R. v. C.(T.), 2013 ONCJ 598
Opinion
WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice be attached to the file: This is a case under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and is subject to subsections 110(1) and 111(1) and
section 129 of the Act. These provisions read as follows: 110. Identity of offender not to be published. —
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a young person, or any other information related to a young person, if it would identify the young person as a young person dealt with under this Act. . . . 111. Identity of victim or witness not to be published.—
(1) Subject to this section, no person shall publish the name of a child or young person, or any other information related to a child or a young person, if it would identify the child or young person as having been a victim of, or as having appeared as a witness in connection with, an offence committed or alleged to have been committed by a young person. . . . 129. No subsequent disclosure.— No person who is given access to a record or to whom information is disclosed under this Act shall disclose that information to any person unless the disclosure is authorized under this Act.
Subsection 138(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply with these provisions, states as follows: 138. Offences.—
(1) Every person who contravenes subsection 110(1) (identity of offender not to be published), 111(1) (identity of victim or witness not to be published) . . . or
section 129 (no subsequent disclosure) . . . (
a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (
b) is guilty of an offence punishable on
summary conviction. ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE sitting under the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act , S.C. 2002, c. 1, as amended; CITATION: R. v. C.(T.) , 2013 ONCJ 598 DATE: 2013·11·04 COURT FILE No.: Central East 12-0899 BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN — AND — T.C., a young person Before Justice C.M. Harpur Heard on October 21, 2013
Reasons for Ruling Voir Dire 11(
b) released on November 4, 2013 Carolyn Ross ........................................................................................ counsel for the Crown Kathryn Wells ............................................................................. counsel for the accused T.C. HARPUR J.: Overview [ 1 ] T.C., 17, is charged with voyeurism in respect of ten year old S.S., the younger sister of his then-girlfriend E.S., in the period from April 1 – July 7, 2012, contrary to s. 162(1) (
a) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] On April 3, 2013, dates were set for Charter applications brought by T.C. and for his trial. The application dates for the Charter matters were October 21, 2013 – an application to stay pursuant to ss. 11(
b) and 24(1) – and November 4, 2013 – an application to stay pursuant to ss. 7 and 24(1). The trial dates which have been scheduled are November 18, 2013, December 20, 2013 and January 6, 2014. The Charter s. 11(
b) application proceeded as scheduled. Ms. Wells for T.C. had previously filed an application record containing T.C.’s affidavit. T.C. gave viva voce evidence on the application. He was the sole witness. Ms. Wells submits that the application record establishes a breach of T.C.’s right to trial within a reasonable time and that the appropriate remedy is a stay. Ms. Ross for the Crown does not dispute the appropriateness of the stay remedy for a s. 11(
b) breach but submits that T.C. has not made out that breach. For the reasons which follow, the application is granted and the charge is stayed. The Chronology [ 3 ] There is no material dispute as to this matter’s history. It is as follows: July 31, 2012 Complaint made August 2, 2012 Police commence investigation August 2 to 7, 2012 Police interview the complainant’s family and obtain video statements from S.S. and her mother L.S. September 14, 2012 Police attend at T.C.’s high school and arrest him. T.C. provides to the police a video statement.
T.C. is released and given a first appearance date of October 23, 2012. October 19, 2012 Information sworn. Crown provides some disclosure. It does not include any of the referenced videos or the notebook notes of the officer in charge. October 23, 2012 First appearance. Ms. Wells has been retained. Ms. Wells’s agent files a designation and appears for Ms. Wells and T.C.. The agent asks for disclosure and that the matter be put to November 13, 2012. The Crown does not have its file and says it will try to assemble and provide disclosure. The matter is remanded to November 13, 2012.
November 13, 2012 Second appearance. Ms. Wells’s agent appears for her and T.C.. A crown resolution meeting has been scheduled for November 21, 2012. The agent asks for and is given a remand date of December 4, 2012. November 21, 2012 T.C.’s counsel and the Crown conduct the Crown resolution meeting December 4, 2012 Third appearance. Ms. Wells’s agent appears for her and T.C.. The agent requests and is given a judicial pre-trial date of January 8, 2013.
December 11, 2012 Counsel for T.C. writes to the Crown seeking additional disclosure, namely, the video statement of the complainant, the notes of the officer in charge and the notes of another police officer involved in the investigation. January 8, 2013 Judicial pre-trial and fourth appearance. Counsel for T.C. appears for him and comments on record about the still- outstanding disclosure, namely, the notes of the two police officers and the video statements of T.C., S.S. and Mrs. S.. Defence counsel requests and receives a date for continuing judicial pre-trial on March 8, 2013.
Counsel for T.C. and the Crown indicate that the Crown will be assessing its case “in the interim”.
February 4, 2013 Defence counsel writes to the Crown reiterating its request for thestill outstanding disclosure items noted on record on January 8,2013.March 6, 2013 The Crown provides some further disclosure which does notinclude the items noted on January 8, 2013.March 8, 2013 Continuing judicial pre-trial and fifth appearance. Ms. Wellsappears for T.C.. Ms. Wells notes on record the still-outstandingdisclosure. The Crown notes on record that it will subsequentlybe assessing reasonable prospects of conviction. The Courtproposes a further judicial pre-trial.
Counsel agree on April 3,2013.March 14, 2013 The Crown provides disclosure of the three video statements.April 3, 2013 The Crown advises the defence in advance of court that theCrown intends to proceed to trial. Continuing judicial pre-trialand sixth appearance. T.C. appears by counsel. The Charterapplication and trial dates are set. T.C.’s counsel indicates “many, many available dates prior to October 21st”.June 25, 2013 The Crown provides partial notes of the officer in charge to thedefence.October 21, 2013
Section 11(
b) voir dire with ruling reserved. I indicate to counselthat, if the s. 11(
b) application is unsuccessful, either a blended s.7 voir dire and trial or the s. 7 voir dire alone will proceed onNovember 4, 2013. Analysis [4] The matters for a court to consider in this type of motion are familiar: overall length of delay from the laying of the chargeuntil T.C.’s trial concludes; waiver of any time periods by T.C.; the reasons for the delay; and prejudice to T.C.: R. v. Morin (1992), 71C.C.C. (3d) (S.C.C.). The Overall Delay [5] The first of these factors is described by Code, J. in R. v. Lahiry 2011 ONSC 6780 , [2011] O.J. No. 5071 (Ont.Sup.
Ct.) as “simply a mechanism for weeding out frivolous applications”. Here, given an overall delay of one year and two to fourweeks from the laying of the information until the start of trial and of approximately fourteen and one-half months from information toanticipated completion of trial, it cannot be said that T.C.’s application is frivolous. This is particularly so given the provisions of s. 3 ofthe Youth Criminal Justice Act. In this regard, I agree with the conclusion of Vaillancourt, J. in R. v. S.R. [2005] O.J. No. 728 (O.C.J.)that the
section “incorporates the sentiments” of Osborne, J.A. in R. v. M.(G.C.) [1991] O.J. No. 855 (O.C.A.), as follows: In my opinion, the general principles set out in Askov apply to young offenders. There is a particular need to conclude youth courtproceedings without unreasonable delay, consistent with the goals of the Young Offenders Act and the principles upon which it is based.I do not, however, view young persons as being entitled to a special constitutional guarantee to trial within a reasonable time, whichdiffers in substance from that available to adults.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that, as a general proposition, youth court proceedingsshould proceed to a conclusion more quickly than those in the adult criminal justice system. Delay, which may be reasonable in the adultcriminal justice system, may not be reasonable in the youth court. There are several reasons for this. They include the well-establishedfact that the ability of a young person to appreciate the connection between behaviour and its consequences is less developed than anadult’s. For young persons, the effect of time may be distorted.
If treatment is required and is to be made part of the Young OffendersAct disposition process, it is best begun with as little delay as is possible. Waiver [6] The Crown does not suggest that T.C. has waived any time periods. Reasons for Delay [7] The principal parting of the Crown’s and T.C.’s ways in this application relates to reason for delay. Parenthetically, an issuearose in submissions as to whether the s. 11(
b) clock begins to run in this case from the date of T.C.’s arrest or from the date theinformation is sworn. Ms. Wells urges the former because, she says, the Crown had completed its investigation by September 14, 2012when T.C. was arrested and because his release to the community after that date was subject to various restrictions. Ms. Ross, for theCrown, submits that Sopinka, J. in Morin was quite clear and has put the matter to rest, as follows: As I have indicated, this factor requires the court to examine the period from the charge to the end of the trial.
Charge means the date onwhich an information is sworn or an indictment is preferred (see Kalanj, supra, at p. 1607). Pre-charge delay may in certaincircumstances have an influence on the overall determination as to whether post-charge delay is unreasonable but of itself it is notcounted in determining the length of the delay.
Ms. Wells would limit the principle expressed by Sopinka, J. to cases where an accused is released following arrest without anyindication that a change will be laid and without conditions. Such was the case in R. v. Kalanj (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R.1594 (S.C.C.) apparently relied on by Sopinka, J. in the excerpt above. [8] I agree with the Crown’s submission on this point. Sopinka, J. has not limited the principle he expressed in the mannersuggested by the defence.
Thus, although prior delay can affect the court’s determination of whether post-information delay isunreasonable, the clock begins to run from the laying of the information. [9] Turning to the time periods here after October 19, 2012, there is some consensus in the Crown and defence attributions. Both characterize the approximate six and one-half months from April 3 until October 21, 2013 as institutional delay.
Indeed, the Crownaccepts as institutional delay all post-April 3, 2013 time until the commencement of trial (a date which is projected in its materials to beNovember 18, 2013), as well as seventy-one days from the pre-April 3, 2013 period, for an institutional delay total of two hundred andninety-eight days -over nine and one-half months. [10] The defence sees institutional delay as the period from April 3 to October 21, 2013. However, Ms. Wells would add to the s.11(
b) delay clock another five and one-half months, approximately, of delay said to have been caused by the Crown, beginning withT.C.’s first appearance on October 23, 2012. [11] With respect, I would ascribe the post-October 19, 2012 periods somewhat differently than counsel have on the basissubsequently described.
My assessment is as follows: October 19 – January 8: Inherent – 2 months , 3 weeks January 8 to April 3: Crown – 3 months April 3 to May 15: Inherent (counsel availability) – 1 month, 2 weeks May 15 to October 21: Institutional – 5 months, 1 week October 21 to October 25: Inherent – 1 week October 25 to December 20: Institutional – 2 months Inherent Crown Institutional 2 months, 3 weeks 1 month, 2 weeks ___________1 week 4 months, 2 weeks 3 months _____________ 3 months 5 months, 1 week 2 months ______________ 7 months, 1 week [12] There is nothing extraordinary or institutionally dilatory about the first appearance date and the three remands to and onDecember 4, 2012.
While the Crown did not have its brief on October 23, 2012, neither that fact nor the lack of proper disclosure seemsto have slowed the ensuing required steps of setting a Crown resolution meeting and a judicial pre-trial. The times set for these stepsseem to be within the usual parameters. The remand dates of November 13, December 4 and January 8 were all requested by thedefence, not imposed over any form of protest.
It would be over-reaching, in my view, for T.C. now to propose not only that the Crownought to have provided full disclosure by the time of his first appearance (not in itself an unreasonable expectation) but also that, if hehad then had full disclosure, he would have set a trial date. That would be to ignore the intake requirements inherent in the prosecution. [13] There is, however, a significant issue as to when the neutral intake period ended. Ms. Ross’s submission is that T.C. was aready and willing participant in the adjournments on January 8 and March 8, 2013 of the judicial pre-trial for continuation.
Since thejudicial pre-trial is part of the required procedure in this jurisdiction prior to the setting of a date for trial, the delay clock was insuspension, the argument goes, until April 3, 2013. [14] Ms. Wells counters that, if the Crown had complied with its obligation to make full and timely disclosure, then the positionthe Crown ultimately arrived at on April 3, 2013 – the resolution to proceed to trial – would have been reached by January 8, 2013 andthe defence need not have marked time after that date. Ms.
Wells says, with reason, that the defence cannot be characterized as ameaningful participant in the ongoing pre-trial process, at least until receipt of the video statements in mid-March 2013, in the absence ofmaterial disclosure from the Crown. Ms. Wells also underscores the delay, until April 3, 2013, of advice from the Crown that its
assessment of reasonable prospects of conviction was complete and that the matter would proceed to trial. This information, the defencesays, was a prime factor in its willingness to agree to remands beyond January 8, 2013 and to defer setting a trial date at that time. [15] In support of her submission that the delay clock ought not to be seen as unmoving from January 8 until April 3, 2013, Ms.Wells cites R. v. S.R., supra. There, the Crown sought to characterize as inherent delay a period of approximately one year during whichit explored the possibility of a “conference” resolution option.
Vaillancourt, J. found the period to be institutional delay, as follows: I find that the time required to deal with the conference falls under the heading of institutional delay. The legislation contemplates thepossibility of a conference with the view that the offence will not proceed to trial. The Crown must monitor this option in order to assessits viability and completion within a reasonable time. If this option proves to be unworkable, then alternatives must be considered in anexpeditious fashion.
The clock cannot be allowed to tick in a vacuum. [16] I agree with the defence position concerning this interval. While the Crown did provide the video statement to the defenceon March 14, 2013, it failed to equip T.C. with this documentation, documentation fundamental to an assessment of the case he had tomeet, prior to that date. Any pre-trial involvement by the defence until that point would necessarily have been tentative. Further, neitheron March 14, 2013, nor thereafter until June 25, 2013, did the Crown provide any notes of the officer in charge.
This, again, wasdocumentation significant to the defence for purposes of a pre-trial and requested explicitly as early as December, 2012. Hindsight isalways 20/20 but surely a reconstruction of the Crown’s approach on and after December 4, 2013 based on reasonable pomptitude wouldhave all or at least most of the long-requested disclosure in the hands of the defence and the Crown decision on prospects of convictionformulated, both within a few weeks of December 4. Had that been done, what occurred on April 3, 2013 could have occurred onJanuary 8.
This interval was wasted. [17] Bearing in mind the decision of Code, J. in Lahiry, supra, I would also reduce somewhat from counsels’ characterizations theinstitutional delay portion of the period after April 3, 2013. Code, J’s realistic analysis on this issue was as follows: Finally there is no place for fictions when seeking to prove Charter violations. It is rarely true that counsel is immediately available fortrial, when setting a date. Whenever counsel take a new case they complete various preliminary steps during the intake period.
Oncethey have taken these steps and are ready to set a date for trial, they need to set aside sufficient time in their calendars to prepare the newcase for trial and to then conduct the trial. If the case is lengthy and complex, or if counsel are very busy, it may be some considerableperiod of time before counsel are ready for trial.
To use a simple hypothetical, if counsel has no time in his/her calendar to prepare anew case for trial and to then try it until ten months in the future, and the earliest date that the Court has available for the trial is twelvemonths in the future, then systemic congestion in the Court is the cause of only two months of delay. The other ten months is delay thatthe accused needs, for entirely beneficial reasons, in order to allow his/her counsel of choice to prepare the case for trial and toaccommodate it in an otherwise busy calendar.
It is good and necessary delay that would have occurred in any event, even if the Courthad earlier available dates. It is a fiction to characterize this kind of useful delay as unwarranted or unreasonable or prejudicial. [18] The record in this case does not contain any indication of the dates on which counsel would have been able to commence trialafter April 3, 2013, other than the indication that day by Ms. Wells’s representative that Ms. Wells had “many, many” prior availabledates. In the absence of anything firmer - and both Ms. Ross and Ms.
Wells affirming that the case is not complex and hinges oncredibility - I have used a six week benchmark for calendar-clearing by counsel. Accordingly, the institutional delay after April 3, 2013until the commencement of trial is slightly more than five months and slightly more than seven months to trial completion. The“administrative guideline” referred to in R. v. M.(G.C.), supra, and R. v. T.R. (ON CA), [2005] O.J.
No. 2150(O.C.A.) is five to six months. [19] I have noted from the “green sheet” prepared by the trial coordinator on April 3, 2013 and attached to the information that,on that date, the first five days being offered by court for the Charter motions and trial were October 21, November 4, November 18,December 20 and December 23, 2012. The Crown then put on record its availability on all of these dates. According to the green sheet,the defence was unavailable on the last of these dates or on three other final days for trial prior to January 6, 2013 offered by the court(on all of which the Crown was available).
Accordingly, it seems to me that the Ontario Court of Justice cannot be regarded as “unableto accommodate the parties” for trial completion at any point after December 20. However, it was unable to accommodate trialcompletion from October 25 - notionally the quickest lapse of five trial and motion days – until December 20. Thus, I regard the post-October 21, 2013 institutional delay to trial completion as a period of slightly less than two months. [20] As I have indicated, I regard the approximate three month period from January 8 until April 3, 2013 as attributable to theinaction of the Crown.
Prejudice [21] As to prejudice, both in his affidavit and his testimony on the application, T.C. adverted to the way this matter is affectinghim. Such prejudice as T.C. has described arises largely from the embarrassment of his arrest at his school and the stigma under whichhe has continued to labour among his friends, acquaintances and family. He testified to depression and anxiety but agreed that he has notsought medical advice about these difficulties. He has deferred seeking employment for several months out of fear that the fact of hischarge will come to light.
He missed a work shift on the day of his arrest. The terms of his release do not appear to be onerous. In hersubmissions, Ms. Wells conceded that the evidence of prejudice on this record is not overwhelming. To the extent, however, that T.C.was obliged to undergo the strains naturally flowing from facing a criminal charge for an unduly long period, they can properly beregarded as prejudice from delay: Morin, supra. And what constitutes an unduly long period may well be less in the case of a youth thanin the case of an adult given the particular sensitivity of the young to the passage of time: R. v.
M.(G.C.), supra. Balancing
[22] Again, institutional delay to trial completion has exceeded the upper end of the administrative guideline by slightly more thanone month in a case which requires five days of court time. While this excess does not, in itself, weigh particularly heavily in favour ofunreasonable delay, when it is taken into account with the apparent idleness of the Crown, in terms of disclosure and decision-making,from December 4, 2012 until April 3, 2013, the total number of months to be attributed to the Crown during which this youth has beenand will be required to wait rises to more than ten.
I accept that, in the eyes of a sixteen and seventeen year old young man facing acriminal charge, that is a very long time. [23] In R v. Kovacs-Tatar (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4756 (O.C.A), the Ontario Court of Appeal describedthe balancing of the interests which s. 11(
b) is designed to protect in the following manner:
Section 11(
b) is framed in terms of reasonableness. As noted, the courts have refrained from creating limitation periods withinwhich certain types of cases must be tried lest the judicial guillotine descend in the form of a stay of proceedings. This inevitablyrequires the trial court to exercise judgment, having regard to the factors enumerated in Morin. In Morin at p. 13, Sopinka J. describedthe exercise in these terms: • The general approach to a determination as to whether the right has been denied is not by the application of a mathematical oradministrative formula but rather by a judicial determination balancing the interests which the
section is designed to protect againstfactors which either inevitably lead to delay or are otherwise the cause of delay. As I noted in Smith, supra [R. v. Smith (1989), (SCC), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 97], “[i]t is axiomatic that some delay is inevitable. The question is, at what point does the delaybecome unreasonable?” (p. 105). 58. The interests involved do not just include the accused’s liberty and security interests and his or her interest in a fair trial.
There aresocietal interests in ensuring that an accused is tried within a reasonable time, to minimize the prejudice to accused and ensure they aretreated humanely and fairly (Morin at p. 12). But, there is also a societal interest in ensuring that accused are tried on their merits.
AsSopinka J. said at p. 13 of Morin, “As the seriousness of the offence increases so does the societal demand that the accused be brought totrial.” [24] The details of T.C.’s charge as described in the application materials are that, between April 2, 2012 and July 7, 2013, hesecretly recorded S.S. changing clothes in her bedroom, a recording S.S. then discovered and deleted. Exhibit 4 in this application is acopy of the Crown screening form which indicates that, the Crown is proceeding summarily and that, on a plea to the charge, the Crownwould seek as a sentence a youth probation order.
While the offence, if made out, would constitute a shameful violation of S.S.’s privacyand certainly criminal rather than merely prankish conduct, it would not rank among the more serious crimes. It is preferable that anycriminal charge proceed to trial on its merits but the particularly compelling desirability of this occurring which exists in the case of avery serious charge (see, for example, R. v. Seegmiller (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 5004 (O.C.J.) and R. v.
Kovacs-Tatar, supra) does not exist here. [25] Without pretending to be engaged in an exercise approaching exact science, my balancing of the interests of T.C. and societymilitates against a finding that T.C. can now receive his trial within a reasonable time. The proceeding is fraught with both institutionaldelay somewhat in excess of the common law administrative guideline and Crown delay which materially slowed the process. Bearingin mind that T.C. is a young accused in respect of whom Parliament requires law enforcement characterized by “promptness and speed”,I regard his s. 11(
b) right as having been infringed. The charge is stayed. Released: Monday, November 4, 2013 Signed: “Justice C.M. Harpur” Justice C.M. Harpur, O.C.J.
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