the investigation yes, it’s case specific. Q. Right, each case is a little bit different? A. Yes. Q.
Okay, but it’s to try and potentially get some evidence against the seller who’s selling – the dealer who’s selling drugs? A. As well as the purchaser as well, both.” [see Transcript May 28, 2013, page 33 lines 5 to 20] … “Q. …and you thought when you searched Jeanette Nolan's phone, you would find evidence that could be used against Ms. Ormston? A. As well as Ms. Nolan, both.” B. [see Transcript May 28, 2013, page 34 lines 24 to 29] … “Q….so how is it that searching Ms. Nolan's phone is going to assist with the investigation of Ms. Nolan [as a purchaser]?... A. We know what she ordered…from Ms.
Ormston…from the context of the text message… Q. …and how would that assist? A. Because it tells us that she picked up drugs from Ms. Ormston. Q. …how does it matter who she got the drugs from on a simple possession? A. Because it helps…with the investigation of the trafficking as well. Q. But on the investigation of the trafficking against Ms. Ormston?
A. As well, yes. Q. How does it help with the investigation against Ms. Nolan…where she got the drugs from?... A. Because it puts it in context right, like it makes a scenario, it helps with our scenario … A. It helps also in the trafficking investigation against Ms. Ormston.” [see Transcript May 28, 2013, page 36 line 25 to page 38 line 26] [37] It is clear from these answers that one of the purposes for which Det. Cst. Davies searched Jeanette Nolan's cell phonewas to find text messages providing evidence relating to the meeting during which she is alleged to have bought crack cocaine from JanetOrmston.
This would be evidence against Jeanette Nolan to prove that she possessed the crack cocaine found on the road by her car. [38] As indicated above, Det. Cst. Davies testified in cross-examination that he believed the permissible purposes of a searchincident to arrest are “to assist in an investigation, to collect evidence, to put it in context” and that “obviously case law changes and newthings come out, new practices exist and we change our ways with case law” [see Transcript May 28, 2013 page 47 lines 17 to 30].
Headvised that the evidence must be evidence that “can be” used at the arrestee’s trial, but it doesn’t have to be. Det. Cst. Davies alsotestified that, “when we arrest people or charge people or investigate people and lay charges against them, once we arrest them, if wefind evidence relating to them or others, we will seize it and bring it before the Court as evidence” [see Transcript May 29, 2013 page 9lines 27 to 31]. [39] It is clear from his evidence that Det. Cst. Davies requires additional training with respect to the permissible scope andlimitations of search incident to arrest.
He also needs to be educated about the current state of the law which equates text messages withspoken conversations in the context of privacy issues. He and other officers must continue to educate themselves about the lawful searchof cell phones, as cases such as Fearon, supra, currently before the Supreme Court of Canada, are decided. While Det. Cst.
Davies has acorrect understanding that one ground for searching someone incident to arrest is to gather evidence against them, he was unable toarticulate that there are three specific purposes for conducting a search incident to arrest: 1) To ensure the safety of the police and the public; 2) To protect evidence from destruction at the hands of the arrestee or others; and 3) To discover evidence that can be used at the arrestee’s trial. (See Caslake, supra) [40] In some cases, instead of searching cell phones, the police might have the grounds to obtain prior judicial authorization tosearch the records of internet service providers for text messages sent or received by subscribers (the form of authorization may varydepending on whether it is for existing records or the prospective production of future private communications – i.e. search warrant orwiretap): see R. v.
Telus 2013 SCC 16 , [2013] S.C.J. No. 16 (S.C.C.) amended April 29, 2013. When considering searches ofcell phones incident to arrest, however, it is important to note (when considering the second grounds - to prevent destruction ofevidence), that text messages, photographs and other content can be easily deleted from cell phones with the press of one command.
With the rapid advance in technology permitting control of electronic devices from a remote location (e.g. remote locking and deleting ofall data from iPhones, apps to control thermostats remotely, accessing and deleting voicemail remotely, etc.), it may be that in the nearfuture parties will be able to delete text messages or images from all types of cell phones remotely. This would mean that even if a cellphone was seized without being searched immediately, by the time the police could obtain a search warrant, the evidence might be lostby being deleted by the accused or someone assisting him/her.
While the potential destruction of this type of evidence was not a factorin the case before me, it is important for courts to be mindful of this issue when considering whether the police are acting for thepurpose of protecting evidence from being destroyed when searching cell phones incident to arrest. [41] Although he did not articulate it as being connected to search incident to arrest, I would be very surprised (especiallygiven that he is a member of the Drug Enforcement Unit), if Det. Cst.
Davies was completely unaware that he has a right to searchsomeone for weapons where the safety of an officer or the public is in issue. This is a basic police training issue. Perhaps he does notrealize that this is connected to search incident to arrest police powers. It is clear, however, that in the case before me there is noevidence that there were any safety concerns that would have provided grounds for searching the cell phone. There may be suchconcerns in other cases, for example, where weapons or explosives are believed to be involved in a crime. [42] In spite of Det. Cst.
Davies' incomplete understanding of the scope of search incident to arrest, I find that he acted in goodfaith when he searched for text messages on Jeanette Nolan's cell phone. I conclude that it was both subjectively and objectivelyreasonable for him to search for evidence relating to the meeting that had just taken place, during which he believed Jeanette Nolan
bought drugs from Janet Ormston. I accept that this was done in order to gather relevant potential evidence against Jeanette Nolan on a possession of crack cocaine charge. Contrary to Defence Counsel’s submission, the fact that Jeanette Nolan was being charged with simple possession of drugs does not mean that the case against her wouldn’t benefit from having evidence that she had in fact purchased them (especially in a case such as this where the crack cocaine was found on the roadway near the driver’s door, and not on her person).
I disagree with the Defence submission that “the text messages would be irrelevant to Ms. Nolan's trial”. Evidence connecting Jeanette Nolan as the buyer of the drugs found would clearly be relevant as to whether she knew of or had control over those drugs. Whether the text message evidence could also be used against Janet Ormston is irrelevant to whether Det. Cst. Davies was conducting a valid search incident to arrest, so long as one of the officer’s purposes was to gather evidence against Jeanette Nolan in relation tothe drug buy.
I accept that one of his purposes in searching the cell phone was in fact to gather evidence against Jeanette Nolan and do not accept that it was done solely to gather evidence against Janet Ormston. [ 43 ] I also accept that the search of the cell phone contents by Det. Cst. Davies was a cursory one within the meaning of Polius, supra, at paragraph 41. The officer looked only for those text messages relating to the meeting that had taken place between Janet Ormston and Jeanette Nolan and for the phone number connected to “Janet” listed in Contacts.
It is significant that all text messages unrelated to the meeting that had taken place that day were “discarded”/ignored. The evidentiary value of the text messages as relating to a drug buy was reasonably apparent on a reading of them in the context of the rest of the investigation (especially the surveillance evidence).
This is apparent in particular in the following messages: Jeanette Nolan: How much do I owe; Janet Ormston: 120; and later, Jeanette Nolan: make it 2 hb instead of one whole pls; Janet Ormston: k cool”. [ 44 ] Applying the Caslake, supra, principles to the facts of this case, I conclude that Det. Cst. Davies was acting within the scope of permissible authority when he searched Jeanette Nolan's cell phone pursuant to her arrest, so there is no breach of Janet Ormston's s. 8 Charter rights on this basis.
There still remains the additional issue of whether the search of the contents of the cell phone amounted to a breach of s. 8 because it was done without a search warrant. The Law with Respect to the Search of Cell Phone Contents [ 45 ] On February 20, 2013, the Ontario Court of Appeal released its decision which deals with the issue of the search of cell phones incident to arrest in Fearon , supra . On July 11, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal from that decision, limiting the issue on appeal to the cell phone search.
This means that the law in this area remains unsettled until the Supreme Court decides the issue. I must make my decision based on the law as it exists today and I am bound by the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal. [ 46 ] The Fearon case dealt with the search of a cell phone which had been seized during a pat down search incident to arrest for robbery with a firearm. The cell phone was not locked or password protected. The photographs and text message were not in plain view, and the officer had to go into the contents of the phone to retrieve them.
When the police officer searched the cell phone at the time of the arrest he found an incriminating text message as well as photographs of guns and cash. A gun matching the photograph was later found in the getaway car. Although the cell phone was searched several more times at the police station, no further evidence was found on it. Several months later the police obtained a search warrant to examine the contents of the phone again believing that the case law now required it (no challenge was taken to the search warrant at trial).
The cell phone images and text message were admitted into evidence by the trial judge. [ 47 ] On appeal it was argued that a warrantless search of cell phone contents incident to arrest, that goes beyond a cursory search to look for evidence connected to the crime, breaches s. 8 of the Charter unless there are exigent circumstances. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association argued that the police should not be permitted to conduct even a cursory search of a cell phone except in exigent circumstances.
The Court was asked, but declined to carve out a cell phone exception to the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest. [ 48 ] The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the search of Mr. Fearon’s cell phone at the scene of the arrest satisfied the criteria for the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest to apply, because the police reasonably believed that a cursory examination of the contents of the cell phone would yield evidence relevant to the robbery.
At paragraph 57 they concluded as follows 57 …I cannot conclude, in the circumstances of this case, that the original examination of the contents of the cell phone fell outside the ambit of the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest. Apparently, the cell phone was turned "on" and it was not password protected or otherwise "locked" to users other than the appellant. The police officers had a reasonable belief that they might find photographs and text messages relevant to the robbery.
The initial search at the time of the arrest involved a cursory look through the contents of the cell phone to ascertain if it contained such evidence. [ 49 ] The Court came to a different conclusion regarding the additional searches of the cell phone at the police station, indicating that the police should have stopped the search and obtained a search warrant before examining the cell phone again at the police station. On this issue the Court of Appeal stated the following at paragraphs 58 to 60: 58 The subsequent examinations of the contents of the cell phone at the police station are more difficult to analyze.
Arguably, those examinations went beyond the limits for a search incident to arrest. See Caslake , at para. 25 . In my view, the proper course for the police was to stop the examination of the contents of the cell phone when they took the appellant to the police station and then proceed to obtain a search warrant. Detective Abdel-Malik agreed that there was no urgency to search through the cell phone . There is no evidence that it would have been impracticable to appear before a justice to obtain a search warrant in the usual manner.
If it was impracticable for an officer to appear before a justice to obtain a search warrant, the police could have proceeded to obtain a telewarrant under s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code . That said, the trial judge concluded that the examination of the contents of the cell phone at the police station were connected to the search at the scene of the arrest. Although some time and distance had passed from the arrest, the trial judge found that the police were still looking for evidence of the location of the jewellery and the gun as well as for contacts among the parties to the offences.
These were findings of fact made by the trial judge. While I would have come to a different conclusion , I cannot say that these factual findings reflect palpable and overriding error.
59 There is also another observation to make about the search of the cell phone at the police station. No additional evidence appears to have been discovered by the police and none was tendered in evidence from that search.
Even if the search at the police station went beyond the limits of Caslake s. 24(2) is not engaged. 60 In the result, I conclude that the trial judge did not err in her finding that the examination of the contents of the cell phone at the time and place of arrest and later at the police station were within the ambit of the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest. [Emphasis added by the Court] [ 50 ] In concluding that the search of Mr. Fearon’s cell phone did not breach his s. 8 Charter rights the Court of Appeal declined to cut out an exception for cell phones from search incident to arrest.
Justice Armstrong states at paragraphs 69 to 77 that: iv. Conclusion on the proposed cell phone exception 69 Much of the argument in this case, both here and in the court below, focused on Polius . The appellant argued that the reasoning in Polius should apply in this case. Counsel for the respondent distinguished Polius from the case at bar. The Director of Public Prosecutions, on the other hand, took the position that Polius was wrongly decided. 70 I agree that Polius is distinguishable from this case.
In Polius , the arresting officer received his instructions from a senior officer who did not brief him on the circumstances of the alleged offence. When the cell phone was seized on arrest, the arresting officer had no instructions to seize it and no reason to believe that it would contain relevant evidence. 71 The cell phone in Polius was turned over the next day to a technician of the Toronto Police Service who conducted an examination of the phone over two or three days without obtaining a search warrant.
The technician prepared a 15 page report that included an appendix of over 200 pages of the information in the defendant's cell phone. Given the facts of Polius , it is not surprising that Trafford J. concluded it was a case that called for a search warrant. 72 The problem I have with the appellant's position and, in particular, the position of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, is that it would appear to mark a significant departure from the existing state of the law on the basis of a record that does not suggest it is necessary.
While I appreciate the highly personal and sensitive nature of the contents of a cell phone and the high expectation of privacy that they may attract, I am of the view that it is difficult to generalize and create an exception based on the facts of this case.
The facts of this case, with the correct application of the existing law, suggest that the search and seizure of the cell phone at the scene of the arrest were carried out appropriately and within the limits of the law articulated by the Supreme Court in Caslake . 73 In this case, it is significant that the cell phone was apparently not password protected or otherwise "locked" to users other than the appellant when it was seized. Furthermore, the police had a reasonable belief that it would contain relevant evidence.
The police , in my view, were within the limits of Caslake to examine the contents of the cell phone in a cursory fashion to ascertain if it contained evidence relevant to the alleged crime. If a cursory examination did not reveal any such evidence, then at that point the search incident to arrest should have ceased. 74 The appellant directed this court to statements made by the trial judge in Little , where she concluded at para. 147 that the cell phone in issue "functioned as a mini-computer".
Furthermore, the court in Little found that the contents of the cell phone "were not immediately visible to the eye" and were "extracted by a police officer with specialized skills using specialized equipment." There was no suggestion in this case that this particular cell phone functioned as a "mini-computer" nor that its contents were not "immediately visible to the eye".
Rather, because the phone was not password protected, the photos and the text message were readily available to other users. 75 If the cell phone had been password protected or otherwise "locked" to users other than the appellant, it would not have been appropriate to take steps to open the cell phone and examine its contents without first obtaining a search warrant. 76 In short, I find myself in the same position as this court found itself in Manley .
To quote from the reasons of Sharpe J.A. again, it is "neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of the powers of the police to search the stored data in
cell phones seized upon arrest." 77 It may be that some future case will produce a factual matrix that will lead the court to carve out a cell phone exception to the lawas articulated in Caslake. This is not that case. To put it in the modern vernacular: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." [Emphasis added by the Court] [51] In S.M., supra, decided in 2012 prior to Fearon, Justice Nordheimer found that the non-owner of a cell phone has an,“ongoing and important privacy interest” in the text messages stored on another person’s cell phone.
In considering the issue of standingto challenge cell phone searches, the important privacy concerns that attach to the contents of cell phones was addressed at length atparagraphs 15 to 25: 15 …Long gone are the days when a phone was simply used to make or receive calls with others. Nowadays, cell phones can, andusually do, contain vast amounts of personal information.
Cell phones not only make and receive what I might refer to as traditionalforms of telephone calls, they also act as recording devices (both audio and video), cameras and depositories of other forms ofcommunications such as emails and, more importantly in this case, text messages.
That reality in turn requires an analysis of the type ofinformation that the police obtained through the searches of the cell phones because, depending on the nature of that information,different conclusions arise regarding any privacy interest in the information. 16 The prosecution is correct that S.M. has no standing to challenge the searches of other persons' cell phones with respect to certainforms of information.
For example, S.M. has an insufficient privacy interest in the contact list in another person's cell phone such as tohave standing to challenge a search and seizure of a cell phone and the discovery of that information. While the information contained ina contact list will involve private information belonging to each contact, in this case S.M.'s nickname and his phone number, any privacyinterest the contact has in that information is significantly reduced once that person communicates that information to other personsknowing that those persons may record it and/or share it with others.
Similarly, in the normal instance, the non-owner of a cell phonewould not have any privacy interest in photos or recordings that might be contained within that cell phone and that were, presumably,created by or on behalf of the owner of the cell phone. I conclude, therefore, that S.M. has no standing to challenge the search and seizureof either Mr.
Skeete's cell phone or K.R.'s cell phone insofar as the prosecution seeks to rely on the contents of the contact lists foundtherein. 17 Conversely, I conclude that the non-owner of a cell phone does have an ongoing and important privacy interest in otherinformation that might be obtained from another person's cell phone. In particular, the non-owner of a cell phone has anongoing privacy interest in text messages that are either contained in a cell phone or that can be obtained from the records of thecarrier for that cell phone.
I reach that conclusion for the following reasons. 18 Text messages are a relatively recent phenomenon but their increasing use as a method of communication between individualscannot be denied. Text messages are instantaneously transmitted and it is generally expected that text messages will receive an equallytimely response. The contents of the text messages in this case demonstrate that reality. Text messages are not like email messages wherean immediate response is not an expectation inherent in the mode of communication used - although a quick response may nonethelessbe wanted.
Text messages occur very much more in "real time". Indeed, text messages are often a substitute for an actualconversation and thus are much more akin to a traditional telephone conversation than they are to other modes ofcommunication. Emails, on the other hand, are more akin to an electronic version of a letter. 19 I recognize that there are still differences between a telephone conversation and a text message. Principal among those differencesis that there is generally no record of the contents of a telephone call whereas there is a record of the contents of a text message.
Thisdistinction is important because it serves to take text messages outside the scope of the provisions of
Part VI of the Criminal Codedealing with the interception of private communications. While a text message would fall within the definition of "privatecommunication" contained in s. 183, I agree with the conclusion that others have reached that the prohibition against the interception ofprivate communications involves a contemporaneous interception of the communication, not a later seizure of that same communication -see, for example, R. v. Finlay (1985), (ON CA), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 66. By way of example, if aperson happened to record all of their telephone conversations, the police would not need an authorization under
Part VI to seize thoseexisting records. Rather, they would obtain a search warrant under s. 487 for the records. … 21 The conclusion that text messages are not covered by
Part VI of the Criminal Code does not carry with it, however, thecorollary conclusion that the non-owner of the cell phone, who is a party to a text message retrieved either directly or indirectlyfrom the cell phone, does not have any privacy interest to protect in the state's seizure of that message. The scope of privacyinterests does not depend on the nature of the authorization by which the authorities seize private communications.
… 23 With text messages, the state is not technically making a permanent record of private communications. Both the originator and therecipient of the message each make a record of it through the means utilized to communicate the message. The originator maintainscontrol of his/her copy of the message but never has control of the recipient's copy. That distinction does not, in my view, changethe nature of the privacy interest. The reality is that we now live in a world where a great deal more of our daily actions are recordedthan has been the case in the past.
The advent of the "digital age" carries with it the creation of digital records of all types…. 24 The fact that a digital record exists of a text message does not substantially change the privacy interest that arises from thenature of the message. It is still a private communication that the sender intends only for the recipient.
While I accept that thefact that there is a record of that message beyond the control of the originator slightly lessens the privacy interest, in the sensethat the originator must be alert to the possibility that the recipient might show or otherwise transmit the message to others, Ibelieve that there is a qualitative difference between that risk and the risk that the state will seize the message.
Again, theobservations of La Forest J. in Duarte are apposite, at para. 30: I am unable to see any similarity between the risk that someone will listen to one's words with the intention of repeating them and therisk involved when someone listens to them while simultaneously making a permanent electronic record of them. These risks are of adifferent order of magnitude. The one risk may, in the context of law enforcement, be viewed as a reasonable invasion of privacy, theother unreasonable. They involve different risks to the individual and the body politic.
In other words, the law recognizes that weinherently have to bear the risk of the "tattletale" but draws the line at concluding that we must also bear, as the price of choosing tospeak to another human being, the risk of having a permanent electronic recording made of our words. 25 I would amend the latter observation of La Forest J., given the realities of the world in which we now live more than twentyyears later, to say that the law ought to draw the line between the risk of the "tattletale" who chooses to show a text message to athird party and the seizure by the state of text messages as the price of someone choosing to adopt this form of "new age" privatecommunication over the traditional telephone call. [Emphasis added by the Court] [52] My colleague, Justice De Freitas, recently considered the issue of text messages on cell phones, in very similarcircumstances to the case before me, in the decision of R. v.
Terrence Andrew Knox (unreported, April 12, 2013, O.C.J.). Mr. Knox hadsent a text message offering to sell cocaine to someone who, unbeknownst to him, was in police custody (the police had seized thatperson’s cell phone upon arrest). The police replied to the message, arranging to meet with Mr. Knox to buy cocaine, and when hearrived at the pre-arranged time and location he was arrested and found to be in possession of 13 grams of cocaine and a small amount ofmarijuana. The cell phone was not password protected and the police did not have to take steps to break into the phone to access itscontents.
Justice De Freitas concluded that Mr. Knox did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone to which he sentthe incriminating text message but that he did have a privacy interest in the content of the message itself, However, the police were in lawful possession of the phone as it was seized incident to arrest. As a result, they have the authority toconduct a cursory review of the phone for the purpose of gathering evidence with respect to their investigation.
In those circumstances,the search complied with s.8 of the Charter. [53] I adopt Justice De Freitas’ very persuasive analysis of the issues relating to the privacy issues relating to text messagesfound on another person’s cell phone as follows: Analysis Has Mr Knox established a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text message sent to Crozier’s phone? There are two distinct questions which must be answered in any s.8 challenge. The first is whether the accused had a reasonableexpectation of privacy. The second is whether the search was an unreasonable intrusion onto that right to privacy.
The existenceof a reasonable expectation of privacy is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances with reference to a number offactors including the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy and the objective reasonableness of that expectation. (See R. v.Edwards (1996), (SCC), 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (SCC) at paragraphs 33 – 45.) Mr. Knox chose not to testify. As a result, I have no evidence from him of his subjective expectation of privacy in the text message thathe sent to Crozier. That is not fatal to his privacy claim.
For more than two decades courts have struggled to define the parameters of privacy in the face of rapidly changing technology andforms of communication. Today, smart phones are ubiquitous. People call, e-mail, text, and “tweet” constantly. Since 2007 – an eternityin the rapidly evolving world of communication technology – courts have accepted that e-mails sent via smart-phone engenderobjectively reasonable expectations of privacy. (See R. v.
Giles 2007 BCSC 1147 , 2007 BCJ No 2918 (S.C.)) More recently, a court accepted that the sender of a text message has a privacy interest in a message sent to and retrieved from the cellphone of a third party. [reference to Justice Nordheimer in S. M., supra omitted] … In R. v. Telus …the Court held that a wiretap authorization under
Part 6 of the Criminal Code is required to authorize the prospectiveseizure of text messages from a database kept by a cell phone company. In that context, the court concluded that there is anexpectation of privacy in a text message: “Text messaging is, in essence, an electronic conversation. The only practical difference between text messaging and thetraditional voice communications is the transmission process. This distinction should not take text messages outside the protection ofprivate communications to which they are entitled in
Part VI. Technical differences inherent in new technology should not determine thescope of protection afforded to private communications. As all parties acknowledged, it is clear that text messages qualify as telecommunications under the definition in the
Interpretation Act.They also acknowledged that these messages, like voice communications, are made under circumstances that attract a reasonableexpectation of privacy and therefore constitute "private communication" within the meaning of s. 183.” (See R. v. Telus 2013 SCC 16 , [2013] S.C.J. No.16 at paragraphs 5 and 32) While there is still some uncertainty as to the constitutionally appropriate method for seizing text messages, it is now clear thatan accused has a reasonable expectation of privacy in them. Was the warrantless search of the cell phone lawful?
The Crown relies in part on the common law doctrine of search incident to arrest to provide the legal authority for the search ofCrozier’s cell phone. A search is properly incidental to arrest where the police attempt to “achieve some valid purpose connected to thearrest” including the need to ensure officer safety, the protection of evidence from destruction, or the discovery of evidence which can beused at the arrestee’s trial. (See R. v. Caslake (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 51 at paragraph 13) Officer Campbell testified that he seized two phones from Crozier on arrest.
He examined the phones and confirmed that one of them – aSamsung - had been used to contact the undercover officer who had arranged to buy cocaine from Crozier. Officer Campbell seized thephone at 8:45 pm. By 9:50 pm he was at the police station processing the seized items and at 10:01 pm the incriminating text messagewas received on the Samsung phone.
When asked why he read the text message he testified: A: …I’ve been involved in lots and lots of good investigations, and I know through my experience that drug traffickers ….use phones asthe main tool of their trade….that’s the way they do business is through phones, to set up meetings with people, to discuss drug pricing,and we just arrested Crosier for trying to sell drugs to an undercover officer, so my thought was that this text message could potentiallyhave evidence to support our charges against Crozier”. I accept Officer Campbell’s testimony.
It establishes a clear nexus between the crime for which Crozier was arrested and OfficerCampbell’s decision to read Mr. Knox’ text message. That finding suggests that the “seizure” of the message was justified by a validsearch incident to arrest. However, as noted in the Crown factum, the weight of judicial authority is split on whether cell phones can besearched incident to arrest. In British Columbia there are few limits on the type of search that can be conducted once the phone is
properly seized. (See R. v. Giles 2007 BCSC 1147 , 2007 BCJ No 2918 (S.C.)) In Ontario, only a cursory inspection is permitted. Anything more invasive requires a warrant. (See R. v. Polius [2009] OJ No 3074 (SC); R. v. Finnikin, [2009] O.J. No. 6016 (S.C.); R. v. Little (ON SC), [2009]OJ No 3278 (S.C.); and R. v. Manley 2011 ONCA 128.) The most recent attempt to settle the parameters of search incident to arrest with respect to cell phones is the Ontario Court of Appeal’sdecision in In R. v.
Fearon, [2013] ONCA 106… The court refused the request to carve out a cell phone exception to the search incident to arrest power… [reference to paragraphs 72 to 76 of Fearon omitted] … I am satisfied that Officer Campbell’s reading of the text message was authorized as a valid search incident to arrest. Furthermore, Mr.Knox is one step removed from Mr. Fearon in that the phone searched by the police in this case was not his.
While I’veconcluded that he had an expectation of privacy in the impugned text message, his privacy interest is attenuated by the fact thathis message is stored on a phone belonging to someone else. I accept the officer’s evidence that the cellphone was not password protected nor did he have to use any special software to rummagethrough the content of the phone. In my view, the Crown has met it’s onus of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the seizure ofthe text message was lawful. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Telus does not alter the analysis.
At first blush, the decision appears to supportMr Hochberg’s argument that the police required a wiretap authorization in order to read Mr. Knox’s message. However, the Telus court was dealing with the prospective seizure of text messages under the authority of a general warrant. The Courtconcluded that, in those circumstances, a wiretap authorization pursuant to
Part VI of the Criminal Code was required. The Court did notaddress the seizure of historical text messages like the one at issue in this case nor consider whether those messages can be validly seizedincident to a lawful arrest.
On my reading of the current state of the law, a police officer may conduct a cursory cell phone search incident to a lawful arrest. [Emphasis added by the Court] [54] I disagree with the submission of Defence Counsel that Justice De Freitas misread Telus, supra, and S.M., supra, infinding that that the privacy interest in a sent text message is attenuated because the message is stored on a phone belonging to someoneelse. This is simply common sense.
While based on the caselaw I find (as did Justice De Freitas) that there is a reasonable expectationof privacy which attaches to every text message no matter where it is stored, the fact that the sender has no control over who views itonce it is sent is simply stating the obvious. In fact that is precisely what happened to Mr. Knox when he sent his text message and itwas read by a police officer. This is also exactly what Det. Cst. Davies meant when he testified in this case, “once it’s gone, it’s gone,it’s into another phone, you’re relying [on] the person on the other end”.
Whether the text message remains private to the intendedrecipient depends very much on who has access to their phone. This analysis in no way undermines the requirements of the police toaccess text messages on cell phones pursuant to lawful police powers or prior judicial authorization. [55] I accept that the physical location of a text message does not drive the analysis of the expectation of privacy: see Telus,supra, at paragraph 7, when describing text messages stored on an internet service provider’s computer database; also R. v. Ward [2012]ONCA 660 at paragraph 77; and R. v.
Shayesteh (1996), (ON CA), 111 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.S.C.) at paragraph 41. The Application of the Law Concerning Cell Phones to the Factsof this Case
[56] An application of the caselaw to this case leads me to conclude that while Janet Ormston did have a reasonableexpectation of privacy with respect to the text messages located on Jeanette Nolan's cell phone, that Det. Cst. Davies' search of the cellphone was not an unreasonable intrusion onto that right to privacy. [57] I find that it was reasonable for Det. Cst. Davies to believe that he might secure evidence in relation to the offence forwhich Jeanette Nolan was being arrested when he searched her cell phone.
It was reasonable for him to believe that the arrestee, Ms.Nolan, may have had communications with Janet Ormston prior to or during their meeting when Ms. Nolan was believed to havepurchased crack cocaine from her. The first officer to examine the contents of the cell phone was Det. Cst. Davies at the police stationshortly after the arrest. I conclude that the search was closely connected to the search incident to arrest at the scene.
There was,however, no urgency to the situation that would justify searching the cell phone on the basis of exigent circumstances. [58] It is very important for me to consider the direction given by the O.C.A. in Fearon, supra, in paragraph 58, that the policeshould have applied for a search warrant in that case before the search of Mr. Fearon’s cell phone at the police station. The facts inFearon are distinguishable from this case, however, because the police had already conducted a cursory search of Mr. Fearon’s cellphone at the scene and then conducted an additional examination of it at the police station.
I conclude that the Fearon case directs that,so long as a cursory search of a cell phone is conducted for one of the purposes permitted by sea
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