2010 ONSC 6444, 2010 ONSC 6444

CITATION : Hermant v. Secord 2010 ONSC 6444 COURT FILE NO.: 17140/10 DATE: 20101208 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE B E T W E E N: ) ) Karen Hermant ) ) ) Peter J. Doucet, for the Applicant ) Applicant ) ) - and - ) ) ) Jean Guy Secord ) ) ) Susan T. McGrath, for the Respondent ) Respondent ) ) ) ) HEARD: November 15, 2010 DECISION ON MOTION Cornell J.: [ 1 ] This is a motion brought by the respondent, Jean Guy Secord, (“Mr. Secord”) to have the applicant’s lawyer, Peter J. Doucet (“Mr. Doucet”) removed as solicitor of record. This is just one of the skirmishes in what is shaping up to be a lengthy battle.

Introduction [ 2 ] The applicant, Karen Hermant (“Ms. Hermant”) has brought an application for a declaration that the Separation Agreement, dated August 12, 2009 (“the Agreement”) between her and Mr. Secord, is void due to misrepresentations alleged to have been made by Mr. Secord, lack of financial disclosure, and unconscionability. [ 3 ] Mr. Secord alleges that Mr. Doucet has a conflict of interest in connection with such application in that he acted for and received confidential information from Mr. Secord’s new wife, Kara Chenier-Secord (“Ms. Chenier-Secord”). [ 4 ] In addition, Mr.

Doucet now employs Louise Lamothe who was the family law assistant to the lawyer who was acting for Mr. Secord at the time that the parties entered into the Agreement. Factual Background

[ 5 ] The parties started living together in January of 2001. They married on August 10, 2007 and separated on January 16, 2009. They have one child, Brent Daniel Secord who was born on October 27, 2001. [ 6 ] Following his divorce, Mr. Secord married Kara Chenier, who is now known as Ms. Chenier-Secord. [ 7 ] Ms. Hermant asserts that Mr. Secord has done everything in his power to prevent her from being represented by experienced family law counsel. In her material, she asserts that she initially wanted Sylvano Carlesso to be her family law lawyer but that Mr. Secord said that his lawyer would not deal with Mr.

Carlesso and if she decided to retain him, that the matter would be hard-fought and lengthy. [ 8 ] Ms. Hermant was then directed by Mr. Secord to Kelly Watson of the firm, Riopelle Griener. At the time, Ms. Watson was a recent call to the bar and she declined to accept Ms. Hermant’s retainer. After Mr. Secord called one of the lawyers at Riopelle Griener firm, Ms. Hermant was advised that Ms. Watson would, in fact, act for her. The application to set aside the Agreement alleges that Ms.

Hermant proceeded to sign the Agreement without any financial disclosure, with no valuation of assets and with no spousal support despite an enormous disparity in income between the parties. Conflict of Interest – Ms. Chenier-Secord [ 9 ] Mr. Secord’s position is that Mr. Doucet has previously acted for Ms. Chenier-Secord, his current wife, and that in the process of so doing, came into possession of confidential information that is now being used against Mr. Secord in this application. In her affidavit, Ms. Chenier-Secord deposes that “Mr.

Doucet represented Chenier Motors Ltd. and me as President of Chenier Motors Ltd., personally, for a number of years, from 2007 to 2008.” Ms. Chenier-Secord goes on to depose that Mr. Doucet has “considerable information about me, my lifestyle and my apparent income level”. Ms. Chenier-Secord’s affidavit goes on to indicate that Mr. Doucet provided her with legal advice about recovering the cost to charter an airplane from Aiken, South Carolina to Timmins, Ontario, to transport an attack dog that she had acquired for $30,000. Ms. Chenier-Secord indicates that “only Mr.

Doucet knew the amount I paid for the dog”. [ 10 ] In the brief but thorough cross-examination of Ms. Chenier-Secord, she concedes that Mr. Doucet did not act as corporate counsel for Chenier Motors Ltd. or for her personally. The extent of the work undertaken by Mr. Doucet consisted of a single letter to a disruptive customer of Chenier Motors Ltd. [ 11 ] When pressed on cross-examination, Ms. Chenier-Secord conceded that the only confidential information that Mr. Doucet was privy to was the amount that she paid for the attack dog. In a reply affidavit, Ms. Hermant indicates that she had known Ms.

Chenier- Secord for approximately eight years and had dealt with her on both a professional and personal level during that time. Ms. Hermant indicates that Ms. Chenier-Secord showed her the website where she purchased the dog and told her that the dogs were valued from $20,000 to $80,000 because they were specially-trained guard dogs. She further indicates that Ms. Chenier-Secord told her that she paid at least $30,000 for this new dog, and about the arrangements that she had to make to get the dog to Timmins by the use of a private aircraft.

Conflict of Interest – Louise Lamothe [ 12 ] At the time that the Agreement was prepared, Mr. Secord was represented by Ben Gosselin. Louise Lamothe (“Ms. Lamothe”) was employed by Ben Gosselin during the time that he represented Mr. Secord. As a result, it is conceded that Ms. Lamothe has confidential information about Mr. Secord and the circumstances surrounding the Agreement that is now under attack. [ 13 ] Ms. Lamothe came to work for Mr. Doucet on July 13, 2010. Mr. Doucet is a sole practitioner. His senior assistant and office manager is Tammy Picard.

He also employs Elaine Tremblay and Lyudmyla Boyko as legal assistants. [ 14 ] Ms. Lamothe has been a legal assistant for over twenty-three years. She was initially hired and trained by Louise Gauthier, now the Honourable Madam Justice Gauthier, Regional Senior Justice of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Northeast Region. Following her employment with Louise Gauthier, as she then was, Ms. Lamothe received further training and supervision by two senior and respected practitioners in Timmins. Given this background and training, Ms.

Lamothe states that she understands “the essential nature of confidentiality within a law firm and the serious consequences of breaching such confidentiality. I would never embarrass my employers, my mentors, the clients whom I serve, nor would I put my name and reputation in jeopardy by breaching such confidences in any way.” [ 15 ] Prior to being formally hired by Mr. Doucet, her previous involvement with the Hermant and Secord matter was identified and strict measures were put in place. These included: 1) Mr. Doucet made it abundantly clear in no uncertain terms that Ms.

Lamothe was not to communicate with him or any member of his staff concerning any of her dealings with Mr. Secord in any manner whatsoever. 2) All information that Ms. Lamothe might have, regardless of its nature or source, concerning her dealings with Mr. Secord was to remain locked within her and she was to “die with all of [her] secrets.” 3) Mr. Doucet assured her that he would not attempt to communicate with her in any way concerning Mr. Secord, and that if any of his staff attempted to speak to her about the Hermant/Secord matter, even in the most casual fashion, she was to immediately report this to Mr.

Doucet. [ 16 ] Mr. Doucet indicated that any breach of this directive would be a serious disciplinary issue. [ 17 ] These requirements were then made clear to all of Mr. Doucet’s staff. Tammy Picard is Mr. Doucet’s senior litigation assistant and office manager. She is the assistant who is responsible for the Hermant/Secord file. In accordance with Mr. Doucet’s instructions, Tammy Picard e-mailed all staff on July 13, 2010, to confirm the terms of the directive and to have a written record of it. All of Mr.

Doucet’s staff have deposed that the directive has been followed. [18] Ms. Hermant indicates that Mr. Secord is a very determined and intimidating individual. He has already interfered with herchoice of legal representation. He has made it clear that he is going to take every opportunity to fight Ms. Hermant’s application. Thatthis is not an empty threat can be clearly discerned from the fact that, although this application was only served in July of 2010, therehave been three case conferences, multiple motions and six separate court orders.

The Continuing Record now runs to three volumes. [19] In the circumstances, Ms. Hermant, quite understandably, indicates that she needs an experienced senior family law litigator toproperly represent her. To paraphrase Ms. Hermant’s material, it is suggested that the pool of senior family law litigators in Timminswho do not have a conflict and who would be prepared to deal with Mr. Secord’s aggressive tactics is not terribly deep. Theuncontradicted evidence before me is that if Mr. Doucet is removed from the file, Ms. Hermant will be required to retain out-of-towncounsel. The Issues Ms.

Chenier-Secord [20] 1) To what extent did Ms. Chenier-Secord retain Mr. Doucet to provide legal assistance? 2) During the course of such retainer, was any confidential information provided by Ms. Chenier-Secord to Mr. Doucet? 3) If any such confidential information was provided, was it relevant to any of the issues in this application? 4) As a non-party, does Ms. Chenier-Secord have the ability to raise confidentiality concerns? Ms. Lamothe 5) Did Ms. Lamothe receive confidential information during the course of Ben Gosselin’s retainer to prepare the Agreement that is underattack in this application? 6) If Ms.

Lamothe is privy to any such confidential information, is there a risk that it will be used to the prejudice of Mr. Secord. The Law [21] The leading decision on the removal of a solicitor of record because of a conflict of interest is the case of MacDonald Estate v.Martin, (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235. In that decision, the court weighed the underlying policy considerations andreviewed the approach taken in England, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

On behalf of the minority, Cory J.would have adopted a bright line approach, which would have created an irrebuttable presumption that the knowledge of an incominglawyer, including confidential information disclosed to him by his former clients, has become the knowledge of the new firm. Theunderlying rationale for this approach is to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice. The majority rejected thisposition and took a more nuanced approach to the subject.

While recognizing the dangers that exist with respect to the possible use ofconfidential information and the need to preserve public confidence in the judicial system, the majority held that in certain cases, itwould be possible for counsel to continue to act if sufficient safeguards were put in place in a timely fashion to protect the confidentialinformation. The court stated, at p. 1260, “Typically, these cases require two questions to be answered:

(1) Did the lawyer receiveconfidential information attributable to a solicitor and client relationship relevant to the matter at hand?

(2) Is there a risk that it will beused to the prejudice of the client?” [22] The court went on to state: In my opinion, once it is shown by the client that there existed a previous relationship which is sufficiently related to the retainer fromwhich it is sought to remove the solicitor, the court should infer that confidential information was imparted unless the solicitor satisfiesthe court that no information was imparted which could be relevant. This will be a difficult burden to discharge.

Not only must thecourt’s degree of satisfaction be such that it would withstand the scrutiny of the reasonably informed member of the public that no suchinformation passed, but the burden must be discharged without revealing the specifics of the privileged communication.

Nonetheless, Iam of the opinion that the door should not be shut completely on a solicitor who wishes to discharge this heavy burden. [Emphasisadded.] [23] In terms of addressing the second question as to whether there is a risk that the information will be used to the prejudice of theclient, the court stated, at p. 1262: In answering this question, the court should therefore draw the inference, unless satisfied on the basis of clear and convincing evidence,that all reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that no disclosure will occur by the “tainted” lawyer to the member or membersof the firm who are engaged against the former client.

Such reasonable measures would include institutional mechanisms such asChinese Walls and cones of silence. [24] In accordance with a suggestion made by the court in MacDonald Estate, the Canadian Bar Association developed standards forthe use of institutional devices in cases of this nature. This framework was used by the Law Society of Upper Canada in the creation of

rule 2.05 of the Rules of Professional Conduct , which provides as follows: 2.05 CONFLICTS FROM TRANSFER BETWEEN LAW FIRMS

(1) In this rule “client” includes anyone to whom a lawyer owes a duty of confidentiality, whether or not a solicitor-client relationship exists between them. “confidential information means information obtained from a client that is not generally known to the public, and “matter” means a case or client file but does not include general “know-how” and, in the case of a government lawyer, does not include policy advice unless the advice relates to a particular case. Application of Rule

(2) This rule applies where a lawyer transfers from one law firm (“former law firm”) to another (“new law firm”), and either the transferring lawyer or the new law firm is aware at the time of the transfer or later discovers that (

a) the new law firm represents a client in a matter that is the same as or related to a matter in which the former law firm represents its client (“former client”), (

b) the interests of those clients in that matter conflict, and (

c) the transferring lawyer actually possesses relevant information respecting that matter. Law Firm Disqualification

(4) Where the transferring lawyer actually possesses relevant information respecting the former client that is confidential and that, if disclosed to a member of the new law firm, may prejudice the former client, the new law firm shall cease its representation of its client in that matter unless (

a) the former client consents to the new law firm’s continued representation of its client, or (

b) the new law firm establishes that it is in the interests of justice that it act in the matter, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including, (

i) the adequacy and timing of the measures taken to ensure that no disclosure to any member of the new law firm of the former of the former client’s confidential information will occur, (ii) the extent of prejudice to any party, (iii) the good faith of the parties, (iv) the availability of suitable alternative counsel, and (

v) issues affecting the public interest. … Transferring Lawyer Disqualification

(7) A transferring lawyer described in the opening clause of subrule (4) or (6) shall not, unless the former client consents, (

a) participate in any manner in the new law firm’s representation of its client in that matter, or (

b) disclose any confidential information respecting the former client.

(8) No member of the new law firm shall, unless the former client consents, discuss with a transferring lawyer described in the opening clause of subrule (4) or (6) the new law firm’s representation of its client or the former law firm’s representation of the former client in that matter.

Determination of Compliance

(9) Anyone who has an interest in, or who represents a party in, a matter referred to in this rule may apply to a tribunal of competentjurisdiction for a determination of any aspect of this rule. Due Diligence

(10) A lawyer shall exercise due diligence in ensuring that each member and employee of the lawyer’s law firm, each non-lawyerpartner and associate, and each other person whose services the lawyer has retained (

a) complies with this rule, and (

b) does not disclose (

i) confidential information of clients of the firm, and (ii) confidential information of clients of another law firm in which theperson has worked. Commentary [25] The commentary to this rule states that “[a]doption of only some of the guidelines may be adequate in some cases, whileadoption of them all may not be sufficient in others.” [26] Despite the establishment of these standards and as noted in the Commentary, compliance with all guidelines is not necessary toovercome a disqualification motion. The guidelines are not mandatory and need not be met in every case in every detail.

Each case mustbe analyzed on the particular facts that the case presents: see Bank of Montreal v. Dresler, (2002), 2002 NBCA 69 , 253 N.B.R.(2d) 37 (C.A.) (“Dresler”) and Robertson v. Slater Vecchio, (2008), 2008 BCCA 306 , 81 B.C.L.R. (4th) 46 (C.A.). [27] In this particular case, Ms. Lamothe is not a lawyer, but a legal assistant. A number of cases have considered this issue and it isnow settled law that a non-professional employee’s change of firms can give rise to a disqualifying conflict of interest: see Hildinger v.Carroll (2004), (ON CA), 2 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. C.A.); Chern v.

Chern (2006), 2006 ABCA 16 , 55 Alta.L.R. (4th) 28 (C.A.) 18; Ocelot Energy v. Jans, (1998), 165 Sask.K. 252 (Q.B.); Dalgleish v. Dalgleish, [2001] O.J. No. 2187. [28] There is also a concern that the use of a motion to remove counsel can be used as a tactical weapon in the litigation process. This form of “removal litigation” is designed to gain a tactical advantage by adding to the length, cost and agony of the litigation.

InDresler, supra, the court stated, at para. 90: The Task Force was concerned that disqualification motions would be initiated solely for tactical reasons and not a genuine concern tomaintain the integrity of the legal profession and public confidence in the administration of justice. Even if unsuccessful, motions can bedamaging to the responding party. The litigation may be significantly delayed. Moreover, the additional cost, both financial andpsychological, may provide the motivation for settling or abandoning the original matter from which the conflict arose.

In that regard,the Task Force noted that since MacDonald Estate v. Martin was decided, there was a considerable increase in the incidence ofdisqualification applications. A search on Quicklaw reveals that that decision has been cited in no less than 276 decisions. [29] The same concerns about “removal litigation” were raised in Sharp Electronics of Canada Ltd. v. Battery Plus Inc., [2000] O.J.No. 2642 (S.C.).

Keenan J. stated, at para. 20: Since the ruling of the Supreme Court in MacDonald Estate, the courts have seen a dramatic increase in the number of cases in whichmotions are brought to remove counsel from the record. The courts have become more and more alert to the use of “removal litigation”by one party to gain a tactical advantage over its opponent. [30] This phenomenon was recognized by Esson C.J.S.C. in Manville Canada Inc. v. Ladner Downs (1992), (BC SC), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 208 (B.C.S.C.), at p. 224: No doubt some of those applications are brought to prevent a risk of real mischief.

But can there be any doubt that many are broughtsimply because an application to disqualify has become a weapon which can be used, amongst other things, to discomfit the oppositeparty by adding to the length, cost and agony of litigation. If that becomes a regular feature of our litigation, it would not likely do much

to improve the profession’s standards in an area in which there seem to have been few serious problems. But it could do much to further reduce the court’s ability to get judgment in a timely way. Analysis Conflict of Interest - Ms. Chenier-Secord [ 31 ] The material before me clearly indicates that the one time that Mr. Doucet acted for Ms. Chenier-Secord in connection with the disruptive customer; there was no confidential information provided to Mr. Doucet that has any bearing on the issues in this application. [ 32 ] Ms. Chenier-Secord goes on to say that she consulted with Mr.

Doucet at the time that she was trying to transport her new attack dog from North Carolina to Timmins. The Rules of Professional Conduct are broad enough to include such consultation as establishing a solicitor and client relationship. That being said, the issue of the cost of dog and the manner in which it would be transported to Timmins have absolutely no relevance to the issues raised in this application. [ 33 ] Apart from that, Ms. Chenier-Secord is not a party to these proceedings. Counsel for Mr.

Secord conceded that there is no reported case which goes so far as to provide protection for confidential information provided to a non-party and that if I chose to do so, I would be making new law. To accede to this request would extend the protection of confidential information to almost boundless limits and I decline to do so. [ 34 ] Given all of the weaknesses associated with the claims made in connection with Ms.

Chenier-Secord’s so-called confidential information, it raises serious questions in my mind about the bona fides of the motion to remove counsel and tends to support the submission that this motion was brought for tactical reasons. Conflict of Interest – Ms. Lamothe [ 35 ] There is no doubt that Ms. Lamothe is in possession of Mr. Secord’s confidential information. Indeed, this was conceded at the outset of the motion. This being so, the onus shifts to Mr. Doucet to show that reasonable steps have been taken in a timely fashion to safeguard such confidential information. [ 36 ] Mr.

Doucet was cognizant of the conflict at the time that he hired Ms. Lamothe. Prior to formally engaging her as an employee, he took specific steps to protect the confidential information. Ms. Lamothe and all other staff members were directed that under no circumstances was Ms. Lamothe to work on or have any form of communication with Mr. Doucet or any member of his staff concerning her knowledge of Mr. Secord’s affairs nor were any members of Mr. Doucet’s staff to obtain or attempt to obtain any of Ms. Lamothe’s knowledge from her.

Apart from this verbal instruction that was given to all staff, a written directive was circulated by the office manager. Ms. Lamothe and all other members of Mr. Doucet’s staff are categorical that there has been no disclosure by Ms. Lamothe of any information concerning Mr. Secord or his affairs. [ 37 ] Ms. Lamothe has been a legal assistant for over twenty-three years. She has been trained and mentored by experienced members of the Bar.

She understands the professional obligations that accompany her position. [ 38 ] Some, but not all of the Canadian Bar Association’s Task Force Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), a copy of which is attached as Appendix “A” to this decision, have been observed in this case. It is conceded that the Hermant/Secord file is not password protected and that Ms. Lamothe’s desk is in close proximity to that of the legal assistant that works on this file. To that extent, there is a lack of compliance with the Guidelines.

Having said that, I am somewhat at a loss in understanding why those measures would help to protect the disclosure of confidential information. The mischief here is the disclosure of the confidential information possessed by Ms. Lamothe, not the possibility that any incremental information may come to her attention during the time that the matter progresses. [ 39 ] Mr. Doucet has substantially complied with r. 2.05 of the Law Society of Upper Canada Rules of Professional Conduct . I am satisfied as to the adequacy and the timing of the measures taken by him to ensure that no disclosure within his law firm of Mr.

Secord’s confidential information would occur. I am also satisfied that Mr. Doucet satisfied the due diligence requirements of r. 2.05(10) by

ensuring that each employee of his law firm would comply with the rule in not disclosing confidential information obtained from another law firm in which the person has worked. I am also satisfied that given the exigencies of Mr. Doucet’s practice, he has substantially complied with the Guidelines established by the Canadian Bar Association’s Task Force report on Conflict of Interest Disqualification. [ 40 ] A litigant should not be deprived of her choice of counsel without good cause. Mr. Secord has previously manipulated Ms.

Hermant’s legal representation and there is a serious danger in this case that this motion amounts to “removal litigation” in order to allow him to continue to do this. If the motion is successful, Ms. Hermant will be required to obtain out-of-town counsel. Considerable delay and expense will be involved in order for the new lawyer to become familiar with the file. This is a high conflict case involving competing claims for, among other things, custody and access.

In such a case, any further delay is of great concern to the court. [ 41 ] In Dresler , the court stated, at para. 96: Recall that in MacDonald Estate v. Martin , Justice Sopinka formulated the test in terms of whether the public, represented by the reasonably informed person, would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur. Alternatively, he stated that it is necessary to determine whether all reasonable measure have been taken to rebut the presumption that lawyers [ in this case, a legal assistant] in the same firm share confidential information.

Bluntly stated, a judge adjudicating on a disqualification motion must look at the issue from the perspective of the disinterested third person lacking legal acumen, but not common sense. CONCLUSION [ 42 ] Taking into account Ms. Lamothe’s background and training as well as the timing and adequacy of the steps taken by Mr. Doucet to prevent the disclosure of any confidential information known to Ms. Lamothe, I am persuaded that the reasonably informed person would be satisfied that no use of confidential information would occur.

The cone of silence was created in a timely fashion and there is substantial compliance with the Law Society’s Rules and the Canadian Bar Association’s Guidelines. [ 43 ] If there is any doubt as to the correctness of this assessment, I am further of the opinion that the motion to disqualify counsel was brought as a tactical weapon as part of a course of “removal litigation,” which is also a sufficient ground to dismiss the application. [ 44 ] The application to remove Mr. Doucet is dismissed with costs to follow the event.

If the parties are unable to agree upon costs, they may make written submissions to me, such submissions not to exceed two pages in length exclusive of abbreviated time records. The applicant’s submissions shall be made within fourteen days of the release of these reasons with the responding material to be provided within ten days of such date. ___________________________ Justice R. D. Cornell Released: December 8, 2010 APPENDIX “A”

Guidelines for Managing Conflicts of Interest, adapted from the Canadian Bar Association’s Task Force report entitled Conflict of Interest Disqualification: Martin v. Gray and Screening Methods (February 1993), in Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules of Professional Conduct, commentary to r. 2.05.

Relationship to Clients 2.05 Conflicts from Transfer between Law Firms Rule 2 In cases where a transferring lawyer joining a government legal services unit or the legal department of a corporation actually possesses confidential information respecting a former client that, if disclosed to a member of the new “law firm,” may prejudice the former client, the interests of the new client (Her Majesty or the corporation) must continue to be represented.

Normally, this will be effected by instituting satisfactory screening measures, which could include referring the conduct of the matter to counsel in a different department, office or legal services unit. As each factual situation will be unique, flexibility will be required in the application of subrule (4)(b), particularly clause (v). Only in those situations where the entire firm must be disqualified pursuant to subrule (4) will it be necessary to refer conduct of the matter to outside counsel. GUIDELINES 1. The screened lawyer should have no involvement in the new law firm's representation of its client. 2.

The screened lawyer should not discuss the current matter or any information relating to the representation of the former client (the two may be identical) with anyone else in the new law firm. 3. No member of the new law firm should discuss the current matter or the previous representation with the screened lawyer. 4. The current matter should be discussed only within the limited group that is working on the matter. 5.

The files of the current client, including computer files, should be physically segregated from the new law firm's regular filing system, specifically identified, and accessible only to those lawyers and support staff in the new law firm who are working on the matter or who require access for other specifically identified and approved reasons. 6. No member of the new law firm should show the screened lawyer any documents relating to the current representation. 7.

The measures taken by the new law firm to screen the transferring lawyer should be stated in a written policy explained to all lawyers and support staff within the firm, supported by an admonition that violation of the policy will result in sanctions, up to and including dismissal. 8. Undertakings should be provided by the appropriate law firm members setting out that they have adhered to and will continue to adhere to all elements of the screen. 9. The former client, or if the former client is represented in that matter by a lawyer, that lawyer, should be advised (

a) that the screened lawyer is now with the new law firm, which represents the current client, and (

b) of the measures adopted by the new law firm to ensure that there will be no disclosure of confidential information.

10. The screened lawyer’s office or work station and that of the lawyer’s support staff should be located away from the offices or work stations of lawyers and support staff working on the matter. 11. The screened lawyer should use associates and support staff different from those working on the current matter. 12. In the case of law firms with multiple offices, consideration should be given to referring conduct of the matter to counsel in another office. COURT FILE NO.: 17140/10 DATE: 20101208

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE B E T W E E N: Karen Hermant Applicant - and – Jean Guy Secord Respondent DECISION ON MOTION Cornell J. Released: December 8, 2010