B.C.J.B. v. E.-R.R.R., 2020 ONCJ 438
Opinion
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE CITATION: B.C.J.B. v. E.-R.R.R. , 2020 ONCJ 438 DATE: 2020 09 28 COURT FILE No.: Toronto DFO-15741/17 – B2 BETWEEN: B.C.J.B. Applicant Father — AND — E.-R. R. R. Respondent Mother Before Justice Alex Finlayson Heard on July 22, 2020 and August 28, 2020 Reasons for Judgment released on September 28, 2020 Zahra Taseer....................................................................... counsel for the applicant father Mira Pilch....................................................................... counsel for the respondent mother ALEX FINLAYSON J.:
PART I: NATURE OF THIS MOTION [ 1 ] The parties are the parents of a boy, B.R.M.R., who is almost 10 years old. This is my decision following a motion I heard on August 28, 2020, brought by the father. He raises three core issues. [ 2 ] First, B.R.M.R. has never received the childhood vaccines that other children in Ontario routinely receive. The father seeks an order that he be given decision making authority over having the child vaccinated. [ 3 ] Second, like all children in Ontario, B.R.M.R. stopped attending his private school and day care in person, following the Covid-19 shutdowns earlier this year.
Now that the child’s private school and day care have re-opened, a dispute has arisen as to his return to school and day care. The father seeks an order that the child not return to the private school and the day care. He proposes that the child switch to the public stream, and that he cease attending his day care altogether. [ 4 ] Third, the father alleges that the mother has been overly restrictive in allowing him to spend more time with B.R.M.R.
He asks the Court to order an equal time-sharing arrangement, on a week on, week off basis. [ 5 ] By the time the motion was argued, several issues, including the one about the child’s return to school this year, resolved on consent. The parties agreed to defer the father’s request for an equal time-sharing arrangement to trial. In this decision, I address only the remaining vaccination and day care issues left on this motion, and I give directions for the next steps in this case.
PART II: THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS AND A
SUMMARY OF THIS DECISION [ 6 ] This motion was argued with each counsel taking a different approach as to the applicable legal framework that ought to govern the Court’s determination about the remaining issues.
[ 7 ] Counsel for the father relies on Harper J.’s decision in C.M.G. v. D.W.S., 2015 ONSC 2201 , a vaccine case in which he disregarded the joint custody terms in the parties’ separation agreement, incorporated into a consent order, based on a best interests’ test. Counsel further relies on section 56(1) of the Family Law Act specifically, as the statutory authority for this Court to disregard the custody term in the parties’ Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013.
In short, the father submits that the “best interests of the child” test should govern the issues on this motion, regardless of the history of parenting and the custody term in the parties’ Parenting Agreement. [ 8 ] Regarding the vaccine issue, the father argues that the onus should be on the mother to demonstrate why B.R.M.R. ought not be vaccinated, like other children in Ontario are. [ 9 ] The father wants the Court to take judicial notice that vaccines are “safe and beneficial”.
That way, and particularly if the Court directs a trial, the father will go into the trial knowing that he need not call expert evidence to establish this. He also asks the Court to take judicial notice of public policy which supports vaccines. [ 10 ] The mother opposes the father’s motion. The mother’s arguments rest heavily on the status quo and the custody term in the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013. The mother submits that the father must demonstrate “exigent circumstances” to change the status quo prior to trial, and she says he has not done so.
In other words, short of a trial, the mother may continue to decide whether the child should be vaccinated or not. The mother may also continue to decide whether the child should go back to day care or not, too. [ 11 ] Although the father would frame the vaccine issue as being subject to the best interests’ test, counsel for the father also made arguments that the need for B.R.M.R. to be vaccinated right now is also an “exigent circumstance”, and an issue which should not be delayed to a trial. The father’s “exigent circumstances” arguments center around the impact of Covid-19.
The father separately asks the Court to take judicial notice of various matters relating to Covid-19, including that Covid-19 is impacting the level of “herd immunity” in the community.
Because of this impact of Covid-19, father says that B.R.M.R. is now at greater risk of contracting vaccine preventable diseases, and at greater risk of harm should he contract a vaccine preventable disease. [ 12 ] In the further alternative, if the Court is not prepared to empower the father to deal with the child’s vaccination on this motion, then he says the Court should direct a trial. [ 13 ] The custody term in the Parenting Agreement has never been incorporated into a Court Order. Both sides agree that this is not a variation case, in which
section 29 of the Children’s Law Reform Act would apply. Although neither side argued that it is strictly necessary to demonstrate a material change in circumstances for the Court to make an order that would be inconsistent with the custody term in the Parenting Agreement per se, at times during the submissions, both counsel seemed to suggest implicitly, if not expressly, that there must be some new circumstances to warrant the Court’s intervention. [ 14 ] I agree that the best interests’ test applies. This is not a Motion to Change an existing order. Material change in circumstances is not the test.
Nor do I find that it is necessary for the father to demonstrate “exigent circumstances”. [ 15 ] I find that the relevance of, and the weight that should be attached to the custody term in Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013, to be two-fold. The Parenting Agreement is a reflection of the parties’ intentions when they signed it. It is also evidence of the status quo, which is a factor to consider, but within the best interests’ analysis . However, if the Court finds it not to be in B.R.M.R.’s best interests, the Court may disregard it.
Moreover, the custody term in the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 is not actually part of a “domestic contract”, and that too necessarily impacts its weight. [ 16 ] I find that the case law overwhelmingly supports the conclusion, that the father should be empowered to make medical decisions about B.R.M.R.’s vaccinations at this time.
I see no absolutely no good reason to delay this issue to a trial, despite mother’s arguments to the contrary. [ 17 ] The Court also finds that it may take judicial notice of some, but not all of the matters, that counsel for the father would have the Court take judicial notice of. Later in this decision, I explain what I will take judicial notice of, in more detail. [ 18 ] Regarding the school issue, again that issue resolved on consent at the outset of argument, but for the 2020-2021 school year only. The day care issue, however, did not.
Despite the temporary settlement of the school issue, the overall school and day care issues are at least somewhat interrelated. [ 19 ] I would not accede to the outcome that the father seeks, regarding the day care issue. There is no basis for the Court to stop the child from attending day care prior to trial, based on the record before me. While the father would have the Court rely on Covid-19 as a basis to disturb the long-standing day care arrangements that have been in place for this child, his concerns are really more financial in nature, and that day care for B.R.M.R. is no longer necessary.
Those concerns are also somewhat intertwined with the father’s request for a shared parenting schedule, which he has already agreed to defer to the trial. Therefore, whether the child should continue in day care in the longer term, and/or how the financial consequences of the mother’s decision to send the child to day care should be apportioned, will be addressed at the trial.
PART III: BACKGROUND FACTS A. History of the Parents’ Relationship [ 20 ] The parents never cohabited. The father says that since the child was born, he wanted a relationship with him. The father says he has worked hard to establish that relationship over the past 10 years, despite the mother frustrating his attempts. While he says it was never his intent to raise the child in a romantic partnership with the mother, early on he believed it would be possible to work collaboratively with her. That, the father says, has not materialized.
He believes the mother became difficult over parenting issues, when she realized that there would not be any romantic future between them. [ 21 ] The mother alleges that the father showed little interest in the child. She cites a number of examples to support this, both during
her pregnancy and when the child was younger. Despite the obstacles that the mother says the father himself erected to the development of his relationship with the child, the mother says she nevertheless made efforts to keep the father informed and involved. The mother says the father only started to show some interest, when the paternal grandparents advised they wanted to meet their grandchild. [ 22 ] While the father may have been more aloof initially (a fact which is disputed), there is evidence that the father did make efforts to pursue a relationship with the child.
Much (but not all) of that effort has been directed towards pursuing increased parenting time with the child, beginning when B.R.M.R. was about 2 ½ years old. [ 23 ] What has transpired between the parents concerning B.R.M.R. begins with their Parenting Agreements. The parties have signed two such Parenting Agreements. There is also an unsigned, draft Agreement, which a so-called “intermediary” finalized for them by the fall of 2011, and which the mother says led to the creation of the first signed Parenting Agreement.
And, there is evidence before the Court about the father’s subsequent efforts to pursue a relationship with the child after he signed the first Agreement. B. The 2011 Draft Agreement [ 24 ] The mother says that even prior to B.R.M.R.’s birth, she was cognizant of the need for there to be a clear, written parenting agreement concerning custody, access and child support. So before the child was born, she used an “intermediary” named Anna Spinola to facilitate discussions with the father. She says the father was invited to use an intermediary of his own, but he chose not to. [ 25 ] Ms.
Spinola, who is not a lawyer, was involved in negotiating and preparing that draft Agreement. The mother says she sought independent legal advice about its terms. She says the father was advised to get legal advice too, but whether he did this is not in any sworn form before the Court. Rather, in an unsworn letter dated August 9, 2020 that the mother attaches to her affidavit sworn August 20, 2020, Ms. Spinola states that the father did obtain that legal advice. She does not specify from whom. [ 26 ] Ms. Spinola finalized the draft Agreement in the fall of 2011.
It provides that the mother would have custody of the child. The mother says that father never mentioned a desire to have custody back then, nor that having B.R.M.R. vaccinated was important to him. [ 27 ] Even though the parents did not sign this draft, the mother says that the father confirmed he agreed to its terms, by email dated November 28, 2011 [1] . The mother says that the parties followed its terms, until they signed the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013. C.
The Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 [ 28 ] The mother says that the parents used the 2011 draft Agreement as a template to create the signed Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013. The mother says it was negotiated over “several months", beginning in late 2012, with the assistance of counsel. The mother says that during the negotiations, the father did not raise any desire to change custody. [ 29 ] The father says that it was a “combination of pressure and hopefulness” that led him to sign this Parenting Agreement in the spring of 2013.
His signature on the Agreement pre-dates his various efforts to increase his parenting time with B.R.M.R. [ 30 ] It is unnecessary for me to summarize the terms of this Agreement in their entirely, as the child support terms, for example, are not relevant to the issues on this motion. Regarding parenting, it provides that the mother will have sole-custody of B.R.M.R. It also provides for some, limited access between the father and B.R.M.R. I note, however, that its terms make provision for increases to the father’s parenting time, including by way of review.
Indeed, paragraph 3.8 provides that the parties will review access and the holiday schedule, once the child and the parties are comfortable with the
schedule in the Agreement [2] , including when the child turns four years old. [ 31 ] Paragraph 3.9(
k) directs the parties to maintain a reasonable and flexible position respecting the custody/access arrangements for the child, and at all times “will his best interests prevail”. The balance of this subparagraph refers to maintaining flexibility regarding the schedule, to accommodate special occasions, activities and the like. [ 32 ] Paragraph 12.1 says that the Parenting Agreement is a “parenting plan entered into under
section 54 of the Family Law Act [ie. a separation agreement] , and is a domestic contract that prevails over all matters dealt with in the Family Law Act”. [ 33 ] Paragraph 12.3 is a usual severability clause. It says, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the invalidity or unenforceability of any term of this Agreement does not affect the validity or enforceability of any other term. Any invalid term will be treated as severed from the remaining terms.” D. Increases to the Father’s Parenting Time with B.R.M.R.
After The Parties Signed the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 [ 34 ] The father says between 2013 and 2017, he made countless attempts to gain “greater and more equitable access” to B.R.M.R., before involving this Court. He says he tried to communicate with the mother in writing and in person, he says he attended co-parenting and counselling sessions several times with numerous counsellors, he says he participated in private mediation multiple times with numerous providers, and he says there have been several meetings between the parties and their counsel.
It became clear to the father that working collaboratively with the mother would not be possible. He describes the mother’s attitude about his relationship with B.R.M.R. as “adversarial and competitive”. [ 35 ] In his affidavit of August 5, 2020, the father details the numerous, but gradual increases to his parenting time with B.R.M.R. that he was able to achieve through persistence.
The detail in his affidavit in this respect begins in 2013 and runs to the present. [ 36 ] According to this history (which the mother does not dispute), beginning on May 1, 2013, the father initially had access on Wednesdays from 6:00 pm to 8:15 pm. The affidavit maps out six different schedules between May 1, 2013 and the time this proceeding began in July 2017. There have been a further
schedule increases since then.
E. The Initiation of Court Proceedings [ 37 ] The father commenced this proceeding on July 19, 2017. There have been a number of appearances before the case management judge, leading up to this motion. [ 38 ] The father says that after he commenced these proceedings, the mother tried to delay the proceedings. The father cites that she has now changed lawyers three times, that she requested adjournments, and that she did not follow through with mediation at Mediate393 after he completed his intake there, as examples of her delay tactics. F.
The “Interim Amending Parenting Plan” dated June 29, 2018 [ 39 ] In the early summer of 2018, about a year into this litigation, the parents signed a further Agreement, called an “Interim Amending Parenting Plan” dated June 29, 2018. The terms of that Agreement deal only with the father’s access. The father says they entered into this interim agreement, after the first case conference before Pawagi J. on March 29, 2018, and “after hearing from the Court” [3] .
The father says that although there was an agreement to increase his access on an interim basis, no progress was made on the vaccination issue. [ 40 ] Paragraph 1.5 of the “Interim Amending Parenting Plan” dated June 29, 2018, says that this new interim agreement replaces paragraph 3.2, 3.4, 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 of the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013. The terms replaced pertained to the father’s previous regular and holiday access schedules, and certain conditions of that access. The interim agreement otherwise did not replace the other terms of the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013.
Indeed, the last sentence of paragraph 1.5 of the “Interim Amending Parenting Plan” reads, “Other than as specifically modified herein, the Parenting Plan remains in full force and effect.” The mother points out that the father once again agreed to custody being vested in her when he signed this interim agreement. [ 41 ] However, paragraph 6 of the “Interim Amending Parenting Plan” also states that the parties intended to review its terms again, in October 28, 2018, “as part of their longer term negotiations regarding various parenting issues”.
And the clause indicates that the interim agreement ends on the earliest of the date the parties enter into a further amending agreement, minutes of settlement or further order of the court. [ 42 ] Finally, paragraph 6 makes it clear that the interim agreement is without prejudice to any rights or claims of the parties. I would not find that the father compromised his position regarding the vaccination or other custodial issues by signing this interim agreement. G.
The Court’s Subsequent Temporary Orders [ 43 ] The parents consented to a number of further temporary orders for access and other incidental matters, after they signed this Interim Amending Parenting Plan. However, neither the Parenting Plan dated April 18, 2013, nor the “Interim Amending Parenting Plan” dated June 29, 2018, were ever incorporated into a Court Order.
Nor was any temporary or final custody order ever made in these proceedings so far. [ 44 ] The father’s current parenting time with B.R.M.R. now occurs on Fridays, after day-care (with different pick-up times depending on the time of the year), to Monday mornings return to school, and on Wednesdays from 4:00 pm until Thursday mornings, return to school. [ 45 ] The father says that he has not been allowed to spend time with B.R.M.R. outside of the mandated access at different points. On his account, the mother has been inflexible for special occasions, and when he needed to re-schedule his access.
He says the child is not even allowed to spend more than a few hours with paternal grandparents, uncles or the father’s partner of 9 years, without him being present. [ 46 ] The mother disagrees, saying that over the years, she has asked the father to care for B.R.M.R. for additional periods from time to time, but he would not always do so. Occasionally, she says, the father would take B.R.M.R. for some extra periods that she offered, but even then, he would only do that for a day or two. H.
Prior Proceedings Leading Up to this Motion [ 47 ] By December 17, 2019, this case was on the trial track, for the first time. Pawagi J. endorsed that the parties and counsel had confirmed their availability for the trial assignment court on May 7, 2020, and for the trial sittings in June, 2020. The issues for trial were to include the vaccination issue, and any other issue not resolved by that date. However, the assignment Court and trial sittings did not happen, on account of Covid-19.
So instead, on April 7, 2020, Pawagi J. directed that there would be a further settlement conference in July, at which point she anticipated the plan would be to re-send this case to the next assignment Court, in the absence of a settlement. [ 48 ] There appears to have been an administrative error regarding scheduling that July 2020 settlement conference. On or around May 21, 2020, former counsel for the mother filed a 14B Motion, asking either to set a date, or to reschedule this case, for July 9, 2020.
The Court Clerk responded that the next date in this matter had actually been set for September 24, 2020. [ 49 ] On July 8, 2020, counsel for the father filed a 14B Motion, requesting an urgent case conference or a motion, prior to August 1, 2020, regarding the school, day care and vaccination issues. By that point, the mother and her second lawyer had parted company. The mother responded to the father’s 14B Motion on a self-represented basis, arguing that these issues were not urgent.
She also said she required more time to retain fresh counsel. [ 50 ] On July 16, 2020, Pawagi J. endorsed the following: This case has been before the court for two years. It had been scheduled to proceed to the June trial sittings on the issue of vaccination and any other issues that had not been settled by that time. These sittings were cancelled as a result of Covid-19 restrictions on the court. The court is now gradually moving toward the resumption of normal operations. This case should not be delayed further.
Adjourned to July 22, 2020 at 11 a.m. for telephone conference before Justice Finlayson to be spoken to regarding the scheduling of aconference and/or motion before His Honour. [51] On July 22, 2020, I advised the parties that I would hear the motion. At that point, there was also a dispute about whether thechild would attend a summer camp at his day care for the balance of the summer. The day care was either re-opening, or it was about tore-open soon. However, the mother required an adjournment to retain fresh counsel to respond to the motion.
As a term of theadjournment, the parties agreed that the child would not go to summer camp for the balance of the summer. With that issue resolved, Imade a scheduling order for the exchange of motion materials, and I set this motion to proceed on August 28, 2020. The
schedule tookinto account the mother’s request for more time to retain counsel. [52] The parties filed motion materials pursuant to the
schedule that I imposed. Then, on August 11, 2020, the mother, nowrepresented by fresh counsel, filed a 14B Motion, advising the Court that she would be moving to strike a portion of a paragraph in thefather’s affidavit of August 5, 2020, as well as a number of exhibits attached to that affidavit. In her 14B Motion, the mother requestedan additional appearance to address the evidentiary issues, if necessary.
I directed that the parties could make submissions about theevidentiary issues as part of the argument of the motion. [53] At the outset of argument on August 28, 2020, the Court struck a portion to the disputed paragraph in the father’s affidavit onconsent, but counsel did not agree about the exhibits.
The latter was argued, and I address the admissibility of those exhibits, and the useto which they will be put, later in this decision. [54] Also at the outset of argument on August 28, 2020, the parents advised the Court that they had settled the issue about thechild’s return to school for the 2020-2021 school year. The Court granted a consent order that the child would resume attending schoolthis year, provided the mother paid any private school fees.
They did not settle the day care issue, beyond their prior consent that thechild would not go to camp for balance of the summer only. [55] In addition, the Court made a number of other consent orders as follows: (
a) The Court ordered that the father would be allowed to amend his Application[4]; (
b) The Court ordered that the child shall be referred to by initials in any published judgments of the Court; and (
c) The Court ordered that the parties were not to discuss any issues raised in the litigation with the child, including vaccination. [56] At the outset of argument, I asked the parties to address whether the Court should just direct a trial, particularly if it could bescheduled for the December 2020 sittings. Counsel took a break to consider this. [57] After the break, the father abandoned his request to change the parenting
schedule pending trial, in favour of that expeditedtrial. However, as indicated earlier, the parties advised the Court that they still intended to argue the vaccine and day care issues.
PART IV: ISSUES AND ANALYSIS RESPECTING THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK A. The Applicable Legal Provisions Concerning Incidents of Custody [58] Pursuant to
section 21, either parent may apply to this Court for an order respecting custody of or access to the child ordetermining any aspect for the incidents of custody of the child. The merits of that application must be determined on the basis of thebest interests of the child, in accordance with subsections 24(2), (3) and (4). [59] Section 24(2) requires the Court to consider all the child’s needs and circumstances, which includes a list of enumerated factorsthat must be applied to the evidence.
No one factor in section 24(2) has greater weight than the other, although there may be more evidence about one factor versus another. See Libbus v. Libbus, (2008) (ON SC), 62 R.F.L. (6th) 416 (Ont. S.C.J.)¶88; see also Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 ¶ 10. [60] Section 24(3) provides that a person’s past conduct shall be considered only in accordance with subsection (4), or if the court issatisfied that the conduct is otherwise relevant to the person’s ability to act as a parent. Section 24(4) concerns violence and abuse,which is not a relevant factor in this case before me.
However, the parents’ past conduct has been called into question as relevant to theirabilities to act as parents, and so section 24(3) is engaged on this motion. [61]
Section 28 of the Children’s Law Reform Act deals with incidents of custody or access. Pursuant to section 28(1)(
a) and (b), theCourt may grant the custody of or access to the child to one or more persons, it may determine any aspect of the incidents of the right tocustody or access, and pursuant to section 28(1)(c), it may make additional orders as the Court considers necessary and proper in thecircumstances, including a list of enumerated orders. [62] At ¶ 21 of Chou v. Region District School Board, (S.C.J), Perkins J. defined incidents of custody asfollows: “Custody” is not defined in Ontario legislation, though its meaning in family law is generally understood.
It consists of a bundle ofrights and obligations, called “incidents” in sections 20 and 21 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C. 12, as amended. Family law cases often deal with the allocation of rights of custody. Those rights include the right to physical care and control of thechild, to control the child’s place of residence, to discipline the child, to make decisions about the child’s education, to raise the child in aparticular religion or no religion, to make decisions about medical care and treatment. The incidents of custody can be dealt with alltogether or separately, according to
section 21, and today it is common for parents who have separated to agree, and for courts to order,that some incidents of custody are jointly vested in the parents and some belong to one parent exclusively. If a custodial right is joint, itmay be exercised by any one of the persons who has it.
[ 63 ]
Section 29 of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides that a court shall not make an order that varies an order in respect of custody or access made by a court in Ontario unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child. While this
section does not apply in this case, I mention this
section and the material change test in particular, because of the nature of some of the arguments I heard about certain thresholds that might apply on this motion. I also mention this
section because material change in circumstances type factors appear to permeate into some of the case law, including in cases where there was an initial application for custody, but also where there was an existing custody agreement that had never been incorporated into an order. B.
The Proper Characterization of the Parties’ Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 and Its Impact Upon the Court’s Analysis [ 64 ] A number of other statutory provisions are relevant to the analysis, and in particular to the weight which should attach to the custody term in the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013. [ 65 ] Section 20(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act states that each parent is equally entitled to custody of B.R.M.R.
However, where the child has lived with one parent with the other’s consent, implied consent or acquiescence, the exercise of the other’s entitlement of custody and the incidents of custody is suspended, until a separation agreement or order provides otherwise. See section 20(4).
Pursuant to section 20(7), the parents’ entitlements to custody or access, or to incidents of custody, are subject to alteration by an order of the court or by separation agreement. [ 66 ] Both sections 20(4) and (7) speak only of a court order or a separation agreement as being sufficient to change the suspension of, or to alter the equal entitlement to custody. There is no custody order in this case. An issue thus arises as to whether the “Parenting Agreement” is a separation agreement for the purposes of these sections.
For the reasons that follow, I find the Parenting Agreement does not qualify as a separation agreement. [ 67 ] According to
section 51 of the Family Law Act, a “domestic contract” means a marriage contract, separation agreement, cohabitation agreement, paternity agreement or family arbitration agreement as defined in various other sections of the legislation. [ 68 ] I take no issue that the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 (and the subsequent Interim Amending Parenting Plan for that matter) meet the formal requirements of a domestic contract under the legislation.
Pursuant to section 55(1) of the Family Law Act, a domestic contract and an agreement to amend or rescind a domestic contract, are unenforceable unless made in writing, signed by the parties and witnessed. However, that does not end the inquiry. [ 69 ] Paragraph 12.1 of the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 self-refers to itself as a “parenting plan entered into under
section 54 of the Family Law Act” and “a domestic contract that prevails over all matters dealt with in the Family Law Act”. These self-characterizations do not, on their own, make that so. [ 70 ]
Section 54 of the Family Law Act is the
section that defines what a separation agreement is, in the Family Law Act . While two persons may sign a “separation agreement” that addresses custody and access issues, the requirements of
section 54 include that the two signatories must have cohabited. [ 71 ] In this case, there is no suggestion that the parents ever cohabited. In fact, the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 (and the Interim Amending Parenting Plan) explicitly state the contrary. [ 72 ] Although it is not a separation agreement, if the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 is another kind of domestic contract, then it may alter the analysis in this case.
Section 68 of the Children’s Law Reform Act reads, “[w] here a domestic contract as defined in the Family Law Act makes provision in respect of a matter that is provided for in this Part, the contract prevails except as otherwise provided in
Part IV of the Family Law Act .” [ 73 ] To qualify as another form of a domestic contract, the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 would have to fall within one of the other
definitions of a domestic contract in
section 51 of the Family Law Act . There is no suggestion that the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 is either a marriage contract, a cohabitation agreement or a family arbitration agreement within the meaning of
section 51 of the Family Law Act . Portions of the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 do fit within the definition of a paternity agreement, but not its custody provisions. [ 74 ]
Section 51 of the Family Law Act says that a “paternity agreement” is a domestic contract entered into under
section 59. While section 59(1) makes provision for a man and woman who are not spouses to enter into an agreement for the payment of child support, the
section does not provide that paternity agreements may include custody and access terms. Only the child support terms in the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 may form part of “paternity agreement”, and therefore a “domestic contract”, within the meaning of sections 51 and 59. [ 75 ] Again, paragraph 12.3 of the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 is its severability clause.
As the custody terms are not properly part of a “paternity agreement”, and they are therefore severable from the Agreement. [ 76 ] Without addressing its characterization, counsel for the father submits that the custody term in the Parenting Agreement of April 18, 2013 should be disregarded on a best interests’ analysis, pursuant to section 56(1) of the Family Law Act. In a custody case under the Children’s Law Reform Act , the Court may turn to section 56(1) of the Family Law Act by virtue of
section 68 of the Children’s Law Reform Act . However, these disregarding provisions only apply to domestic contracts. As the custody term in the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 does not actually form part of a domestic contract, I tend to disagree with counsel for the father that section 56(1) has any application. [ 77 ] In the result, what the Court actually has before it, is a written agreement that is not a domestic contract insofar as custody is concerned. Nevertheless, although section 56(1) does not strictly apply per se, the Agreement is not insulated from scrutiny on a best interests’ basis.
Case law has addressed how written agreements that are not domestic contracts are to be treated.
C. The Case Law Concerning How to Treat the Parenting Agreement [78] Several cases address how agreements containing custody terms should be treated when a court is asked to make a custodyorder either consistent with, or inconsistent with the term(
s) of the agreement. The cases include analysis, both about agreements that aredomestic contracts, and about those which are not. The case law is conflicting.
(1) Custody Terms in An Agreement Are Subject to the Best Interests Test [79] Several decisions apply the Court’s duty to have regard to the child’s best interests irrespective of any custody terms of writtenagreements, whether they are in domestic contracts or not. The basic premise is that a Court may disregard a custody term in anagreement if it would be in a child’s best interests to do so. [80] In C. (M.A.) v. K.(M.), 2009 ONCJ 18, Cohen J. had before her an agreement which, like in this case before me, was not adomestic contract.
Nevertheless, at ¶ 45 she held, “I begin by stating the well-established principle that, in custody and access cases, acourt is not bound by the provisions of domestic contracts.” Although she did not apply section 56(1) of the Family Law Act per se, shemade the aforementioned statement with reference to that provision. I take from Cohen J.’s comments, that an agreement which is noteven a domestic contract would certainly not be exempt from scrutiny on a best interests’ analysis, when a domestic contract thatactually receives statutory recognition, is always subject to that test.
At ¶ 49 of the case before her, Cohen J. held that the agreementwas useful as a reflection of the parties’ intentions regarding the parenting arrangements at the time they entered into the agreement inquestion, but she did not ascribe to it much other weight. [81] The Court took a similar approach to an actual domestic contract (a separation Agreement) in Libbus v. Libbus, cited earlier. At¶ 110, Nelson J. found that the agreement provided a “window of opportunity to the court to examine the parties’ thinking at the timethey entered into it”.
(2) The Concept of Parental Autonomy and Whether Material Changes in Circumstances Type Considerations Should Factor intothe Analysis [82] Some decisions would place more weight on parental intention, as reflected in their agreements. This is based on a policy thatparental autonomy should be respected, and parents should be encouraged to enter into agreements. Some (but not all) of the cases alsogo on to essentially apply material change like considerations in the analysis, even where no order exists to be varied, to give effect tothat policy. [83] For example, in the mobility case, Woodhouse v.
Woodhouse, (1996) (ON CA), 29 O.R. (3d) 417 (C.A.), theCourt discussed the difference between an application to vary a prior order, that would entail a consideration of the findings of a judgewho made the previous order and new evidence, versus an initial application where there is just a separation agreement in place. TheOntario Court of Appeal held that separation agreements are not binding on the court, because it is in the interests of the children ratherthan those of the parents that are at issue.
However, it is also “reasonable to think that at the time the separation agreement was made itreflected the parties' views of the best interests of the children” and the Court should consider “the prior agreement as well as theevidence of the proposed or changed circumstances”. I note, however, that these comments were made in the context of a proposedmove, where new circumstances were advanced as the basis for the move. [84] In Tumino v. Tumino,
(2002) R.F.L. (5th) 427 (Ont. S.C.J.), another mobility decision, Kiteley J. cited Woodhouse v. Woodhouseand Gordon v. Goertz, and applied a material change test , even though the parties’ agreement had not been incorporated into a Courtorder. This is another decision which discusses parental autonomy in this context. [85] Citing ¶114 of L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s concurring opinion in Gordon v. Goertz, (1996) (SCC), 134 D.L.R. (4th)321 (S.C.C.), Kiteley J. wrote, “it is sound public policy that parenting agreements be encouraged.
If the contents were simply ignored,it would eliminate any incentive to use the time and resources to negotiate them.” While Kiteley J. went on to expressly apply a materialchange test, I note that appears to have been based, at least in part, on a submission from counsel that that was the proper approach. [86] In Todoruck v. Todoruck, 2014 ONSC 6983, Nightingale J. partially applied the Miglin test (which I will come to) to anagreement. However, he also referred to the Court’s ability to disregard an agreement based on best interests, and the material changetest.
Regarding the Court’s comments about material change, at ¶ 43, he suggested that a “parent who seeks to overturn a reasonablecustodial access agreement entered into at the time of separation should be prepared to prove the agreement is no longer reasonable andhow his or her proposed arrangement better meets the best interests of the children.” [87] By contrast, in Askalan v. Talen, 2012 ONSC 4746 (S.C.J.), Spies J. disagreed with Kiteley J.’s approach in Tumino v. Tumino. Also citing Woodhouse v.
Woodhouse, at ¶29, she wrote, “[i]n my view, the Court of Appeal very clearly stated that SeparationAgreements are not binding on the court. I am not aware of any case that provides that a Separation Agreement has the force of an orderor that in making a change to a separation agreement the court must find a “material change in circumstances”.
In fact, in the case of adecision with respect to education, an incident of custody, given the provisions of section 56(1) of the Family Law Act, I am clearly notbound by the terms of the Agreement.” [88] At ¶31, Spies J., accepted that the terms of the Separation Agreement should be considered in determining what is in the child’sbest interests now, to the extent they show what the parents thought about that, at the time they entered into it. [89] Similarly, in Carpenter v. Carpenter (2000), (ON SC), 11 R.F.L. (5th) 281 (Ont.
S.C.J.) Aston J. held thatthe terms in a separation agreement were a factor for the Court to consider. But he also held that it was not necessary for the movingparty to meet a threshold test of material change in circumstances. [90] And finally, in Molloy v. Molloy, 1991 CarswellOnt 3554 (Gen. Div.), Granger J. held that a motion judge should determinewhat is in the best interest of the children pending trial based on all the evidence, not just the evidence since the separation agreement
was signed.
(3) Whether the Test in Miglin v. Miglin Applies to Custody Terms in An Agreement [91] Some cases would give weight to a custody term in an agreement, based on the Supreme Court’s test in Miglin v. Miglin 2003SCC 34. Miglin v. Miglin concerned what amount of deference should be given to a spousal support agreement, on an initial applicationfor spousal support brought under
section 15.2 of the Divorce Act. Miglin v. Miglin has been cited over 1000 times since its release. Some decisions have extended its principles and test, to other contexts, including in custody cases. [92] The well-known Miglin test contains two stages. At stage one, a court will consider whether there were any circumstancessurrounding the negotiation of the agreement that might cause a court to discount it. Where the court is satisfied that the conditionsunder which the agreement was negotiated are satisfactory, the Court will examine the substance of the agreement.
The court mustdetermine the extent to which the agreement takes into account the factors and objectives listed in the Divorce Act (since the case dealtwith spousal support under the Divorce Act).
Only a significant departure from the general objectives of the Divorce Act will warrant thecourt’s intervention on the basis that there is not substantial compliance with the Divorce Act.[5] [93] At stage two, the court should assess the extent to which enforcement of the agreement still reflects the original intention of theparties, and the extent to which it is still in substantial compliance with the objectives of the Divorce Act. See ¶ 80-91 of Miglin v.Miglin. [94] In at least one Alberta and three Ontario trial and/or motions decisions, courts have applied the Miglin test in custody cases: seeBlois v.
Gleason, 2009 CarswellOnt 2527; Di Raimo v. Di Raimo, 2020 ONSC 5233; Hearn v. Hearn, 2004 ABQB 75; and Todoruck v.Todoruck, 2014 ONSC 6983. In this decision, I will comment only on the three Ontario cases, given that I must decide this case beforeme according to the statutory framework in Ontario, and specifically under provincial legislation. [95] First, I note that Blois v. Gleason was decided under the Divorce Act. There is no mention of how section 56(1) of the FamilyLaw Act, which allows the Court to disregard an agreement based on a best-interests test alone, factors into a Miglin analysis.
Bycontrast, in Di Raimo v. Di Raimo, the Court specifically addressed this difference, citing that when a custody claim is made under theDivorce Act, provincial legislation, and in particular section 56(1) of the Family Law Act, would have no application. [96] Todoruck v. Todoruck was also case decided under the Divorce Act. Nightingale J. cited Bois v. Gleason, Hearn v. Hearn andMiglin v. Miglin for the proposition that the Court must consider the importance of parental autonomy. But as I have already said,Nightingale J. also cited and appears to have applied two other tests in the case before him.
Regarding the best interests’ test, (whichmay be at odds with the more rigorous Miglin test’s analysis), he said this at ¶ 42: Although the parents' agreement with respect to post-separation childcare arrangements are entitled to great weight, the court is notbound to give effect to the custody agreement if the agreement does not promote the child's best interests. L. (A.) v. K. (D.) (2000), 2000BCCA 455 , 9 R.F.L. (5th) 341 (B.C. C.A.) and (2000), 2000 BCCA 633 , 11 R.F.L. (5th) 158 (B.C. C.A.). [97] So while the Court in Todoruck v.
Todoruck does not specifically refer to section 56(1) of the Family Law Act, Nightingale J.cited the very principles contained in that section, but based on case law rather than section 56(1) of the Family Law Act. [98] With great respect to the Court in these Ontario decisions, none explain why the Miglin test should apply to custody decisionsat all, given the very different statutory framework in which the Miglin test was developed, compared to that which governs custodydecisions.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has since clarified that the test in Miglin was responsive to the specific statutory directions of s.15.2 of the Divorce Act. Albeit in the context of a support variation under
section 17 of the Divorce Act, at ¶ 27 and 28 of L.M.P. v. L.S.,2011 SCC 64, the Court said while an agreement is not to be ignored, it will be treated differently, having regard to the different purposesof each statutory provision. [99] In that regard, it is important to note that
section 15.2(4)(
c) of the Divorce Act, pursuant to which the Miglin test was developed,directs the Court to consider any agreement or arrangement relating to the support of either spouse, when making a support order. Thereis no such statutory language regarding custody or access in either the Divorce Act or the Children’s Law Reform Act. To the contrary,Ontario’s provincial legislation specifically directs the Court to disregard any domestic contracts, or even consents that are not domesticcontracts, which are not in the best interests of the child. [100] Regarding Di Raimo v.
Di Raimo, while the Court in that case found that section 56(1) of the Family Law Act had no applicationin Divorce Act proceedings, the decision makes no reference to section 16(8) of the Divorce Act, which still states that the court shallonly take into consideration the best interests of the child by reference to the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of thechild.
And respectfully, the decision incorrectly states a challenge to an agreement under provincial legislation may not be launched intandem with Divorce Act claims. [101] Section 36(1) of the Family Law Act, which provides for a stay when an application under the Divorce Act is started, onlyoperates to stay claims made under
Part III of the Family Law Act. Section 56(1) of the Family Law Act is in
Part IV. Similarly, section27 of the Children’s Law Reform Act provides for a stay of custody and access applications under the Children’s Law Reform Act. Neither stay provision ousts the Court’s jurisdiction to consider the validity of an agreement under section 56(1) of the Family Law Act. [102] In this case before me, even if section 56(1) of the Family Law Act does not strictly apply since the custody term in the ParentingAgreement of April 18, 2013 is not part of a domestic contract, there is still section 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act. Bestinterests is the mandatory consideration.
(4) Whether There Is An Onus on One Parent or the Other to Prove the Child Should Be Vaccinated or Not [103] Regarding the vaccination issue specifically, counsel for the father also argued that the mother bears an onus to show why thechild should not be vaccinated. It is suggested in some of the cases, including in at least one of the vaccination cases, which I will come
to, that such an onus does in fact rest with one parent or the other. [104] I prefer Benotto J.A.’s recent comments in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. J.G., 2020 ONCA 415. Although they weremade about an access claim under Ontario’s child welfare legislation, at ¶ 63 she said, “the court here was not being asked to makefindings of fact about past events. A child’s best interests in connection with future access involve a delicate weighing and balancing ofmultiple factors.
It is not a fact-finding mission and the exercise is not assisted by determining what the onus is or where it lies”. [105] McLachlin J. made similar comments in Gordon v. Goertz at the best interests’ stage of the analysis, once material change hadbeen proven[6]. At ¶ 47, she said, “the judge must embark on a fresh inquiry in light of the change and all other relevant factors todetermine the best interests of the child.
There is neither need nor place to begin this inquiry with a general rule that one of the partieswill be unsuccessful if he or she fails to satisfy a specified burden of proof.” [106] While I would not place the aforementioned onus on the mother, her past and current decision-making has been called intoissue. There must be some burden on her to persuade the Court that her decision-making was and is in the child’s best interests, and tosupport her argument that B.R.M.R. might be at risk of harm from a vaccine. To do this, she would have to present some reliable andadmissible evidence.
(5) Whether an “Exigent Circumstances” Test Applies to the Vaccine Issue [107] By contrast, mother relies on M.W. v. E.B., (ON SC), 2005 CanLii18315 (S.C.J.) for the proposition that thefather must demonstrate “exigent circumstances” to change the status quo on a motion prior to trial. At ¶ 12-14 of M.W. v.
E.B., theCourt held that generally speaking, the status quo will be maintained on an interim custody motion, in the absence of compelling reasonsindicating a change is necessary in the child’s best interests. [108] Compelling circumstances might include a situation of “actual or potential harm, danger, or prejudice for the child; of suchnature or magnitude that immediate rectification or correction are required to safeguard the child’s best interests”. The status quo,“…will have a strong gravitational pull”, but not if “the child is in peril”. See F.K. v.
A.K., 2020 ONSC 3726 ¶ 52. [109] The rationale for this rule is that it will not be in a child’s best interests to be “tossed back and forth pending final disposition ofthe custody/access issues.” See M.W. v. E.B. ¶ 13. To that I would add that where there are factual issues and credibility issues indispute, it may also be appropriate to direct a trial. See M.W. v. E.B. ¶ 15.
Obviously, the former quote is referable to changing aresidential arrangement pending trial, but mother nevertheless argues this principle has application to the issues before the Court on thismotion, too. [110] As I have said, while he submits that it is just the best interests test that applies to the vaccine issue, the father neverthelessframed some of his argument within the parameters of this “exigent circumstances” test. The father’s affidavit material relies, to acertain extent, upon Covid-19 as a basis for having the child vaccinated now.
Because of Covid-19, the father feels the issue ofvaccination is even “more relevant now than ever” and the resolution of the vaccination issue cannot be delayed. The father believes themother’s position against vaccinating the child, “shows a lack of understanding and insight into the health crisis in the world”. [111] The father says the following circumstances are “exigent”. He says there is a current and anticipated strain on the health caresystem. He wants the child to have immediate protection against vaccine-preventable diseases.
He worries that should the child contracta vaccine-preventable disease, B.R.M.R. will be more vulnerable to Covid-19 in general, due to compromised immunity. He is worriedthat if the child becomes sick with such a disease and has to be hospitalized, he will be at greater risk from Covid-19 in the hospital. [112] The father asks me to take judicial notice of decreasing “herd immunity” in the community. He says this is a consequence ofCovid-19, due to doctor’s offices having closed, and other children not receiving vaccines in the same frequency or regularity as before.
To be clear, his request that I take judicial notice of this, is separate from his other submissions about judicial notice, which I addresslater. [113] At Exhibit “N” to his affidavit of August 5, 2020, the father attaches two news stories from the Globe and Mail and the NationalPost dated May 19, 2020 and June 20, 2020. These news articles are amongst the exhibits that the mother moves to strike. [114] These news articles explain that certain reporters spoke to a few doctors, who in turn advised that Canada’s vaccination rates aredropping, due to doctors’ offices’ closures.
Therefore, the father submits that unvaccinated B.R.M.R. is at greater risk. [115] To persuade the Court to judicially notice this, the father points to R. v. Morgan, 2020 ONCA 279. At ¶ 8, the Ontario Court ofAppeal held that the Court may take judicial notice of the fact of the Covid-19 pandemic, its impact on Canadians generally, and thecurrent state of medical knowledge of the virus, including its mode of transmission and recommended methods to avoid its transmission.
Counsel asks the Court to judicially notice this impact from Covid-19 under Court of Appeal’s category, “the impact [of Covid-19] onCanadians generally”.
The father also relies on other decisions, decided in the criminal context, in which bail courts or sentencingjudges have taken Covid-19 into account, in deciding whether to grant bail, non-custodial sentences, or to reduce the length of a custodialsentence. [116] The mother says that the father is “deliberately attempting to use the current pandemic to manufacture a sense of urgencyregarding the vaccination issue by trying to leverage the communal fear of this virus”.
The mother points out that the father does notprovide expert evidence that the child is at risk of becoming sicker or more susceptible to other diseases if he was to contract Covid-19,however. [117] I tend to agree with the mother regarding her comments about the father’s failure to provide expert evidence about thesepropositions. I do not accept her statements about the father trying to “leverage” Covid-19, however. [118] The newspaper articles fall short of the standard required for the Court to take judicial notice of a fact.
Quite apart from the factthat they are newspaper articles, the contents of the articles themselves are not conclusive or indisputable. Except in one instance, none
of the physicians interviewed in the newspaper articles were even located in Ontario [7] . Nor is any scientific data referenced in either
article about a hit to “herd immunity” in the Ontario context. To the contrary, one of the articles references the inability to get data from Ontario about this. [ 119 ] I agree with Ms. Pilch about the inadmissibility of these articles. I do not find the father’s “herd immunity” argument to fall within the Court of Appeal’s comments about the “impact [of Covid-19] on Canadians generally”. And regarding the bail decisions, to a certain degree it is important to recognize that bail decisions are decided on a relaxed evidentiary standard. See section 518(1)(
e) of the Criminal Code . I do not find the bail decisions (or the sentencing decisions) to be particularly helpful to the determination of the issues before me. [ 120 ] All that said, the father’s fears about what might be the impact upon the child if he were to contract a vaccine preventable disease are understandable. The fact that he has not tendered expert evidence to establish some of the aforementioned arguments is of no moment.
I say that because it is unnecessary for the father to prove a link between the child not being vaccinated with existing vaccines, and an enhanced risk from Covid-19. [ 121 ] While Courts are often loathe to vary custody or access orders pending trial on a temporary motion absent exigent circumstances, particularly when there may be a trial soon, I note again those arguments are often made concerning whether there should be a significant change to a child’s residential arrangements prior to trial, or some other kind of major change like a move or a school change.
I appreciate that in one of the vaccine cases that I discuss in more detail below, C.M.G. v. D.W.S. (cited below), one of the parents wanted to take an international trip, which triggered the parents to come back to Court.
However, there is nothing in the ruling, nor in any of the other motions’ decisions concerning vaccines, that requires a parent to show “exigent circumstances”. [ 122 ] I do not find that the father has to meet an “exigent circumstances” test in relation to his motion for health decision-making over vaccines, just because the issue was raised on a motion and there happens to be a status quo of the mother having this decision-making historically.
That said, I would find that he does some obligation to explain to the Court why he is challenging the mother’s decision- making now, and why the order he seeks is in B.R.M.R.’s best interests. But I would not raise that to the level of having to demonstrate “exigent circumstances”. [ 123 ] Vaccines by their definition are preventative. The parents and the child are lucky that B.R.M.R. has not come into contact with and contracted a vaccine preventable disease so far in his life.
Just because he has not, why should a parent have to wait until there is an outbreak, some other new circumstance like a global pandemic, or some other factor like a trip, before having the grounds to bring a motion to ask the Court to make an order about this? [ 124 ] I find the child is already exposed to risk by not being vaccinated as it is. It is not an answer to argue that the child has not contracted a disease during the last 10 years, so what’s the harm in waiting a few more months to trial. This, in effect, is what the mother argues.
If it is in the child’s best interests to act now, then the Court should intervene. It must not wait until a trial, because of a threshold test that was developed in a different factual context. D. Conclusions Respecting the Applicable Legal Framework and the Court’s Treatment of the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013 [ 125 ] In
summary, I find the following legal principles apply: (
a) Although there is no order, separation agreement or other domestic contract in place respecting custody, the mother is still the child’s de facto custodial parent. The child has lived with her since birth, with the father consent, implied consent or acquiescence. Until now, the father’s entitlement to exercise the entitlement to custody and the incidents of custody has been suspended, within the meaning of sections 20(4) of Children’s Law Reform Act ; (
b) While the mother has been the child’s de facto custodial parent, the wisdom of her past and current decision-making has been placed in issue and is alleged to be contrary the child’s best interests; (
c) Regarding the treatment of the Parenting Agreement and whether it additionally tips the analysis one way or the other, I prefer the approaches taken in Askalan v. Talen , C. (M.A.) v. K.(M.), Carpenter v. Carpenter and Molloy v. Molloy. In my view, the approach in these cases is more in keeping with the governing legislation; (
d) On the one hand, policy promotes parental autonomy and encourages parents to enter into agreements. I need not comment on whether this policy applies with equal force to an agreement that is not a domestic contract. For the purpose of my analysis in this case, I will assume that it does; (
e) Nevertheless, and although section 56(1) doesn’t strictly apply to allow the Court to disregard it, since the custody term is not part of a “domestic contract”, section 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act still requires the Court only to apply a best interests test. There is no reason to exempt the custody term in this particular Agreement before me from that standard; (
f) Material change in circumstances type considerations will not factor into my analysis. Nor would the Court require the father to demonstrate any “exigent circumstances” in relation to the vaccine issue, for the reasons I have already articulated. However, the father does have to satisfy the Court why the Court should intervene; (
g) Likewise, the Court would not place an onus on the mother to explain why the child should not be vaccinated, as the father argued. However, the mother must still explain her decision-making, and provide evidence to support her position that there is a risk to this child from vaccines, with admissible medical evidence; (
h) I do not find the Miglin test to apply. It would place undue weight on the Parenting Agreement dated April 18, 2013, to which it is not entitled;
(
i) If I am wrong in that regard, a Miglin analysis would not change the outcome. Under the Miglin test, the Court must assess the agreement’s substantial compliance with the governing legislation. In this case, that would be the Children’s Law Reform Act , which revolves around a child’s best interests. It is hard to see how the custody term in this case was compliance with the objectives of the legislation, either at the time the Agreement was signed, or now. As I will explain, it is not in the child’s best interests for the mother to have decision making over vaccinations any longer, given the manner in which she was and is exercising that decision-making authority; (
j) The Court intends to consider all relevant evidence put before it concerning B.R.M.R.’s best interests; (
k) The custody term in the Parenting Agreement is a relevant to what the parents’ intentions were at the time they signed it; and (
l) The custody term is similarly relevant to determining what the status quo is . The status quo is a factor the Court will consider under section 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act . However, even if the Parenting Agreement had never been signed, there is no serious dispute in this case about what the status quo is.
PART V: WHETHER THE COURT SHOULD TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE SCIENCE BEHIND ONTARIO’S PUBLICLY FUNDED VACCINES [ 126 ] In his factum, the father asks the Court to take judicial notice of “the science of vaccines and vaccination”.
During submissions, counsel said that I should take judicial notice that vaccines are “safe and beneficial” in general, and take judicial notice of public policy to help me resolve this case. [ 127 ] In her factum, the mother says the question for the Court is whether it may take judicial notice “of a benefit to [B.R.M.R.] from receiving vaccinations”. [ 128 ] Both sides filed authorities, including references to a well-known evidence text book, the father filed various documents from government and other sources about vaccines, and both sides made submissions about judicial notice. [ 129 ] Except for the request about public policy, both other propositions, as framed by counsel, are imprecise and I would not take judicial notice of either statement as currently framed by counsel.
Furthermore, judicial notice cannot resolve whether there is anything particular to B.R.M.R. that would contraindicate him receiving any of those vaccines, however unusual that might be. The latter may require some evidence, although as the case law reveals, the evidentiary burden to refute this will not usually be onerous [8] . [ 130 ] Before I delve into this judicial notice issue, it is important again to place the issue into its proper context. Given the widespread, indisputable information about Ontario’s publicly funded vaccines, courts should not have to be deciding whether those vaccines are safe.
But when a parent (in this case the mother) exercises her decision-making in such a fashion as not to follow routine medical advice that is universally given for most children in Ontario (and Canada and many other places around the world), the reasonableness of the parent’s decision-making process inevitably engages a review of what the parent considered and relied upon to arrive at her decision, contrasted with universally known medical advice. A.
The Father’s Documentation Relating to Judicial Notice [ 131 ] At Exhibits “G” to “M” of his affidavit of August 5, 2020, the father relies on an Ontario government document, entitled “Immunization 2020 – Modernizing Ontario’s Publicly Funded Immunization Program”, various print outs from the Government Canada available on its website, a
summary of portions of the Immunization of School Pupils Act available on the City of Toronto’s website, charts from the World Health Organization summarizing certain position papers, and the World Health Organization Immunization News Letter dated June 2020. The mother objects to the court relying on the information contained in any of these sources. [ 132 ] I only intend to refer to the documents from the governments of Ontario and Canada. The information contained therein is sufficient for the analysis.
I need not decide whether to take judicial notice of the information contained in the other documents the father supplied, although I would note that judges in other cases have taken judicial notice of information about vaccines from the World Health Organization before. [ 133 ] The “Immunization 2020” document from the government of Ontario maps out part of Ontario’s plan to continuously review and improve the health care system.
The document is self-described as a “first-of-its-kind roadmap for Ontario that will help our government and our partners achieve a high performing, integrated immunization system.” It also reflects the findings of the Advisory Committee for Ontario’s Immunization System Review. [ 134 ] The “Immunization 2020” document identifies a number of goals and action items relating to immunizations. One of Ontario’s identified goals is to strengthen public confidence in the safety and effectiveness of vaccines, and to promote the shared responsibility for immunization among individuals in the community.
While the “Immunization 2020” document contains a number of action items regarding future health care planning, it also contains much information about the current system of vaccine delivery, and about the safety and efficacy of vaccines that are already part of current public health. [ 135 ] Among other things, the document explains: (
a) Publicly funded immunization programs have been incredibly effective at preventing diseases that would otherwise cause illness and death; (
b) Many diseases that were once common and devastating in Canada have been eliminated or drastically reduced; (
c) Immunization benefits not only the individual, but others in the community via “herd immunity”; (
d) Immunization reduces the burden on the health care system and saves other health care costs that would otherwise be incurred in the treatment of disease;
(
e) Ontario was the first province to pass laws requiring children to be vaccinated against certain diseases in order to attend schools,(subject to a valid exemption); (
f) Similar provisions exist respecting licensed day cares; (
g) Ontario publicly funds a total of 22 different vaccines as part of both routine and high-risk targeted immunization programs,which protect Ontarians against 16 diseases, across their lifespan; (
h) Primary health care providers administer the majority of immunizations in Ontario, as part of routine health care. Vaccines areadministered by physicians, nurse practitioners and midwives, and registered nurses and registered practical nurses under appropriatemedical directives. Since 2012, trained pharmacists may now deliver the flu shot to Ontarians over the age of 5; (
i) Ontario regularly updates its immunization schedules to keep current with the latest scientific evidence; (
j) Local public health units, and health care providers make immunization information available online to Ontarians; (
k) Adverse events following immunization are reported and monitored, led by Public Health Ontario; (
l) Ontario monitors immunization safety data; and (
m) Ontario uses a nationally recommended analytic framework to inform government decisions regarding publicly fundedvaccines. That includes reliance on scientific evidence. [136] The documents that the father supplied to the Court from the government of Canada’s website include portions of the CanadaImmunization Guide. Its introduction reads in part, “[v]accines are a cornerstone of public health and their use has significantlycontributed to the prevention and control of infectious diseases in Canada and internationally.
Immunization is not just for children; adolescents now routinely receive various vaccines to protect against [various diseases]….. The risk of vaccine preventable diseasetransmission remains and would significantly increase if vaccination were stopped.
Immunization providers and the public should beaware that, with the success of childhood immunization programs, there is a tendency to underestimate the risks of vaccine-preventablediseases and overestimate the risk of vaccines”. [137] The documents from the government of Canada explain that comprehensive federal and provincial/territorial immunizationpolicies in Canada, and the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of vaccines and immunization programs, have resulted in a low incidenceof vaccine-preventable diseases and their associated morbidity and mortality. Canada has a national immunization strategy.
Immunization programming in Canada is a shared responsibility between the federal and provincial and territorial governments. Thereare two scientific advisory committees, whose members are recognized experts in multiple fields, including pediatrics, infectiousdiseases, immunology, medical microbiology, internal medicine and public health. The national scientific advisory body onimmunization has been developing recommendations for the use of vaccines for Canadians since the 1960s. [138] Health Canada is responsible for the regulation of vaccines.
It reviews the clinical and manufacturing information of vaccinesubmissions and authorizes the sale of vaccines in Canada. With the Public Health Agency of Canada, it is responsible for monitoringvaccine safety and effectiveness. Recommendations regarding vaccines authorized for use in Canada, are scientific evidence based.
Theprovinces/territories and local public health authorities undertake the planning and delivery of immunization programming. [139] The documents from the government of Canada explain that immunization is highly important and has led to the elimination,containment and control of diseases that were once very common in Canada. Vaccines are important in all stages of life. It reiterates thatimmunizations provide savings in health care costs. [140] These documents also tell parents how vaccines work, when administered in their children.
They warn parents that somevaccine preventable diseases have no treatment or cure. Children can become very sick, suffer lifelong disability or die. [141] The documents from the government of Canada state that which is universally known by reasonable people, that vaccines do notcause autism. Misinformation in this regard originated with a false 1998 study, that was later retracted. Many larger studies havedebunked this myth. Researchers and scientists around the world have rejected any such a link between autism and various vaccines. [142] In terms of side effects, vaccines may cause common and mild ones.
There is a small chance of an allergic reaction (less than 1in 1 million), and that usually happens just after the vaccine is given. This is why a health-care providers require the child to remain inthe clinic for 15 to 20 minutes after the vaccination, to treat the child in case that happens. Serious reactions are very rare. [143] Some vaccines are inactive whereas others are live. It is not possible to develop disease from inactive vaccines. Live vaccinesmay cause very mild symptoms, but this too is rare.
The ingredients in vaccines are also safe. [144] For the reasons that follow, I am prepared to take judicial notice of the information in the documents from Ontario and Canadathat I have just summarized. Therefore, the documents/guide from Ontario and Canada shall not be struck from the record. As I do notneed to rely on the additional documentation supplied by the father, I need not address the mother’s motion to strike those documents anyfurther. B.
Applicable Legal Principles Concerning Judicial Notice [145] According to Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, “The Law of Evidence in Canada” 5th ed., Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2018,at page 1393 (and see also R. v. Williams, (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128 ¶ 54): Judicial notice is the acceptance by a court or judicial tribunal, in a civil or criminal proceeding, without the requirement of proof, of thetruth of a particular fact or state of affairs. Facts which are (
a) so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute among reasonable persons;
or (
b) capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resorting to readily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy, may benoticed by the court without proof of them by a party. [146] In this case, I have been asked to take judicial notice of both adjudicative facts (namely that vaccines are “safe and beneficial”),to resolve the factual dispute between the parents, and legislative facts to inform the Court’s decision-making (namely government policyas reflected in the aforementioned documents and Ontario legislation, surrounding vaccines), as informative to the Court’s legalreasoning. [147] At pages 506-507 of “The Law of Evidence”, 7th ed., Toronto: Irwin Law Inc. 2015, Justice Paciocco and Professor Stuesserexplain the difference between these kinds of facts: It is important to distinguish between taking judicial notice of “adjudicative facts” and “legislative facts”.
Judicial notice, as outlined,applies to adjudicative facts, which are facts to be determined in the litigation between the parties. Legislative facts are also admittedwithout the need for proof. However, legislative facts are those that have relevance to legal reasoning and the law-making process andinvolve broad considerations of policy.
Legislative facts assist in determining questions of law and are not intended to assist in resolvingquestions of fact. [148] Justice Paciocco and Professor Stuesser also discuss a third category, namely “social framework facts” which provide a contextfor the judge to consider and apply the evidence in a given case. Although some of the cases that counsel supplied me with concerntaking judicial notice of this kind of evidence, “social framework facts” are not in issue in this case before me.
The facts I am beingasked to judicially notice are in the fields of science and medicine, and related government policy. [149] Between them, both counsel have submitted three criminal law decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada regarding judicialnotice. The decisions are helpful for their general principles, but not their specific facts or application to those facts. All three decisionsinvolved whether the Court should take judicial notice of social science evidence, to determine whether to allow challenges for cause inthe jury selection process. [150] Counsel for the father relies on R. v.
Williams, principally for the
summary of the law of judicial notice referred to fromSopinka’s evidence text. In R. v. Williams, the accused called witnesses and tendered studies to establish widespread prejudice in thecommunity against indigenous persons. At ¶ 54, the Court held that it may not be necessary to duplicate this investment in time andresources to establish racial prejudice in the community in all subsequent cases. However, the Court also declined to decide whethersuch a judicially noticed fact during the jury selection phase, would apply to other phases of a criminal trial. [151] Counsel for the mother relies on R. v.
Find, 2001 SCC 32. R. v. Find concerned whether it was appropriate for the defence tomount a similar challenge, not based on racial prejudice, but based on biases that might arise out of the nature of the offence itself. Thecharges in R. v. Find concerned sexual offences and children. In the result, the Court concluded that the material presented fell short ofthe standard required for the Court to take judicial notice of a widespread societal bias. At best, the material established that the crime ofsexual assault frequently elicits strong attitudes and emotions. [152] R. v.
Spence, 2005 SCC 71, also supplied by the mother, is the third jury selection case that I was provided. This case alsoinvolved concerns over racial prejudice. In part, this case considered whether a different approach is warranted, when the Court is askedto take judicial notice of social framework facts versus other facts.
Without needing to discuss this difference, I note that the Court didconclude, that the closer a fact approaches to the dispositive issue, the more the Court ought to take a stricter approach to taking judicialnotice. [153] It has been said that judicial notice and expert evidence are not compatible. Expert evidence is called because the expert hasknowledge that goes beyond the knowledge of the ordinary person. See page 510 of Paciocco and Stuesser in “The Law of Evidence.” [154] However, those comments were made in the context of a critique of the conduct of the trial judge in R. v.
Desaulniers, (1994) (QC CA), 93 C.C.C. (3d) 371 (Que. C.A.). In that case, the trial judge relied on findings in a report and a book, tochallenge an expert’s credibility. The judge did his own research, and the material upon which the judge was relied was not put to theexpert during the trial. [155] That said, scientific facts can become so well known generally, that the court can judicially note them without the need forexpert evidence, and perhaps even without reference to any external sources. See Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, “The Law ofEvidence in Canada”, page 1399; see also Griffin v.
R., 1980 CarswellNS 19 ¶ 11-15. [156] As well, there may be precedential value, where a certain fact has been noted by a judge in a previous matter. At page 1394 ofSopinka, Lederman and Bryant, “The Law of Evidence in Canada”, the authors write that the Court may examine the case law todetermine whether any particular fact an be noted. See also R. v. Williams ¶ 54. [157] Counsel for the father would have me rely on the findings of other courts in prior vaccine cases, which had been made based onexpert testimony.
However, it is important to note that there may be a distinction drawn in the case law, between a court relying on aprevious decision in which judicial notice was taken, versus a court now taking judicial notice based on a finding of fact in a prior casethat was grounded in expert evidence or other testimony. See R. v. Kirton (2007), 2007 MBCA 38 , 219 C.C.C. (3d) 485 (Man.C.A.). [158] Even if the latter is to be avoided, it also is conceivable that a proven fact from a previous case may become so well known as tofall within the purview of facts that may now be judicially noticed.
While judicial notice lags behind the advance of science, its scope is“constantly enlarging”. See R. v. Savidant, 1945 CarswellPEI
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