) ) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – v. –, 2017 ONSC 4014

CITATION : R. v. Evaschuk, 2017 ONSC 4014 OSHAWA COURT FILE NO.: 14068/16 DATE: 20170 829 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: ) ) HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – bradley evaschuk Defendant ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) D. Bronowicki, for the Crown R. Yasskin, for the Defendant ) ) HEARD: June 2, 2017 and July 28, 2017 Woodley, J. REASONS FOR DECISION RE SENTENCING Overview [ 1 ] By way of an amended Indictment dated January 3, 2017, Bradley Evaschuk stood charged with nine counts as follows: i. Count one: fraud over $5,000; ii. Count two: attempt fraud over $5,000; and iii.

Counts three to nine: uttering forged documents. [ 2 ] Mr. Evaschuk plead not guilty to all nine counts. [ 3 ] On January 17, 2017, a jury found Mr. Evaschuk guilty on all nine counts charged by the indictment. The matter adjourned to January 25, 2017, to set a date for sentencing. Mr. Evaschuk’s bail conditions continued on the same terms pending further Order of the Court. [ 4 ] On January 25, 2017, the sentencing hearing was set for April 6, 2017. [ 5 ] On April 6, 2017, at the request of Mr. Evaschuk’s counsel, the sentencing hearing adjourned to June 2, 2017. [ 6 ] On June 2, 2017, Mr.

Evaschuk’s counsel advised that Mr. Evaschuk had made partial restitution of $10,000 the day prior and planned to make full restitution within the next few weeks. Defence counsel also advised that Mr. Evaschuk’s father was undergoing a MRI on his brain in the next few days and may be undergoing brain surgery to remove a suspected tumour. Mr. Evaschuk’s counsel requested a further adjournment to allow for full restitution and to obtain more information concerning Mr.

Evaschuk’s father’s health. [ 7 ] The Crown objected to the adjournment on the basis that there had already been substantial delay and the public has an interest in obtaining finality with respect to the sentencing. [ 8 ] Pursuant to s. 723(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada , I ordered that Mr. Evaschuk was to serve and file any information concerning his father’s medical condition that he wished the court to consider for sentencing on or before Friday August 11, 2017. Mr. Evaschuk then provided his personal submissions for consideration for sentencing to the court. Following Mr.

Evaschuk’s submissions the date for delivery of the sentencing decision was set for August 29, 2017. [ 9 ] I have now received the medical documents and considered them together with Mr. Evaschuk’s submissions, the submissions of counsel for the Crown and for Mr. Evaschuk and the Pre-Sentence Report. [ 10 ] These are my Reasons for Decision for Sentencing. The Crown’s Position

[ 11 ] The Crown is seeking 16 months custody together with 3 years’ probation with the requirement to report immediately to the probation officer upon release from custody. The Crown further seeks an Order that Mr. Evaschuk: a. obtains counselling as directed by his probation officer; b. has no contact or communication directly or indirectly with Ms.

Major except through a 3rd party to arrange for access and/or by a family court order; c. for partial restitution to be paid within the 3 year probation period in such amount as the court deems appropriate; d. full restitution of the remaining amount not ordered to be paid within three years pursuant to a free standing restitution order, held jointly and severally with Ms. Major; and e. for a DNA Order. Mr. Evaschuk’s Position [ 12 ] Mr.

Evaschuk is seeking a lengthy conditional sentence between 18 and 24 months with no custodial requirement but with rigorous conditions to require community service hours, counselling and rehabilitation. [ 13 ] Mr. Evaschuk takes no issue with the Crown’s position regarding the length or terms of the requested probation, restitution Order or other ancillary orders and specifically consents to a DNA Order. The Issue [ 14 ] The sole issue before me is what is the appropriate sentence considering all of the facts and circumstances of this case? The Facts [ 15 ] Mr.

Evaschuk is a Canadian citizen, born on April 1, 1969, in Toronto, Ontario. [ 16 ] Mr. Evaschuk is separated from his common law spouse Kimberley Major with whom he shares two children, both girls, currently 16 and 8 years of age. Mr. Evaschuk and Ms. Major are involved in a family law dispute relating to custody, access and support of the children. [ 17 ] Mr. Evaschuk has one sister and his parents have been married for over 50 years. [ 18 ] Mr. Evaschuk shares a close and loving relationship with his sister and parents. [ 19 ] As a youth, Mr.

Evaschuk was a gifted athlete who became a professional baseball player at 18 years of age. Mr. Evaschuk continued to play professionally for various teams into his early 20’s. [ 20 ] In May of 1996, Mr. Evaschuk became a professional firefighter employed by the Toronto Fire Services. [ 21 ] Mr. Evaschuk and Ms. Major began their common law relationship in 1996 and resided together until 2009. The relationship was “stormy” marked by drug use and incidents of assault resulting in criminal charges laid against Mr. Evaschuk in 2001 and December of 2009. [ 22 ] Following the 2001 assault charges, Mr.

Evaschuk attended a 30-day treatment program for cocaine addiction and Mr. Evaschuk reports that he has been clean from cocaine since attending the program. [ 23 ] On May 13, 2002, in relation to the 2001 assault charges, Mr. Evaschuk was convicted of: assault; assault causing bodily harm; assault of a peace officer; and possession of a prohibited/restricted weapon. [ 24 ] With respect to the assault charges, Mr. Evaschuk received an 18-month conditional sentence and 12 months of probation. With respect to the weapon charge, Mr.

Evaschuk received a $250 fine and discretionary prohibition order, regarding s. 110 of the Criminal Code , for 10 years. [ 25 ] Mr. Evaschuk breached his conditional sentence and on September 23, 2003, received a three-day jail sentence for the breach. [ 26 ] The wrongful acts forming the basis of the current charges that the jury found Mr. Evaschuk guilty of committing commenced in February of 2009 when Mr. Evaschuk began submitting fraudulent health and benefit claim forms with attached forged invoices to the administrator of his City of Toronto employee benefit plan.

The claim forms sought repayment of expenses never incurred for services never rendered to Mr. Evaschuk, Ms. Major and their dependent children. [ 27 ] In December 2009, Mr. Evaschuk was charged for the second time with assaulting Ms. Major. Mr. Evaschuk was released on recognizance of bail. [ 28 ] Mr. Evaschuk breached his recognizance. [ 29 ] On June 8, 2011, Mr. Evaschuk was convicted of failure to comply with recognizance. He was sentenced to 45 days in jail,

served intermittently. [30] Mr. Evaschuk committed a further breach of recognizance. [31] On November 7, 2011, Mr. Evaschuk was convicted of failure to comply with recognizance. He received a $1,000 fine. [32] On January 20, 2012, in relation to the December 2009 charges, Mr. Evaschuk was convicted of two counts of assault againstMs. Major and sentenced to 75 days in jail, to be served intermittently, followed by a three-year probation order with a discretionaryprohibition order re s. 110 of the Criminal Code, for 5 years. [33] From February 2009 to October 31, 2013, during the period that Mr.

Evaschuk was before the court on the second assaultcharges and while he was subject to recognizance of bail, Mr. Evaschuk submitted 23 fraudulent health benefit claims which attachedthereto 300 forged invoices seeking payment of approximately $32,000, with payments made directly to Mr. Evaschuk’s bank accounttotalling $23,130.15. [34] The filing of the fraudulent claims ceased in October of 2013 when Manulife advised the account was under audit. [35] In September of 2014, Mr.

Evaschuk was suspended and/or fired from his position as a firefighter with the City of Toronto, dueto the charges before the court. [36] The Pre-sentence Report stated that Mr. Evaschuk awaited news of arbitration to attempt to regain his position as a firefighter.However, no mention was made of reinstatement at the sentencing hearing and during his personal submissions Mr. Evaschuk advisedthat he had lost his employment as a firefighter. Counsel for Mr. Evaschuk advised that he intended to continue his education, start ahealth supplement company and work as a personal trainer. [37] In December of 2016, Ms.

Major plead guilty to some of the same charges laid against Mr. Evaschuk together with other fraudcharges relating to fraud against ODSP. Ms. Major was sentenced to two years in custody followed by three years’ probation with a freestanding restitution order made joint and several with Mr. Evaschuk. [38] In the Pre-sentence Report, Mr, Evaschuk expresses his regret of being “too trusting” and not using his due diligence. TheReport further stated that Mr.

Evaschuk accepts some responsibility for his actions in the commission of these offences and presents ashaving an understanding of the gravity of his offence and the potential ramifications. Mr. Evaschuk feels “his offence is a result of himnot taking due diligence and putting too much trust in his partner at the time”. During his personal submissions to the court Mr.Evaschuk expressed remorse for his actions. [39] The fraudulent acts perpetrated by Mr. Evaschuk took place over a period of several years and involved twenty-three claims andthree hundred forged invoices.

The total amount of the loss to the City of Toronto was $23,130.15. [40] The Pre-Sentence Report describes Mr. Evaschuk as being a contributing member of society who lives a pro-social lifestyle. Byall accounts, Mr. Evaschuk has a strong support network, a strong work ethic, and resourceful in terms of employment. [41] Mr. Evaschuk’s previous supervisor considered Mr. Evaschuk cooperative and suitable for further periods of communitysupervision.

SENTENCING CONSIDERATIONS The Crown’s Position [42] As noted, the Crown requested a 16-month custodial sentence with three years’ probation with terms and a restitution order of$23,130.15. [43] In support of its’ position, the Crown submitted that the criminal acts were not spontaneous but planned. The plan wascomplicated and well planned. [44] The actions of Mr. Evaschuk were carefully thought out and involved several layers for execution. [45] The Crown further argued that Mr. Evaschuk’s actions constituted a breach of trust as Mr.

Evaschuk in his capacity as planholder defrauded the City of Toronto of monies earmarked for the support of City employees and their dependants who are in need ofcare. The fraudulent acts constitute a fraud on the public. [46] The Crown submitted that Mr. Evaschuk’s involvement in a sophisticated longstanding scheme is an aggravating factor, and heshould be ordered to pay restitution for the total amount received being $23,130.15 less any amounts repaid to date of sentencing. [47] In support of its submissions, the Crown relied on R. v. Bogart, [2002] O.J. No. 30309 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Dobis, (ON CA), [2002] O.J.

No. 646 (Ont. C.A.); R v. Pierce, [1997] O.J. No. 5495, affirmed [2008], O.J. No. 2006 (Ont. C.A.); R. v.Velupillai, [2007] O.J. No. 5495, affirmed [2008], O.J. No. 2006 (Ont. C.A.); R v. Takeshita, [2013] O.J. No. 1122 (Ont.S.C.J.); and R.v. Mathur [2017] O.J. No. 2559 (Ont. C.A.). The Offender’s Position [48] Mr. Evaschuk’s counsel submitted that the appropriate sentence would be a lengthy conditional sentence followed by probationwith terms and a restitution order. [49] Mr.

Evaschuk’s counsel submitted that the overarching principles in sentencing are that the sentence should be fit, within theset parameters and uniform to sentences others have received for similar crimes.

[ 50 ] Mr. Evaschuk’s counsel submitted that a conditional sentence was appropriate in the circumstances of this case. [ 51 ] To support his position concerning the type and length of sentence, Mr. Evaschuk’s counsel relied upon R. v. Proulx [2000] SCC 5; R. v. Bogart , [2002] O.J. No. 30309 (Ont. C.A.) ; R. v. Garrick , [2012] ONSC 2528, CarswellOnt 2643; R. v. Huang , [2011] ONSC 2545, CarswellOnt 2643 and R. v. MacDiarmid , [2001] OCA, CarswellOnt 185. Availability of a Conditional Sentence [ 52 ] As noted, Mr. Evaschuk seeks a conditional sentence and the Crown seeks a custodial sentence.

Both parties agree that any sentence should be followed by probation with terms and a restitution order. [ 53 ] To begin the review, I note that on November 20, 2012, the new conditional sentencing regime came into force. As a result, the offence of fraud over $5,000 became ineligible for a conditional sentence as the maximum penalty is 14 years. In the present case, the indictment covers the period February 1, 2009 to October 31, 2013, and straddles both sentencing regimes.

As the indictment commencement date pre-dates the sentencing regime amendments, I have proceeded on the basis that a conditional sentence may be available in the circumstances. [ 54 ] Pursuant to s. 742 of the Criminal Code if a person is convicted of an offence and the court imposes a sentence of less than two years, the court may, for the purpose of supervising the offender’s behaviour in the community, order that the offender serve the sentence in the community, subject to conditions imposed under

section 742.3 . [ 55 ] In the present case, availability of a conditional sentence is subject to the court being satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and that the sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718.1 and 718.2. [ 56 ] According to the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.

Proulx, [2000] SCC 5 the intent of Parliament in enacting s. 742 was: i. to assist in reducing society’s reliance on incarceration; and ii. to give effect to principles of restorative justice for all offences save those which result automatically in a minimum term of imprisonment. [ 57 ] Where a sentencing judge is convinced that the statutory requirements imposed by the Criminal Code have been satisfied, then an analysis of the principles of sentencing as enumerated by ss. 718 to 718.2 is undertaken to determine whether a conditional sentence is appropriate. [ 58 ] In the present case, there is no request nor would I consider imposing a sentence of more than two years.

This requirement is satisfied. [ 59 ] Further, having considered the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offences, including Mr. Evaschuk’s prior convictions, the information contained in the Pre-Sentence Report, and the evidence presented at trial, I am satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community. This requirement is also satisfied. [ 60 ] It is now necessary to complete an analysis of the principles of sentencing as enumerated by ss. 718 to 718.2 to determine whether a conditional sentence is appropriate.

Purpose and Principles of Sentencing [ 61 ]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the purpose and principles of sentencing. [ 62 ] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: a. To denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community; b. To deter the offence and other persons form committing offences; c. To separate offenders from society, where necessary; d.

To provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and e. To promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 63 ] A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 64 ] A sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: a. A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender; b.

Evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim and evidence that the offence was committed while the offender was subject to a conditional sentence order or released on parole, shall be deemed aggravating circumstances;

c. A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; d. An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and e.

All available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done tovictims or to the community should be considered for all offenders. [65] In considering what sentence would be appropriate, the court must take into account the objective seriousness of the offenceand the offender’s degree of responsibility in light of the aggravating and mitigating factors related to the commission of the offence orthe situation of the offender. [66] In assessing the offender’s responsibility in relation to the imposition of an adequate sentence in the case of fraud, the followingfactors should be examined: • the nature and scope of the fraud and the victim’s actual economic or financial losses; • the degree of premeditation in the planning and implementation of the fraud; • the offender’s conduct after the commission of the offence, including the repayment of the victims; • whether the offender cooperated with the authorities and pled guilty at the first opportunity; • the judicial record; • the personal gain realized from the fraud; • the relationship of authority and trust with the victim; and • the motive underlying the commission of the fraud. [67] In imposing an appropriate sentence on an accused for the wrongful acts committed, the weight assigned to the varyingsentencing objectives must be adapted to the circumstances of the case and to the individual offender.

General and Specific Deterrence and Denunciation [68] In the present case, the Crown indicated that the principles of general and specific deterrence and denunciation should takeprecedence. [69] Courts across Canada have long held the principles of general deterrence and denunciation to be primary considerations insentencing in fraud cases. (See R. v. Poirier, 2007 CM 1023, 2007 CarswellNat 4404; R. v. Stymiest, 2006 NBQB 129, 303 N.B.R. (2d)10; R. v. Walker, 2011 CarswellOnt 16147 (C.J.); R. v. Gray, (ON CA), 76 O.A.C. 387). [70] Fraud over $5,000 is a serious offence.

Fraud is not a crime of impulse and is normally committed by a person who isknowledgeable and likely aware of the consequences. Awareness comes from the sentences given to others. [71] Mr. Evaschuk was in a position of trust as a firefighter, an employee of the City of Toronto, and the plan holder of the healthand benefit plan. The fraud committed by Mr. Evaschuk as against his health and benefit plan took careful planning and involvedmultiple layers of document preparation.

However, execution of the fraud through the filing of fraudulent health care claims supportedby forged invoices was relatively simple. [72] The prevention of frauds of this nature are time consuming and expensive. Fraud prevention of this nature requires numerousemployees to conduct detailed investigations, forensic reviews, and ongoing surveillance applied to all health claims and plan holderenquiries.

Frauds of this nature challenge the availability of health and benefit plans for all employees and their dependents and is notlimited to this employer and these employees. [73] Given the availability and ease of execution of this type of fraud versus the expense and difficulty in identifying and preventingthis type of fraud - general deterrence and denunciation must be primary sentencing considerations. Mitigating Factors [74] Mitigating factors in the present case include: a. Mr.

Evaschuk’s strong ties to the community; b. the fact that he has a strong supportive family; c. the fact that he has made partial restitution; and d. the fact that he has expressed remorse to this court. [75] While Mr.

Evaschuk’s former employment as a firefighter and his skills or status or reputation in the community may otherwisehave qualified as mitigating factors, s. 380.1(2) of the Criminal Code prohibits any such consideration in the current circumstances. [76] Further, although the loss suffered by the City of Toronto was limited to a relatively small amount ($23,130.15), the loss waslimited due to the administrator’s investigation and not due to any voluntary act of contrition on the part of Mr. Evaschuk.

Aggravating Factors [ 77 ] The aggravating factors include: a. Mr. Evaschuk abused his position of trust and defrauded his employer, the City of Toronto, a public body, of over $5,000; b. The scheme’s sophistication, the planned and deliberate nature of the transactions, the levels of planning (forged invoices and fraudulent claims) and the lengthy period of time over which the fraud was carried out; c. the fact that the fraud was carried out during a period that Mr. Evaschuk was before the court on other charges, and subject to recognizance of bail; and d. the loss of health care benefits by Mr.

Evaschuk’s dependents. Parity [ 78 ] Although I was advised generally about Ms. Major’s charges and sentence - I was not provided with any specifics including a copy of her indictment, pre-sentence report, prior convictions or any record of the actual sentence imposed. While Mr. Evaschuk and Ms. Major’s offences are similar in some respects, given their differing prior criminal records, differing indictments and differing personal circumstances - I find there is no basis to apply parity between Ms. Major and Mr. Evaschuk regarding sentencing. Moral Blameworthiness and Responsibility [ 79 ] Counsel argued that Mr.

Evaschuk’s moral blameworthiness and/or moral culpability was low and a conditional sentence would be more appropriate. Counsel further argued that as the jury could have found Mr. Evaschuk guilty on any combination of actual knowledge/wilful blindness and/or as a principal or as an aider, the court should infer the lowest level of moral blameworthiness and/or moral culpability in the circumstances of this case. [ 80 ] The Crown argued that Mr. Evaschuk had a high level of moral blameworthiness and/or moral culpability on any

interpretation of the jury’s verdict. The Crown cited the following acts committed by Mr. Evaschuk as evidencing moral blameworthiness and/or moral culpability: a. He listed Ms. Major as a dependent on the forms although they were separated; b. He signed some of the forms; c. He provided Ms. Major with his passwords to monitor the Manulife account; d. He telephoned Manulife and obtained information from them that was utilized in the fraudulent claims; e. He provided false information to Manulife about his residence address; f. He received the payments from Manulife into his sole accounts; g.

He used the payments received from Manulife immediately; and h. Even if Mr. Evaschuk gave some of the money to Ms. Major, Mr. Evaschuk utilized much of the funds for his personal living items such as groceries, alcohol and clothing. [ 81 ] The Crown submitted that whether there was actual knowledge or wilful blindness, whether Mr. Evaschuk participated as a principal or an aider, Mr. Evaschuk was more than peripherally involved in the fraudulent scheme and a high level of culpability attaches to him. [ 82 ] The Crown argued that either Mr.

Evaschuk knew the truth or did not want to know the truth because he relied on the funds. Either way he was a willing and active participant. Mr. Evaschuk did nothing to stop the fraudulent activity and he fully participated. This amounts to significant and troubling wilful blindness. [ 83 ] Having heard and considered each parties’ argument and the evidence presented before the jury at the trial, I fully accept the submissions of counsel for the Crown on this issue. [ 84 ] Mr.

Evaschuk clearly has a high level of moral blameworthiness and culpability in these crimes regardless of whether he acted as principal or aider with actual knowledge or with wilful blindness.

Appropriateness of Conditional Sentence [ 85 ] Both Crown and Defence Counsel submitted various cases regarding the appropriateness of a conditional sentence in these circumstances. [ 86 ] Defence counsel relied on Garrick , Huang and MacDiarmid and Crown counsel relied on Bogart, Dobis, Pierce, Velupillai , Takeshita and Mathur. [ 87 ] The cases of Bogat, Dobis and Pierce, involved cases of abuse of trust and large-scale fraud.

Each case determined that deterrence and denunciation are paramount considerations in such circumstances. [ 88 ] The cases of Velupillai, Takeshita and Mathur, involved frauds of a smaller scale with breaches of trust attached. Similar to

Bogart, Dobis and Pierce, each case determined that deterrence and denunciation are paramount considerations in such circumstances. [89] The cases of Garrick, Huang and MacDiarmid, offer differing perspectives on sentencing. The Garrick and Huang decisions,however, did not involve breaches of trust, and the facts are entirely distinguishable from the present case. The MacDiarmid decision isalso distinguishable. The real issue was whether the conditional sentence or the fine should be deleted as the sentence was otherwiseillegal.

The Court deleted the fine and upheld the conditional sentence without any analysis as to the fitness of the sentence. [90] In the present case, similar to the decisions of Bogart, Dobis, Pierce, Velupillai, Takeshita, and Mathur, the crimes committedby Mr.

Evaschuk involved fraud with breaches of trust attached. [91] Further, similar to Mathur, I find that the following factors were present and favour deterrence and denunciation beingparamount: i. the high degree of sophistication and planning involved; ii. the significant number of individual claims made on each claim form and the number ofinvoices forged for each individual claim (300); iii. the fact that the fraudulent activity continued over 51 months; iv. the fact that the fraud was perpetrated on a public body, being the City of Toronto; v. the fact that the fraud was perpetrated while Mr.

Evaschuk was before the court and subject toprobation; and vi. the fact that Mr. Evaschuk was caught, as opposed to voluntarily terminating his activities. [92] Similar to Velupillai and Takeshita, I fear that the fact that Mr. Evaschuk was engaging in the fraudulent activity while beforethe court on other charges subject to a probation order suggests strongly that he holds the real potential to re-engage in this kind ofcriminal activity. [93] The fraudulent activity carried out by Mr.

Evaschuk has similarities to that described in Velupillai, due to the nature of the crimethere is a low risk of detection by the authorities and an almost limitless nature of the losses that could occur. [94] For the above noted reasons a denunciatory sentence that will sharply deter others of like mind who have made similar riskassessments is required. [95] Further, due to these specific concerns, I find that to be effective specific deterrence, a custodial sentence is required. [96] In determining the fitness of the sentence, the court must take into account the fundamental principle that the sentence must beproportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. [97] The term of incarceration should also be “as short as possible and tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused,” withthe aim of meting a just and appropriate sentence. (R. v.

Hamilton, (ON CA) 1 at para. 96). Having said this the courtmust consider the effect of any sentence on any specific individual. [98]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code, provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the lawand the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. [99] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is served by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:denunciation, deterrence, separation where necessary, rehabilitation, reparation, promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, andacknowledgement of the harm done to the victim and the community. SENTENCE IMPOSED [100] Mr. Evaschuk, please stand.

After lengthy consideration and following a weighing and balancing of the various principles andobjectives, I have determined that the custodial sentence for these offences will be a global sentence of six months broken down asfollows: a. Count one is fraud over $5,000. A reasonable sentence for this count will be six months in custody, to be served concurrently to theother sentences. b. Count two is attempt fraud over $5,000. A reasonable sentence for this count will be six months in custody, to be servedconcurrently to the other sentences. c. Counts three to nine are uttering forged documents.

A reasonable sentence for each such count will be one month in custody, to beserved concurrently to the other sentences. [101] There will be a probation order for 36 months following completion of the six-month custodial sentence. The terms of the 36month probationary order will be that Mr. Evaschuk shall: a. Keep the peace and be of good behaviour; b. Appear before the court when required to do so by the court;

c. Notify the court or the probation officer in advances of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or probation officer of any change of employment or occupation; d. Report to a probation officer within two working days after release from custody, and thereafter as directed by the probation order; e. Attend counselling as determined by the probation officer; f. Reside at a place approved of by the probation officer; g.

Be prohibited from communicating with Kimberley Major directly or indirectly for any reason except through a 3 rd party to arrange for access to his children and/or by an order of the family court; h. Remain at least 500 meters away from any residence, place of worship, or place of education or employment of Kimberley Major; i. Make restitution to the City of Toronto in the amount of $13,130.15, within 5 years from your release of custody; and j. For a DNA Order; and k.

Pay the mandatory victim surcharge of $200 per count within twelve months after release from custody. [ 102 ] This sentence reflects the purpose and principles of sentencing for denunciation, specific and general deterrence and restitution, along with mitigating and aggravating factors. Justice S.J. Woodley Released: August 29, 2017 ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – BRADLEY EVASCHUK REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Justice S. J. Woodley Released: August 29, 2017