Docket: CACV2395 Hilarie Margaret Jochems Appellant - v. -, 2013 SKCA 81

THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2013 SKCA 81 Date: 2013-07-25 Between: Docket: CACV2395 Hilarie Margaret Jochems Appellant - and - Tyler Jason Jochems Respondent Coram: Richards C.J.S., Ottenbreit and Caldwell JJ.A. Counsel: James J. Vogel for the appellant W. Timothy Stodalka for the respondent Appeal: From: 2013 SKQB 94 Heard: June 19, 2013 Disposition: Appeal dismissed Written Reasons: July 25, 2013 By: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards

In Concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ottenbreit The Honourable Mr. Justice Caldwell Richards C.J.S. I. Introduction [ 1 ] This appeal concerns an interim custody and access order made in the context of a divorce proceeding. [ 2 ] The appellant, Hilarie Jochems, and the respondent, Tyler Jochems, have one child. When the child was three months old, Ms. Jochems left the matrimonial home in Saskatchewan, moved unilaterally to Winnipeg with the child, and did not return. Mr. Jochems petitioned for divorce and secured an interim custody and access order. One feature of the order is that, if Ms.

Jochems chooses to remain in Winnipeg, primary caregiving responsibilities will transfer to Mr. Jochems. Ms. Jochems asks this Court to overturn that aspect of the decision. [ 3 ] This case, like so many mobility contests, is not easy to resolve. Although there may be some basis on which the ruling of the Chambers judge can be questioned, I conclude that the appeal must be dismissed. The judge took into account all of the relevant factors and made a considered assessment of the best interests of the child. The deferential standard of review which applies here precludes this Court from interfering with his order.

II. Background [ 4 ] I will not outline the facts in great detail. They have been clearly recounted by the Chambers judge at paras. 4 to 21 of his reasons for decision. See: 2013 SKQB 94 . I propose to sketch only a few of their highlights. [ 5 ] Mr. and Ms. Jochems began living together in 2008 and were married in 2010. Their daughter, Emrie, was born on April 14, 2012. They lived in Fleming, a town near Moosomin, in southeastern Saskatchewan. [ 6 ] In the time immediately following Emrie’s birth, the relationship between Mr. and Ms. Jochems began to deteriorate.

On July 12, 2012, when Emrie was three months old, Mr. Jochems returned home to find Ms. Jochems and Emrie gone. Ms. Jochems had left a note saying that she had travelled to Winnipeg (where her family lives) for a sibling’s birthday party. Ms. Jochems did not return and Mr. Jochems began pressing to see Emrie. [ 7 ] Mr. and Ms. Jochems met on August 10, 2012 in Brandon. Mr. Jochems was allowed to hold Emrie for about five minutes and he then met with Ms. Jochems in a waiting vehicle to discuss their circumstances. She presented a document for him to sign.

It would have seen him give her sole custody of Emrie and relieve him of having to pay child support. This upset Mr. Jochems. [ 8 ] Mr. Jochems retained a lawyer and, on August 22, 2012, the lawyer wrote to Ms. Jochems. She recommended that Ms. Jochems seek legal counsel, indicated that Mr. Jochems was prepared to negotiate a separation agreement and, in effect, warned that Mr. Jochems could bring an application for an order requiring Ms. Jochems to bring Emrie back to Saskatchewan so that he could have reasonable access to her. Ms. Jochems’ lawyer then responded by saying that Ms.

Jochems did not intend to return from Winnipeg but that she was committed to ensuring Emrie had a “positive and strong ongoing relationship” with her father. The lawyer did not explain how this would be arranged. Mr. Jochems filed for divorce on September 27, 2012. He claimed joint custody of Emrie with equal parenting time. [ 9 ] On December 8, 2012, Mr. Jochems was allowed access to Emrie in Brandon. The visit lasted approximately four hours. It ended unpleasantly when Ms. Jochems pressed for particulars as to how Mr. Jochems’ time with Emrie had been spent. [ 10 ] Mr.

Jochems filed an application for interim relief on December 21, 2012. From that point on, he was allowed to see Emrie for four hours every two weeks by meeting Ms. Jochems at a point between Winnipeg and Fleming. [ 11 ] Ms. Jochems and Emrie are living with her parents in Winnipeg. Ms. Jochems is employed in a day care. Mr. Jochems lives in the family home in Fleming and continues to work regular hours. His 2011 income was just over $81,000. The parents of both Mr. Jochems and Ms.

Jochems appear to be very supportive and prepared to assist with Emrie’s care. [ 12 ] Since the latter part of May, and on the strength of a court-ordered schedule, Mr. Jochems has had Emrie in his care from 10:00 a.m. Saturdays until 5:00 p.m. Sundays. III. The Decision of the Chambers Judge [ 13 ] The Chambers judge noted the many factual disputes revealed by the affidavits filed by Mr. and Ms.

Jochems but concluded that those affidavits established four basic points: [29] … The first is that the respondent unilaterally decided to take Emrie from the family home to Winnipeg, and to keep her in Winnipeg, without the consent or agreement of the petitioner. Second, she did so because she preferred to live with her parents in

Winnipeg than to live with the petitioner in Fleming. Third, she left with Emrie without applying for a court order entitling her to do so.And fourth, that since her departure she has severely curtailed the petitioner's capacity to spend a reasonable amount of parenting timewith Emrie. [14] The Chambers judge then went on to refer to the parties’ agreement that the “best interests of the child” was the controllingconsideration and to note some of the governing case law such as Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27.

Healso expressed concern about allowing a parent, by way of the unilateral removal of a child, to establish a “new normal” and therebycarry the day in a custody proceeding. [15] Ultimately, the Chambers judge decided that an appropriate order, on an interim basis, was one requiring Ms. Jochems to returnEmrie to Saskatchewan by way of a “structured transition” involving the end result that, if Ms. Jochems chose not to move back toSaskatchewan, Mr. Jochems would become the primary caregiver for the child. The Chambers judge also ordered that a pre-trialconference be convened on an expedited basis.

The particulars of his order are set out below: 1. The parties shall have joint custody of Emrie Margaret Jochems born April 14, 2012; 2. The primary residence of the child shall remain with the respondent on the following terms: (

a) the petitioner shall have parenting time with Emrie in Brandon, Manitoba, on Saturday, March 23, 2013, from 10:00 a.m. to5:00 p.m. The respondent shall deliver her to the petitioner, and the petitioner shall return her to the respondent at the McDonald'srestaurant on the No. 1 highway in Brandon, Manitoba or at such other location as the parties may agree upon; (

b) the petitioner shall have parenting time with Emrie in Brandon, Manitoba on Saturday, March 30, 2013 from 10:00 a.m. to3:00 p.m. and on Sunday, March 31, 2013 from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., with the exchange to take place as set out in clause (

a) above; (

c) the petitioner shall have parenting time with Emrie in Fleming, Saskatchewan, from 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on Saturday,April 6, 2013 and 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 7, 2013. The respondent shall deliver her to the petitioner at his residence inFleming on each day. The petitioner shall return her to the respondent on each day at a location in Moosomin, Saskatchewan to bedesignated by the respondent; (

d) the petitioner shall have parenting time with Emrie in Fleming, Saskatchewan from 12:00 noon on Saturday, April 13, 2013until 12:00 noon on Sunday, April 14, 2013. The respondent shall deliver her to the petitioner at his residence in Fleming and thepetitioner shall return her to the respondent at a location in Moosomin, Saskatchewan to be designated by the respondent; (

e) The petitioner shall have parenting time with Emrie in Fleming, Saskatchewan from 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 20, 2013until 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 21, 2013 and from 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 27, 2013 until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 28, 2013.The respondent shall deliver her to the petitioner at his residence in Fleming on each of April 20, 2013 and April 27, 2013. The petitionershall return her to the respondent on each of April 21, 2013 and April 28, 2013 at a location in Moosomin, Saskatchewan to bedesignated by the respondent; 3.

If the respondent does not take up residency within a radius of 40 kilometres from Moosomin, Saskatchewan on or before 6:00 p.m.on May 3, 2013, the primary residency of the child shall thereupon be with the petitioner in Fleming, Saskatchewan. Thereafter, therespondent shall have liberal and generous parenting time with the child on such terms as may be agreed upon between the parties or asdetermined by the court on the application of either party; 4.

If at any time on or before May 3, 2013 the respondent decides to resume residency with the child in Fleming, Saskatchewan, sheshall give 30 days written notice of her intention to the petitioner. Upon the expiration of the said 30 day period, the petitioner shallvacate the former family home in Fleming, Saskatchewan and shall deliver up exclusive possession thereof to the respondent. Thereafter,either party may apply on seven days notice for an order varying the parenting

schedule set out in paragraph 2, clauses (

a) to (

e) of thisorder; 5. The petitioner shall pay interim child support to the respondent for the months of March, April and May, 2013 in accordance withthe Guidelines. The petitioner's 2011 annual income is determined to be $81,065.00 and the monthly support amount is determined to be$681.00. The amount of child support may be varied on the application of either party when a parenting

schedule has been establishedfor the child from and after May 3, 2013;

6. Each party shall provide the other party with current income information and a copy of his or her 2012 income tax return on orbefore April 30, 2013 and a copy of their 2013 Notice of Assessment on or before May 31, 2013; 7. Each party shall attend the Parenting After Separation and Divorce Program and file a certificate of completion with the courtwithin 45 days; and 8. A pre-trial conference shall be scheduled by the Local Registrar on an expedited basis, with the date to be set in consultation withcounsel but in any event within 60 days. IV. Application to Lift the Stay and Other Developments [16] Ms.

Jochems appealed to this Court. Mr. Jochems then applied to lift the stay of the Chambers judge’s order which had beenengaged by operation of Rule 15(1) of The Court of Appeal Rules. Caldwell J.A. granted the application but adjusted the timing of the“structured transition” so that it would begin after a pre-trial conference scheduled for May 24, 2013.

See: 2013 SKCA 53. [17] The pre-trial conference was adjourned sine die because of an apparent misunderstanding on the part of a Queen’s BenchChambers judge. [18] The visitations contemplated by the order of Caldwell J.A. began on the weekend of May 25-26 with the result that the clockembedded in the amended order of the Chambers judge was running and, if Ms. Jochems had chosen not to return to Saskatchewan(more specifically to a place within 40 kilometres of Moosomin), Mr.

Jochems would have become the primary caregiver for Emrie, onan interim basis, as of June 30, 2013. [19] The appeal itself was argued in this Court on June 19, 2013. There appeared to be a reasonable prospect of resolving the case at apre-trial conference. As a result, we reserved our decision and made an order extending the period of Mr. Jochems’ weekend access sothat, with the cooperation of the Court of Queen’s Bench, a pre-trial conference could be held in early July. [20] A pre-trial conference was conducted on July 9, 2013 but, although Mr. and Ms.

Jochems are reported to have worked hard toachieve a settlement, they were not successful in this regard. [21] Accordingly, it now falls to this Court to render a decision on the substance of the appeal. V. Analysis [22] Ms. Jochems submits that the Chambers judge’s decision should be set aside to the extent that it would involve a change in primarycaregiver if she does not move from Winnipeg back to the Moosomin area. She argues three main points: (a) “contingent” custodyorders (where a parent’s right to custody is made dependent on a relocation) cannot be made, (

b) the Chambers judge conducted noanalysis of the impact that a change in primary caregiver would have on Emrie, and (

c) the Chambers judge did not take account of thefact that the status quo is the current situation, i.e. Emrie presently lives in Winnipeg with Ms. Jochems. [23] Before turning to an assessment of Ms. Jochems’ arguments, it is important to underline the governing standard of appellate reviewin cases of this kind. Simply put, that standard involves a considerable measure of deference to the decision-making of the Chambersjudge. This Court is not entitled to simply re-make a custody and access decision from the ground up along the lines that it might havepreferred or thinks best. See: Van de Perre v.

Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014. [24] It is also important, as a preliminary consideration, to underline this Court’s general reluctance to interfere with interim orders ofthe sort in issue here. In Mantyka v. Dueck, 2012 SKCA 109, 399 Sask. R. 303, the Court commented as follows: [47] … This Court has repeatedly discouraged appeals from interim orders in family law proceedings. See, for example: Foss v. Foss(1991), (SK CA), 31 R.F.L. (3d) 367; Graham v. Tomlinson, 2010 SKCA 101, 324 D.L.R. (4th) 156 at para. 15;M.V.D. v. C.K.L., 2005 SKCA 145, 275 Sask. R. 158 at para. 6; Hall v.

Hall, 2011 SKCA 86, 337 D.L.R. (4th) 89 at para. 1. It hastaken this approach in an effort to help litigants avoid both the delays that such appeals necessarily involve and, as well, to avoid the costof such proceedings. As Jackson J.A. said in Hall "[i]n most cases, the interests of the parties, and the children, are best served byproceeding quickly to the pre-trial settlement conference stage rather than expending time and scarce resources on an appeal from aninterim order". [25] Against this background, I will deal first with the submission that this Court’s ruling in Delaire v. Delaire, 2002 SKCA 71, 223Sask.

R. 229 means that a judge simply cannot make a “contingent” custody and access order. The Court’s full decision in Delaire is setout below: [1] This appeal is from an order granting custody of two children to their mother on condition that she relocate from Calgary to NorthBattleford, where the father resides. If the mother failed to relocate, custody was to go to the father. The mother had moved from NorthBattleford to Calgary with the children, after an application to the court which allowed the move, in July 2000, and has resided there withthem since that time. The mother has appealed.

[2] We are all of the view that the trial judge erred in principle in making the custody order conditional on the mother relocating toNorth Battleford. No one questioned the ability of the mother to meet the needs of the children, nor the fact that she had been theirprimary caregiver throughout their lives.

The condition that the mother relocate to North Battleford in order to keep custody of thechildren is based on the judge's decision that she had no good reason for moving to Calgary other than her "personal benefit, to theexclusion of the benefit of the children" and that he was confident that she could find employment in North Battleford. This amounts to adecision that since the mother was motivated to move for reasons which did not satisfy the trial judge as being for the benefit of thechildren, she should be compelled to relocate. [3] The Supreme Court of Canada, in Gordon v.

Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, has made clear, at p. 61, that theparent's reason for moving is relevant only in the exceptional case where it is relevant to that parent's ability to meet the needs of thechild. In this case no one questioned the ability of the mother to meet the needs of the children in Calgary. [4] The order below is set aside, and an order granting custody to the mother is substituted therefor. In discussions as to access, thecourt indicated to the parties that access would be granted as follows: 1. The father would have access on alternate Christmas and School Holidays. 2.

The father would have access on the first weekend in each month. 3. The father would drive to Calgary to exercise his right of access, and the mother would drive to North Battleford to retrieve thechildren at the conclusion of each visit. The parties agreed to draft an order in accord with the above, filling in the necessary details.

In the absence of agreement, either partymay apply for further directions. [5] The mother will have her costs in the usual way. [26] I do not read this to be a declaration that, at the level of general principle, a court can never make an order to the effect that custodyis dependent on where a parent chooses to live. It seems to me that, depending as always on the facts of the individual case, it mightwell be in the best interests of a child to live with a particular parent if that parent resides in location X but in the child’s best interests tolive with the other parent if the first parent lives in location Y.

See: James G. McLeod, Child Custody Law and Practice, looseleaf(Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 7-17. [27] I understand the Court in Delaire to have been saying only that the trial judge in that case had erred by putting an improperemphasis on the mother’s motivation for moving to Calgary and that this had created a resulting error in the assessment of the bestinterests of the children. This same view of Delaire was adopted by this Court in Gilles v. Gilles, 2008 SKCA 97, [2008] 10 W.W.R.610 at para. 27. As a result, this aspect of Ms.

Jochems’ argument must fail. [28] I turn, therefore, to the submission that the Chambers judge conducted no analysis, or no adequate analysis, of the potential impacton Emrie of a change in principal caregiver. I agree that the judge did not work through a detailed assessment of this point. However, itis clear that he was very alert to it and that his assessment of Emrie’s situation directly underpinned his decision-making.

The Chambersjudge was expressly concerned with crafting an order that would be in the child’s best interests and wrote as follows: [34] Both parties agree that the guiding principle in matters concerning the parenting of Emrie must be "the best interests of the child".They also agree that what will be in Emrie's best interests should be assessed having regard to the principles outlined in the foundationaldecision of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Gordon v. Goertz (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, 141 Sask.

R. 241, a caseinvolving an application by a custodial parent for a change in an existing custody and access order.… … [40] In fashioning an order that will operate in Emrie's best interests, there are a number of circumstances I must take into account.One reality is that, rightly or not, Emrie has spent the last approximately eight months in Winnipeg. Another is that I cannot order therespondent to move back to Saskatchewan. At most, I may order her to return Emrie to the jurisdiction of the court, leaving it for her todecide if she will return as well.

Given her deep care and concern for Emrie, I expect that she will but if she does not, I must be preparedto find that it will be in Emrie's interests to have her primary residence with the petitioner, with liberal and regular parenting time to therespondent. [emphasis added]

[ 29 ] I do not understand Ms. Jochems to say that Mr. Jochems will be unable to parent Emrie properly. On this issue, she effectively contends only (and this is contradicted by Mr. Jochems) that he did very little by way of caring for Emrie, or showing interest in her, during the three months between her birth and the move to Winnipeg. There is no suggestion in the material before the Court to indicate that Mr.

Jochems has had any difficulty looking after Emrie during his recent periods of overnight access or that Emrie has been anything other than happy and safe while in his care. [ 30 ] I also note on this front that Mr. Jochems works full-time. But, that said, Ms. Jochems works as well. As I read the file, it appears that grandparents will be enrolled to look after Emrie during the day no matter which parent is her primary caregiver. Mr.

Jochems’ family is said to be fully prepared to offer him help should he become the primary caregiver. [ 31 ] All of this information played itself out in a situation where the Chambers judge was very concerned about the unilateral way in which Ms. Jochems had taken Emrie to Winnipeg and about the impact that the move and Ms. Jochems’ subsequent conduct had had on the relationship between Mr. Jochems and the child. In the words of the Chambers judge, Ms. Jochems had “severely curtailed” Mr. Jochems’ ability to spend reasonable parenting time with Emrie.

Thus, although it is obviously unusual to contemplate a change in primary caregivers on the strength of affidavit evidence alone, the particular circumstances of this case are such that I am not persuaded this Court is entitled to intervene on the basis that the Chambers judge did not adequately consider the impact of his order on Emrie. To the contrary, he made his order precisely because he assessed it to be in her best interests. [ 32 ] Ms. Jochems’ final argument is that the Chambers judge did not take account of the reality that the status quo of the matter before him was a situation where Ms.

Jochems and Emrie lived in Winnipeg with Ms. Jochems’ parents. She contends that this state of affairs should have been preserved pending the trial. [ 33 ] This submission is, in effect, another way of saying that the judge did not consider Emrie’s best interests. Again, I am not convinced that the Chambers judge made any error on this point which, given the governing standard of review, warrants the intervention of this Court. The judge was confronted with a difficult situation where one parent had moved a very young child unilaterally and without the benefit of a court order.

While always keeping in mind the best interests of Emrie, one of his central concerns was to avoid rewarding Ms. Jochems’ actions, if possible, and to also avoid the creation of a “new normal” which might effectively determine the result of the trial in her favour. In this regard, he quoted a variety of relevant authorities including this Court’s recent decision in Mantyka v. Dueck , supra : [ 34 ] The difficult business of adjudicating mobility issues can be made even more challenging when a custodial parent relocates before the propriety of the relocation is raised in court.

This is because the custodial parent may have already quit a job, sold a house or otherwise given up accommodation in his or her original place of residence and taken up work or made living arrangements in the new place of residence. The children too may have left a school and their established patterns and settled into a new school, made new friends and developed new routines. There can be, as a result, a significant measure of disruption involved in reversing or rolling back a relocation which has already taken place.

This is not a part of the equation when a custodial parent seeks leave to relocate in advance of a planned or anticipated move. [ 35 ] That said, a family law culture of "move first and ask questions later" is self-evidently not something that can be either approved or encouraged. Neither parents nor their counsel should see relocations of children as a means of obtaining tactical advantages in custody or access disputes.

Among other things, that is why there is a distinct reluctance to give any credit to a custodial parent who moves unilaterally, knowing that the move will be controversial, and then attempts to resist an application to reverse the move by arguing that he or she has quit a job, sold a house or otherwise made decisions which will be difficult to roll back. Problems of this sort are generally seen as being self-imposed. See for example: Ofukany v. Ofukany , supra [2009 SKQB 234] at paras. 6 and 7; Brandt v. Dean , 2010 SKQB 401 , 363 Sask.

R. 293 at para. 19 . [34] I agree that, on the face of things, there are obvious concerns about the prospect of changing the primary caregiver of a very young child on an interim basis when this, by definition, means that custody might change again if the result of the trial should go against Mr. Jochems on that issue. This sort of back-and-forthing would be self-evidently difficult for most children. However, at the same time, the Chambers judge needed to be alert to Emrie’s interest in establishing a meaningful relationship with Mr.

Jochems. [35] On the facts of this case, it seems to me that the Chambers judge was entitled to decline to treat Ms. Jochems’ unilateral move to Winnipeg as having created a new status quo and to refuse to give effect to her reluctance to return to Saskatchewan. As indicated, the central challenge addressed by the Chambers judge was one of determining Emrie’s best interests. He was not directly concerned, as a first priority, with Ms. Jochems’ interests. Without in any way meaning to trivialize the effect of the marriage breakdown on Ms.

Jochems, it should be noted (and this was underlined by the Chambers judge) that Ms. Jochems went to Winnipeg simply because she no longer wanted to live with Mr. Jochems. She did not move to improve her economic or educational prospects, to escape abuse or to seek out better opportunities for Emrie. She did not identify any way in which the move benefitted Emrie. [ 36 ] Most of the concerns expressed by Ms. Jochems about relocating to Saskatchewan relate to her welfare, not Emrie’s. She says, for example, that she will have to quit her job in Winnipeg.

The case law tends to treat these sorts of problems as being “self-inflicted.” In any event, it is also worth noting that Mr. Jochems has undertaken to vacate the family home in favour of Ms. Jochems and Emrie if Ms. Jochems relocates back to Fleming. Further, Ms. Jochems’ job at the day care where she had worked before her move to Winnipeg is apparently available to her. (To the extent there is any dispute about this point, it is evident that there are many job opportunities in the Moosomin area.) In other words, a move by Ms.

Jochems back to Saskatchewan, although obliging her to quit her current job in Winnipeg and undergo the stress of moving and settling back into a Saskatchewan community, would nonetheless be much less disruptive than might often be the case in a situation where a parent contemplates the reversal of a unilateral move. [ 37 ] I am not persuaded that the Chambers judge committed a reviewable error in his approach to the fact that Ms. Jochems had relocated Emrie to Winnipeg and had been there with her for some eight months as of the date of the interim order. VI. Conclusion

[ 38 ] I conclude that Ms. Jochems’ appeal must be dismissed with costs in the usual way. [ 39 ] Having said that, it is necessary to make some adjustments to the order of the Chambers judge so as to give effect to the “structured transition” he contemplated. This is so because, in light of the time which has passed since the order was made, the dates originally specified in it have been overtaken. Thus, in the end, the order will be amended to read as follows: 1. The parties shall have joint custody of Emrie Margaret Jochems born April 14, 2012; 2.

The primary residence of the child shall remain with the respondent on the condition that the petitioner shall have parenting time with Emrie on such terms and in such places as may be agreed between the petitioner and respondent and, failing such agreement, shall have parenting time by way of picking up Emrie at the respondent's residence in Winnipeg on July 27 and August 3, 10, 17, and 24 at 10:00 a.m. and with the respondent picking up Emrie at a location in Moosomin (to be designated by the respondent) at 5:00 p.m. on July 28 and August 4, 11, 18, and 25; 3.

If the respondent does not take up residency within a radius of 40 kilometres from Moosomin, Saskatchewan on or before 6:00 p.m. on September 1, 2013, the primary residency of the child shall thereupon be with the petitioner in Fleming, Saskatchewan. Thereafter, the respondent shall have liberal and generous parenting time with the child on such terms as may be agreed upon between the parties or as determined by the court on the application of either party; 4.

If the respondent decides to resume residency with the child in Fleming, Saskatchewan, she shall give as much written notice of her intention to the petitioner as possible and, in any event, shall give not less than 15 days written notice of her intention. Upon receipt of the said notice, the petitioner shall vacate the former family home in Fleming, Saskatchewan as soon as reasonably possible and, in any event, no later than 15 days after receipt of the notice and shall deliver up exclusive possession thereof to the respondent.

Thereafter, either party may apply on seven days notice for an order varying the parenting

schedule set out in paragraph 2 of this order; 5. The petitioner shall pay interim child support to the respondent for the months of March, April and May, 2013, and on an ongoing basis, in accordance with the Guidelines . The petitioner's 2011 annual income is determined to be $81,065.00 and the monthly support amount is determined to be $681.00. The amount of child support may be varied on the application of either party when a parenting

schedule has been established for the child from and after September 1, 2013; 6. Each party shall provide the other party with current income information and a copy of his or her 2012 income tax return on or before April 30, 2013 and a copy of their 2013 Notice of Assessment on or before May 31, 2013; 7.

Each party shall attend the Parenting After Separation and Divorce Program and file a certificate of completion with the court within 45 days. [ 40 ] Justice Wilson, who conducted the pre-trial conference in this matter, has indicated her willingness to conduct a further settlement pre-trial conference or a management pre-trial conference following this decision. Accordingly, counsel are directed to contact the Court of Queen’s Bench to make such arrangements as may be appropriate. DATED at the City of Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 25th day of July, A.D. 2013. “Richards C.J.S.” Richards C.J.S.

I concur “Richards C.J.S.” for Ottenbreit J.A. as per authorization I concur “Caldwell J.A.” Caldwell J.A.