Docket: CACV2074 United Steelworkers, Local 7458 Appellant - v. -, 2013 SKCA 86

THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2013 SKCA 86 Date: 2013-08-16 Between: Docket: CACV2074 United Steelworkers, Local 7458 Appellant - and - Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (Cory Division) Respondent Coram: Cameron, Jackson & Ottenbreit JJ.A. Counsel: Gary Bainbridge for the Appellant Kevin Wilson, Q.C. for the Respondent Appeal: From: 2011 SKQB 86 Heard: March 25, 2013 Disposition: Appeal Dismissed Written Reasons: August 16, 2013 By: The Honourable Madam Justice Georgina Jackson

In Concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Cameron The Honourable Mr. Justice Ottenbreit Jackson J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] This is an appeal from the decision of Acton J. ( 2011 SKQB 86 , 390 Sask. R. 34) dismissing an application to quash a decision of the Labour Relations Board ( (2010), 177 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 1 , LRB File No. 026-09). The essential issue is whether Acton J. erred by determining that the Board’s decision, finding that the activities of the Potash Corporation did not breach its obligation to bargain collectively, is reasonable. I conclude that he did not err; the appeal should be dismissed. II.

Background [ 2 ] The parties before the Court are Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. (Cory Division) and United Steelworkers, Local 7458, which represents the employees at the Cory mine. The Union filed an application with the Board, alleging that the Potash Corporation had committed an unfair labour practice contrary to s. 11(1) (

c) of The Trade Union Act , R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17 by failing to bargain collectively with it and instead bargaining directly with the employees. [ 3 ] The dispute between the Potash Corporation and the Union arises in this context. The vacation year for the employees at the Cory mine runs from July 1st to June 30th of the following year. Employees at the Cory mine receive their annual vacation pay at the start of the vacation year and are thereafter required to take their vacation time within the vacation year (Article 6.05(

a) of the Collective Agreement, as modified by letter agreement). Having been paid in advance for the time they are away on vacation, the employees are not paid while actually on vacation. [ 4 ] The Cory mine employees were on strike from August 7, 2008 to November 13, 2008, which reduced the time available for vacation during the 2008-2009 vacation year by approximately three months.

In light of the shortened year, some employees inquired about the possibility of waiving their vacation entitlement and continuing to work at their regular rate of pay. [ 5 ] On February 9, 2009, the Potash Corporation met with the Union to raise the notion of allowing employees to waive part or all of their remaining vacation time for the 2008-2009 vacation year only. The Union opposed the idea but, after further discussions, agreed to canvass the individual members as to their preference.

Eighty percent of those canvassed rejected the option of working rather than taking vacation. [ 6 ] On February 12, 2009, the Potash Corporation announced that layoffs would take place from March 22, 2009 to May 16, 2009 to correct an inventory overage, thus further reducing the time available to take vacation leave by an additional six weeks or so. [ 7 ] By letter to the Union dated February 25, 2009, the Potash Corporation advised that it was “unfortunate” the parties “were unable to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.” Accordingly, the letter continued, the Potash Corporation “will be mutually agreeing with employees” who wish to waive their vacation, and enter into a written formal agreement with such employees for the purpose of filing with the Director of Labour Standards under s. 37 of The Labour Standards Act , R.S.S. 1978, c.

L-1. [ 8 ] The Potash Corporation then posted a notice in the workplace, advising employees that they could waive their vacation time by continuing to work for pay, if they wished to do so, by approaching a General Foreman, and that the Potash Corporation would enter into a separate written agreement with each willing employee in purported compliance with s. 37 of The Labour Standards Act . About 20 employees chose to do so. [ 9 ] Shortly thereafter, the Union filed an application with the Board, alleging an unfair labour practice pursuant to s. 11(1) (

c) of The Trade Union Act , which compels the Potash Corporation to bargain collectively with the Union, and makes it an unfair labour practice not to do so. No employee opted to grieve the matter; nor did the Union take any steps in that regard. III. Relevant Statutory and Collective Bargaining Provisions [ 10 ] The relevant provisions of The Trade Union Act are:

Interpretation 2 In this Act: (b) “bargaining collectively” means negotiating in good faith with a view to the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement, or a renewal or revision of a bargaining agreement , the embodiment in writing or writings of the terms of agreement arrived at in negotiations or required to be inserted in a collective bargaining agreement by this Act, the execution by or on behalf of the parties of such agreement, and the negotiating from time to time for the settlement of disputes and grievances of employees covered by the agreement or represented by a trade union representing the majority of employees in an appropriate unit;

Rights of employees 3 Employees have the right to organize in and to form, join or assist trade unions and to bargain collectively through a trade union of their own choosing ; and the trade union designated or selected for the purpose of bargaining collectively by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for that purpose shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in that unit for the purpose of bargaining collectively. Unfair labour practices 11

(1) It shall be an unfair labour practice for an employer, employer’s agent or any other person acting on behalf of the employer: … (

c) to fail or refuse to bargain collectively with representatives elected or appointed, not necessarily being the employees of the employer, by a trade union representing the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit; [emphasis added] [ 11 ] The relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are: MANAGEMENT RIGHTS 3.01 The Union recognizes the right of the Company to operate and manage its business in all respects except as expressly modified or restricted by this Agreement and to make and alter from time to time reasonable rules and regulations to be observed by employees , provided however, that any dispute as to the reasonableness of such rules and regulations or any dispute involving claims of discrimination inequity or unfairness against any employee in the application of such rules and regulations shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure of this Agreement . 3.02 The Company shall have the right to hire; to discipline, demote and discharge employees for just and sufficient cause; and to direct the workforce, provided however, that any exercise of these rights in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement shall be subject to the Grievance Procedure. 3.03 The Company shall not exercise its right to direct the workforce in a discriminatory, inequitable or unfair manner. ... 6.05 (

a) The annual vacation period begins July 1 each year and vacations earned as in

Article 6.01 must be taken before June 30 of the following year . 6.05 (

b) By mutual written agreement between an employee and the Company, vacations may be carried forward and accumulated in the next vacation year . The Union shall be furnished a copy of such agreement when made. Current year vacation will take precedence over prior years carry forward and accumulated vacations, regardless of seniority. [emphasis added] A further letter of agreement between the Potash Corporation and the Union provided: Pursuant to

Article 6.05(

c) it is agreed that for the vacation year, in anticipation of a vacation shutdown, the Company will pay out all outstanding vacation monies earned up to and including May 30th of each year for the life of this Agreement. This payout will occur on June 30th of each year for the life of this Agreement , however an employee may elect, in writing by May 31, to have his available vacation pay allotment paid out when he takes his vacation time . The formula to be used is the total vacation earnings divided by the number of entitled vacation hours.

If the employee makes this election, the vacation earnings will be paid in the applicable pay period in which the employee utilized vacation hours. (see: Letter of Understanding #6 at p. 111 of the collective agreement; emphasis added) [ 12 ] The relevant provision of The Labour Standards Act is: Agreement to forego annual holiday 37(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, an employer and an employee may enter into a written agreement to the effect that, because of shortage of labour, the employee will not take an annual holiday to which he is entitled under

section 30 .

(2) Where a written agreement made by an employer and employee pursuant to subsection (1) is filed with the director: (

a) the employer is not subject to

section 31 with respect to that employee; and (

b) the employer shall, within twelve months after the date on which the employee became entitled to an annual holiday, pay to theemployee the annual holiday pay to which he is entitled in respect of the annual holiday. [emphasis added] IV. Decision of the Board [13] The Board dismissed the Union’s application. The Board found that “neither the proposal which the [Potash Corporation]communicated to members of the bargaining unit nor the individual agreements that were signed with individual employees represent aviolation of s. 11(1)(

c) of the Act” (para. 40). In support of this conclusion, the Board found that the Potash Corporation’s actions fellwithin the scope of the management rights clause contained in the collective agreement and that they were analogous to the granting ofother forms of leave, i.e. maternity leave, which would not be bargained with the Union. [14] Relying upon Saskatchewan (Community Living Division, Dept. Community Resources)(Re) (2009), 178 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 195, (Sk.

L.R.B.), the Board concluded that because the Potash Corporation’s proposal could have been the subject ofcollective bargaining does not mean that it had to be the subject of collective bargaining outside of the statutory “open period” providedfor in The Trade Union Act (see para. 42).

Since the Potash Corporation’s proposal did not involve a “technological change” within themeaning of s. 43 of the Act and there was no “re-opener” provision in the collective agreement that would have been triggered by thePotash Corporation’s proposal, the Board was satisfied that the Potash Corporation’s proposal fell within the scope of the managementrights clause contained in the collective agreement (para. 43). [15] The Board addressed other arguments of the Union, including that the Potash Corporation’s conduct in consulting with the Unionprevented it from later implementing its proposal over the Union’s objections.

The Board accepted the Corporation’s evidence that itsofficers advised the Union early on that it had the management right to present its proposal to the employees regardless of the Union’sposition on the matter. From all this, the Board concluded that the Potash Corporation was not, at that time, under an obligation toaccede to the Union’s wishes regarding its proposal.

Of particular significance to the Board, in coming to this conclusion, was the factthat the Potash Corporation’s proposal occurred mid-contract and outside of the statutory obligation on the Potash Corporation to bargaincollectively with the Union (para. 47). V. Decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench [16] The Union applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench for an order quashing the Board’s decision. [17] Relying on Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners ofAmerica, Local 1985 v.

Graham Construction and Engineering Ltd., 2008 SKCA 67, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 622, leave to appeal to S.C.C.refused, [2008] 3 S.C.R. vii, Acton J. found that the standard of review applicable to the Board’s decision is reasonableness rather thancorrectness. He then asked himself the following series of questions (at para 14): 2. Did the Board commit reversible errors in dismissing the applicant’s unfair labour practice application? (

a) Did the Board answer a question not put before it nor argued before it, namely, whether the respondent had an obligation tobargain … mid-term of the collective agreement? (

b) Did the Board fail to answer the question put before it, and argued before it, namely, whether the respondent had failed tobargain with the applicant? (

c) Did the Board ignore or fail to refer to past jurisprudence argued and placed before it in relation to direct bargaining? (

d) Was the Board’s finding that the respondent was only required to bargain during the open period reasonable? (

e) Was the Board’s finding that it was not required to decide whether the respondent's proposal complied with the requirements of s.37 of The Labour Standards Act reasonable? (

f) In the alternative, if the Board’s finding that it was not required to decide whether the respondent's proposal complied with therequirements of s. 37 of The Labour Standards Act was unreasonable, was s. 37 applicable? [18] Acton J. answered all of the questions negatively, finding that the Board’s decision was within the range of reasonable outcomes. [19] With that, the Union appealed to this Court pursuant to s. 7(2) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000, S.S. 2000, c. C-42.1. VI. Analysis [20] It is common ground that the standard of review to apply to the question, of whether the Queen’s Bench Court erred when it found

the Board’s decision reasonable, is the standard of what has come to be known as “correctness.” [21] The Union does not take issue with Acton J.’s conclusion that the standard of review of the Board’s decision is reasonableness, butnonetheless the Union states the issues that this Court must decide as follows: 1. Did the learned Chambers Judge err in law in failing to find that the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board (“Board”) answered aquestion not put before it, nor argued before it, namely, whether the Potash Corporation had an obligation to bargain mid-term of acollective agreement; 2.

Did the learned Chambers Judge err in law in failing to find that the Board failed to answer the question put before it, and arguedbefore it, namely, whether the Potash Corporation had failed to bargain with the certified bargaining agent (the Appellant Union),regardless of when the bargaining occurred; 3. Did the learned Chambers Judge err in law in failing to find that the Board ignored or failed to refer to its considerable pastjurisprudence, argued and placed before it, as to the illegality of direct bargaining; and 4.

Did the learned Chambers Judge err in law in finding in the alternative that s. 37 of The Labour Standards Act has application,when inter alia that

section requires a shortage of labour, and the Potash Corporation was in fact laying off employees. [22] In my respectful view, this statement of the issues is not consistent with a review on the basis of reasonableness as articulated byDunsmuir and the Supreme Court of Canada decisions post-dating that decision.

For the most part, the Union uses language and refersto concepts that pre-date Dunsmuir and suggest a review by the Queen’s Bench based on correctness. [23] On what constitutes a review based on the standard of reasonableness, it is useful to repeat the key passage of Dunsmuir: [47] Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standardsof reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result.Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions.

Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range ofacceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decisionreasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concernedmostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process.

But it is also concernedwith whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.[emphasis added] [24] Since Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada has reiterated how a tribunal's decision is to be assessed, based on a standard ofreasonableness. The most recent of these decisions are: Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General),2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471; Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v.

Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals,2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 616 and Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708. In the last of these decisions, Abella J., writing for a unanimous Court, stated: [13] … Dunsmuir … represents a respectful appreciation that a wide range of specialized decision-makers routinely render decisionsin their respective spheres of expertise, using concepts and language often unique to their areas and rendering decisions that are oftencounter-intuitive to a generalist.

That was the basis for this Court’s new direction in Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v.New Brunswick Liquor Corp., (SCC), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, where Dickson J. urged restraint in assessing the decisions ofspecialized administrative tribunals.

This decision oriented the Court towards granting greater deference to tribunals, shown inDunsmuir’s conclusion that tribunals should “have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions” (para.47). [emphasis added] [25] According to Dunsmuir, a court must consider both the outcome and the quality of the reasons, having regard for their justification,transparency and intelligibility. As this Court stated in United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1400 v.

Wal-Mart Canada Corp., 2012 SKCA 131 at para. 127; 358 D.L.R. (4th) 313, “[u]nreasonable error along the way could conceivably vitiate that decision, but acourt must be careful not to lose sight of the fact that at bottom the individual issues do not in and of themselves amount to ‘reasonableconclusions’, ‘acceptable and rational solutions’ or ‘outcomes’ to use the words of Dunsmuir.” In the instant case, the Board arrived atone outcome: finding no unfair labour practice as alleged. [26] Having regard for this body of authority, the issue this Court must decide is whether Acton J. erred by failing to find the Board’sdecision unreasonable on the ground that the Board misinterpreted the governing legislation and the collective agreement and, as a result,failed to find the Potash Corporation had refused to bargain collectively. [27] In addition to casting the issues in the way that it has, I recognize that the Union has also made discrete arguments, which can betaken as challenging the reasonableness of the Board’s decision, and which I will now address. [28] The Union’s principal argument is that the Board’s decision is unreasonable because it decided whether there was an obligation tobargain mid-term rather than deciding whether the employer’s actions constituted direct bargaining—and, according to the Union’s

submissions, those actions self-evidently constitute direct bargaining as evidenced by the past jurisprudence of the Board and by virtue ofthe fact the Potash Corporation approached the Union first before going to the employees directly. I cannot give effect to the Union’sarguments for the following reasons. [29] First, the Union’s argument assumes that “direct bargaining” is a legal concept that is capable of precise definition. The SupremeCourt of Canada has held that direct bargaining is illegal, but no definition per se of direct bargaining exists: Syndicat Catholique desEmployés de Magasins de Québec Inc. v.

Cie Paquet, (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 206 and McGavin Toastmaster Ltd. v.Ainscough, (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 718—decisions relied upon by the Union in the within appeal. Broad principles exist,but even with respect to those, much remains in the eye of the beholder, requiring the exercise of judgment in any given case. Forexample, it is commonly understood that the prohibition against direct bargaining is designed to protect the authority of the union as thesole bargaining agent of the employees and not to undermine or seek to subvert the union or its authority (David J.

Corry, CollectiveBargaining and Agreement, looseleaf, vol. 1 (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2013) at 8:3000 and the authorities referred to therein).Making this point, however, does not answer the question as to whether, in any given case, the employer’s actions amount to directbargaining.

Not only is there no bright line as to when an employer will be found to have engaged in direct bargaining, the term isusually interpreted and applied by arbitral boards and not by the courts and is usually considered in the context of employers negotiatingwith employees when no collective agreement is in force or when the parties are engaged in negotiation to complete a new agreement.(See: Ottawa Citizen (The) v. Ottawa Newspaper Guild, Local 205, [1979] 2 Can.

L.R.B.R. 251 at 271.) [30] Second, contrary to the Union’s argument, the Board did not evade or overlook whether the Potash Corporation’s actions amountedto direct bargaining. The Board referred specifically to the Union’s complaint (para. 2). The Union’s complaint was expressed in thismanner: 4. The applicant alleges that an unfair labour practice (or a violation of the Act) has been and/or is being engaged in by the saidEmployer by reason of the following facts:

j) These actions and notifications by the Employer are a direct affront to the Union's role as the certified and exclusive bargaining agentin this workplace respecting all terms and conditions of employment of its members. This attempt to circumvent the Union after initially– and properly – seeking the Union's consent undermines, intentionally or otherwise, the role of the Union in this workplace, constitutesa failure to bargain with the Union, and amounts to a violation of

section ll(l)(

c) of The Trade Union Act. [Appeal Book, pp. 33a-34a;emphasis added] The Board then further explained the Union’s position, first by stating that “the mischief the Act seeks to avoid is direct bargaining itself,because of the corrosive effect circumventing the Union can have on the Union’s role as the exclusive representative agent for allmembers of the bargaining unit” (para. 25) and second, by citing the decisions relied upon by the Union (see: United Food andCommercial Workers, Local 1400 v. Culinar Inc., [1999] Sask. L.R.B.R 97, LRB File No. 038-98; United Food and CommercialWorkers, Local 1400 v.

Madison Development Group Inc., [1996] Sask. L.R.B.R. 75, LRB File No. 131-95; and Saskatoon City PoliceAssociation v. Saskatoon Board of Police Commissioners, [1993] S.L.R.B.D. No. 72 (QL), (LRB File No. 240-93)). [31] Third, the Board did not ignore its past jurisprudence. The Board mentioned the key decisions, when reviewing the Union’sarguments. More importantly, the Board’s past jurisprudence does not dictate a particular result in this case; each decision cited to us isdistinguishable and illustrates how fact specific each ruling is.

For example, Saskatoon City Police Association, supra concerns acomplaint made under s. 11(1)(

m) of The Trade Union Act. Section 11(1)(

m) prohibits an employer from unilaterally changing rates ofpay, hours of work or other conditions of employment without bargaining collectively respecting the change with the trade unionrepresenting the majority of employees in the appropriate unit and is intended to protect the union’s bargaining rights once a collectiveagreement has expired and a new agreement has yet to be negotiated. The Board held on that occasion that the employer had unilaterallyacted to change the terms of employment, but the relevance of the decision in this context is questionable.

The Board in the within casedid not decide that the Potash Corporation had changed terms or conditions of employment for the individual employees who acceptedits offer, but rather that the Potash Corporation had not failed to bargain collectively because it had no obligation to do so.

Admittedly,the Board navigates a fine line in a case such as this, but surely, it is for the Board to determine whether the employer has crossed thatline and for this Court to defer to the Board’s decision, in the absence of something more egregious than what has occurred in the instantcase. [32] Re Regina Public Library, [2001] S.L.R.B.D. No. 81 (QL) may be distinguished for similar reasons.

On that occasion, the Boardconcluded that the employer’s actions, in forwarding a proposal to certain bargaining unit members for the creation of a newclassification of casual employees, constituted a failure to bargain collectively. The Board characterized the employer’s actions asseeking employee approval to a “bargaining proposal” which “undermined the role of the Union as the exclusive representative of theemployees by getting part of the Union’s membership to sign onto a collective bargaining proposal that was inconsistent with theUnion’s overall bargaining strategy and position” (para. 26, emphasis added).

Again, this decision does not compel this Court toconclude that the Union’s position had been undermined when the Board was not prepared on the facts of this case to so decide. [33] The determination of whether the Potash Corporation had engaged in direct bargaining was squarely before the Board. Contrary tothe Union’s arguments, the Board did not evade the answering of it.

The Board began its reasons with this comment: [42] As this Board found in Saskatchewan (Community Living Division), supra [ ], the Employer's proposalcertainly could have been the subject of collective bargaining; certainly the parties had negotiated and agreed to similar workplaceissues.

However, it would be an erroneous leap of logic to conclude that allowing employees to waive or [forego] all or a portion of theiraccumulated vacation entitlement must be the subject of collective bargaining outside of the statutory "open period'' provided for in theAct. [italics in original; underlining mine] [34] This statement is obviously reasonable and is the cornerstone of the Board’s analysis that follows. From there, the Boardconcluded that the employer’s actions fell not within the prohibited area of direct bargaining but in the realm of management rights.

Thatfinding takes its character from a series of circumstances that resulted in a significantly shortened production year. The Board made afurther finding of fact that the Potash Corporation had made it clear at the outset that it was preserving unto itself its management right in

these circumstances to approach the employees directly.

Finally, the Board stated that the Potash Corporation should not be faulted or penalized for behaving in a manner to be encouraged in labour relations indicative of the mature relationship it had with the Union. [ 35 ] Given that a failure to bargain collectively encompasses an employer’s actions in direct bargaining, the Board’s determination that the employer had not failed to bargain collectively constitutes a finding by the Board that the employer did not engage in direct bargaining as that term is understood by the Supreme Court jurisprudence. [ 36 ] The Union argues further that the Potash Corporation’s actions clearly do not fall within the management rights clause because the Potash Corporation entered into individual contracts with the employees as sheer proof that what happened here amounted to direct bargaining.

This argument overlooks s. 37 of The Labour Standards Act , which appears on its face to require such contracts. If for some reason that

section does not apply, it does not change the fact that the Potash Corporation entered into the individual contracts to comply with that Act and for no other reason. Nor does it affect the reasonableness of the Board’s conclusion that the subject matter of the contracts was positioned beyond the scope of the terms and conditions of the collective agreement. [ 37 ] Whether an employer’s actions fall within the area of management rights or whether they constitute a failure to bargain collectively are questions that have no relevance in the law outside of the labour relations realm.

They are also concepts that target the heart of labour relations, in that an employer that engages in “direct bargaining” is not collectively bargaining—a core requirement of the Act . As such, the questions before the Board were quintessentially part of its decision-making mantel and its resolution of them must be accorded deference by the reviewing court, and by this Court, in its turn. [ 38 ] It goes almost without saying that the Board’s reasons are intelligible and transparent.

As to outcome, given the whole of the evidence and what appears to be the one-off nature of the decision, this Court cannot say that it is not reasonable. Facially speaking, it does not appear that the Potash Corporation sought to subvert the role of the Union or to undermine its authority. Nothing in what the Board has done here leads this Court to conclude that the Board has resiled from the principle that the collective agreement, not individual negotiation, should govern the employment relationship in a unionized workplace.

Rather, a unanimous Board compared the Potash Corporation’s actions more to the daily running of the corporation than to the momentous matters of bargaining changes to the relationship. In short, this Court must accord the Board’s decision the deference it deserves. VII. Conclusion [ 39 ] The appeal is dismissed with costs in the usual way. DATED at the City of Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 16th day of August, A.D. 2013. ___ “Jackson J.A.” _________________ Jackson J.A. I concur ___ “Cameron J.A.” _______________ Cameron J.A. I concur ___ “Ottenbreit J.A.” ______________ Ottenbreit J.A.