R. v. Costache, 2013 ONSC 4447

CITATION: R. v. Costache, 2013 ONSC 4447 COURT FILE NO.: 172/11 DATE: 20130627 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE RE: Her Majesty The Queen v. Stefan Costache BEFORE : K.L. Campbell J. COUNSEL : Stephania Fericean , for the Crown, respondent Daniel F. Moore and G. Jenner , for the accused, appellant HEARD : March 18, 2013 ENDORSEMENT [Summary Conviction Appeal] A. Overview [ 1 ] The appellant, Stefan Costache, was charged with assaulting the complainant, his former common law spouse, Ecaterina Corina Ivan, and threatening to set fire to her dwelling.

Both offences were alleged to have take place in Toronto on September 25, 2010. The appellant was tried by the Honourable Madam Justice L. Favret of the Ontario Court of Justice. [ 2 ] The complainant was the only Crown witness. Ms. Ivan testified about the details of the assault and the threat. She testified that she met the appellant at approximately 12:00 noon on September 25, 2010, on the street outside her apartment building. The appellant was bringing their two young children, aged five and seven years, back to her. This was the location they had agreed to exchange their children that day.

The complainant was waiting in her car nearby. [ 3 ] According to the complainant, when they met that day, the appellant smelled of alcohol and was not sober. In the previous weeks, they had been engaged in an ongoing dispute over the amount of the monthly child support payments the appellant was required to make to the complainant. The appellant wanted the complainant to agree to a reduced amount, and to provide him with a letter indicating her agreement to this reduction. Ms. Ivan testified that, when the appellant again asked her about the letter on September 25, 2010, she told him to contact her lawyer.

At that point, according to the complainant, the appellant exploded and became upset and agitated. He pushed her on her shoulder and slapped her on the face with his right hand. The appellant then told her that he would “fix” her by setting her apartment on fire. The complainant fled back to her car. [ 4 ] The appellant testified in his own defence and denied the use of any violence or threats against the complainant. In his testimony, the appellant described a typically innocuous meeting with the complainant wherein he delivered their two children and their back-packs to the complainant.

According to the appellant, their conversation that day was amicable. He denied having consumed any alcohol that morning. The appellant testified that, after the complainant had returned to her vehicle, he realized that he had forgotten to ask her about the legal documents he had earlier requested. Accordingly, in a raised voice, the appellant asked her, twice, if she was going to give him the documents. While she did not turn around or respond, the appellant thought that she had heard him, but just did not want to answer.

That was the end of their interaction that day. [ 5 ] The appellant described the complainant’s allegations of assault and a threat as “totally untrue.” Indeed, in cross- examination the appellant described the complainant’s allegations as “a malicious false accusation” that had been “planned cold- heartedly” by the complainant to set him up. The appellant suggested that the complainant had intentionally organized the child exchange to take place on the street so that their innocuous meeting would not be captured by the surveillance camera in the lobby of the

apartment building. [6] The trial judge, in lengthy and detailed Reasons for Judgment released on September 2, 2011, found the appellant guilty ofthe offence of assault, but not guilty of the threatening offence. The key issue at trial was credibility, and the trial judge, essentially,accepted the key aspects of the testimony of the complainant, and rejected the key elements of the testimony of the accused. In thisregard, the trial judge expressly applied the three-pronged analytical formula articulated in R. v. W.(D.), (SCC), [1991] 1S.C.R. 742.

In the result, after engaging in a lengthy and detailed analysis of the evidence, the trial judge found that the appellant losthis temper, and pushed and slapped the complainant. The trial judge concluded that the Crown had met its onus of establishing the guiltof the appellant in relation to the alleged assault on the complainant. However, in relation to the charge of threatening, the trial judgeexpressed a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. [7] Subsequently, on October 17, 2011, the trial judge granted the appellant a conditional discharge and placed him on a 12month term of probation.

The trial judge also made a weapons prohibition order, pursuant to s. 110 of the Criminal Code, for a period offive years. [8] The appellant has appealed against the verdict of guilty reached by the trial judge in relation to the charge of assault.

Theappellant contends that: (1) the trial judge significantly misapprehended the evidence; (2) the trial judge applied different standards ofcritical analysis to her assessment of the credibility of the appellant and the complainant; (3) the verdict of the trial judge finding theappellant guilty of the offence of assault is unreasonable and not supported by the evidence; and (4) the trial judge failed to provideadequate reasons explaining the result and permitting meaningful appellate review. B. Analysis 1. The Alleged Misapprehensions of the Evidence a.

Introduction [9] In his main ground of appeal, the appellant contends that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence in at least four criticalrespects. For the reasons outlined below, I reject these arguments. In my opinion, the trial judge neither misapprehended the evidence,nor committed any error of fact or law in drawing the inferences she did in relation to these issues. Indeed, the trial judge was entitled todraw the inferences which she did in relation to each of these four issues. See: R. v. Morrissey (1995), (ON CA), 22O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.) at pp. 538-541; R. v.

Wadforth, 2009 ONCA 716, 247 C.C.C. (3d) 466, at para. 79-81; R. v. Lohrer, 2004 SCC 80,[2004] 3 S.C.R. 732, at para. 2. b. The Appellant Exaggerated His Financial Difficulties [10] First, the appellant argues that the trial judge placed too much weight on the evidence that, in an email message he sent to thecomplainant on August 26, 2010, he exaggerated the extent of his ongoing financial difficulties. I disagree. [11] In this email message, the appellant proposed a significant reduction in his monthly child support payments and hisextraordinary expenses to the complainant.

The appellant told the complainant that he was currently incurring “increased child relatedexpenses” over and above his child support obligations, but he described those increased expenses as “realistic, necessary andunavoidable.” The appellant also indicated that, for a “long time,” he had been “running a negative balance” between his income and hisexpenses, and had to live on credit. The appellant noted, however, that he had “exhausted” his credit.

The appellant indicated that hewas “still facing financial hardship.” The appellant expressed his hope that they could reach an amicable agreement, but he indicatedthat this issue was a “matter of urgency,” and so he sought her “prompt response.” [12] In his trial testimony, the appellant admitted, in cross-examination, that this email message painted a “pretty dire” and“desperate” picture of his financial circumstances, and suggested that he was in “pretty desperate financial strife” at the time.

Theappellant also testified, however, that by the time he sent this email message to the complainant, he had “secured some private financing”which had permitted him to “get rid” of his mortgage, and which had allowed him to remain on a “breaking even” basis. [13] In her Reasons for Judgment, the trial judge contrasted the appellant’s August 26, 2010 email message, with his trialtestimony, about his financial circumstances at the time, and concluded that, in his email message to the complainant, the appellant hadexaggerated his financial circumstances as urgent and desperate, when in fact he was making “ends meet.” More particularly, Favret J.stated: In cross-examination the [appellant] acknowledged that because of the private financing he was able to make ends meet when he wrote that email.

In this email he said the financial situation was a matter or “urgency”. I find that in his email of August 26th the [appellant]exaggerated his financial circumstances as desperate. I find this significantly undermines the reliability of his evidence. Thisrepresentation is significantly inconsistent with his evidence that he had made financial arrangements, the result of which allowed him tomake ends meet. [14] There seems to be no question that, in his August 26, 2010 email message to the complainant, the appellant was exaggeratingthe difficulties he was experiencing in his financial circumstances.

In trying to convince the complainant to accept his proposedreduction of his monthly child support and extraordinary expenses, he tried to make her believe that he was facing desperate and urgentfinancial hardship. The appellant described how he had been, for a long time, running a “negative balance” between his income and hisexpenses and had “exhausted” his credit. In fact, at the time he sent this email to the complainant, the appellant had already takenremedial steps to put him on a “break even” financial basis.

In my view, the trial judge was entitled to view this email message as a priorinconsistent statement regarding his financial circumstances at the time, and conclude that this inconsistency significantly underminedhis overall reliability as a witness. The precise evidentiary weight to be attributed to this exaggeration by the appellant was, of course,for the trial judge. I am not prepared to hold that she erred in drawing the conclusion that she did with respect to the significance of this

evidence. c. The Appellant Denied He Was Upset by the Evasive Actions of the Complainant [ 15 ] Second, the appellant contends that the trial judge erred in concluding that his testimonial denial that he was not bothered or upset by the complainant’s delays in responding to his requests for information, made no sense. I disagree. [ 16 ] The appellant testified that he had requested certain documents from the complainant in relation to her employment and financial status.

While the complainant had provided him with some of the documentation he had requested, the materials she provided were incomplete, and he had requested clarifications. He also testified that the complainant seemed “evasive” in answering his inquiries and delayed in sending him documents. She would not give him a “straight-answer” about her employment status. In his August 26, 2010 email message to the complainant, the appellant proposed a significant reduction in his monthly payments to the complainant.

In his September 15, 2010 email message to the complainant, the appellant suggested that they engage in an amicable telephone conversation about a topic of mutual interest. The appellant suggested that it was obvious that the support payments would have to change, and asked that they try to minimize their legal costs. Again, the appellant asked the complainant for a number of supporting documents.

The appellant testified that while he had hoped that the complainant might reply, she did not respond to this email message, nor did they otherwise communicate again until the date of the alleged offence. [ 17 ] The appellant testified that he asked the complainant about those documents again on September 25, 2010, twice, but the complainant did not respond. He had held out some hope that they would discuss the issue at that meeting. The appellant testified that he thought that the complainant heard his inquiries in this regard, but just did not want to answer him.

In cross-examination, the Crown suggested that the complainant’s flat refusal to talk to him made him upset. In response, the appellant testified that he saw no reason to be upset. The fact that she ignored him did not bother him at all. [ 18 ] In her Reasons for Judgment , the trial judge concluded that the appellant’s testimonial denial that he was not bothered or upset by the actions of the complainant on September 25, 2010 did not make any sense.

More particularly, the trial judge stated: By September 25 th the [appellant] acknowledged that he had not received the information he requested in order to verify the complainant’s assertions. He denied he was upset by this. I find this makes no sense in the circumstances. The [appellant] wanted to move the matter forward promptly. He wanted the information to verify the information provided. I infer he did not believe he could move ahead without that information. I find timeliness was an issue for the [appellant]. His emails and evidence corroborate this. He wanted matters to move promptly.

He did not believe the complainant was acting promptly. That he went to the exchange intending to remind the complainant about the documents he requested supports this conclusion.

In the circumstances it does not make any sense that the [appellant] would not be bothered or upset by either the complainant’s failure to promptly respond to his request for the documentation or his email of September 15 th . [ 19 ] In my view, in all of the circumstances, it was open to the trial judge to find that the appellant’s evidence on this issue simply made no sense, in that it did coincide with common human experience or mesh with our general understanding of human nature. Moreover, these are the kinds of factual inferences that the trial judge was ideally suited to draw.

I am not persuaded that the factual inference drawn by the trial judge on this issue was an unreasonable inference that was not open to her on the evidence. d. The Complainant Had No Motive to Fabricate Her Criminal Allegations [ 20 ] Third, the appellant contends that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence relating to the complainant’s alleged motive to fabricate evidence.

I disagree. [ 21 ] In denying the complainant’s allegations, the appellant testified not only that they were wholly untrue, he also accused the complainant of “cold-heartedly” planning this “malicious false accusation” against him and, in effect, setting him up for this manufactured allegation. The appellant speculated that the complainant had deliberately organized their meeting on September 25, 2010 to take place on the street so that their interaction, which she knew would be uneventful and innocuous, would not be recorded by any surveillance camera in the lobby of the complainant’s apartment building.

Without any independent, objective evidence to the contrary, the complainant would be free to advance her manufactured allegations of criminality. [ 22 ] In his testimony, the appellant did not offer any reason that might motivate the complainant to invent these allegations against him.

However, in his closing submissions, defence counsel for the appellant speculated that the complainant had made up her allegations in order to try to “gain an advantage in the Family Court proceedings,” in that it would keep in place the original monthly support payments to the complainant without reduction. [ 23 ] In her Reasons for Judgment , the trial judge accurately reviewed the evidence on this issue and: (1) concluded that there was no evidentiary basis upon which to conclude that there might have been a surveillance camera operating in the lobby of the complainant’s apartment building; and (2) rejected the appellant’s speculative suggestion that the complainant had “set him up” on the basis that it was not supported by the evidence.

Further, the trial judge stated: The [appellant] has suggested the complainant was motivated to manufacture her evidence and statement to the police in order to secure the child support payments she had been receiving. This makes no sense whatsoever based on the record here. The complainant was prepared to accept a child support payment that was lower than the amount the [appellant] paid in August when he made his formal proposal to vary the amount. She proposed about $500 less than the amount the [appellant] was paying in August pursuant to the order referred to above.

The [appellant] had proposed paying about $500 per month less than the amount the complainant proposed he pay. The amount she proposed and the amount the [appellant] proposed were … both less than the amount the [appellant] was paying pursuant to the order. [ 24 ] In my view, the trial judge did not misapprehend any of the evidence on this issue. Moreover, in my opinion, it was open to the trial judge, on the evidence, to draw the factual inference that the complainant had no motive to manufacture these allegations against

the appellant. [25] In August of 2010, pursuant to the governing family court order, the appellant was paying the complainant slightly in excessof $1,500 monthly in combined child support and day care expenses. In his email to the complainant on August 26, 2010, the appellantproposed that, in light of his financial difficulties, he pay a total of only $500.

In a letter dated September 8, 2010, the complainant’slawyer responded to this proposal by suggesting that, if the issue could be resolved without a court application, the complainant wouldbe willing to accept a total of $1056 monthly from the appellant for child support. [26] Accordingly, the trial judge accurately described the complainant’s proposal as being approximately $500 less than thepayments the appellant was required to make pursuant to the family court order.

The trial judge also accurately described the appellant’sproposal as the equivalent of approximately $500 a month less than the amount he would pay if he accepted the complainant’s proposal. The trial judge was also accurate in observing that both proposals were less than the amount the appellant was paying pursuant to thefamily court order.

Moreove, it was, in my view, not unreasonable for the trial judge to conclude that, if the complainant was voluntarilywilling to agree to a $500 monthly reduction in her child support payments, she would hardly seem to be motivated to manufacturecriminal allegations against the appellant in order to maintain the higher quantum of the payments required by the family court order. e.

The Appellant’s Knowledge of the Complainant’s Employment Status [27] Fourth, the appellant contends that the trial judge erred in rejecting his evidence that, prior to September 9, 2010, he did notknow that the complainant was not working. Again, I disagree. [28] The complainant testified that in March of 2010, her employment contract expired and she began receiving unemploymentinsurance. She never went back to work thereafter. Instead, she stayed at home to look after her children and her sick mother.

Thecomplainant recalled that she told the appellant about being “laid off” sometime after March, but “well before” July of 2010. Accordingto the complainant, in July of 2010, when the appellant began asking about her employment status, she told him that she was stillunemployed.

She also told the appellant that she was not concerned about the child care expenses as she was staying at home with theirchildren and collecting unemployment insurance. [29] In his letter to the appellant dated September 8, 2010, counsel for the complainant, in responding to the appellant’s request fora reduction in the monthly child support payments, advised the appellant that the complainant’s financial circumstances were diminishedas she was “not employed.” In an email message he sent to the complainant the next day (September 9, 2010), the appellant asked thecomplainant to provide him with copies of certain documents including her “Notice of layoff” and her “Employment Insurance paymentstub.” [30] In cross-examination, the appellant testified that, on the date of the alleged offence on September 25, 2010, he did not have aclear understanding of the complainant’s employment status.

He knew that she had been working in a clerical position with the ScotiaBank. However, when he asked her about her status prior to this date, he never got a “straight answer” from the complainant. She wasalways evasive, and said that she did not want to talk about the issue. The appellant expressly denied knowing that the complainant wasunemployed. However, the appellant testified that, in approximately July of 2010, the complainant had “hinted” that she might not havea job.

When confronted with his email request to the complainant on September 9, 2010, asking the complainant for a copy of her“Notice of layoff,” the appellant denied knowing that she had been laid off. [31] In her Reasons for Judgment, the trial judge rejected the appellant’s evidence that, prior to September 9, 2010, “he did notknow the complainant was not working.” In this regard, the trial judge concluded that this was a “significant inconsistency in the[appellant’s] evidence.” [32] In my view, based upon this body of evidence, the trial judge was entitled to reject the testimony of the appellant as to hisknowledge of the complainant’s unemployment.

Indeed, in my opinion the evidence strongly suggests that the accused was well awareof the complainant’s lack of employment in July of 2010. The trial judge did not misapprehend any aspect of the evidence, nor did shedraw any unreasonable inference regarding this issue. 2. The Alleged Application of Divergent Standards of Scrutiny Regarding the Evidence [33] The appellant contends that the trial judge applied an unequal standard of scrutiny in her assessment of the evidence of thecomplainant and the appellant.

According to the appellant, while Favret J. applied an “exacting” standard of scrutiny in her assessmentof his testimony, she applied a much more “relaxed” standard of scrutiny in her assessment of the testimony of the complainant. [34] As a matter of legal principle, it is clearly wrong for a trial judge to apply a greater degree of critical scrutiny to the testimonyof an accused person than is applied to the testimony of a complainant.

In reviewing the important evidence in a criminal case, the trialjudge must fairly consider all of the evidence, regardless of whether it is called by the Crown or the accused, with the same, even andequal level of careful analysis. See: R v. Gostick (1999), (ON CA), 137 C.C.C. (3d) 53 (Ont.C.A.) at para. 13-15, 39;R v. C.(J.) (2000), (ON CA), 145 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Ont.C.A.) at para. 13; R. v. Owen (2001), O.A.C. 378, at para. 2-3;R v. F.(J.) (2003), (ON CA), 177 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont.C.A.) at para. 90; R. v. C.(H.), 2009 ONCA 56, 241 C.C.C. (3d)45, at para. 62. [35] In R. v.

Howe, (2005), (ON CA), 192 C.C.C. (3d) 480, Doherty J.A., delivering the judgment of the Court ofAppeal for Ontario, articulated the burden which is cast upon an appellant who challenges credibility findings made by a trial judgebased upon an allegation that the trial judge erroneously employed different levels of scrutiny in his or her analysis of the evidence.

Inthis regard, Doherty J.A. stated, at para. 58: This argument or some variation on it is common on appeals from conviction in judge alone trials where the evidence pits the word ofthe complainant against the denial of the accused and the result turns on the trial judge’s credibility assessments. This is a difficultargument to make successfully. It is not enough to show that a different trial judge could have reached a different credibility assessment,or that the trial judge failed to say something that he could have said in assessing the respective credibility of the complainant and the

accused, or that he failed to expressly set out legal principles relevant to that credibility assessment. To succeed in this kind of argument,the appellant must point to something in the reasons of the trial judge or perhaps elsewhere in the record that make it clear that the trialjudge had applied different standards in assessing the evidence of the appellant and the complainant. [36] As the courts have observed, the legal threshold for establishing such a claim is “very high.” See: R. v. Cloutier, 2011 ONCA484, 272 C.C.C. (3d) 291, at para. 86, 93-94; R. v. Jones, 2013 ONCA 245, at para. 8; R. v.

Schell, 2013 ABCA 4, at paras. 34-35. [37] In the circumstances of the present case, the appellant has not met that threshold. In my view, while the trial judge certainlyreached different conclusions about the credibility of the complainant and the credibility of the appellant, in my view those conclusionswere not reached by Favret J. by assessing their respective testimony with different levels of care or scrutiny. [38] Rather, the conclusions of the trial judge were reached from her analysis of the evidence, and the burden of proof on theCrown.

In this regard, it is noteworthy that the trial judge expressly applied the three-pronged standard outlined in R. v. W.(D.). FavretJ. concluded in this regard, that the testimony of the appellant did not raise a reasonable doubt in her mind in relation to the charge ofassault. Further, after thoroughly reviewing the testimony of the complainant, the trial judge found as a fact that, on September 25, 2010,the appellant lost his temper when the complainant told him to call her lawyer, and he pushed the complainant and slapped her in theface.

The trial judge found that the Crown had established the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt in relation to the chargeof assault. I note that, with respect to the charge of threatening, the trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis that she harboured areasonable doubt as to his guilt in relation to that charge. [39] In my view it simply cannot be said that Favret J. judged the testimony of the appellant more harshly and/or the testimony ofthe complainant more forgivingly.

In my view, in her Reasons for Judgment the trial judge examined their evidence with the same levelof scrutiny in making her findings of credibility. 3. The Reasonableness of the Verdict [40] The appellant contends that the verdict reached by the trial judge is unreasonable. In advancing this argument, the appellantrepeats his claims that the trial judge misapprehended key aspects of the evidence and applied an unequal standard of scrutiny in heranalysis of the testimony.

Further, the appellant argues that his testimony was consistent and credible, whereas the testimony of thecomplainant was internally inconsistent on a number of points and inconsistent with other pieces of independent evidence. The appellantargues that this should have raised “serious doubts” about the complainant’s credibility as a witness. [41] In considering the reasonableness of a verdict, the responsibility of an appellate court is to determine, on the whole of theevidence adduced at trial, whether the verdict is one that a properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered.

This process requires more than simply determining whether there is any evidence to support the verdict. It requires the appellate courtto thoroughly review, analyze and, within the limits of appellate disadvantage, weigh the evidence, and consider, through the lens ofjudicial experience, whether judicial fact-finding precludes the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. This process does not, however,permit the appellate court to simply retry the case, or give effect to any vague unease, or any lurking or reasonable doubt it may havebased on its own review of the written record. See: R. v.

Corbett, (SCC), [1975] 2 S.C.R. 275, at pp. 278-279, 282; R.v. Yebes, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 186; R. v. W.(R.), (SCC), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, at pp. 129-132; R. v. Burns, (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656, at para. 14; R. v. François, (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 827,at pp. 835-838; R. v. Biniaris, 2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381, at para. 24, 38, 40, 42; R. v. G.(A.), 2000 SCC 17, [2000] 1 S.C.R.439, at para. 6, 28-29; R. v. R.(J.S.), 2012 ONCA 568, 112 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 69-72; R. v.

H.(W.), 2013 SCC 22, at paras. 27-28; R. v.Melo, 2013 ONSC 4338, at paras. 36-41. [42] In my view, applying this governing legal standard of appellate review, the verdict reached by the trial judge in this case, thatthe appellant is guilty of the offence of assault, cannot be said to be an unreasonable verdict. [43] At its essence, this was a simple case.

The complainant testified that, at her meeting with the appellant on September 25,2010, the appellant lost his temper when she effectively refused his request for further documentation in connection with their ongoingmatrimonial law dispute over monthly child support payments. She told him to talk to her lawyer. According to the complainant, at thatpoint, the appellant pushed her and slapped her. On the basis of her testimony, there is no question that the appellant was guilty of anassault. It was open to the trial judge to find the complainant to be a credible witness and accept her testimony.

While the appellantdenied any verbal or physical confrontation with the complainant on September 25, 2010, it was similarly open to the trial judge to findthe appellant to be an incredible witness and reject his testimony. Finally, it was open to the trial judge, in all of the circumstances ofthis case, after considering the entirety of the evidence, to find that the Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt the allegedguilt of the appellant on the charge of assault. See: R. v. D.(J.J.R.) (2006), (ON CA), 215 C.C.C. (3d) 252(Ont.C.A.); leave denied: [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 69; R. v.

M.(R.E.), 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 31-32, 48-51, 64-68; R. v.Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, at para. 23-24, 30; R. v. Hull, (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3177 (C.A.) atpara. 3-9; R. v. Jaura, [2006] O.J. No. 4157 (C.J.). [44] In other words, in my opinion the conviction of the appellant on the charge of assault was a verdict that a properly instructedjury, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered given all of the evidence in this case. Judicial fact finding does not preclude theverdict reached by the trial judge.

It is not for me to now simply retry the case on appeal and reach a different verdict. Accordingly, thisground of appeal fails. 4. The Adequacy of the Reasons for Judgment [45] The appellant also challenges the legal sufficiency of the Reasons for Judgment provided by the trial judge. The appellantclaims that the 38 pages of reasons that were provided by Favret J. in this case foreclose meaningful appellate review and do not permithim to understand how and why he was convicted of the offence of assault.

I disagree. [46] In my view, in the circumstances of this case, the Reasons for Judgment provided by the trial judge are legally adequate. Viewed from a functional and context-specific approach, and read in their entirety, against the background of the evidence and live

issues in this case, the Reasons of the trial judge adequately explain why the accused was convicted, provide public accountability for the verdict, and permit effective appellate review of the decision. See: R. v. Sheppard , 2002 SCC 26 , [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 24- 28 , 46-52, 55; R. v. Braich , 2007 SCC 27 , [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903, at para. 31 ; R. v. Gagnon , 2006 SCC 17 , [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, at para. 12-16 , 19; R. v. Walker , 2008 SCC 34 , [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245, at para. 19-23 ; R. v. M.(R.E.) , at para. 15-57 ; R. v. Dinardo , at paras. 24-35 ; R. v.

S.(A.J.) , 2011 ONCA 566 , 106 O.R. (3d) 586, at paras. 12-13 ; R. v. S.(T.) , 2012 ONCA 289 , 284 C.C.C. (3d) 394, at para. 45-46 , 75-80. C. Conclusion [ 47 ] In the result, the appeal must be dismissed. An order shall issue accordingly. ___________________________ Kenneth L. Campbell J. Released: June 27, 2013