HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN — v. —, 2014 ONCJ 391
Opinion
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE DATE: 2014·08·06 COURT FILE No.: Halton File No. 13-135 BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN — AND — JOHN WELLS Before Justice Sheilagh O’Connell Heard on February 7 and February 18, 2014 Ruling delivered on February 18, 2014 Written Reasons Mary Ward ........................................................................................ counsel for the Crown Michael Engel …………………………………………….for the defendant John Wells O’CONNELL J.: 1. INTRODUCTION: [1] John Wells was charged with operating a motor vehicle while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded 80 mgs ofalcohol in 100 mls of blood, contrary to ss 253(1) (
b) of the Criminal Code, possession of a controlled substance, contrary to section 4(1)of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and three Highway Traffic Act offences. [2] Mr. Wells sought a judicial stay of these proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the“Charter”). He alleged that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under
section 11(
b) of the Charter had been infringed. [3] Mr. Wells was arrested and charged with these offences on January 4, 2013. After five court appearances, on June 4, 2013, trial dates were set for April 2nd and 4th, 2014, more than fifteen months after Mr. Wells was charged. [4]
Section 11(
b) of the Charter protects the right to a trial within a reasonable time. The question in this case is whether thedelay is unreasonable, having regard to the factors and framework set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morin, (SCC), [1992]1 S.C.R. 771 and R. v. Askov,[1991], 1 S.C.R. 771. [5] Mr. Wells’ application was heard on February 7th and February 18th, 2014. On February 18, 2014, I determined that his rightto a trial within a reasonable time had been infringed and ruled that that the charges be stayed, with written reasons to follow. These aremy reasons. 2.
CHRONOLOGY: [6] The chronology of events, as evidenced by Mr. Wells’ affidavit and the transcripts filed of all court appearances, is asfollows:
a. January 4, 2013: Mr. Wells is arrested and charged with the offences. After his arrest and the obtaining of breath samples, he wastaken to the Oakville Trafalgar Hospital for a psychiatric assessment. He was held there until the next day, when he was released on aPromise to Appear. b. January 22, 2013: First appearance in court. Mr. Wells was provided with some initial disclosure, including the breath room DVD,and screening form. He requests a four week adjournment to review the disclosure and retain counsel. c. February 19, 2013: Second appearance in court. Mr. Wells has retained Mr. Engel as counsel.
An agent appears and files adesignation. The matter is adjourned to March 19, 2013. d. March 2, 2013: Mr. Engel writes to the Crown and requests additional disclosure, including the following, as set out in his letter: “Please also provide me with the entirety of his videotaped activities on the date of his arrest including any taken at the scene as wellall his activities at the police station including his arrival, booking, cell surveillance and release. In the alternative, if there either is novideo or if only part of what is requested can be provided, please advise precisely as to why that is.” In Addition: 1.
The Maintenance and Calibration Log for the particular instrument. 2. The two annual maintenance reports preceding the subject test date. 3. The Alcohol Standard Log for the particular instrument for the six week period preceding the subject test date. 4. The Device Usage Log for the particular instrument for the six week period preceding the subject test date. 5. The “Certificate of a Qualified Analyst, Standard Alcohol Solution” for the alcohol standard used to verify the operation of theparticular device for the period preceding the date of the alleged offence. 6.
Any other operator-generated or breath technician-generated documents pertaining to this particular device.” e. March 19, 2013: Third appearance in court. An agent for Mr. Engel appears and the matter is adjourned to April 16, 2013, as Mr.Engel is waiting for the further disclosure requested. The Crown confirms that the disclosure requested is not available at that time andthe matter is adjourned to “receive further disclosure.” f. April 5, 2013: In a letter dated April 5, 2013, the Crown provides some of the disclosure requested in Mr.
Engel’s March 2, 2013letter, but there is still outstanding disclosure, including the full maintenance and calibration records for both the roadside device and theIntoxilyzer, the booking video, sally port video and cell video and certificate of analysis. g. April 16, 2013: Fourth appearance in court. Agent appears and the matter is again adjourned as Mr. Engel is waiting fordisclosure. The Crown advises the court that the further disclosure has arrived and it will be sent out later today. The Crown requests thatdefence counsel
schedule a resolution meeting with the Crown. The matter is adjourned to May 7, 2013. h. April 22, 2013: In a letter dated April 22, 2013, the Crown provides the booking video, sally port video, cell video, and theCertificate of An Analyst. However, there was no audio on some of the videos. i. May 7, 2013: Fifth appearance in court. Agent appears on behalf of Mr. Engel and requests a further adjournment for outstandingdisclosure of the maintenance and calibration records for both the roadside devices and the Intoxilyzer.
The defence is requesting fourweeks for the disclosure, but agrees to conduct a resolution meeting with the Crown in the interim. The matter is adjourned to June 4,2013 for outstanding disclosure and to conduct a resolution meeting. j. May 30, 2013: Crown resolution meeting (pretrial) conducted with counsel. k. June 4, 2013: Sixth court appearance. The trial dates of April 4, 2014 and April 14, 2014 are set (ten months later). Earliestavailable dates. An interim date of August 23, 2013 is set for a judicial pretrial. l. August 23, 2013: Judicial pretrial conducted with counsel. Trial dates confirmed.
Request for the booking sheet in lieu of audioon the video and other pending disclosure. 3. THE LAW AND GOVERNING PRINCIPLES: [7] An 11(
b) analysis requires a balancing of two distinct rights: the individual rights of the accused and general societal rights.As Mr. Justice Laskin explained in R. v. Qureshi (2004), (ON CA), 190 C.C.C. (3d) 453 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 8 and9: “Section 11(
b) aims to protect both the individual rights of the accused and the rights of society. It protects three individual rights: itprotects the accused's right to security of the person by minimizing the anxiety and stigma of criminal proceedings; it protects theaccused's right to liberty by minimizing the effect of pre-trial custody or restrictive bail conditions; and it protects the accused's right to afair trial by ensuring that the proceedings occur while evidence is fresh and available. See R. v. Morin, (SCC), [1992] 1S.C.R. 771, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) at p.
Section 11(
b) also seeks to protect two societal rights. First, it protects the public's interest in having our laws enforced by having thosewho break the law tried quickly. Promptly held trials increase public confidence. Second, s. 11(
b) seeks to protect the public's interest inhaving those accused of crime dealt with fairly. See R. v. MacDougall, (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 45, 128 C.C.C. (3d)483 (S.C.C.) at p. 496.”
[8] In R. v. Morin, supra, the Supreme Court of Canada sets out the four factors that a court must consider in assessing whetherthere has been a violation of a right to a trial within a reasonable time as follows: 1. the length of the delay; 2. waiver of time periods; 3. the reasons for the delay, including,
a) the inherent time requirements of the case
b) the actions of the accused
c) the actions of the Crown
d) the limits on institutional resources
e) any other reason for the delay, and 4. Prejudice to the accused [9] No single factor is determinative. What is required is a balancing of all of the Morin factors in determining whether Mr.Wells’ right to a trial within a reasonable time has been breached. The s. 11(
b) exercise involves "a judicial determination balancing theinterests which the
section is designed to protect against factors which either inevitably lead to delay or are otherwise the cause of delay".See R. v. Morin, at para. 31. [10] The defendant bears the legal burden of establishing that his
section 11(
b) right has been violated. If a breach of
section 11(b)has been established, then a stay is the “minimal remedy”. No flexibility exists, a stay of the proceedings must be ordered. See Rahey v.The Queen, (SCC), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 at page 615; R. v. Thompson, [2009] O.J. No. 4586 (C.A.) at paragraph 9. [11] In R. v. Papandrea, [2012] O.J. No. 4880, 2012 ONCJ 651, 270 C.R.R. (2d) 90, Justice S.D. Brown summarizes the legalprinciples established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Morin and cases that followed at paragraphs 7 and 8 of his decision: [7] In R. v. Godin, 2009 SCC 26 , [2009] S.C.J.
No 26, the Supreme Court of Canada revisited and confirmed the R. v. Morinanalysis. As stated at paragraph 18: 18 The legal framework for the appeal was set out by the Court in Morin, at pp. 786-89. Whether delay has been unreasonable isassessed by looking at the length of the delay, less any periods that have been waived by the defence, and then by taking into account thereasons for the delay, the prejudice to the accused, and the interests that s. 11(
b) seeks to protect. This often and inevitably leads tominute examination of particular time periods and a host of factual questions concerning why certain delays occurred. It is important,however, not to lose sight of the forest for the trees while engaging in this detailed analysis.
As Sopinka J. noted in Morin, at p. 787, "[t]he general approach ... is not by the application of a mathematical or administrative formula but rather by a judicial determinationbalancing the interests which [s. 11 (b)] is designed to protect against factors which either inevitably lead to delay or are otherwise thecause of delay." [8] The Court went on to restate, "... that the prolonged exposure to criminal proceedings resulting from the delay gave rise to someprejudice".
The Court further stated at paragraph 37 and 38 that: 37 It is difficult to assess the risk of prejudice to the appellant's ability to make full answer and defence, but it is also important tobear in mind that the risk arises from delay to which the appellant made virtually no contribution. Missing from the analysis of themajority of the Court of Appeal, in my respectful view, is an adequate appreciation of the length of the delay in getting this relativelystraightforward case to trial.
As noted already, prejudice may be inferred from the length of the delay. 38 Moreover, it does not follow from a conclusion that there is an unquantifiable risk of prejudice to the appellant's ability to makefull answer and defence that the overall delay in this case was constitutionally reasonable. Proof of actual prejudice to the right to makefull answer and defence is not invariably required to establish a s. 11(
b) violation. This is only one of three varieties of prejudice, all ofwhich must be considered together with the length of the delay and the explanations for why it occurred.” 4. APPLICATION OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO THIS CASE: 1. The Length of the Delay: [12] The total time from the charge to the first date of trial in this matter was 15 months. This period of time is of sufficient lengthto merit a review of the reasonableness of the delay. The Crown concedes this. 2. Waiver of Some or all of the Time Periods: [13] The applicant did not waive any period of delay in this case.
The Crown acknowledged this during submissions. 3. The Reasons for the Delay: a. Inherent Time Requirements of the Case:
[14] In R. v. Morin, supra, a reasonable intake period for a simple uncomplicated case was suggested to be two months. This timeperiod is considered to be neutral when assessing delay under an 11(
b) analysis. [15] The Crown submits that the intake period in this case should be four months, from January 4, 2013, the date of the initialcharge to May 7, 2013, when, according to the Crown, complete disclosure was received by the Applicant. Although it acknowledgesthat this was “a simple drinking and driving case”, the Crown submits that there should be a longer intake period because the Applicantrefused to proceed with setting trial dates in this matter before disclosure was received.
According to the factum filed on behalf of theCrown, “the Crown’s obligation to provide disclosure is a continuing one, the Crown is not obligated to disclose every last bit ofevidence before a trial date is set.” [16] The Defence submits that the intake period should be two months and that a period of three months, from February 19th,2013 to May 7, 2013, should be attributed to the delay in Crown disclosure. [17] This case was not complex. It involved a routine vehicle stop and breath test. The investigation was complete on the night ofthe arrest.
The officer’s notes, the videos at the police station, and the machine calibration records were all completed that night. Mr.Wells retained counsel promptly, who obtained and reviewed disclosure. The trial time needed was estimated to be two days by bothparties, which the judicial pre-trial judge agreed was a realistic time estimate, as a voir dire on a
section 10(
b) Charter issue wasrequired. It is not disputed that defence counsel is a very experienced criminal lawyer, particularly in drinking and driving cases. [18] In my view, there is no reason why the intake period should be longer than 2.5 months, in light of the additional disclosurerequested on March 2, 2013. It should not take the Crown four months to provide the disclosure requested, as submitted. The applicantwas not refusing to set a date for trial and in fact agreed to a resolution meeting even though disclosure had not been completed.
Theapplicant also agreed to set trial dates without all of the disclosure requested. According to the judicial pretrial case management form,dated August 23, 2013, and signed by both counsel and the judicial pretrial judge, the applicant was still awaiting the booking sheet (inlieu of audio) and further disclosure from the Intoxilyzer technician regarding the set-up of the instrument and the booking sheet. b. Actions of the Accused: [19] In my view, the actions of the applicant did not contribute to the significant delay in these proceedings.
He retained counselpromptly, who obtained and reviewed disclosure and requested disclosure in timely fashion. He did not bring any motions that delayedthe initial proceedings. [20] The Crown submits that disclosure was largely completed on April 22, 2013 and that the applicant delayed conducting aCrown pretrial until May 7, 2013, over a month from when disclosure was provided. It is clear from a review of the transcripts that as ofMay 7, Mr. Engel was still awaiting the full maintenance and calibration records for both the roadside devices and the Intoxilyzer.Nevertheless, he did agree to
schedule a Crown pretrial after that court appearance. This meeting was scheduled for May 30, 2013. Noreason was provided for the delay of three weeks in scheduling that date. I will therefore attribute that delay of three weeks to theapplicant. c. Actions of the Crown [21] Mr. Engel requested the additional disclosure on March 2, 2013, two weeks after he was retained by Mr. Wells. Thedisclosure request was relevant and not unreasonable in the circumstances of this case, specifically the request for the full maintenanceand calibration records and the entire video of Mr.
Wells’ dealings with the police on the night in question. I appreciate that it may havetaken the Crown some time to gather this additional disclosure, and as indicated earlier, I have added two weeks to the inherent timerequirements or neutral time. However, there was nothing unusual in the disclosure requested, and it is difficult to understand the delayin providing it, particularly given the recognition by the Supreme Court of Canada of the importance of securing full maintenance andcalibration records by the defence in these cases. See R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux 2012 SCC 57 , [2012] S.C.J.
No. 57 atparagraph 78. [22] As well, in this case, Mr. Wells was transported to a mental health facility and detained for 24 hours after providing breathsamples and an apparent waiver of counsel. The ‘right to counsel’ was a live issue. The entire videos, including the booking video, the sally port video and the cell video were provided on April 22, 2013, approximately seven weeks after the March 2nd request however,there was no audio. The Crown then agreed to provide the booking sheet given the lack of audio on these videos.
This was stilloutstanding at the August 23, 2013 judicial pretrial. [23] In my view, the delay in providing disclosure led to a delay in scheduling the trial. The delay attributed to the Crown should be from two weeks after the March 2, 2013 request for further disclosure to June 4th, 2013, when the trial dates were finally set, a periodof 2.5 months. Even then, the full disclosure had not been provided. d. The Limits on Institutional Resources [24] This time period is defined as the times that the parties are ready for trial but the system cannot accommodate them.
The Defence submits that on June 4, 2013, when the trial dates were actually set, the earliest available dates were April 2nd and April 14th,2014, with an interim date of August 23, 2013 set for the purpose of a judicial pretrial.
As a result, this time period of 10 months daysshould be characterized as institutional delay. [25] In a letter dated June 4, 2013, and filed as an exhibit in this application, defence counsel wrote to the Crown, to be deliveredby hand in court on June 4, 2013 as follows: “Further to the pretrial that was conducted last week wherein we discussed the merits of the case as well as outstanding disclosure, Mr.
Wells advises that he is anxious to get on with the matter and wants to set a date to proceed. He is in fact prepared to do so today on awith or without counsel basis. As discussed, subject to a review of the balance of the maintenance and calibration data that I’m awaiting, this case is expected to occupy1-2 days given the Charter issues referred to and the possibility of a defence expert. I understand that you are presently setting full daytrials in the new year. It was also agreed that we would also fix an interim date for the purpose of a judicial pretrial as well asconfirmation of my retainer.
Without going on the record, I am available a follows: Dec 1-18 except 6 and 13 Jan 6-30 except 10, 17 and 24 Feb. 1-11 except 7 Mar. 24-31 except 28 April any day except 4, 10, 11, 18 and 25 May any day except 2, 9, 16, 23 and 30 I trust that one of these dates will be convenient to the court. Should any unforeseen difficulty arise or if any further dates are required,please have my agent, Mr.
Brooks contact me to so advise.” [Emphasis added.] [26] Defence counsel states that his letter dated June 4, 2013 was drafted on the premise that after the first available full day fortrial dates were not available until the new year. This is the information that he was provided after the Crown pre-trial and why heprovided all of his dates starting from December of 2013. Mr. Engel states that he was never disabused of the fact that the first trial datesavailable were not until the new year. He submits that he was ready and willing to conduct Mr.
Wells’ trial on virtually “any week ormonth before then that may have been offered.” The affidavit and viva voce evidence of Mr. Wells supports this assertion. The Crowndid not challenge Mr. Wells’ assertion of the availability of his counsel. [27] The Crown submits that these trial dates were scheduled so far in advance because defence counsel did not have anyavailable dates until December of 2013 and that the April 2014 dates were the earliest available dates for trial in the Halton region afterDecember of 2013. [28] The Crown submits that there is no evidence that Mr.
Engel’s letter dated June 4, 2013 was ever filed with the court, and thataccording to the transcript of the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace on June 4, 2013, when the trial dates were set, the agentappearing on behalf of Mr. Engel that day did not file the letter and only advised that, “Mr. Engel did provide me with a letter withavailable dates for trial starting in December of this year.” The Crown submits that this was the reason the trial dates were set in April of2014 as the only available trial dates after December of 2013 were in April.
According to the Crown, there may have been earlier trialdates available. [29] Respectfully, I do not agree with these submissions. The evidence is uncontradicted that Mr. Engel was ready and willing toconduct the trial in this matter on any week or month before the trial dates were offered. Mr. Engel’s letter of June 4, 2013 clearly states,“I understand that your are presently setting full day trials in the new year.” The dates provided by Mr. Engel are then set out for thattime period in his letter. The letter was filed as an exhibit in this application.
This clearly supports the evidence that the first availabledates provided for trial were in the new year. This length of time, regrettably, is not unusual, based on my experience of the limitedjudicial resources in this region. [30] The Crown offered no documentary evidence or otherwise to contradict this evidence. As an officer of the court, Mr. Engelreiterated in his submissions that he was advised that the first available trial dates were not being scheduled until the new year. In cross-examination, Mr. Wells confirmed this understanding and information.
If this information was not correct, then the Crown would surelyhave advised Mr. Engel immediately, given the Crown’s responsibility to ensure that cases are brought to trial. [31] I find that the period between the date that the trial dates were set and the first trial date is 10 months. In R. v. Tran, 2012ONCA 18 , [2012] O.J. No. 83 (C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal held that “parties should not be deemed automatically to beready to conduct a hearing as of the date the hearing is set. Counsel requires time to clear their
schedule so they can be available for thehearing as well as time to prepare for the hearing... and these times are part of the inherent time requirements of the case.” Given thenature of the case, and Mr. Engel’s level of expertise and experience, I deduct two weeks from the above 10 month period for trialpreparation, thus attributing 9.5 months to institutional delay. [32] I therefore accept the calculations of the applicant that the total institutional delay is 9.5 months. Added to that the Crowndisclosure delay of 2.5 months, I find that the total institutional delay in this matter to be 12 months. e.
Other Reasons for the Delay: [33] There are no other reasons for the delay in this case. 4. Prejudice to the Accused: [34] In R. v. Godin, supra, Justice Cromwell, writing for the Supreme Court of Canada, provides the following guidance to courtswhen assessing the prejudice to the accused within the Morin framework, at paragraphs 30 and 31 of that decision: “30 Prejudice in this context is concerned with the three interests of the accused that s. 11(
b) protects: liberty, as regards to pre-trial
custody or bail conditions; security of the person, in the sense of being free from the stress and cloud of suspicion that accompanies acriminal charge; and the right to make full answer and defence, insofar as delay can prejudice the ability of the defendant to leadevidence, cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise to raise a defence. See Morin, at pp. 801-3. 31 The question of prejudice cannot be considered separately from the length of the delay. As Sopinka J. wrote in Morin, at p. 801, evenin the absence of specific evidence of prejudice, "prejudice may be inferred from the length of the delay.
The longer the delay the morelikely that such an inference will be drawn."” [35] The prejudice that arises simply from the fact of being charged should not factor into this analysis. As stated by Justice B.Duncan, in R. v. Egorov [2005] O.J. No. 6171 at paragraph 7: “It is clear that prejudice in the
section 11(
b) analysis relates to prejudice that flows from delay and not from the fact of being charged:See R. v. Pusic (1996), (ON SC), 30 O.R. (3d) 692 a P 721 line a; R. v. Kovacs Tatar (ON CA),[2004] O.J. No. 4756, Nov 22, 2004 para. 33. Nevertheless, prolongation of proceedings can cause what was initially charge prejudice tobecome prejudice caused by institutional delay due to a delay beyond the guidelines.” [36] Mr. Wells filed an affidavit in support of his application setting out the actual prejudice that he states that he has suffered. Hewas cross-examined by the Crown on his affidavit. [37] Mr.
Wells is 21 years old. He has no criminal record and apart from the charges before the court, he has never been chargedbefore. He lives with his parents in the town of Oakville. He graduated from high school in 2009 and he is employed full-time in abakery. At the time of the incident, he was stopped for speeding and a demand was made for a roadside breath sample. After registeringa fail, he was taken to the police station where he provided two samples of his blood, which registered 110 mgs and 100 mgsrespectively. During the course of his arrest, the police conducted a search and seized a small amount of cocaine.
After he provided hisbreath samples, he was taken to the hospital to be assessed, where he was held overnight and released the next day. [38] Mr. Wells suffers from depression. He testified that he was diagnosed with depression prior to these charges and has beenunder a doctor’s care for approximately three years.
Although his illness is being treated with medication, since being charged, hisdepression has deepened. [39] Although he acknowledged that the his depression has been affected by the fact of being charged, he deposed and reiterated incross-examination that the twelve month delay in proceeding to his trial has deepened his depression and anxiety seriously, to the pointwhere he has attempted suicide on two occasions. In May of 2013, he attempted to hang himself and in October of 2013, he slashed hiswrists, leading to his admission to the hospital. [40] In cross-examination, Mr.
Wells testified that prior to being charged, he had never attempted suicide. He further testified thatif his trial had happened months ago, he would never have attempted suicide. He expressed considerable anxiety that, at the time of hiscross-examination in February, these proceedings had been “hanging over his head” for more than one year and his trial was still anotherthree months away.
He testified that “every day that ticks by just gets worse and worse.” [41] In addition to the two suicide attempts since being charged and waiting for trial, he has suffered countless sleepless nights,considerable stress and deepened anxiety. He testified that he has put his life on hold waiting for the outcome of the trial. He hadplanned to enrol in college in December of 2013, but he had foregone this opportunity until this matter is concluded. [42] I find that the evidence is overwhelming that Mr. Wells has suffered actual prejudice as a result of the delay.
The delay offifteen months until his trial has debilitated Mr. Wells to such an extent that he has attempted suicide on two occasions, resulting inhospitalization. 5. CONCLUSION: [43] The total delay in this case is 15 months. I have found that the institutional delay in this case to be 12 months. This was astraightforward impaired driving case and this time to trial is not acceptable in view of the circumstances of this case and the the veryserious actual prejudice to the applicant. [44] In balancing the societal interest in a trial on the merits I am very mindful of the statements of Justice Code in R. v.
Lahiry etal, 2011 ONSC 6780 , [2011] O.J. No. 5071 (Ont. Sup.Ct.) at paragraph 89 of that judgment, which states as follows: “It must be remembered that, for over twenty-five years now, drinking and driving has been regarded as a very serious offence. Indeed, ithas been authoritatively stated that "it has a far greater impact on Canadian society than any other crime", that it is "clearly the crimewhich causes the most significant social loss to the country", and that "every drinking driver is a potential killer". See: R. v. Bernshaw(1995), (SCC), 95 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at para. 16 (S.C.C.); R. v.
McVeigh (1985), (ON CA), 22 C.C.C.(3d) 145 at 150 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Biancofiore (1997), (ON CA), 119 C.C.C. (3d) 344 at paras. 19-23 (Ont. C.A.).Given these pronouncements, balancing the societal interest in a trial on the merits is particularly important in drinking and drivingcases.” [45] In the case before me, there was no accident or bad driving, other than the speeding. Mr. Wells is a young man with noprevious criminal record who has suffered some very serious prejudice as a result of the delay in reaching his trial.
Society also has aninterest in having trials of criminal cases heard within a reasonable time. [46] Balancing all of the above factors, I am satisfied that the applicant has shown on a balance of probabilities that his right totrial within a reasonable time has been infringed. The charges before me will be stayed.[1]
[ 47 ] I thank counsel for the authorities provided and their helpful submissions in this matter. Released: August 6, 2014 Signed: “Justice Sheilagh O’Connell”
Loading document…