Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. D. B.-S., 2013 ONCJ 8
Opinion
WARNING The court hearing this matter directs that the following notice should be attached to the file: This is a case under
Part III of the Child and Family Services Act and is subject to one or more of subsections 48(7) , 45(8) and 45(9) of the Act. These subsections and subsection 85(3) of the Child and Family Services Act , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows: 45.—
(7) Order excluding media representatives or prohibiting publication. — The court may make an order, . . . (
c) prohibiting the publication of a report of the hearing or a specified part of the hearing, where the court is of the opinion that . . . publication of the report, . . ., would cause emotional harm to a child who is a witness at or a participant in the hearing or is the subject of the proceeding.
(8) Prohibition: identifying child. — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.
(9) Idem: order re adult. — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part. . . . 85.—
(3) Idem. — A person who contravenes subsection 45(8) or 76(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 45(7)(
c) or subsection 45(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both. COURT FILE No.: Toronto CFO 09 10657-02 A3 DATE: 2013·01·14 Citation: Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. D. B.-S. , 2013 ONCJ 8 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF TORONTO, Applicant, — AND — MS. D. B.-S., & MR. V. S. Respondents. Before Justice Penny J.
Jones Heard on November 23, 2012 Reasons for Judgment released on January 14, 2013 Ms. Estee Garfin .................................................................................... for the applicant society Ms. Elizabeth Julien-Wilson ............................................................... for the respondent mother Mr. V. S. on his own behalf
JONES, P. J. J.: [1] This is my ruling with respect to the
summary judgment motion brought by the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto (theSociety) under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules relating to the child P. B.-S. (P. ), born […], 2005. In the motion, the Society submitsthat there is no genuine issue requiring a trial and accordingly seeks a finding that the child is in need of protection under section37(2)b(i)(ii) and, if a finding is made, the Society seeks a dispositional order that the child be made a crown ward with a view toplacing the child for adoption. POSITION OF THE PARENTS [2] The father, V. S. is unrepresented.
He opposes both the finding and the dispositional order of crown wardship. In theevent that a finding in need of protection is made, the father seeks a further order of society wardship followed by a supervision orderwith a return of the child to his care at the end of the child’s school year in June, 2013. In the alternative, if a crown wardship order ismade, the father seeks an access order. I presume that the father is contesting the appropriateness of disposing of this matter on the basisof this
summary judgment motion and seeks a viva voce hearing. [3] The mother, D. B.-S. does not oppose the finding in need of protection nor the dispositional order of Crown wardship. Initially, she sought access in the form of a therapeutic access arrangement but part way through the motion she withdrew her claim foraccess and consented to a crown wardship order with a view to the Society placing the child for adoption. She opposes the father’srequest for a return of the child under a supervision order and /or an order for access to the child. THE LAW [4] Rule 16 generally sets out a road map to be followed in the bringing of a
summary judgment motion. It is the Society’sposition, that in the event the court were to find that Rule 16 did not provide the tools necessary to decide the issues before the courtwithin the context of this
summary judgment motion, the court should import the new forensic tools contained in Rule 20 of the Rules ofCivil Procedure. [5] Rule 16 provides that the party bringing such a motion must file affidavit material or other evidence that shows, on aprima facie basis, that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. If the Respondent does not respond, or does not file affidavit or otherevidence that shows there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, and the material filed by the moving party satisfies the court that there is aprima facie case for a
summary judgment order, the Respondent risks losing. [6] In fact, Rule 16 provides that if the court is satisfied that there is “no genuine issue requiring a trial”, the court shallmake a final order. However, even when the court finds a genuine issue for trial, it is not necessary that the motion be dismissed in itsentirety. A court may isolate a particular claim in a case in which a triable issue exists and give directions for a trial of that issueutilizing Rule 16(9) and make a final order relating to those aspects of the case wherein no triable issue is found to exist. In that way,Rule 16 may be used to promote the primary objective set out in Rule 2(5)(
a) by “identifying the issues, and separating and disposing ofthose issues that do not need full investigation or trial.” For those issues that do require a trial, under Rule 16(9), the “court may state theissues and give directions about how and when the case will go to trial.” [7] The case law decided under Rule 16 was originally developed relying on the case law decided under the former Rule 20of the Rules of Civil Procedure, prior to its amendment on January 1, 2010. The seminal cases, such as Aguonie v Galion Solid WasteMaterial Inc. (ON CA), [1998] O.J. no. 459 (Ont. C.A.), Irving Ungerman Ltd. v.
Galanis (1991), (ON CA), 4 O.R. (3d) 545 (Ont. C.A.), Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie (1990), (ON SC), 75 O.R. (2d) 225 (Gen. Div.),Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 432,and Dawson v. Rexcraft Storage and Warehouse Inc.,(1998), (ON CA), 111 O.A.C. 201 speak to the role of the judge hearing such motions and to the need for the judge to“take a good hard look” at the evidentiary record filed to determine whether there exists a genuine issue as to material facts requiring atrial. In deciding such motions, these cases articulated a limited role of the judge.
In those decisions, the judge is cautioned to respect thelimits placed on the role of a judge deciding a “summary judgment” motion. Once the motion judge finds a genuine issue for trial exists,he or she is not to “find facts, weigh evidence or draw factual conclusions.” According to the case law, these roles are reserved to thetrial judge. [8] Since the amendment to Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in January, 2010, this severely proscribed role in civil(non- family) cases has been expanded dramatically. Now, a judge hearing a
summary judgment motion under Rule 20 may weighevidence, evaluate credibility, draw reasonable inferences and may order oral evidence in pursuance of his or her role in determiningwhether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.
[9] To date, Rule 16 has not been amended to include such expanded powers. There is no consensus in the jurisprudence asto whether a court may rely on the expanded powers contained in Rule 20 on a
summary judgment motion under Rule 16 of the FamilyLaw Rules. The question remains undecided whether it is appropriate/or permissible to incorporate all or part of the expanded powerscontained in Rule 20 by invoking Rule 1(7) of the Family Law Rules. For example, Mulligan, J in Steine v. Steine 2010 ONSC 4289, [2010] O.J.No. 3331 (S.C.J.) found it was appropriate to apply the amendments in family cases, and Perkins, J. in Starr v.Gordon, 2010 ONSC 4167 , [2010] O.J.
No. 3223 (S.C.J.) reached the opposite conclusion. [10] The argument for expanding the powers of the court by analogy to Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is premised ona finding by the court that the current Rules do not adequately cover the matter and on the court finding that it is appropriate to do so.
Rule 1(7) reads as follows: If these rules do not cover a matter adequately, the court may give directions, and the practice shall be decided by analogy to theserules, by reference to the Courts of Justice Act and the Act governing the case and, if the court considers it appropriate, by reference tothe Rules of Civil Procedure. [11] The Society in its factum requested leave to provide further submissions on the motion if the court felt it was not able todetermine the issues within the more limited tests and tools provided by Rule 16. [12] Without commenting on whether it is appropriate/possible to incorporate all or part of the expanded powers contained inRule 20 by invoking Rule 1(7), for the reasons set out hereinafter, I am satisfied that I am able to fairly and expeditiously decide thiscase under the current Rule 16 without seeking to employ the expanded analytical tools available under Rule 20 and accordingly do notfeel it is necessary to hear further submissions on this point.
Statutory Finding of Fact [13] The parties agree that the statutory finding of fact I must make pursuant to s. 47(2) are as follows: • Full legal name and age of the child is as follows: P.L.S. B-S., born […], 2005 (male) • Child’s religion: Not Catholic and Not Jewish; • Child’s Indian or Native status: Not Indian and Not Native • Apprehended in the City of Toronto, Ontario on October 5, 2010; • Full legal name of Child’s Mother: D. B.-S.; and • Full legal name of Child’s Father: V.
S. (parent) BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS [14] P. is now seven years eight months old and, during his short life, he has been in the care of the Society for a period inexcess of three years. He has been out of/ removed from his parents care on three separate occasions, namely from: May 4, 2006 toNovember 10, 2006; March 16, 2007 to July 19, 2007 and from October 5, 2010 to date. There are currently no family or communityplans before the court for consideration. [15] P. ’s mother concedes that she is not currently in a position to care for him. Ms.
B-S. has given birth to ten children, eightchildren who are older than P. and one child who is younger. None of the eight older children have been raised by the mother. Themother’s youngest child, B., was apprehended shortly after his birth on […], 2009. Given what appeared to be significant improvementsin the mother’s living situation, B. was returned to her under a temporary supervision order on March 20, 2012.
Unfortunately, B. wasre-apprehended on August 16, 2012 and has remained in care since that date. [16] Originally it was the plan of the Society to place P. with his mother and his half-brother under a supervision order;however, on August 8, 2012, P. was removed from his mother’s home due to an allegation of serious domestic violence and alcoholabuse by his mother and her domestic partner. (A recent hair strand test of the mother submitted into evidence by the Society showsresults consistent with “serious alcoholism”.
The mother denies that such is the case but is not opposing the orders sought by theSociety.) [17] At the time this motion was heard, all access between P. and his mother had ceased. The mother apparently feels that 7year old P. misrepresented the home situation to the Society, and by so doing, caused the society to apprehend B.. Initially, it was herposition that therapeutic access should be ordered given her concern about this false reporting by P. , but she is now supporting theplacement of P. for adoption as she believes that her son needs a permanent home as soon as possible where his needs will be met.
Shedoes not support P. being returned to his father nor does she support continued access to Mr. S. as she does not feel that a return to thefather’s care or continued access would be in her son’s best interests. [18] P. was apprehended from his father’s care after his father was arrested due to allegations of domestic violence. Thefather was taken into custody and charged with assault bodily harm against his then partner, Ms. H. G. (According to the affidavitevidence filed on the motion by the Society, Mr. S. broke Ms G.’s nose.) When the Respondent father was arrested, P. was at home and
witnessed all or part of the events that evening. [ 19 ] It is the Society’s evidence that the father was not providing a suitable home environment for P. . The affidavit evidence filed by the Society indicates that, at the time the father had custody of P. , he was abusing alcohol and drugs and was involved in a highly abusive relationship with Ms G. who was also abusing drugs. Mr. S. was the owner of two rooming houses and would move between his two homes with P. .
A number of the tenants in these rooming houses had drug or alcohol problems and certain of the tenants, according to the police, were involved in prostitution. [ 20 ] Mr. S. is reported to have acknowledged to the Society worker that he was involved in incidents of domestic violence with Ms G. and was prepared to attend for domestic violence counselling but that such counselling had never been commenced.
As well, I note that the father had agreed to participate in parenting programs but had never followed through. [ 21 ] The Society also filed affidavits attesting to comments made by P. to the foster mother, to various Social workers and to the psychologist Dr. Fitzgerald that he witnessed domestic violence and drug abuse in his home (by his mother and father and by other tenants in the home).
P. is reported to have told his worker that he was very angry with his mummy (Ms G.) because she “spit on his dad, pushed him and had him arrested by the police.” [ 22 ] In the father’s affidavit, he does not deny domestic violence or drug and alcohol use in his home, or that incidents of prostitution occurred in the home. [ 23 ] He does deny, however, that he is, or has ever been, a cocaine user. The results of two hair strand tests conducted by Motherisk were filed as evidence on the motion.
The first test conducted on May 10, 2011 showed results that would indicate that the father was a repeat user of cocaine in the medium range; the second test dated May 14, 2012 showed results that would indicate the father was a repeat user of cocaine. Although the father denied use of cocaine and attributed the positive results to environmental exposure, he filed no scientific evidence that would refute the claim by Mr.
Gareri, Director of Motherisk, that the results indicated active usage not environmental exposure because of the metabolite reading obtained. [ 24 ] The father was offered a further opportunity to be retested in November, 2012 which he declined. He did offer to undergo weekly urine tests for the next three months and then he said he would undergo a further hair strand test. [ 25 ] Mr. S. requests that the child be returned to his care under a supervision order after the child completes his current school year.
In his affidavit he noted that the child appeared well settled in his foster home and he should be allowed to complete his school year with his classmates. As well, he stated in his affidavit that he required further time to establish to the Society and to the court that he is not abusing drugs. [ 26 ] If the child is made a crown ward, the father seeks an order for access on the basis that access is beneficial and meaningful and will not impair his opportunities for adoption. [ 27 ] P. has continued to visit with his father once per week.
Initially, access with his father had been twice per week, but was reduced to once per week at a time when the Society was planning to reintegrate P. into the home of his mother. [ 28 ] Generally, access between P. and his father has been positive and P. looks forward to visits with his father and is upset when access does not take place. The father has cancelled approximately 25% of his access visits over the last year for various reasons. His access has remained supervised or semi-supervised.
Since P. was apprehended in October, 2010, the father has never brought a motion that the child be returned to his care or that he be allowed unsupervised or community access to P. . DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
(1) THE FINDING. [ 29 ] The Society seeks a finding that the child is in need of protection under section 37(2) (b)(i)(ii) of the Act which reads as follows: There is a risk that the child is likely to suffer physical harm inflicted by the person having charge of the child or caused by or resulting from that person’s (
i) failure to adequately care for, provide for, supervise or protect the child, or (ii) pattern of neglect in caring for, proving for, supervising or protecting the child. [ 30 ] I accept the uncontested evidence tendered by the Society that, while P. was living in a home provided by his father, he witnessed, on a regular basis, incidents of domestic abuse and drug and alcohol abuse.
At the time of P. ’s apprehension on October 5, 2010, the police had come to the home to investigate a stabbing of one woman by another woman, and the assault of one of those women by P. ’s father which resulted in that woman’s nose being broken. [ 31 ] P. spoke to a number of people including the assessor, Dr. Fitzgerald, about witnessing domestic violence between his father and Ms. G. and about living in homes where physical violence and drug abuse was occurring. [ 32 ] Although Mr.
S. denies that he used cocaine in past or is currently using cocaine, he did not deny the incidents of domestic violence or drug abuse occurring in the home he was providing for P. . [ 33 ] It is not necessary to decide the extent, if any, of the father’s use of cocaine for the purposes of making the finding. Even
if I were to consider that the father’s denial of any drug use raised an issue that required oral evidence for a fair determination, (which Ido not in the face of the two hair strand tests from Motherisk showing repeated, personal use), the issue of the father’s drug use does notraise a genuine issue requiring a trial on the issue of the finding. A determination of that issue (i.e. the extent of the father’s use ofdrugs) is not a material fact, the determination of which would affect the outcome on the issue of the finding. Associate Chief JusticeJohn W.
Morden in Irving Ungerman Ltd.v.Galantis, supra at p. 550 [O.R.] discussed the relationship between a genuine issue for trialand a material fact when he wrote, If a fact is not material to an action, in the sense that the result of the proceeding does not turn on its existence or non-existence, then itcannot relate to a “genuine issue for trial.” [34] On the basis of the uncontested evidence surrounding the circumstances of his apprehension, I am satisfied that there isno genuine issue requiring a trial on the issue of the finding and accordingly I find the child in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i)(ii) of the Act.
I am satisfied that the circumstances surrounding the child’s apprehension posed a risk that this young, vulnerablechild was likely to suffer physical harm and that risk of likely physical harm arose due to the actions, lack of supervision or neglect of thefather [35] I adopt the test set out in para. 43 of the decision of Pazaratz, J. in Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region v. S.C., (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 3969 (Sup. Ct.). In that decision the court held that “no genuine issue for trial existswhere there is no realistic possibility of an outcome other than that as sought by the applicant.” .
On the unrefuted evidence before me,there is no realistic possibility that a finding in need of protection will not be made.
(2) DISPOSITIONAL ORDERS (
a) Crown Wardship [36] P. is now seven years eight months old and has been in the care of the Society for a period in excess of three years. Under
section 70 of the Child and Family Services Act (R.S.O. 1990, c.
C.11, as amended (the Act), given the fact that the child has beenin care for a period in excess of 24 months, there are only two dispositional options available to the court—a supervision order or acrown wardship order (subject to a possible one time six month extension of society wardship under section 70(4)). [37] Section 70(4) does provide that the court may extend the time for the making of a society wardship order, on a one timebasis, for a period not to exceed six months, if such extension is in the child’s best interests to do so. [38] I find that in the circumstances of this case, it would not be in the child’s best interests to extend the time periods set outin
section 70. No exceptional circumstances have been identified by the father which would explain why it has taken so long for thefather to put his plan together, or why I should reasonably conclude that the situation should be expected to change in the foreseeablefuture. In fact, the evidence is that Mr. S. has not worked with the Society in an attempt to deal with his issues including his parentingissues, drug issues and domestic violence issues over the last two years. [39] Mr.
S. is now offering to allow the Society to review his premises, to undergo urine testing three times per week with afollow-up hair test in three months, and to attend a parenting program. This offer comes too late in the proceeding to justify any furtherdelay. If Mr. S. had any intention of making a plan for P. , he would have done so by now.
Any further delay in beginning permanencyplanning is not in P. ’s best interests. [40] Given the circumstances of this case, and considering the fact that in his short life P. has been care for a cumulativeperiod in excess of three years, I am satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial and that the least disruptive order consistent with thebest interests of this child is a crown wardship order under section 57(3) .
As was the case with the finding, on the issue of crownwardship there is no genuine issue for trial because there is no realistic possibility of an outcome other than the one sought by theSociety. (see Children’s Aid Society of Niagara Region v. S.C., supra.)
(3) ACCESS ISSUE [41] Now that I have made the crown wardship order, section 59(2) of the Act provides that any access order made under theAct is terminated. I am advised by the Society that it is their intention to place P. for adoption and the Society is opposed to the father’srequest for an access order. Section 59(2.1) provides that the court shall not make an access order with respect to a ward of the Crownunless the court is satisfied that, (
a) The relationship between the person and the child is beneficial and meaningful to the child; and (
b) The ordered access will not impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption. [42] The onus is on the person requesting the access order to establish to the court that both prongs of the test set out in section59(2.1) have been satisfied. [43] As the mother has withdrawn her claim for access, the only outstanding claim for access is the one made by the father. [44] The society argues that any access order will impair this child’s opportunity for adoption because prospective adoptiveparents may not be willing to come forward to adopt P. knowing that they will be required to deal with this father.
[45] As well, the Society is concerned that the father, if granted access, would not comply with access expectations and, if thechild were placed for adoption, and if the father were successful in obtaining an openness order, he would not support the child in hisadoptive home and this would result in the child being placed in a “loyalty bind”. [46] In considering whether I am in a position to dismiss the father’s claim for access on the basis of the paper record alone, Ihave identified the following undisputed facts from the evidence filed: • P. is almost eight years old and has maintained contact with his family of origin through this entire time. • There is a close and loving relationship between the father and P. . • P. enjoys his time with his father and looks forward to his visits.
The visits between P. and his dad are appropriate. The fatheroften brings toys and food to the visits and the two play together. There are obvious expressions of physical affection (P. enjoys sittingon his father’s lap.) • When his father is late for visits or cancels his visits, P. becomes anxious and sad. • When asked by the adoption worker about his family, P. identifies his brothers and sisters and father as his family. • P. has a poor relationship with his mother.
As recently as August, 2012, he experienced rejection from his mother when he wasblamed by his mother for causing the apprehension of his younger sibling by providing false information to the Society. On his last visitwith his mother she refused to speak to him and asked the worker why he had been brought. P. said to the worker, “Mommy is mad atme”. He never asks about his mother. • P. has suffered much instability and dislocation in his short life. He has been in and out of care on three occasions. He has been inthe care of his mother and father, his father, and his mother and her new partner.
An aunt and an uncle began planning for him and thenwithdrew their plan of care. • P. has been assessed as a child who is delayed academically, and who exhibits many of the characteristics of a child with ADHD. He is currently taking medication to control his behaviour. • P. has expressed a desire to go and live with his dad and his dad has told him that he will try to get him home.
P. frequently crieswhen it is time to leave at the end of a visit. • According to his recent psychological assessment, P. needs a highly supportive, safe and nurturing environment, free of adultconflict or frightening behaviour. [47] I have concluded that this access issue is very complex and does give rise to triable issues. I have determined that I amunable to make this decision on the paper record.
I have concluded for the reasons set out below that I require a viva voce hearing inorder to decide this important issue. [48] The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently provided significant guidance to motion judges in separating those cases orissues that may safely be decided on a paper record and those cases which require a full viva voce hearing in order to fairly decide theissues by articulating the “full appreciation test”. This new test is referred to in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, 2011ONCA 764 , [2011] O.J.
No. 5431 (O.C.A), a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal sitting as five judges on appeal of anumber of decisions made under the amended Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Although not decided under Rule 16, the court’scomments relating to the characteristics of cases that require a trial as opposed to a
summary judgment motion for disposition are equallyvalid and helpful for judges deciding motions under Rule 16. [49] Paragraphs 51, 53 and 54 of the Combined Air decision, supra, speaks to this issue. These paragraphs provide as follows: 51. We think this “full appreciation test” provides a useful benchmark for deciding whether or not a trial is required in the interests ofjustice. In cases that call for multiple findings of fact on the basis of conflicting evidence emanating from a number of witnesses andfound in a voluminous record, a
summary judgment motion cannot serve as an adequate substitute for the trial process. Generallyspeaking, in those cases, the motion judge simply cannot achieve the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to makedispositive findings. Accordingly the full appreciation test is not met and the “interest of justice” requires a trial. 53. We wish to emphasize the very important distinction between “full appreciation” in the sense we intend here, and achievingfamiliarity with the total body of evidence in the motion record.
Simply being knowledgeable about the entire content of the motionrecord is not the same as fully appreciating the evidence and issues in a way that permits a fair and just adjudication of the dispute. Thefull appreciation test requires motion judges to do more than simply assess if they are capable of reading and interpreting all of theevidence that has been put before them. 54. The point we are making is that a motion judge is required to assess whether the attributes of the trial process are necessary toenable him or her to fully appreciate the evidence and the issues posed by the case.
In making this determination, the motion judge is toconsider, for example, whether he or she can accurately weigh and draw inferences from the evidence without the benefit of the trialnarrative, without the ability to hear the witnesses speak in their own words, and without the assistance of counsel as the judge examinesthe record in chamber. [50] Relying on a paper record to decide the access issue, even if I were to rule that I had access to the enhanced analyticaltools available under Rule 20, in these circumstances, would not be sufficient to obtain a full appreciation of the evidence, and I find thata trial with viva voce evidence is required in the interests of justice for me to do so. [51] A decision as to whether access should continue or be terminated is an important one not only to the father but to the
child. [ 52 ] In deciding this case, in my view, it is important and desirable to “hear the voice of the child”. I do not feel that the child’s interests on this issue have been adequately represented to date and therefore I am making an order appointing the Children’s Lawyer under
section 38 of the Act to represent P. . [ 53 ] I am concerned about how termination of contact between the father and P. will affect P. , a child who has experienced so many disappointments in his life and who appears to have a significant attachment to his father. [ 54 ] Indeed, this may be one of those situations where an openness order might actually assist in settling the child into an adoptive “forever home” provided the father is willing and able to support his son in finding such a home. CONCLUSION [ 55 ] I am satisfied that the Rule 16(9) adequately covers this situation.
I have determined that a triable issue exists and I wish to give directions as to how this trial of an issue should proceed. Subrule 16(9) reads as follows: If a court does not make a final order, or makes an order for a trial of an issue, the court may also, (
a) Specify what facts are not in dispute, state the issues and give directions about how and when the case will go to trial (in which case, the order govern how the trial proceeds, unless the trial judge orders otherwise to prevent injustice); (
b) Give directions; and (
c) Impose conditions (for example, require a party to pay money into court as security, or limit a party’s pre-trial disclosure). [ 56 ] Accordingly, I am ordering a trial of an issue on the question of whether the court should make an access order to the father under section 59(2.1) all the while knowing that the effect of making an access order may lead to the making of an openness order in the future if the child is placed for adoption as planned. 1. I am also making an order that a
section 38 order issue for representation of the child. 2. On a temporary basis, I make an access order in favour of the father on the same terms as existed prior to the granting of the Crown wardship order that terminated the prior temporary access order. [ 57 ] I am adjourning this matter back to the case management judge to ensure that the Children’s Lawyer is in place and to organize this trial of an issue to be heard before me. [ 58 ] In the interim, I would urge the Society to begin to search for an adoptive home that might be willing to consider an openness order for this child in these circumstances.
The trial of the issue relating to access should be prepared to address the following issues. 1. What effect would a termination of contact with Mr. S. have on P. ? 2. If an access order were made, would/could Mr. S. be able to support P. in a future adoptive home? 3. If an access order were made with a view to continuing contact between P. and his father in some form of openness arrangement, is there any adoptive home available to P. , given his challenges? [ 59 ] I am requesting that this matter be expedited and be placed back on my list for trial as soon as practicable after it has been prepared for trial.
Released: January 14, 2013 Signed: Justice Penny J. Jones
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