2021 QCCQ 12443, 2021 QCCQ 12443

Eshoo c. Khadir 2021 QCCQ 12443 COURT OF QUEBEC (Administrative and Appeal Division) CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL No: 500-80-042120-213 DATE: November 23, 2021 ______________________________________________________________________ BEFORE THE HONOURABLE ENRICO FORLINI, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ MICHAEL ESHOO Applicant v.

ABOUDJAFAR KHADIR Respondent ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Applicant seeks leave to appeal from a decision of the Administrative Housing Tribunal which refused his request for a postponement of a hearing pertaining to the Respondent’s application in resiliation of lease for unpaid rent and recovery of rental arrears which had been filed in 2017. [1] [ 2 ] In addition, the Applicant also seeks permission to present indispensable new evidence in support of the application for leave to appeal. [ 3 ] The Applicant sought a postponement of the hearing before the Tribunal on the grounds that he intended to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada a decision of the Court of Appeal dated August 4, 2021, [2] which denied his application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court dated March 31, 2021 [3] . [ 4 ] Indeed, in 2017, the Applicant filed lawsuits against the Respondent before the Superior Court in which he claimed that (

i) he is the co-owner with the Respondent of the building where the apartment is located, and (ii) he provided janitorial and property management services to the Respondent in this same building but was not paid. [ 5 ] In October 2017 the proceedings before the Rental Board (as it then was called) were stayed until a judgment having the authority of res judicata was rendered by the Superior Court with respect to the lawsuits filed by the Applicant given that the proceedings before the Rental Board and the Superior Cour raised identical questions of fact and of law. [4] [ 6 ] The Superior Court Judgment dismissed the Applicant’s claims. [ 7 ] In the weeks following the dismissal of the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal of the Superior Court Judgment, the Tribunal convened the parties for a hearing on the merits of the Respondent’s application for resiliation of lease and payment of rent.

Application for permission to present indispensable new evidence on appeal [ 8 ] The Applicant seeks permission to present “indispensable new evidence” in the form of: [5] (

i) an email sent to the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada on October 4, 2021, which mentions that he has attached his “Application for Leave to Appeal … as well as the required documents, forms, and proof of service.” [6] The applicant only seeks permission to adduce the email and not the attachments; and (ii) an email sent to the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada on November 17, 2021, enquiring as to the status of the file and the Registrar’s response on November 18 which states that the Registry “acknowledges receipt of the e-filing of material on October 4th, 2021.

The application for leave to appeal will be reviewed and all parties will be advised in writing if, and when, a file number is assigned.” [7] [ 9 ]

Article 380 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“ C.C.P. ”), which is applicable mutatis mutandi to an appeal to the Court of Québec from a decision of the Tribunal, states that the Court may authorize a party to present indispensable new evidence after giving the parties an opportunity to make representations. [ 10 ] In Droit de la famille – 21612 , the Court of Appeal defines “indispensable new evidence” as follows: [8] “Indispensable new evidence,” within the meaning of this provision, is indeed not simply a means to remedy weaknesses in the evidence

that should have been led at trial. New evidence is that which was not adduced at trial because it was not available at that time and could not have been discovered despite the due diligence of the party now asking to file it in the appeal record. New evidence is not that which the party decided not to submit at trial or which was omitted by mistake or otherwise. Indispensable evidence is that which could have led to a different judgment in first instance and could thus have a substantial impact on the outcome of the appeal.

For that reason, needless to say, “new indispensable evidence” must be identified clearly so that our Court can weigh its potential significance and decisiveness. [ 11 ] In addition to the criteria described above, a party will be allowed to adduce indispensable new evidence only in exceptional circumstances and where the ends of justice must require the introduction of this evidence. [9] [ 12 ] The new evidence which the Applicant would like to introduce was not available when the hearings were held before the Tribunal and in that sense is new evidence. [ 13 ] This being said, according to the new evidence, on October 4, 2021, the Applicant filed at the Registry of the Supreme Court an application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal Decision. [10] The Tribunal rendered the Decision on October 13, 2021, [ 14 ] The Applicant has provided no explanation as to why he did not avail himself of

section 37 of the Rules of procedure of the Administrative Housing Tribunal to ask the Tribunal for authorization to file the new evidence, i.e. the October 4 email to the Registry of the Supreme Court, before it issued the Decision. [ 15 ] Even if the new evidence is considered “new”, it is not indispensable as it could not have led to a different decision in first instance and could not have a substantial impact on the outcome of the proposed appeal. [ 16 ] As explained in greater detail below, the Superior Court Judgment and the Court of Appeal Decision were enforceable on August 4, 2021.

The filing with the Registrar of the Supreme Court of an application for leave to appeal on October 4, 2021, [11] does not suspend the enforceable nature of these decisions. Only a stay of execution obtained under

section 390 C.P.C. or section 65(1) Supreme Court Act would have suspended the final nature (passé en force de chose jugé

e) of the Superior Court Judgment and the Court of Appeal Decision. This stay of execution was never obtained by the Applicant. [ 17 ] The application for permission to present indispensable new evidence on appeal is dismissed.

Application for leave to appeal [ 18 ] As stated above, the Applicant seeks leave to appeal from decisions of the Administrative Housing Tribunal rendered orally on September 6 and 17, 2021 which twice refused his requests for a postponement of the hearing. [ 19 ] The applications to postpone were grounded on the fact that the Applicant intended to seek leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal Decision to the Supreme Court. [ 20 ] On October 13, 2021, the Administrative Housing Tribunal issued its Decision on the merits granting the Respondent’s application for resiliation of the lease, ordered the Applicant’s expulsion from the leased premises and condemned him to pay $12,800 in damages for rental arrears. [12] [ 21 ] The Decision also includes reasons explaining why the requests for a postponement were refused.

It is this Decision that the Applicant seeks leave to appeal from. [ 22 ] The Applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in refusing to grant the postponement given that when these requests were made, he was still within the delay to appeal the Court of Appeal Decision to the Supreme Court. He proposes that leave be granted with respect to the following questions:

a) Did the Administrative Judge err in allowing the file to proceed despite the Applicant’s intention to file an Application with the Supreme Court of Canada?; and

b) Did the Administrative Judge err in not considering the fact that Applicant was still within his 60-day delay to institute further proceedings to Appeal the Superior Court’s decision? [ 23 ] Leave to appeal of a decision of the Administrative Housing Tribunal will only be granted “ when the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Québec ” (section 91 of the Act respecting the Administrative Housing Tribunal, R.S.Q. ch.

T-15 .01). [ 24 ] This phrase has been interpreted to mean that the party seeking leave to appeal must show that the appeal raises a serious or meritorious issue (in the sense of a question of principle) or a novel or controversial issue of law. [13] [ 25 ] It is not sufficient to argue an error of law in the trial judgment to obtain leave under

section 91: it must also be established that the error relates to a legal question of general interest, that is, one that goes beyond the interests of the parties alone. [14] [ 26 ] The Applicant’s request for a postponement arose in following circumstances. [ 27 ] In September 2017, the Respondent filed an application in resiliation of lease and recovery of rental arrears and eviction of the Applicant before the Rental Board (as it was then called).

[ 28 ] A month prior, the Applicant had filed before the Superior Court a lawsuit in file No 500-17-100069-171 in which he asked the court to declare that he is the co-owner with the Respondent of the building in which the leased premises are located.

In a second lawsuit (Québec Superior Court file No 500-17-104822-187), the Applicant claimed from the Respondent $185,000 in damages, namely for the value of services which he rendered to the Respondent in the building where the rental unit is located. [ 29 ] Both proceedings were consolidated and were tried at the same time (collectively, the “ Superior Court Action ”). [ 30 ] By decision dated October 23, 2017, the Rental Board stayed the proceedings before it “jusqu’à ce que le jugement de la Cour supérieure soit passé en force de chose jugée”. [15] [ 31 ] On March 31, 2021, the Superior Court issued its judgment and dismissed all of the Applicant’s claims against the Respondent. [16] Notably, the Court denied his claim to be declared co-owner of the immovable and his claim that he was owed payment for the services he rendered to the Respondent. [17] [ 32 ] Moreover, the Superior Court granted in part the Respondent’s cross-claim against the Applicant, determined that the Applicant’s proceedings were abusive for the purposes of

section 51 C.C.P. and condemned the Applicant to pay to the Respondent $40,000 in damages representing legal fees incurred to contest the lawsuits. [18] [ 33 ] In May 2021, the Applicant filed an application for leave to appeal from the Superior Court Judgment. [19] [ 34 ] On August 4, 2021, the Court of Appeal dismissed the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal (“ Court of Appeal Decision ”). [20] [ 35 ] Following this decision, the Tribunal convened the parties to a hearing on the Respondent’s application in resiliation of lease and recovery of rental arrears scheduled for September 7, 2021. [ 36 ] On that day, the Applicant made a request to postpone the hearing on the grounds that he intended to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada the Court of Appeal Decision. [21] The Tribunal refused the request for a postponement and gave oral reasons. [ 37 ] However, the matter was postponed to September 16 because the Respondent modified his pleadings and since the Applicant’s lawyer was not available. [ 38 ] On September 16, the Applicant reiterated his request for a postponement on the same grounds.

The Tribunal again denied the request. [ 39 ] It is against these two decisions of the Tribunal rejecting his requests for a postponement that the Applicant seeks leave to appeal from. [ 40 ] For the reasons that follow, leave to appeal will not be granted. [ 41 ] It is a well-established principle of law that a judge’s decision to grant or to refuse an application for a postponement is an exercise of discretion and of case management. [22] [ 42 ] Trial judges enjoy a high degree of discretion in deciding whether or not to grant a postponement, and appeal courts give great deference to such decisions. [23] [ 43 ] At the stage of an application for a leave to appeal a decision to refuse an adjournment, the party seeking leave must make a prima facie case that the trial judge’s discretion was exercised in a clearly improper manner. [24] [ 44 ] The Applicant has not demonstrated prima facie that the Tribunal’s decision to refuse his requests for a postponement was exercised in a clearly improper manner. [ 45 ] The member of the Tribunal explains in the Decision the reasons why the requests were refused: [10] À cette date, le locataire formule une demande de remise au motif que son avocat ne peut se présenter à l’audience en raison d’une fête juive.

Au surplus, il soulève que l’audience est prématurée puisqu’il entend porter la décision de la Cour d’appel devant la Cour suprême. [11] Questionné par le Tribunal sur l’état d’avancement de cette démarche, le locataire répond simplement qu’il est en réflexion, mais avance que le délai pour formuler cette procédure n’est pas expiré et qu’il dispose de 90 jours. [12] Le Tribunal refuse de permettre la remise de l’audience pour ce dernier motif. Il est vrai que la demande d’autorisation d’appel devant la Cour suprême doit être signifiée et déposée « dans les 60 jours suivant la date du jugement porté en appel ».

Toutefois, la décision de la Cour d’appel est finale dès son prononcé. Lorsqu’elle est rendue, la décision de la Cour d’appel et celle de la Cour supérieure sont exécutoires. Une

partie peut cependant demander à la Cour d’appel de suspendre l’exécution du jugement, si elle démontre son intention de présenter une demande d'autorisation d'appel à la Cour suprême du Canada. Ainsi, si un droit d’appel devant la Cour suprême existe, il est assujetti à une demande de sursis présentée devant la Cour d’appel. [13] À la date de l’audience, le locataire n’a entrepris aucune procédure devant la Cour d’appel ou la Cour suprême se contentant de dire qu’il est en réflexion. Aussi, dans les circonstances, le Tribunal estime qu’il n’y a pas lieu de suspendre l’audition du dossier.

… [16] Lors de la reprise d’audience, le locataire formule, à nouveau une demande de remise fondée sur les mêmes motifs que ceux qu’il a présentés la semaine précédente.

Il est accompagné par une avocate, qui formule la demande de remise pour assurer la présence de l’avocat lequel ne peut se présenter en raison d’une fête juive et le caractère prématuré de l’audience, vu que monsieur Eshoo est toujours en réflexion. [17] Pour les motifs énoncés verbalement à l'audience et sous réserve de pouvoir les compléter par une décision écrite, le Tribunal a rejeté, séance tenante, cette nouvelle demande de remise. [18] Le Tribunal a tenu compte du caractère infondé du motif résultant du caractère prématuré de l’audience.

Pour les motifs énoncés plus haut, la décision de la Cour d’appel ayant été rendue le 4 août 2021 et aucune procédure n’ayant été entreprise depuis. Il est insuffisant de dire que l’on est en réflexion à partir du moment où la décision est exécutoire . (References Omitted - Underlining Added) [ 46 ] The Applicant argues that the Tribunal erred in refusing to grant the postponement considering that in its October 23, 2017, decision, the Rental Board had stayed the proceedings ”jusqu’à ce que le jugement de la Cour supérieure soit passé en force de chose jugée”.

He adds that the error resides in the fact that the Tribunal confused the notion of res judicata (chose jugé

e) and the enforceable nature of the Court of Appeal Decision. [ 47 ] The Court disagrees. [ 48 ] A decision acquires the force of res judicata when the following three criteria are met: the court must have jurisdiction over the matter, the judgment must be definitive , and it must have been rendered in a contentious matter. [25] [ 49 ] The only issue that is raised by the Applicant’s argument is whether the Court of Appeal Decision was definitive when he made his requests for a postponement.

He argues the decision was not definitive and did not have the force of res judicata because the 60-day delay to file an application for leave to the Supreme Court had not yet expired. [ 50 ] The Applicant’s position is incorrect because it fails to distinguish between the point in time at which a trial court judgment becomes definitive or final and that at which a decision of the Court of Appeal becomes definitive and executory. [ 51 ] In the case of a judgment rendered at trial, the judgment is only enforceable if it is “definitive” or final.

A trial judgment becomes final after the expiry of 30 days from the date of the notice of judgment. [26] Unless provisional execution has been ordered by the court or is permitted by law, upon the expiry of the delay to file an appeal, the trial judgment acquires the force of res judicata ( passé en force de chose jugée ). [27] [ 52 ] This explains why the Dictionnaire de droit privé defines ‘’force de chose jugée’’ as follows: Qualité qu’acquiert un jugement lorsque, en l’absence d’un droit d’appel ou par suite de l’expiration du délai d’appel ou de l’épuisement des voies de recours, il devient exécutoire. [28] [ 53 ] However, the rule is different as it pertains to a decision of the Québec Court of Appeal.

Section 390 C.C.P. states that a decision of this court is ‘’enforceable immediately and bears interest from the date it is rendered.’’ Unlike a trial judgment, there is no need to wait until the expiry of the sixty-day delay to file a notice of application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada [29] to commence forced execution of a Court of Appeal decision. It becomes final and acquires the force of res judicata from the date it is rendered. [ 54 ] This

interpretation was recognized by the Superior Court in Adam v. Tessier , where the plaintiff petitioned the court for an arrest warrant against the defendant to compel him to submit to a post-judgment examination under old

article 543 C.C.P. , now

article 688 C.C.P. [30] [ 55 ] In Adam , the plaintiff had obtained a judgment on September 11, 1975, condemning the defendant to pay him $75,000. On April 12, 1979, the Québec Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court judgment. On April 31, 1979, the plaintiff obtained an order compelling the defendant to submit to a post-judgment examination. [ 56 ] The defendant contested the application for an arrest warrant and asked the court to quash the warrant on the grounds that the decision of the Court of Appeal was not executory or enforceable since the delay to appeal to the Supreme Court had not yet expired.

This is the same argument that is put forth by the Applicant in the present case. [ 57 ] Justice Landry sided with the plaintiff and concluded that : J'en arrive à la conclusion que le requérant a raison sur ce point pour les motifs qui suivent. Tout d'abord, l'article 522 C.P [now art. 390 C.C.P. ] qui fait

partie du

Titre de l'Appel traite à mon avis de cette question en termes clairs. Il y est prévu qu'un jugement rendu par la Cour d'appel est mis à exécution sauf "s'il n'y a appel à la Cour Suprême du Canada. On parle donc ici d'un appel formé en Cour Suprême et non pas de la période des délais qui sont prévus pour former un appel ou encore une permission d'en appeler à la Cour Suprême. Je suis d'opinion que le législateur s'est exprimé sur cette question clairement. De plus, il ne fait pas de doute que l'appel en Cour Suprême est régi par la

Loi sur la Cour Suprême (S.R.C. 1970, ch. 5-19). (Conf. art. 24 C.P. et Parke Davis and Co. v. Laboratoire Pentagone Ltée 1968, B.R. p. 239 .)

Si l'on devait adopter les prétentions de l'intimé, nous serions alors dans la position surprenante suivante. Pendant le temps où courent les délais d'appel, on ne pourrait pas exécuter le jugement de la Cour d'appel…. … La thèse de l'intimé nous obligerait à conclure, quant au sursis de l'exécution des jugements, que la loi est plus sévère pour celui qui a régulièrement logé un appel devant la Cour Suprême et moins sévère pour celui qui tirerait avantage du délai relativement long prévu pour les demandes de permission d'en appeler. Je ne peux souscrire à cette thèse.

Je me dois donc de conclure que l'ordonnance émise par le Protonotaire adjoint le 31 mai 1979 a été émise en conformité des dispositions de l'article 543 C.P. et que l'intimé était donc tenu de s'y conformer. [ 58 ] This reasoning is even more true today given that the art. 390 C.C.P., which replaced old art. 522, states that a “decision of the Court of Appeal is enforceable immediately”/ “L’arrêt est exécutoire immédiatement” whereas the former provision stated “Judgment is executed, …, by the court of first instance, unless there is an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada”/”Le jugement est mis à exécution, …, par la cour de première instance, s’il n’y a appel à la Cour suprême du Canada.” [ 59 ] The member of the Tribunal echoes this when she writes at paragraph 12 of the Decision that “la décision de la Cour d’appel est finale dès son prononcé.

Lorsqu’elle est rendue, la decision de la Cour d’appel et celle de la Cour supérieure sont exécutoires.” [ 60 ] The Tribunal did not misapply the notion of enforceability of a judgment or the notion of the force of res judicata as she clearly made the distinction that applies in regards to a decision of the Court of Appeal as a result of the language of

article 390 C.C.P. [ 61 ] It was open for the Applicant to file an application for leave to appeal pursuant to articles 40 and 43 of the Supreme Court Act (RSC 1985 ch. S-26 ). However, even had he filed this application, and even if the Court had admitted the “new evidence” and considers that the Applicant did in fact file on October 4, 2021, an application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal Decision, this filing would not have suspended the enforceability of the Court of Appeal Decision. [ 62 ] The enforceability of this decision could only have been suspended if the Applicant also filed with the Court of Appeal an application for a stay of execution pursuant to

article 390 paragraph 2 C.C.P . or a similar application with the Supreme Court under

article 65 of the Supreme Court Act . [ 63 ] The Applicant had ample time between August 4, 2021, and his appearance before the Tribunal on September 7 and 16 to file an application for a stay of execution. He chose not to do so.

The filing at the Supreme Court of an application for leave to appeal does not suspend the enforceable nature of the Court of Appeal decision; much less a mere intention to seek leave to appeal. [ 64 ] The Court of Appeal Decision was enforceable on the day on which the Tribunal refused the request for a postponement. [ 65 ] The Applicant provided no explanation as to why he did not seek a stay of execution between August 4 and his appearances before the Tribunal in September.

His lack of diligence is a factor that the member of the Tribunal properly considered in refusing to grant the postponement. [ 66 ] Moreover, the member also likely considered the following excerpt from the Superior Court Judgment: [178] Dans les deux affaires auxquelles le présent jugement met fin, M. Eshoo a institué et mené des procédures abusives au sens de l’article 51 du Code de procédure civile ( « C.p.c. » ). [179] Ses procédures étaient frivoles en ce qu’il savait fort bien qu’il avait cédé sa demi-part de l’Immeuble en 2009 pour se libérer du poids des paiements hypothécaires, dont M.

Khadir reprenait charge, même si le refinancement hypothécaire de 2005 ne servait qu’à M. Eshoo pour son projet distinct sur la rue Saint-Jacques. [180] Tel que déjà statué, M. Eshoo a recouru durant l’instance à des stratégies malveillantes et vexatoires dans la tentative (infructueuse) d’amener M. Khadir à concéder. [181] Le caractère nettement abusif du comportement judiciaire de M. Eshoo l’amène à devoir rembourser à M. Khadir une portion substantielle des honoraires et débours d’avocat que ce dernier a dû engager. [182] M.

Khadir produit des notes d’honoraires (caviardées quant à certains éléments confidentiels), indiquant que, depuis la fin de l’été 2017, il aura dû payer 98 756,71 $ à ses avocats. [183] C’est un montant colossal, mais qui reflète les complications délibérées de M. Eshoo et la nécessité, jusqu’à la modification procédurale du 15 février 2021, de faire face à une poursuite réclamant la copropriété d’un immeuble plus 875 000 $ de dommages- intérêts. [184] Une

partie du préjudice dont se plaint M. Khadir et des mandats donnés à ses avocats, découle du litige dont est présentement saisi le Tribunal administratif du logement. [185] Le Tribunal condamne M. Eshoo à payer 40 000 $ en remboursement partiel des honoraires et débours que M. Khadir a payés à ses avocats. (Reference omitted- underlining added) [ 67 ] Similarly, the fact that the Court of Appeal held that the Applicant’s appeal “on its face has no reasonable chance of success” is

also a factor which makes the Tribunal’s Decision to refuse the postponement a reasonable exercise of its discretion. [31] [ 68 ] The question that the member of the Tribunal had to ask herself on September 7 and 16 was whether the Superior Court Judgment and the Court of Appeal Decision had acquired the force of res judicata , in other words, whether they were enforceable. She decided they were. [ 69 ] Prima facie , this decision is a reasonable exercise of the member’s discretion.

It is consistent with the law and case law which establishes that a decision of the Court of Appeal acquires the force of res judicata on the date it is rendered and is executory as of that day, unless the party obtains a stay of execution.

The mere fact that the party is still within the time period to file an application for leave to appeal is not sufficient to suspend the enforceable nature of a Court of Appeal decision. [ 70 ] For all these reasons, the Court considers that the Applicant has not shown prima facie that the member of the Tribunal failed to properly exercise her discretion when she refused to grant the two requests for a postponement. [ 71 ] Moreover, considering that the appeal sought by the Applicant appears to be simply another tactic to delay the inevitable, it is not in the interest of justice to grant leave.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 72 ] DISMISSES the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal of the Administrative Housing Tribunal’s decision dated October 13, 2021, in file No. 355069, claim No. 2326341. __________________________________ ENRICO FORLINI, J.C.Q. Me David Brook correspondent for Me Israel H. Kaufman Les Services Légaux Kaufman Inc. Applicant’s lawyer Me Yalda Machouf Khadir Roy Robert avocats Respondent’s lawyer Date of hearing: November 17, 2021