Docket: CACR2151 Michael Ray McIntyre Appellant - v. -, 2012 SKCA 111

THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2012 SKCA 111 Date: 2012-11-27 Between: Docket: CACR2151 Michael Ray McIntyre Appellant - and - Her Majesty the Queen Respondent REVISED JUDGMENT: The text of the original judgment has been corrected with text of the erratum (released December 17, 2012) appended. Coram: Vancise, Richards, Caldwell JJ.A. Counsel: Andrew Hitchcock for the appellant Andrea Newsham for the respondent Appeal:

From: Provincial Court Heard: September 6, 2012 Disposition: Allowed in part Written Reasons: November 27, 2012 By: The Honourable Mr. Justice Richards In Concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Vancise The Honourable Mr. Justice Caldwell Richards J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] The appellant, Michael McIntyre, was convicted of one count of trafficking in a controlled substance (cocaine) contrary to s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“ CDSA ”) and one count of possessing proceeds of crime also contrary to s. 355 (

b) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] Mr. McIntyre was sentenced to 14 months in jail. He submits that the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose a conditional sentence and, alternatively, that his jail sentence is too long. II. the facts [ 3 ] Mr. McIntyre was born and raised in Regina. He is currently 25 years old. He reported having a positive and supportive upbringing and his mother says he was a “trouble free” child. [ 4 ] Mr. McIntyre has been in a relationship since 2010. His girlfriend is very supportive of him. They had a baby in April of 2012 and she says he is a “great dad” to her other child. Mr.

McIntyre also has a child from a previous relationship. [ 5 ] Mr. McIntyre graduated from high school in 2006. But for some reasonably short gaps, he has been employed since that time. [ 6 ] When he was 19, Mr. McIntyre began experimenting with cocaine while partying. Occasional use led to an addiction and, by the time of the offences in question here, Mr. McIntyre had a habit that was costing him $600 per week. [ 7 ] The charges against Mr.

McIntyre arose from an undercover operation conducted by the Regina Integrated Drug Unit. [ 8 ] On March 20, 2010, at 8:15 p.m. an undercover officer called a dial-a-dope number seeking a gram of cocaine. She spoke to an unknown male and was directed to a convenience store. When she arrived at the store at 8:34 p.m., Mr. McIntyre was there. [ 9 ] Mr.

McIntyre exited the store and, after asking the officer some questions, got in her car, took baggies from his pocket and exchanged one gram of cocaine for $80.00. [ 10 ] Later that evening, at 9:40 p.m., the officer called the dial-a-dope number again with a view to procuring another gram of cocaine. She was directed to a block on Broder Street and drove to that location. Mr. McIntyre arrived in a car, gave her the cocaine and took another $80.00. [ 11 ] Shortly after this transaction, the police stopped Mr. McIntyre’s vehicle. He was arrested and given his warnings.

He had $280.00 in his possession, $80.00 of which had been given to him by the undercover officer in the course of the second transaction. [ 12 ] Between 10:42 pm and 11:18 pm six people called Mr. McIntyre’s cell phone looking to buy cocaine. [ 13 ] Mr. McIntyre says that he agreed to sell cocaine in exchange for quantities of the drug. III. the sentencing decision [ 14 ] Mr. McIntyre was charged and pled guilty to one count of trafficking cocaine and one count of possession of the proceeds of crime. [ 15 ] The sentencing judge received thorough submissions from both the prosecutor and Mr. McIntyre’s counsel.

Those submissions covered both the governing case law and the relevant facts. [ 16 ] The judge characterized the situation before her as being “on the line” between what might attract a custodial sentence and what might attract a conditional sentence order. She reserved her decision and ultimately imposed a sentence of 14 months in jail. The heart of her reasoning was as follows:

So in reviewing the Court of Appeal cases, my conclusion is that unique circumstances must exist in order for the Court to allow a person guilty of trafficking cocaine to serve his sentence in the community. Now, in this case, Mr. McIntyre was involved in a commercial enterprise as a street level dealer of cocaine. He was only under investigation for one day, and notwithstanding that, there were -- that there were only two drug transactions -- drug purchases by undercover police officers, the accused was clearly in the business of selling cocaine that night. He was trafficking to support his habit.

After being charged, he quit using regularly. And I say that because he has admitted to using twice in the last year, and he is still a frequent user of marihuana. He is young with a nominal -- a nominal record, and has family support and employment. Now, Mr. McIntyre’s circumstances are similar, though, to those in the Craft decision and the Larivial (ph) decision, which I previously mentioned, both young individuals with no record. They both received periods of incarceration for selling cocaine. Based on the sentencing principle which I had previously mentioned, and Mr. -- Mr.

McIntyre’s personal circumstances, I do not feel that a sentence to be served in the community is appropriate. I, therefore, impose a sentence of 14 months incarceration. That is to be served in an institution. IV. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS [ 17 ] The Criminal Code contains a number of provisions which set out the purpose and principles of sentencing. Sections 718 , 718.1 and 718.2 are particularly relevant to this appeal: 718.

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community. . . . 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (

i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or any other similar factor, (ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s spouse or common-law partner, (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years, (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, (iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization, or (

v) evidence that the offence was a terrorism offence shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

[18] The CDSA is also relevant here. Section 10(1) speaks directly to the purpose of sentencing in the context of drug offences: 10.

(1) Without restricting the generality of the Criminal Code, the fundamental purpose of any sentence for an offence under this

Part isto contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, andtreatment in appropriate circumstances, of offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community. [19]

Section 742.1 of the Criminal Code should, of course, be noted as well. It governs conditional sentence orders. Briefly put, s. 742.1says a conditional sentence is available if (

a) the sentence of imprisonment to be imposed is less than two years, (

b) service of thesentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community, and (

c) service of the sentence in the community would beconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing as set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Code. See: R. v. Proulx,2000 SCC 5 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61. V. analysis [20] Mr. McIntyre’s principal submission is that the sentencing judge should have opted for a conditional sentence.

He says she erredby failing to properly appreciate that his involvement in trafficking was a function of a cocaine addiction, by over-emphasizing theprinciples of denunciation and deterrence and by interpreting the decisions of this Court as meaning that, if an offender is convicted oftrafficking in cocaine, a conditional sentence is available only in “unique circumstances”. [21] It is useful to begin the assessment of Mr. McIntyre’s position by noting that the appropriateness of a conditional sentence wasfront and centre at the sentencing hearing.

This was because the Crown had requested a custodial sentence of 18 months, i.e. a sentenceof less than two years, and there was no suggestion that Mr. McIntyre would pose a danger if he served that sentence in the community. As a result, the real issue before the sentencing judge was whether a conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamentalpurposes and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code. [22] The assessment of the sentencing judge’s treatment of the conditional sentence issue must, of course, respect the governingstandard of appellate review. It is well known.

Simply put, this Court is not entitled to simply substitute its view of a proper sentence forthat of a sentencing judge. Rather, it must adopt a posture of deference. The Supreme Court of Canada described the basic rules ofengagement as follows in R. v.

M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500: 90 Put simply, absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a courtof appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit. [23] In this case, there were a number of factors that suggested a conditional sentence might have been an appropriate sentence but, atthe same time, there were other considerations which pointed in the opposite direction.

It is clear from the transcript that the sentencingjudge was alive to them all. [24] The central points that weighed in favour of a conditional sentence can be summarized as follows: (

a) Mr. McIntyre had an essentially trouble free past. As noted, he reported having a positive and supportive upbringing. His onlyprevious conviction was for mischief. He had been given a five month period of probation and ordered to pay restitution. (

b) But for some gaps between jobs, Mr. McIntyre had been employed quite steadily since he had graduated from high school in2006. He had worked as a shelf-stacker, a construction worker and a labourer in the oil patch. He had again secured full timeemployment by the time he was sentenced. (

c) According to the Pre-Sentence Report, a cocaine addiction had been a “major contributing factor” to Mr. McIntyre’sinvolvement in the drug trade. He said that he had developed a habit which had been costing him $600 per week. (

d) After being arrested, Mr. McIntrye moved back in with his mother and, with her help, reported that he had gotten his habit undercontrol. (

e) Prior to sentencing, Mr. McIntyre had been on release for almost two years and had not breached. (

f) Mr. McIntyre had considerable support from his family and his girlfriend. She is reported to be very supportive and to not usedrugs. [25] On the other hand, as noted, there were considerations which tended to suggest that a conditional sentence order might not beappropriate: (

a) Mr. McIntyre’s trafficking activity involved cocaine, a “hard” drug. (

b) Although he was to be sentenced for only one count of trafficking and one count of possession of the proceeds of crime, Mr.McIntyre had committed those offences in a particular context. That context was that he had been involved in a dial-a-dope operation.Before selling the first gram of cocaine to the undercover officer, he had asked her how she “knew them” and had explained that he wasbeing cautious because “a bunch of his guys” had been arrested the night before. He had also said that “a whole shift got busted” theprevious evening. (

c) Again, by way of context, it had been apparent that the offences in question were not “one off”. Immediately following the sale

of the second gram of cocaine to the undercover officer, Mr. McIntyre had been observed to participate in what appeared to be anotherdrug sale. After he was arrested, the police monitored his cell phone for a short time. Between 10:42 p.m. and 11:18 p.m., six peoplehad called his number looking to buy cocaine. (

d) The Pre-Sentence Report indicated that Mr. McIntyre had used marihuana for many years and had continued to use it about twice aweek up to and including the date when the Pre-Sentence Report had been prepared. There was also some ambiguity about his socialcircle. His girlfriend had said that Mr. McIntyre no longer associated with the drug users who had gotten him into trouble. However, thePre-Sentence Report had also indicated that Mr. McIntyre had used cocaine in the past with his current group of friends. [26] There is also another consideration which has come to light only since the sentencing hearing.

On May 28, 2012, Mr. McIntyrepled guilty to one count of possession of marihuana and received a $1,000 fine by way of a sentence. The offence had been committedwhile he had been on bail for the cocaine charges. Mr. McIntyre did not advise the author of the Pre-Sentence Report of it. Nor did headvise the sentencing judge of the charge when he was in court for the offences in issue here. [27] Against the background of these factors, Mr.

McIntyre’s principal argument is that the sentencing judge should have attached moreweight to the fact that he had been addicted to cocaine and had begun trafficking because of his habit. He says that addicts typically donot make rational decisions and that, as a result, standard notions of deterrence have little meaning for them. In a related vein, Mr.McIntyre says that the moral blameworthiness of a person selling drugs to feed a habit is not as high as that of a person selling drugssolely for profit. [28] Given the case law laid down by this Court and the concerns of the sentencing judge, Mr.

McIntyre cannot succeed on this point.The Court has clearly recognized that the fitness of a sentence for a trafficking offence will depend on a variety of factors. One of thosefactors is the motivation for the offence. For example, the Court said in R. v. Pankewich, 2002 SKCA 7, 161 C.C.C. (3d) 534 at para.49, that “those who traffic to support their own habit may be more likely to receive a restorative disposition than those who traffic forother reasons”. The potential significance of an offender’s addiction has been referred to in a variety of other decisions as well. See, forexample: R. v.

Shawile, 2012 SKCA 51, 393 Sask. R. 211 at para. 10. [29] It is important to remember, however, that an offender’s motivation for trafficking is only one of the factors that bears on thedetermination of an appropriate sentence. Other considerations include matters such as the sophistication and significance of the offenceand the accused’s place in the trafficking scheme, the type and quantity of the drug involved, the need for and the utility of thedeterrence which will flow from the sentence imposed, the offender’s record, and the offender’s age and personal circumstances. See: R.v.

Pankewich, supra at para. 49. [30] As a result, the fact that an offender is an addict is a relevant, and obviously sometimes very important, sentencing consideration. However, an addiction does not automatically give a drug trafficker an entitlement to a conditional sentence. As noted, s. 718.1 of theCode requires that, as the fundamental consideration, a sentence must not only be proportional to the degree of the responsibility of theoffender. It must also be proportional to the gravity of the offence.

The fitness of a sentence must always be determined by reference tothe objectives and principles of sentencing set out in the Code and the full range of factual considerations that might be relevant in lightof those objectives and principles. [31] The sentencing judge was well-aware of this framework of principle and of the aspects of it which are of central concern to Mr.McIntyre.

She specifically referred to the passage in Pankewich to the effect that those who traffic to support a habit may be more likelyto receive restorative sentences than those who traffic solely for profit and she concluded that “the principles stated in Pankewich are stillgood law”. Further, in the heart of her reasoning when she explained the basis of her decision, the judge made express reference to thefact Mr. McIntyre had been trafficking “to support his habit”. [32] However, for the sentencing judge, the fact of Mr.

McIntyre’s addiction was not enough to overcome her concern about therealities that he had been trafficking cocaine, had obviously been industriously involved in this regard (albeit, of course, facingsentencing on only one count) and had continued to use drugs after being charged. Of course, this picture is now further complicated forMr.

McIntyre in light of the marihuana charge (and now subsequent conviction) which he elected not to disclose to either the author ofthe Pre-Sentence Report or to the sentencing judge. [33] In all of the circumstances of this case, I would be reluctant to conclude that the sentencing judge discounted the fact of Mr.McIntyre’s cocaine habit in a way which amounted to a reviewable error.

Moreover, any doubts that might have existed in my own mindon this point have been overcome, not only by the marihuana charge and subsequent conviction but as well by the way the charge waskept from the author of the Pre-Sentence Report and the sentencing judge. [34] Mr. McIntyre also suggests the sentencing judge’s analysis was driven off the rails by her statement that the decisions of this Courtindicate that “unique circumstances” must exist before a person found guilty of trafficking in cocaine can be allowed to serve a sentencein the community. [35] I am not persuaded by this argument either.

The judge’s choice of words to summarize the import of the Court’s decisions mightnot have been as apt as possible. However, in my view, this does not appear to have been the source of any bottom line error. The realpoint is that the judge was entirely familiar with the relevant case law and used it to inform her decision about the appropriateness of aconditional sentence in the circumstances of this case. In the end, her use of the phrase “unique circumstances” was not the key to herdecision.

The key was her direct reference to, and direct reliance on, this Court’s sentencing precedents themselves. [36] The reality is that the Court has stressed the importance of deterrence and denunciation in crafting sentences for drug traffickingoffences. As a result, it has long taken the position that a conviction for trafficking in a “hard” drug, such as cocaine, should generallyattract a significant jail sentence. See, for example: R. v. Ruda (1992), (SK CA), 100 Sask. R. 159 (Sask. C.A.); R. v.Dubai, 2008 SKCA 49, 310 Sask. R. 85 at para. 5.

Several decisions of the Court have identified a sentencing range of 18 months tofour years as being applicable for the offence of trafficking in cocaine. See, for example: R. v. Shawile, supra at para. 13; R. v. Aube,2009 SKCA 53, 324 Sask. R. 303 at para. 19; R. v. McCallum, 2007 SKCA 139, 302 Sask. R. 298 at para. 12. Moreover, the Court (atleast in the context of offenders who traffic solely for profit) has also cautioned against over-emphasizing the personal circumstances of

an offender in crafting a sentence and indicated that such considerations are secondary to the goals of deterrence and denunciation. In this regard, the Court has said that it is in error to “over-emphasize the personal circumstances of the offender to the exclusion of an examination of other sentencing factors”. See: R. v. Aube , supra , at para. 19 . [ 37 ] All of these points having been made, it must also be stressed that determining an appropriate sentence for trafficking (like determining an appropriate sentencing for any other offence) involves more than the application of a fixed tariff.

As required by s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code , a fit sentence must, at bottom, be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Moreover, a fit sentence must appropriately take account of the relevant sentencing considerations identified in the other provisions of the Code and CDSA . Thus, not surprisingly, this Court has itself imposed sentences outside of the 18 month to four year jail term range in light of the particular circumstances of individual cocaine trafficking offences. See: R. v. Von Hagen , 2008 SKCA 123 , 314 Sask. R. 77; R. v. Ruda , supra ; R. v.

Sinnott , 2001 SKCA 13 . See also: R. v. Laliberte , 2000 SKCA 27 , 143 C.C.C. (3d) 503. Again, the sentencing judge considered, and was aware of, the key cases in this regard. [ 38 ] In particular, I note that the judge made specific reference to R. v. Kraft 2008 SKCA (SentDig) 36. It involved a 20 year old woman with no previous record. She was selling cocaine out of a house that she shared with her boyfriend. Three weeks prior to the offence, the police had arrested the woman on drug offences. She had been warned and released without being charged.

On the day in question, police stopped a vehicle leaving her house and found cocaine. They then obtained a search warrant and discovered 15 grams of cocaine, digital scales, baggies, drug paraphernalia and $1,200 in cash in the house. Ms. Kraft’s motivation for selling drugs was described as being to support her own habit and to pay her bills. She was convicted of trafficking and sentenced to jail. This Court declined to substitute a conditional sentence for the custodial term.

Not surprisingly, the sentencing judge justifiably believed she was entitled to draw some instruction from that decision on the question of whether she should endorse the use of a conditional sentence in this case. [ 39 ] Given the governing standard of review, I am not prepared to second-guess the sentencing judge’s assessment that the objectives and principles of sentencing found in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Code required that she impose a jail term on Mr. McIntyre.

In the end, I am of the view that she made no reviewable error of principle, or otherwise, in deciding not to opt for a conditional sentence. [ 40 ] Having resolved the question of whether the sentencing judge erred in deciding against a conditional sentence, I turn now to Mr. McIntyre’s argument that the jail term imposed on him was too long. In order to properly assess this issue, it is helpful to consider the more noteworthy cocaine trafficking cases in which the Court itself has imposed a sentence and, as well, to consider a few other cases which, in the view of the parties, are particularly instructive: (

a) R. v. Ruda , supra - Undercover police attended the offender’s place of business looking for cocaine. He later provided the police with 6.25 grams of the drug for $800 cash. The offender was 31 years old, had no previous drug-related convictions, was working and had a wife and children. The Court reduced his sentence of 21 months in jail to 16 months in jail. (

b) R. v. Sinnott , supra - The offender acted as the delivery person for a drug trafficking organization from Vancouver and, in so doing, functioned as part of a commercial enterprise. He was found with “several ounces” of cocaine. The offender was 27 years old and had no previous convictions. He demonstrated a “marked change of attitude” after his arrest and took “extraordinary efforts” to rehabilitate himself. The Court reduced a jail sentence of two years less a day to 15 months. (

c) R. v. Patryluk, 2002 SKCA 33 , 217 Sask. R. 309 - The 21 year old offender bought marihuana and cocaine in Vancouver for the purpose of bringing it to Regina for resale and with an eye to making a $7,000 profit. The street value of the marihuana was between $6,000 and $12,800. The street value of the cocaine was between $5,700 and $8,400. The offender had been a regular drug user and was said to have “a significant problem with drugs and alcohol”. Following his arrest, he resolved to clean up his lifestyle, advance his education and pursue a career. The Court set aside an 18 month conditional sentence.

The offender had served six months on electronic monitoring and had done 150 hours of community service. The Court therefore sentenced him to an additional prison term of 11 months duration. (

d) R . v. Shawile , supra - A 23 year offender was offered a “substantial amount of money” to deliver cocaine to Prince Albert and acted solely out of an interest in money. He had been born in Ethiopia and had had a very difficult childhood. The Pre-Sentence Report was “very positive”. He was arrested with 53 grams of cocaine in his possession. The drug had a street value of between $2,400 and $9,500. The Court set aside a 22 month conditional sentence and imposed an 18 month prison term in its place. (

e) R . v. Dubai , supra - The offender had financial difficulties and hoped to make a profit selling drugs. He sent himself a package from Calgary. It contained 27.9 grams of cocaine (with a street value of between $2,200 and $2,800), 500 ecstasy pills (with a street value of $5,000) and 897 grams of marihuana (valued at $8,900). He was not charged in relation to the marihuana. The Court set aside a 22 month conditional sentence, saying that concurrent sentences of 18 months of imprisonment were appropriate for the convictions of possessing cocaine and ecstasy for the purpose of trafficking. (

f) R. v. Pankewich ; R. v. Gavernoski , supra - A drug dealer dispatched Mr. Pankewich, age 23, and Mr. Gavernoski, age 25, to Vancouver on separate ventures. Mr. Pankewich bought ten ounces of cocaine, valued in bulk at $12,000 and returned to Regina. He was paid $1,500 plus expenses. Mr. Gavernoski acquired one pound of cocaine, valued in bulk at $19,200, and brought it back to Regina. He was paid $1,000 plus expenses. Both men acted solely for profit. The Court set aside conditional sentences and committed each man to the maximum sentence requested by the Crown, that being two years less a day. (

g) R. v. Von Hagen , supra - The offender was 18 years old and had no record. She visited her boyfriend, an inmate at a penitentiary, with four grams of cocaine (street value $360) and 14 grams of marihuana (street value of $200) secreted in a body cavity. She had delivered the drugs under duress and, since the offence, had moved to another city, ended her relationship with the boyfriend and secured full-time employment. The Court set aside a jail term and substituted an 18 month conditional sentence. [ 41 ] In light of these precedents, Mr. McIntyre’s sentence is unduly heavy.

The quantity of cocaine involved in the offence he committed (two grams) was small; he was acting at the lowest end of the trafficking food chain, i.e. street-level dealer; unlike all of the other offenders noted above with the possible exception of Mr. Patryluk and Ms. Kraft, he was an addict and acting in significant part to

feed his habit; he had no meaningful record; he had been a productive member of society; and, after being charged, he had taken steps to turn his life around. His positive approach has continued while in custody. He is attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings. He has been participating in cultural healing programs and sweat lodges. He regularly attends church and has worked in the kitchen. He has applied to the drug treatment program at the Correctional Centre. [ 42 ] In light of all of these considerations, I would reduce Mr. McIntyre’s prison term from 14 months to ten months. vi. conclusion [ 43 ] Mr.

McIntyre’s appeal is allowed to the extent of reducing his jail term to ten months. DATED at the City of Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 27 th day of November, A.D. 2012. “Richards J.A.” _____________________ Richards J.A. I concur “Vancise J.A.” ______________________ Vancise J.A. I concur “Caldwell J.A.” _____________________ Caldwell J.A. Her Majesty the Queen v. Michael Ray McIntyre CACR2151 2012 SKCA 111 written reasons released November 27, 2012 Erratum released December 17, 2012 In paragraph 41, delete the word “ounces”, replacing it with the word “grams”.