r v. Rosseter, 2013 ONSC 7779

CITATION : Rosseter v. Rosseter, 2013 ONSC 7779 COURT FILE NO.: 2611-03 DATE: 20131216 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE B E T W E E N: ) ) LUNDY LEE ROSSETER ) ) ) Hugh McLachlan, Counsel for the Applicant Applicant ) ) ) ) - and - ) ) JOHN STUART ROSSETER ) ) ) ) ) ) Respondent ) ) ) William Sangster, Counsel for the Respondent ) ) ) ) ) ) ) HEARD: August 15 and November 19, 2013 ellies j. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The primary issue in this trial is the determination of the valuation date for equalization of the parties’ net family property under

section 5 of the Family Law Act (“the Act”) . Mrs. Rosseter contends that the date is February 26, 2009. Mr. Rosseter maintains that June 1, 2001 is the proper date. If Mr. Rosseter is correct, then a second issue arises, namely, whether the six-year limitation period prescribed by section 7(3) of the Act for bringing a claim for equalization should be extended under section 2(8). [ 2 ] For the following reasons, I have concluded that the valuation date is February 26, 2009. OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE [ 3 ] The parties were married on June 23, 1973.

They lived together in a home on Main Street West in North Bay from 1980 until May or June of 2001. They separated for short periods of time on a few occasions prior to that date, when Mrs. Rosseter left the matrimonial home to stay with family members. She returned to the matrimonial home on each occasion. However, in May or June of 2001, she left the matrimonial home to live with her parents and a number of months later she rented her own apartment. From that date to the present, the parties have maintained separate residences. Mr. Rosseter continues to reside in the matrimonial home.

[4] Both parties agree that Mrs. Rosseter left in 2001 due to Mr. Rosseter’s severe problem with alcohol. They disagree aboutwhether they were separated at that point. Mrs. Rosseter submits that the parties did not separate until February 26, 2009. Alternatively,she argues that, if they were separated, it was only for the period of time after she left the matrimonial home in 2001 until the spring of2003, when the parties reconciled. [5] After Mrs. Rosseter left the matrimonial home, Mr. Rosseter took steps to resolve his drinking problem. He wasunsuccessful at first.

However, he eventually enjoyed success through Alcoholics Anonymous. Mrs. Rosseter testified that, early in2002, Mr. Rosseter asked her to give him a year to focus his efforts on rehabilitation. Although Mr. Rosseter testified that it was Mrs.Rosseter who wanted nothing to do with him during that period, he also admitted that he was thinking only about “correcting (his)deficiencies” at that point in his life. [6] There is no disagreement between the parties that there was much less contact between them during that period of time thanthere was in the period after the spring of 2003, when Mr.

Rosseter says that he and Mrs. Rosseter “reconnected”. This period of time isto be contrasted with the period of time between 2003 and 2009, as I will highlight in the “Analysis” section, below. [7] The parties also agree that there was no reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitation after February 26, 2009. Afterthat date, the parties opened individual bank accounts and they each retained a lawyer to attempt to negotiate a resolution of the issuesarising from the failure of their marriage. They were unsuccessful. The main stumbling block was the valuation date.

That is thereason for this trial of an issue. The parties are hopeful that, once that date is determined, the rest will fall into place. ANALYSIS [8] Section 4(1) of the Family Law Act (the Act), defines “valuation date” as meaning the earliest of a number of dates,including: The dates the spouses separate and there is no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation. Separation [9] By virtue of this definition, separation and cohabitation are opposites: spouses who are not cohabiting are separated. Perhaps that is the reason why the word “separate” is not defined in the Act.

The verb “cohabit” is defined in s. 1 of the Act as meaning: To live together in a conjugal relationship, whether within or outside marriage. [10] There is no distinction to be made between the noun, “cohabitation”, in s. 4 and the verb defined in s. 1: Pope v. Pope,(1999), (ON CA), 42 O.R. (3d) 514; [1999] O.J. No. 242 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 32. [11] In order to determine if spouses were separated at a point in time, therefore, it is necessary to determine if they werecohabiting.

This is done by examining the nature of the relationship between the parties, having regard to the presence or absence ofvarious circumstances that normally exist where a couple cohabit. A great many of the cases that have considered the meaning ofcohabitation are ones in which spousal support, as opposed to equalization, was at issue.

Nonetheless, they are relevant because s. 29 ofthe Act defines “spouse” for support purposes as including either of two persons who are not married to each other and have cohabitedcontinuously for a period of not less than three years. [12] Amongst the most frequently cited cases on the characteristics of cohabitation are the decisions in Molodowich v. Penttinen(1980), (ON SC), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376; [1980] O.J. No. 1904 (Ont. Dist. Ct.), a support case, and in Oswell v. Oswell(1990), (ON SC), 74 O.R. (2d) 15; [1990] O.J. No. 1117 (Ont. H.C.), an equalization case.

In Molodwich, Kurisko J.reviewed a number of cases and set out a categorized list of questions that might be answered in determining whether a couple iscohabiting: at para. 16 (O.J.). In Oswell, Weiler J. (as she then was) identified a number of indicia for couples who are not: at p. 3(O.J.). In addition to these cases, I have been referred to a decision of the Pension Appeals Board from New Brunswick, namely: Betts v.Shannon, Appeal CP11654; 2001 LNCPEN 4, which also contains a helpful list of the attributes of parties who are cohabiting: at para.8.

In the analysis that follows, I will refer to many of the characteristics of cohabitation considered in these decisions, as well as incertain other cases to which I will refer specifically. Maintaining Separate Residences [13] The parties never resumed living under the same roof after Mrs. Rosseter left the matrimonial home in 2001. However, this isonly one factor to be considered in the analysis. Just as parties can live separate and apart under the same roof, they can cohabit underdifferent roofs. In McEachern v. Fry Estate, [1993] O.J. No. 1731 (Ont. Ct. (Gen.

Div.)), for example, Sheppard J. awarded theapplicant support under the Succession Law Reform Act on the basis that she had cohabited continuously with the deceased for a periodof not less than three years in circumstances where the parties never physically lived together at any time during their 15 yearrelationship. In Thauvette v. Malyon (1996), (ON SC), 23 R.F.L. (4th) 217; [1996] O.J. No. 1356 (Ont.

Ct. (Gen.Div.)), Roy J. determined that the plaintiff was entitled to support under the Act as a “spouse” despite the fact that the parties never livedtogether over the course of a relationship that lasted for approximately ten years. [14] Where the parties lived in separate residences, however, it is important to examine the other circumstances surrounding theirrelationship in order to determine whether they were, in fact, separated. Reasons for Maintaining Separate Residences

[15] This factor was considered in Thauvette, at para. 33. In that case, the parties were each involved in other relationships whenthey first became involved with each other. Malyon was married. The parties maintained separate residences in order to keep theirrespective families separate. [16] In this case, Mrs. Rosseter moved out because of Mr. Rosseter’s alcoholism. Initially, she rented on a month-to-month basis,even though there was enough time between her departure from the matrimonial home and the time at which she began to rent anapartment for her to find accommodation on a yearly lease basis.

This supports her evidence that she was hopeful that the physicalseparation would be temporary, at least initially. [17] As I will outline in more detail below, in the period after the parties reconnected in 2003, Mr. Rosseter visited regularly withMrs. Rosseter at her place of residence. However, according to Mrs. Rosseter, Mr. Rosseter refused to move in with her because he didnot “want to live in a box”. Mr. Rosseter testified he did not wish to give up the former matrimonial home. The home had beenpurchased from his parents. He had been raised there from the time he was a child of four years old.

Following the parties’ physicalseparation, he began to renovate the home, partly for therapeutic reasons, and partly because the home was in need. [18] For her part, Mrs. Rosseter testified that she refused to return to the matrimonial home, which she called a “House ofHorrors”. By this, I understand that she had too many bad memories associated with it. [19] Thus, each party had reasons for not wanting to live in the other’s place of residence that were unrelated to the presence of theother party.

Eating Meals Together [20] Whether the parties prepared meals for one another or ate together are two circumstances often considered in thejurisprudence: see also Newton v. Newton (1995) (ON SC), 11 R.F.L. (4th) 251; [1995] O.J. No. 519 (Ont. U.F.C.);Hazlewood v. Kent, [2000] O.J. No. 5263 (Ont. S.C.). Mr. Rosseter admitted that the parties ate together “a couple” of times each week. These meals were usually eaten at Mrs. Rosseter’s place of residence, but also occasionally at restaurants. According to Mr. Rosseter,although Mrs.

Rosseter did cook some meals, he often picked up take-out food to bring over to her residence. Other Services Performed For One Another [21] The provision of other household services such as washing clothes, cleaning, and shopping is another one of the circumstancesreferred to throughout the jurisprudence. [22] Mrs. Rosseter testified that, although she did not personally clean the Main Street home after she left in 2001, she hiredcleaners to do so. Mr.

Rosseter was candid in admitting that this may have occurred in the period of 2001 to 2003 and that he might notremember it as a result of the battle he was waging with alcoholism at the time. [23] After 2003, the parties shopped from time-to-time for groceries together, despite the fact that they did not do so before 2001. Presence of Personal Items at the Other Party’s Residence [24] This was a circumstance the court considered in Hazlewood and the Appeal Board listed in Betts. [25] In the case at bar, Mrs. Rosseter purchased pyjamas and underwear for Mr. Rosseter’s use while at her residence. AlthoughMrs.

Rosseter kept some of her clothing at the Main Street West home, it would appear that she never went back to retrieve thoseclothes. Attending Social Functions Together [26] Whether a couple engaged in social activities together is another common consideration in the cases to which I have referred. [27] Between 2003 and 2009, Mr. and Mrs. Rosseter attended films, the theatre and golfed together on occasion. In addition to thesocial occasions they enjoyed alone with each other, they attended a number of social functions with others during that period of time.

In2003 and 2007, they attended as a couple at social functions related to Mrs. Rosseter’s employment. In 2004, they attended theirnephew’s wedding, which included a golf tournament in which they golfed together. [28] As shown in the photographs introduced into evidence by Mrs. Rosseter, the parties attended many other family functionstogether after 2003, as well. Celebrating Special Occasions Together [29] Celebrating special occasions together is another feature of cohabitation: see especially Newton, at para. 13; McEachern, atpara. 9. Mrs. Rosseter testified that Mr.

Rosseter bought her a gift for her birthday every year. In 2007, he bought her flowers. According to Mr. Rosseter, he asked Mrs. Rosseter at that time if they could pick up where they left off. [30] In 2008, Mr. Rosseter gave Mrs. Rosseter a birthday card, a copy of which was introduced into evidence. In my view, theprose in the card he selected is relevant to the issues that I must consider. The outside of the card read: For my wife With all my love

Inside, the card read: Even when I first met you, I knew somehow that you would be the love of my life. And that’s exactly what you are. No matter how many years go by, I’ll still think of you as the person I want to share everything with, the person I most want to make happy, the one without whom life would never be the same. You’re my world, my life, my everything. I love you with all my heart, and I always will. Helping Each Other During Difficult Times [31] The parties did not just share happy times together after 2003. Mrs. Rosseter’s father died in 2008. Mr. Rosseter was with herthroughout that period.

According to Mrs. Rosseter, he stayed with her at her place of residence for approximately five nights. According to Mr. Rosseter, it may have been only one. [32] In 2008, the parties lost two other family members, namely Mr. Rosseter’s mother and Mrs. Rosseter’s uncle. They attendedthose funerals and grieved those losses together, as well. [33] In Taylor v. Taylor (1999), (ON SC), 5 R.F.L. (5th) 162; [1999] O.J. No. 5310 (Ont.

S.C.), one of thecircumstances taken into account by Whitten J. in determining the valuation date was the fact that the wife moved back into thematrimonial home to care for the husband after he broke his leg: at para. 27. In July of 2008, Mr. Rosseter severely injured his eye whileat home. Rather than calling 911, he called Mrs. Rosseter. As he explained, he was concerned that the ambulance attendants might notbe able to get into his home. Regardless of the reason, not only did Mrs. Rosseter attend and take him to the hospital, but she also thendrove him down to the Eye Institute in Ottawa, for surgery.

On their return to North Bay, Mr. Rosseter stayed one or two nights withMrs. Rosseter at her place of residence. Since then, Mr. Rosseter concedes that Mrs. Rosseter may have driven him to Ottawa for afurther seven visits relating to his eyes. While in Ottawa, the parties’ visited with their two sons. Vacations Together [34] This characteristic of cohabitation was listed in Betts, formed part of the facts in Oswell and figured prominently inMcEachern. [35] Mr. and Mrs. Rosseter travelled together to Florida on four occasions between 2003 and 2009. On two of these occasions,they spent about ten days together.

On a third, they spent approximately four weeks together. On all of them, they slept in the sameroom. [36] In addition to these longer vacations, the parties stayed together while visiting friends in the Muskokas on two occasions, andin Toronto on one. [37] They took their last vacation together in February 2009. It was not their best. They separated shorty after their return. Sexual Intercourse [38] In virtually all of the cases to which I have referred, and in many more to which I have not, the courts have examined thedegree to which the parties were intimate. In this case, Mrs.

Rosseter testified that the parties had sexual intercourse on a regular basisfrom 2003 to 2009. Mr. Rosseter testified that there were periods of weeks and even months where the parties did not have sexualintercourse. This seems to have been the case towards the end of their renewed relationship, but not so much at the beginning. In any

event, the parties both testified that sexual intercourse occurred on those occasions when they vacationed together, the last occasionbeing February 22, 2009. As well, I find that sexual intercourse did occur on a regular, if not frequent, basis while the parties were inNorth Bay. According to Mr. Rosseter, the parties had sexual intercourse on about a half-dozen occasions each year. Fidelity to One Another [39] In my view, one of the most significant indications of cohabitation is the “attitude of fidelity” the parties have to one another,as Kurisko J. put it in Molodowich (at para. 16, O.J.).

When determining whether a couple are cohabiting, the frequency of sexualintercourse matters less, in my opinion, than the identity of the person with whom it occurred. [40] There is no evidence in this case that either party had sexual intercourse with any individual other than the other party in theperiod between 2003 and 2009. Financial Support [41] In Newton, Czutrin J. placed particular emphasis on whether steps were taken to separate the parties’ financial affairs: seepara. 47. Throughout the period of time at issue in this case, the parties maintained joint bank accounts. Mr.

Rosseter testified that eachof them used only one of the accounts. However, this appears to have been the situation throughout their entire marriage. [42] Moreover, the evidence indicates that little, if anything, else changed after 2001 with respect to the parties’ financialarrangements. For example: (

a) The parties shared a joint safety deposit box. (

b) They both used a single Sears account. (

c) Mr. Rosseter made contributions to the RRSP’s of both parties between 2001 and 2009. (

d) Mrs. Rosseter is still named as the beneficiary on Mr. Rosseter’s life insurance policy. (

e) Mrs. Rosseter is still named as a beneficiary in Mr. Rosseter’s will. Shared Use of Assets [43] This was a consideration listed in Betts. In addition to the safety deposit box to which I have referred, there is evidence thatMr. and Mrs. Rosseter shared other assets. Mr. Rosseter had three different vehicles over the course of time, all of which he allowedMrs. Rosseter to drive on a regular basis. The Parties’ Behaviour Towards One Another in the Presence of Third Parties [44] Most of the cases consider how the couple was viewed by third parties.

Strictly speaking, this is opinion evidence and it isnot admissible. What is important is the behaviour of the parties towards one another that lead to the opinion. [45] Mrs. Rosseter introduced a number of photographs that depicted the parties in the company of others. In all the photographsin which they both appear, Mr. and Mrs. Rosseter seem to be enjoying not only the company of their friends and family, but also of eachother. In many of them, they are seated next to or near one another. In one of the photographs (#29), taken during their trip to Florida in2009, the parties are shown holding hands. [46] Mrs.

Rosseter called several family members to confirm various aspects of her testimony. Amongst them was NancyLaframboise, Mrs. Rosseter’s younger sister. She testified about a number of occasions upon which she saw the parties together. Shetestified that Mr. Rosseter referred to Mrs. Rosseter as his “wife” or his “bride”, and called her “Lee“ or “Dolly”, both of which I gatherare terms of endearment. None of this was disputed by Mr. Rosseter. Indeed, he admitted that they held themselves out as a marriedcouple and he introduced her to others as his wife when they were socializing.

How the Parties Referred to Themselves in Documents [47] The fact that the parties referred to themselves as “married”, rather than “separated”, when filing income tax returns wasconsidered in Czepa v. Czepa (1988), (ON SC), 16 R.F.L. (3d) 191 (Ont. S.C.), varied on other grounds, (ON CA), 26 R.F.L. (3d) 118 (Ont. C.A.), at page 196, as well as in Oswell. [48] Throughout their marriage, Mrs. Rosseter completed income tax returns for both of the parties. This was a rather complicatedtask, because Mr.

Rosseter’s mother had settled a trust for him, but was receiving the income from the trust and paying the taxes on thatincome while she was alive. On all of the paper returns filed in the relevant period, the parties were referred to as “married”, not as“separated”. Mr. Rosseter signed his tax return each year. Although he testified that he signed it without reading it because he trustedMrs. Rosseter, I do not believe that he would have insisted that the return be changed even if he had. I see this as evidence that bothparties viewed themselves as still being involved in a conjugal relationship.

Steps Taken Towards the Legal Termination of their Relationship [49] In the fall of 2005, there was an incident after which Mr. Rosseter told Mrs. Rosseter he wanted a divorce and the two of themdid not speak to one another for months. In early 2006, Mr. Rosseter invited Mrs. Rosseter to attend with him upon a lawyer for thepurpose of obtaining legal advice about a divorce. She accepted the invitation. During the meeting with the lawyer, both parties asked

questions. However, nothing came of it. As Mr. Rosseter put it, the parties parted company on the street corner after the meeting andeach went their separate ways. However, they continued to see each other and to engage in the various activities together to which I havereferred in these reasons. [50] In 2007, Mr. Rosseter attended upon a lawyer by himself. According to him, the meeting was a disaster, for several reasons. Once again, no further steps were taken by Mr. Rosseter to terminate his relationship with Mrs.

Rosseter and the parties continued to seeeach other. [51] I do not view these meetings as being of particular significance in this case. In Oswell, both parties attended separate lawyersand the wife had her lawyer write to suggest that the parties enter into a separation agreement. However, Weiler J. held that the partiesdid not separate for the purposes of the equalization of their net family property until the following year. In Tesfatsion, the husband fileda petition for divorce, but later withdrew it. The trial judge in that case found that the parties did not separate until six years later.

Reasonable Prospect of the Resumption of Cohabitation [52] Based on the foregoing, I have concluded that the parties were cohabiting in the period between 2003 and 2006. However,even if I am incorrect in that conclusion, I would certainly find that there was a reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitationduring that time period. [53] The jurisprudence with respect to this issue is not as plentiful as that with respect to the issue of separation. Regrettably, someof the cases appear to blend the two issues.

It is true that many of the circumstances that I have referred to above are also relevant to theissue of whether there is a reasonable prospect that the parties would resume cohabitation: Taylor, at para. 17 (O.J.). However, while thepresence of some or all of the indicia of cohabitation is relevant to that issue, it is possible to conclude that there was a reasonableprospect of the resumption of cohabitation in the absence of any or all of them.

This will be the case where a court finds that, despite thedegree to which a relationship between two parties deviates from the cohabitation norm, both parties had a genuine desire to resumecohabitation: Torosantucci v. Torosantucci (1991), (ON SC), 32 R.F.L. (3d) 202, [1991] O.J. No. 759 (Ont. U.F.C.). The Parties’ Intentions [54] Mrs. Rosseter was never asked about her willingness or desire to resume cohabitation. I believe this is because her positionthroughout has been that the parties never separated or, if they did, they resumed cohabitation in 2003. [55] Mr.

Rosseter testified that he always wanted to reconcile with Mrs. Rosseter. I accept that evidence. However, I do notaccept Mr. Rosseter’s contention that Mrs. Rosseter felt otherwise. She had a chance to make a “clean getaway” when she left in 2001,but she did not. She could have seen her own lawyer for the purpose of legally terminating the relationship prior to 2006, but she didnot. She could have followed up on the advice she received from the lawyer they saw together that year, but she did not. Instead, sheengaged in all of the activities with him to which I have referred until February of 2009.

Efforts to Resume Cohabitation [56] The prospect of the resumption of cohabitation must be looked at from an objective point of view, as well as a subjective one. As Beckett J. put it in Torosantucci, at page 4 (O.J.): A reasonable prospect of reconciliation must be more than wishful thinking on the part of either party. There must be more than residualaffection that may linger by one or both of the parties. The Act does not speak of a "prospect" of reconciliation but a "reasonableprospect".

The Oxford Concise Dictionary 7th Edition, defines prospect as "expectation, what one expects." The question is whether areasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would reasonably believe that the parties had a prospect or expectation of resumingcohabitation. [57] In finding that there was no reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitation, Beckett J. relied on the failure of theparties in that case to take any steps to reconcile. He wrote, at that same page: I do not doubt that Mr. and Mrs. Torosantucci wished that their marriage would have been otherwise than it was. I accept, on the part ofMr.

Torosantucci, that he retained, and continues to retain, some degree of affection for her. But wishful thinking is not the stuff ofreconciliation. There must be some indication or step taken by both of them in that direction. In this case, no attempt was made tomediate or reconcile their differences, no counselling from third parties was sought and most importantly no meaningful discussions evertook place between them as to if, how or when their marriage might be put back together. [58] Both parties testified that they discussed counselling for their marital problems, although their evidence about it differed.

According to Mrs. Rosseter, only one conversation took place, during which they each refused the other’s request to attend counselling. According to Mr. Rosseter, there were two discussions. The first took place while he was still drinking. In that conversation, he refusedMrs. Rosseter’s plea that they get help. He testified he later made the same suggestion, perhaps just before meeting with the lawyer in2006, and Mrs. Rosseter refused. On either version, both parties demonstrated a willingness to attend counselling by making therequest, and the presence of a stubborn streak by refusing it. [59] Mr.

Rosseter testified that Mrs. Rosseter did not wish to discuss their past or their future. However, as I have mentioned, healso said that he asked his wife in 2007 if they could pick up where they left off. There is no evidence of her reply. Based on the factthat Mr. Rosseter continued to engage in the activities he did with Mrs. Rosseter until 2009, I infer that her response left him with a

reasonable hope that they could resume cohabitation. [ 60 ] I also make that inference based on the steps the parties took to resume living under one roof in the period between 2003 and 2009. After 2003, the parties began looking to purchase a home together. Mr. Rosseter testified during his pretrial questioning that the parties attended as many as five to ten open houses, although he could not think of that many while testifying at trial. According to Mrs. Rosseter, in 2008 they came close to making an offer on one of them. Mr. Rosseter testified that he thought that Mrs.

Rosseter wanted him to sell the Main Street West property so that she could then immediately seek equalization with respect to her portion of the sale proceeds. He testified that this was why he was reluctant to purchase another home. However, during cross-examination, he testified that the parties had never discussed the sale of the Main Street West property and that, instead, it was his intention to rent the property to tenants. I find that his fears were unjustified.

CONCLUSION [ 61 ] Based on my consideration of all of the foregoing, I have concluded that the parties separated between 2001 and 2003, but that they resumed cohabitation thereafter until they finally separated without a reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitation on February 26, 2009. [ 62 ] If I was not inclined to this view, I would certainly hold that there was a reasonable prospect of the resumption of cohabitation throughout the period from 2001 to 2009, based on all of the activities in which the parties engaged as a couple. [ 63 ] Therefore, the valuation date for the purposes of the equalization of net family property is February 26, 2009. [ 64 ] Given my conclusion, it is not necessary to consider whether the limitation period should be extended under s. 2(8) of the Act.

However, I must say that it is hard to imagine not doing so in the circumstances. [ 65 ] If the parties cannot agree on costs, they may make written submissions, as follows: (

a) Mrs. Rosseter shall have 30 days in which to serve and file written submissions of no more than 10 double-spaced pages, excluding attachments; (

b) Mr. Rosseter shall have 20 days from the receipt of those submissions in which to serve and file written submissions, similarly limited in length; (

c) Mrs. Rosseter shall have 10 days from the receipt of those submissions in which to serve and file reply submissions, limited to 5 double-spaced pages, excluding attachments. [ 66 ] If a further case or settlement conference would be of assistance in resolving the remaining issues, one can be arranged through the office of the trial coordinator. Ellies J. Released: 20131216 CITATION : Rosseter v. Rosseter, 2013 ONSC 7779 COURT FILE NO.: 2611-03 DATE: 20131216

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE LUNDY LEE ROSSETER Applicant – and – JOHN STUART ROSSETER Respondent REASONS FOR DECISION Ellies J. Released: 20131216