Dziczek Poplawski c.

Coopérative d'habitation Skanagowa de Pointe St-Charles 2019 QCCQ 7318 COURT OF QUÉBEC (Administrative and Appeal Division) CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-80-039477-196 DATE: November 26, 2019 ______________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE DOMINIQUE GIBBENS, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ maria dziczek poplawski Applicant v. coopérative d’habitation skanagowa de pointe st-charles Respondent -and- Régie du logement Mise en cause ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ON AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL OF A RÉGIE DU LOGEMENT DECISION (Articles 91 of an Act respecting la Régie du logement (CQLR, c.

R-8-1)) ______________________________________________________________________ CONTEXT [ 1 ] For over 20 years, the Applicant and her husband Slawomir Poplawski have lived in a dwelling of the Coopérative d’habitation Skanagowa de Pointe St-Charles (the “ Cooperative ”) pursuant to a residential lease. They still do so, with one of their two adult daughters, although both the Régie du logement (Me Daniel Laflamme) (the “ Régie ”) and the Superior Court have ruled that the lease ended on June 30, 2017. [ 2 ] Mr. Poplawski and the Cooperative have been embroiled in protracted litigation for several years.

In February 2017, the board of directors made the decision to expel Mr. Poplawski as a member of the Cooperative. He contested this decision before the Superior Court, but it was found to be valid. [1] [ 3 ] Later, the Cooperative took proceedings before the Régie to have Mr.

Poplawski and his family evicted, on the basis that the regulations of the Cooperative provide that an expelled member must leave at the end of the ongoing term of his or her lease. [2] In a decision rendered June 3, 2019 (the “ Eviction Decision ”), [3] the Régie found that the lease of the dwelling had terminated on June 30, 2017 and ordered the eviction of Mr.

Poplawski and all other occupants from the dwelling. [ 4 ] After receiving service of the Eviction Decision on June 12, 2019, the Applicant filed motions to intervene in the eviction proceedings and to obtain the revocation of the decision. [4] In these motions, she alleges, in essence, that: (

a) she was unaware of said proceedings prior to receiving service of the Eviction Decision; (

b) she is a tenant of the dwelling in her own right and as such, should have been a named party to the eviction proceedings; and (

c) she should also have been a named party because she is a beneficiary of a declaration of family residence. [ 5 ] The Régie took the position that the Applicant required authorization to file these motions because the Superior Court has declared her husband a quarrelsome and vexatious litigant and has prohibited him, directly or indirectly, from filing proceedings before administrative tribunals such as the Régie without prior authorization of its President or designated representative. [5] [ 6 ] The Applicant therefore filed an application for authorization, [6] which was denied by the Régie on four grounds. [7] [ 7 ] Firstly , the Régie found that the motions were tardy. [8] It did not accept the Applicant’s claim that she was unaware of the eviction proceedings against her husband and, having concluded that she was aware of them, the Régie found that her lack of diligence in asserting any purported rights was fatal.

The Régie wrote: [21] Le Tribunal considèrerait (sic) absolument invraisemblable que la demanderesse n’ait jamais eu connaissance de cette saga judiciaire , qui perdure pourtant depuis de plusieurs mois, pour ne pas dire plusieurs années, et qui s’est transportée autant devant la Régie du logement qu'à la Cour supérieure. [22] D’ailleurs, la demanderesse admet, lors de son témoignage, qu’elle était parfaitement au courant que son époux se rendait, à certaines occasions, au tribunal concernant un litige l’opposant à la coopérative en lien avec le logement.

Elle affirme même avoir questionné son époux quant aux risques de se voir être expulsés du logement. Ce dernier lui aurait alors répondu qu’elle ne devait pas s’inquiéter.

[23] Partant, la demanderesse est aujourd’hui malvenue de se manifester inopinément et de demander, dans une ultime tentative de préserver le lieu de résidence de la famille, la possibilité d’intervenir et de faire valoir de supposés droits qu’elle prétend posséder. La demanderesse ne s’est pas montrée diligente. Elle ne peut invoquer sa propre turpitude . [24] Cela suffirait pour conclure que les demandes d’autorisation devraient être refusées. Le Tribunal considère que la coopérative a été amplement préjudiciée durant toute cette saga judiciaire.

Cette saga doit un jour connaître son terme. [Emphasis added] [ 8 ] Secondly , the Régie found, on the facts, that the Applicant had not proven her purported rights as a tenant or as a member of the Cooperative, as appears from the following passage: [9] [26] D'abord, le statut exact de la demanderesse, à savoir si elle est membre de la coopérative ou même locataire, est loin d’être certain. En fait, la demanderesse n’a pas convaincu le Tribunal du fait qu’elle était

partie prenante au bail de logement . [27] Elle exhibe certes un formulaire de bail visiblement très ancien sur lequel apparait son nom, avec une précision à l’effet qu’elle est l’épouse de l’autre personne dont le nom apparait, soit M. Poplawski. Une flèche tracée sur le formulaire relie cette précision au nom de M. Poplawski, comme pour insister essentiellement sur le statut matrimonial de la demanderesse. [28] Cependant, le Tribunal constate que ce bail n’est aucunement signé par la demanderesse, si ce n’est à la

section du formulaire faisant office d’avis de résidence familiale. Cela tend d’ailleurs à accréditer la thèse voulant qu’elle ne soit pas locataire, puisqu’un tel avis ne peut, par définition, être utile qu’à l’époux qui n’est pas lui-même une

partie au bail. [29] En outre, la question n’est pas tant de savoir si la demanderesse était, en 1996,

partie au bail venant d’être conclu, mais plutôt de savoir si on peut aujourd’hui la considérer comme une locataire du logement. La situation a pu évoluer de bien des façons depuis les premiers jours du bail. [30] Or, rien ne permet de croire que, avant de chercher à introduire ses demandes dans le présent dossier, la demanderesse se considérait elle-même comme une locataire en bonne et due forme ou qu’elle agissait comme telle dans ses relations avec la coopérative .

De même, rien de démontre que la coopérative considérait la demanderesse comme une locataire ou qu’elle se comportait comme tel dans ses relations avec elle . [31] Par exemple, aucun avis de modification des conditions du bail n’a été produit en preuve à l’audience, lesquels auraient permis de démontrer qu’ils étaient adressés ou non à la demanderesse à

titre de locataire . [32] D’autres questions demeurent également en suspens. Est-ce qu’il arrivait à la demanderesse de payer elle-même le loyer? Est-ce que d’autres types d’avis lui étaient acheminés? Transmettait-elle elle-même des avis ou des réponses à des avis donnés par la coopérative? Absolument rien ne porte à le croire. Le fardeau de la preuve incombe néanmoins à la demanderesse . [33] Par ailleurs, il appert à l’audience que la demanderesse ne serait pas ou plus membre de la coopérative .

Un règlement de la coopérative aurait d’ailleurs pour effet de limiter à un seul le nombre d’individus pouvant posséder le statut de membre parmi les occupants d’un logement. [34] La demanderesse utilise d’ailleurs ce fait pour contester l’application, à son cas d’espèce, du règlement de la coopérative voulant qu’un membre qui perd son statut doive quitter le logement à la fin du bail. Elle prétend qu’elle ne peut perdre un statut qu’elle ne possède pas.

Conséquemment, ne pouvant perdre le statut de membre, elle n’aurait pas à quitter le logement à la fin du bail et bénéficierait entièrement des effets du droit au maintien dans les lieux. [35] Cet argument part de la prémisse que la demanderesse est bel et bien locataire, ce dont le tribunal n’a pas été convaincu, tel qu’expliqué précédemment. Même alors, et cela dit avec respect, le tribunal ne saurait se ranger à cet argument.

Si elle s’avérait exacte, la thèse de la demanderesse aurait pour effet de donner plus de droits aux locataires non membres qu’aux membres eux-mêmes, ce qui irait à l’encontre des principes coopératifs. [Emphasis added] [ 9 ] Thirdly , the Régie found that the declaration of family residence could not grant the Applicant rights against the Cooperative: [40] L’

article 403 du Code civil , qui porte sur la protection de la résidence familiale en matière de louage résidentiel, n’a pas pour effet de créer un lien de droit entre l’époux qui n’est pas locataire et le locateur. [41] Cette disposition n’a pas, non plus, pour effet d’empêcher un Tribunal de prononcer la résiliation judiciaire du bail ni de statuer sur toute autre demande en lien avec le bail.

Elle a encore moins pour effet d’empêcher le Tribunal d’ordonner l’expulsion d’occupants sans droits d’un logement. [42] En fait, cette disposition vise uniquement à protéger, à certaines conditions, l’époux qui n’est pas locataire contre les actes passés par son propre conjoint qui auraient pour effet de sous-louer le logement, de céder ses droits ou de mettre fin au bail. [43] D’ailleurs, dans l’éventualité d’un tel acte, le recours prévu au second alinéa de l’article 403 permet uniquement à l’époux non locataire, s’il a inscrit une déclaration de résidence familiale, de demander au Tribunal l’annulation de l’acte passé sans son consentement. [44] Cette disposition n’est donc d’aucune pertinence dans le cadre du présent dossier.

Au contraire, le fait que la demanderesse invoque cette disposition entre en contradiction avec sa prétention à l’effet qu’elle soit elle-même locataire et réconforte le tribunal dans son appréciation des faits.

[ 10 ] Finally , it found that the Applicant’s proposed motions could not succeed in light of the Superior Court judgment of January 2019, which ruled that the lease for the dwelling came to an end on June 30, 2017; even if the Applicant were a party to this lease, she could not have the Régie bring the lease back into existence given the Superior Court judgment: [45] Finalement, il convient d’apporter une précision et d’insister sur un élément fondamental dans le présent débat, soit le fait que la décision rendue par ce tribunal le 3 juin 2019 n’avait aucunement pour effet de prononcer la résiliation du bail. [46] Au contraire, cette décision partait plutôt du constat que la résiliation du bail était déjà effective, comme l’avait d’ailleurs confirmé la Cour supérieure dans un jugement rendu le 9 janvier 2018.

Pour cette raison, les occupants du logement constituaient des occupants sans droit et, en conséquence, ce tribunal a ordonné l’expulsion desdits occupants. [47] Puisque le bail avait été résilié avant même la décision du 3 juin 2019, force est de conclure que les procédures que souhaite introduire la demanderesse devant la Régie du logement sont vouées à l’échec. Ces demandes ne pourraient jamais avoir comme effet de faire revivre le bail éteint, quand bien même la demanderesse était elle-même

partie à ce bail, ce dont le Tribunal n’est d’ailleurs pas convaincu . [48] En tout état de cause, ce Tribunal ne peut faire fit du jugement de la Cour supérieure confirmant la résiliation du bail, ni le renverser, ni aller à son encontre.

Si la demanderesse souhaite faire annuler les incidences du jugement rendu par la Cour supérieure, ce n’est certes pas à la Régie du logement qu’elle doit s’adresser . [49] Le Tribunal conclut donc que les procédures que la demanderesse souhaite introduire ne peuvent permettre qu’une seule chose : retarder ce que la Cour supérieure a qualifié d’inévitable, soit le départ de la coopérative de tous les occupants du logement. [50] Partant, il serait possible de qualifier d’abusifs et de dilatoires les recours que souhaite introduire la demanderesse, ce qui en soi justifierait le refus d’en autoriser le dépôt. [Emphasis added] [ 11 ] It is from this decision (the “ Authorization Decision ”) that the Applicant now seeks leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS

a) The Conditions Applicable to an Appeal from a Decision of the Régie [ 12 ] The Act respecting the Régie du logement [10] (the “ Act ” ) provides a limited right of appeal from decisions of the Régie.

An appeal is possible with leave of the Court only “ when the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Québec ”. [11] [ 13 ] A matter will generally be considered as one which ought to be submitted to this Court if the appeal raises questions that are serious ( i.e. questions of principle), new, controversial or of general interest. [12] [ 14 ] Leave to appeal may also be granted where the issues raised call into question the higher interests of justice such as, for example, where the applicant demonstrates, prima facie , an apparent weakness in the decision because of a manifest and overriding error in the appreciation of the facts or in law, or if there was a violation of the rules of natural justice. [13] [ 15 ] The Court has wide discretion to determine whether leave to appeal should be granted in a given matter.

Although its role at this stage is not to decide the merits of the proposed appeal, it must ensure that the arguments raised are serious and have a reasonable chance of success, keeping in mind the legislator’s intent that manifestly ill-founded appeals should not be authorized. [14] [ 16 ] It should also be underscored that an appeal regarding the Régie’s appreciation of the facts is exceptional. The Régie hears witnesses and is able to appreciate their credibility and the probative value of their testimony. On appeal, the Court is bound by a high level of deference towards the Régie’s appreciation of the facts.

For these reasons, the Court has often stated that leave to appeal from the Régie’s appreciation of the facts is exceptional, more particularly when it comes to testimonial evidence. [15] [ 17 ] To obtain leave to appeal in this regard, an applicant must demonstrate prima facie the existence of an error that is both “manifest” ( i.e. obvious on the face of the decision) and “overriding” ( i.e. that goes to the very core of the outcome of the case). [16]

b) The Applicant’s Grounds of Appeal [ 18 ] The Applicant argues that the Authorization Decision is affected by an apparent weakness, as the Régie made numerous errors of fact or law, which can be summarized as follows: [17]

a) The Régie erred in concluding that the vexatious litigant order rendered against Mr. Poplawski applied to the Applicant;

b) Even if the order were applicable to her, the Régie erred by failing to consider the proper test, focusing only on the fact that her motions would indirectly benefit Mr. Poplawski;

c) The Régie erred in finding that a declaration of family residence in a lease applies only where one of the spouses is a party to the lease;

d) The Régie erred in concluding that the Superior Court had ruled in January 2018 that the lease at issue had ended on June 30, 2017 and, consequently, that the Applicant’s motions could not succeed as they purport to go against the Superior Court’s findings. According to the Applicant, the Superior Court ruled only that Mr. Poplawski was expelled as a member of the Cooperative and not that the lease had ended, hence the eviction proceedings before the Régie; and

e) The Régie erred in finding that only a member of the Cooperative can be a tenant.

[ 19 ] The Applicant contends that these errors give rise to questions that are both serious and novel, namely the manner in which a vexatious litigant order can apply to third parties who are not themselves vexatious litigants and the impact of a declaration of family residence with respect to tenancy in a housing cooperative.

c) Should Leave to Appeal be granted? [ 20 ] The Court is of the opinion that leave to appeal from the Authorization Decision should not be granted for the following reasons. [ 21 ] Firstly, the Authorization Decision rests on the Régie’s appreciation of facts, upon which the Court is particularly reluctant to intervene in the absence of a manifest and overriding error, and no such error has been demonstrated here, even prima facie . [ 22 ] Indeed, the Régie refused to authorize the Applicant’s motions because it found that said motions were inadmissible and could not succeed.

This is based first and foremost on the Régie’s appreciation of the Applicant’s testimony to the effect that she was unaware of the eviction proceedings taken by the Cooperative until she received service of the Eviction Decision on June 10, 2019. [ 23 ] Clearly, the Régie did not believe the Applicant; it concluded on the facts that she was aware of the eviction proceedings against her husband for some time, yet neglected to come forward in a timely manner to assert her purported rights.

The Applicant does not establish, even prima facie , that the Régie made a manifest and overriding error in this appreciation of her testimony. [ 24 ] Under the circumstances, the Court believes that an appeal would be doomed to fail.

The Régie heard the Applicant and was in a privileged position to assess the credibility and probative value of her testimony; on appeal, such determinations are entitled to a high level of deference and the Court sees nothing here that would allow it to intervene. [ 25 ] Insofar as the Applicant was aware of the eviction proceedings for some time and neglected to come forward until judgment had been rendered, the Court sees no apparent weakness in the Régie’s conclusion that the tardiness of her motions was fatal, irrespective of her status as tenant or member of the Cooperative. [18] [ 26 ] This is sufficient to conclude that leave to appeal must be denied.

Appeals that are doomed to fail should not be authorized. But there is more. [ 27 ] The Applicant does not show a manifest and overriding error in the Régie’s conclusion that she did not prove her status as a tenant or member of the Cooperative. As set out in paragraphs 26 to 35 of the Authorization Decision reproduced above, the reasoning of the Régie finds support in the evidence. [ 28 ] The Court does not, moreover, see an apparent weakness in the Régie’s conclusion regarding the declaration of family residence contained in the original lease of 1996. [ 29 ]

Article 403 of the Civil Code of Québec (“ C.C.Q. ”) reads as follows: 403. Neither spouse, if the lessee of the family residence, may, without the written consent of the other, sublet it, transfer the right or terminate the lease where the lessor has been notified, by either of them, that the dwelling is used as the family residence. A spouse having neither consented to nor ratified the act may apply to have it annulled. [ 30 ] As already stated, the Régie concluded on the facts that the Applicant was not a tenant or lessee and the Court sees no apparent weakness in that determination of fact. [ 31 ] Does

Article 403 C.C.Q. provide rights to the Applicant vis-à-vis the Cooperative even if she is not a lessee? The Court does not believe so. [ 32 ] In light of

Article 403 C.C.Q. and the declaration of family residence contained in the original lease, Mr. Poplawski – as lessee – could not sublet the dwelling, transfer his rights as lessee or terminate the lease without the Applicant’s consent. On the facts, however, he did not do so; he was expelled from the Cooperative in February 2017, which resulted in the lease then in place ending at the end of the term following his expulsion, namely on June 30, 2017. [ 33 ] The declaration of family residence does not preclude this from happening.

It does not, moreover, grant the Applicant separate and distinct rights to occupy the dwelling after the lease has ended. [ 34 ] As to the other grounds of appeal raised by the Applicant, they are not determinative given the Court’s conclusions. [ 35 ] To conclude, the Court finds that the proposed appeal would be doomed to fail and, consequently, that it must not be authorized. [ 36 ] Given the particular circumstances of this case, the Court uses its discretion to suspend the execution of the Eviction Decision until February 1, 2020 in order to allow the Applicant and her family to find a new dwelling, under the condition that all unpaid rent is paid to the Cooperative within five (5) days of this judgment and that future rent is paid on the 1 st day of the months of December 2019 and January 2020.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: DISMISSES the Application for Leave to Appeal a Régie du logement Decision ; SUSPENDS the execution of the decision rendered June 3, 2019 by the Régie du logement in file bearing 385293 31 20180307 until February 1, 2020 in order to allow the Applicant and her family to find a new dwelling, under the condition that all unpaid rent is paid to the Coopérative d’habitation Skanagowa de Pointe St-Charles within five (5) days of this judgment and that the future rent is paid on the

1 st day of the months of December 2019 and January 2020; WITH LEGAL COSTS . __________________________________ DOMINIQUE GIBBENS, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: September 11, 2019 Me Julien Delangie Narang & Associés, s.e.n.c. Attorney for the Applicant Me Audrey Pinel-Chouinard Cossette Dolan Avocats, s.e.n.c.r.l. Attorney for the Respondent Me Jean-Sébastien Landry Régie du logement Attorney of the Mise en cause