Docket: CACR2406 Carlin Nordstrom Appellant - v. -, 2014 SKCA 124

THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2014 SKCA 124 Date: 2014-11-27 Between: Docket: CACR2406 Carlin Nordstrom Appellant - and - Her Majesty the Queen Respondent Coram: Richards C.J.S., Caldwell and Whitmore JJ.A. Counsel: Carlin Nordstrom appearing on his own behalf Andrew Davis and James Fyfe for the respondent Appeal: From: 2011 SKPC 166 and 2014 SKQB 26 Heard: October 21, 2014 Disposition: Appeal dismissed Written Reasons: November 27, 2014 By: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards

In Concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Caldwell The Honourable Mr. Justice Whitmore Richards C.J.S. I. introduction [ 1 ] The appellant, Carlin Nordstrom, is a Treaty Indian. He operated a game farm on a large fenced-off part of the Poundmaker First Nation near North Battleford, Saskatchewan. Mr. Nordstrom stocked the farm with elk and white-tailed deer. His clients, usually Americans, paid to hunt those animals. [ 2 ] Mr. Nordstrom became entangled in the regulatory scheme established by various federal and provincial wildlife management statutes and regulations.

His difficulties related principally to the importing of animals and the exporting of animal parts. He was convicted after trial in the Provincial Court of various counts under The Wildlife Act, 1998 , SS 1998, c W-13.12 [ The Wildlife Act ] and the Wild Animal and Plant Protection and Regulation of International and Interprovincial Trade Act , SC 1992, c 52 [ WAPPRIITA ]. He was also convicted of obstruction of justice. [ 3 ] Mr. Nordstrom then appealed to the Court of Queen’s Bench in its capacity as a

summary conviction appeal court. There, some of his convictions were set aside. Nonetheless, when the dust had settled, Mr. Nordstrom still stood guilty of a number of offences under both The Wildlife Act and WAPPRIITA . [ 4 ] In this Court, Mr. Nordstrom seeks to overturn several aspects of the appeal judge’s decision and to secure acquittals across the board. His submissions raise a number of somewhat involved questions. Most centrally, these questions concern the meaning of key terms in The Wildlife Act , the effect of various regulations made under that Act and the

interpretation and significance of certain Poundmaker First Nation bylaws and Band Council resolutions. II. Background [ 5 ] In order to set the stage for a proper examination of Mr. Nordstrom’s arguments, it is necessary to lay out something of both the applicable regulatory scheme and to summarize the events that led to charges being laid against him. A. The Regulatory Scheme [ 6 ] The regulatory framework governing the game farming industry has both provincial and federal components. [ 7 ] The Wildlife Act is the heart of the provincial scheme.

It defines “wildlife” as follows: 2 In this Act: … “wildlife” means a vertebrate animal of any species, excluding fish, that is wild by nature in Saskatchewan and includes: (

a) any part, tissue, genetic material, eggs, sperm, embryos or other forms of developmental life; and (

b) any exotic wildlife found in Saskatchewan; [ 8 ] The Wildlife Act then goes on to provide, among other things, that wildlife may not be imported to or exported from the province without a licence: 31

(1) Subject to the regulations, no person shall, without having first obtained an export or import licence issued pursuant to this Act or the regulations: (

a) export or cause to be exported from Saskatchewan any wildlife; or (

b) import, release or introduce into Saskatchewan any wildlife. … [ 9 ] The Wildlife Regulations, 1981 , RRS c W-13.1 Reg 1 say that, if a person obtains a big game licence and attaches the seal to wildlife taken pursuant to the licence, the seal is authority to export legal limits of the game in question:

(1) For the purposes of subsection 31(1) of the Act: (

a) a game bird licence or big game licence seal constitutes the authority to export legal limits of the game taken under that licence, if the game accompanies the licensee; … (

b) a game export permit on the form provided by the department must accompany any shipment of game out of the province which is not accompanying the licensee; …

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), raw big game hides may be exported if a big game seal is attached to the hide. [ 10 ] There are also provincial regulations dealing with game farms. The Domestic Game Farm Animal Regulations , RRS c A-20.2 Reg 10 [ The Game Farm Regulations ] establish operating requirements for such farms in relation to matters like enclosures for animals, herd inventories and programs to monitor animal health. The Regulations also set out detailed rules for labelling slaughtered animals. Section 18(2) is of particular interest here.

It says this: 18(2) Subject to subsection (3), every domestic game farm operator who slaughters or authorizes the slaughter of a domestic game farm animal on his or her domestic game farm shall ensure that the hard antlers, horns, hide and carcass of the animal are labelled with the following particulars before they are removed from the farm: (

a) the date of the slaughter; (

b) the unique identification of the animal; (

c) the species and sex of the animal; and (

d) the domestic game farm licence number or the name of the domestic game farm operator. [ 11 ] It is also necessary to have regard to The Captive Wildlife Regulations , RRS c W-13.1 Reg 13. They set out what might be called a game farm exemption from the export licence requirements found in s. 31(1)(

a) of The Wildlife Act . That exemption is expressed in these terms: 13(1) Any person importing or exporting wildlife or parts of wildlife shall obtain an import or export licence, as the case requires, pursuant to

section 30 of the Act.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) but subject to subsection (3), a person who holds a valid licence pursuant to The Domestic Game Farm Animal Regulations may export domestic game farm animals without an export licence.

(3) A person who holds a valid and subsisting licence described in subsection (2) who imports or exports wildlife for a purpose other than that mentioned in subsection (2) shall comply with subsection (1). [emphasis added] [ 12 ] Those are the key components of the provincial regulatory scheme. There is also legislation on the federal side of the ledger. WAPPRIITA regulates the interprovincial movement of animals and animal products. Sections 6, 7, 8(

a) and 11 of that Act are set out below: 6.

(1) No person shall import into Canada any animal or plant that was taken, or any animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant, that was possessed, distributed or transported in contravention of any law of any foreign state.

(2) Subject to the regulations, no person shall, except under and in accordance with a permit issued pursuant to subsection 10(1), import into Canada or export from Canada any animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant.

(3) Subject to the regulations, no person shall, except under and in accordance with a permit issued pursuant to subsection 10(1), transport from one province to another province any animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant. 7.

(1) Where the transportation out of a province of an animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant, is permitted by the province only if the person who transports it holds a permit issued by a competent authority in that province, no person shall, except under and in accordance with such a permit, transport any animal, plant or part or derivative of an animal or plant from that province to another province.

(2) No person shall transport from a province to another province any animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant, where the animal or plant was taken, or the animal, plant, part or derivative was possessed, distributed or transported, in contravention of any provincial Act or regulation. 8. Subject to the regulations, no person shall knowingly possess an animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant, (

a) that has been imported or transported in contravention of this Act; … 11. No person shall knowingly furnish any false or misleading information or make any misrepresentation with respect to any matter in this Act. B. The Facts [ 13 ] Mr. Nordstrom was the sole shareholder of Cree Nation Outfitters Ltd. At the material times, the company offered outfitting services for hunting and fishing expeditions involving free-range animals. It also operated a game farm on Poundmaker First Nation lands. [ 14 ] Mr.

Nordstrom, largely at his own expense but with the assistance of some grants, erected a wire fence around the game farm lands. He also purchased nearby private land. There he erected a lodge which he used as his home and also as a facility for the provision of accommodation, meals and hospitality for game farm clients. [ 15 ] Cree Nation Outfitters bought domestically bred elk and deer from licenced game producers located both within Saskatchewan and outside of the province. These animals were transported to the game farm and then released into the fenced area.

Most of the animals were male, because antlers were of particular interest to game farm clients. [ 16 ] Client hunters were escorted into the fenced area of the farm by guides employed by Cree Nation Outfitters. A client, with the assistance of a guide, would locate a deer or elk and, if the antlers of the animal were in the agreed range, the client would shoot the animal. It would then be field dressed before being taken back to the lodge where it was skinned, the antlers removed and so forth.

Typically, the client would take the antlers, some or all of the hide, and occasionally the meat, back to the United States. [ 17 ] The specific circumstances which led to charges being laid against Mr. Nordstrom were described by the appeal judge. With but a few minor changes, I reproduce his

summary below:

a) On September 18 and 19, 2006, the Clark party from Alabama hunted on Mr. Nordstrom’s game farm and killed a white-tailed deer and an elk. Instead of the kills being documented and labelled as game farm kills, the Clarks were issued Waterhen First Nation hunting licences and seals for the animal parts. The Clarks crossed the border into the United States with the meat and antlers using the Waterhen licences and seals provided by Mr. Nordstrom.

b) On October 2, 2006, Frank Moore from California killed a white-tailed deer on Mr. Nordstrom’s game farm. Instead of the kill being documented and labelled as game farm kill, Mr. Moore was issued a Waterhen First Nation hunting licence and seals for the hide, meat and antlers by Mr. Nordstrom. Mr. Moore used the licence and seals to take the products with him back to the United States.

c) On October 14, 2006, the Kelley party from Florida killed five white-tailed deer and one elk on Mr. Nordstrom’s game farm. Instead of the kills being documented and labelled as game farm kills, the Kelley party members were issued Waterhen First Nation hunting licences and seals for the animal parts. When the Kelley party arrived at the Saskatoon airport on October 24 to return home, they took with them the capes ( i.e. heads and shoulders) and antlers. When approached by wildlife officers they produced the Waterhen First Nation licences.

Upon informing the wildlife officers that the animals had been killed on Mr. Nordstrom’s game farm, the members of the Kelley party were advised that they did not have the proper licences or documents and their licences and the capes and antlers were seized.

d) In October of 2006, Mr. Nordstrom imported two white-tailed deer from an Alberta game farm into Saskatchewan and then onto his game farm. Mr. Nordstrom did not obtain an import licence.

e) Between August 28 and September 4, 2006, the Smith party from Minnesota killed five elk on Mr. Nordstrom’s game farm. Instead of the kills being documented and labelled as game farm kills, the Smith party members were issued Waterhen First Nation hunting licences and seals for the animal parts. The meat from some of the animals was packaged and shipped to Mr. Smith in Minneapolis accompanied by a Waterhen First Nation licence. On November 27, 2006, Mr. Nordstrom attempted to move some 36 hides or capes and 37 sets of antlers into the United States through the border crossing at Osoyoos, British Columbia.

Documents purporting to be Poundmaker First Nation hunting licences and seals accompanied the hides and antlers. The hides and antlers included those destined for the Smith party. III. The Trial Decision [ 18 ] The trial judge heard from 17 witnesses over the course of seven days. He delivered a carefully reasoned 91-page decision, acquitting Mr. Nordstrom of some charges and entering stays on others (See: 2011 SKPC 166 ). At the end of the day, Mr. Nordstrom was sentenced on some 12 counts. They were as follows: (

a) In relation to the activities of the Clark party: two convictions (counts 2 and 4 in Information 24163588) for exporting animal parts without having obtained an export licence, contrary to s. 31(1)(

a) of The Wildlife Act ; (

b) In relation to the activities of Mr. Moore, a conviction (count 6 in Information 24163588) for exporting animal parts without a licence, contrary to s. 31(1)(

a) of The Wildlife Act ; (

c) In relation to the activities of the Kelley party, one conviction (count 3 in Information 24168333) for exporting animal parts without a licence, contrary to s. 31(1)(

a) of The Wildlife Act , and one conviction for obstruction (count 2 in Information 24168333), contrary to s. 129 (

c) of the Criminal Code ; (

d) In relation to Mr. Nordstrom’s importation of deer from Alberta, one conviction for knowingly possessing animals that had been unlawfully imported, contrary to s. 8 (

a) of WAPPRIITA (count 6 in Information 24168333) and one conviction for importing wildlife without a licence, contrary to s. 31(1)(

b) of The Wildlife Act (count 8 in Information 24168333); and, (

e) In relation to the activities of the Smith party and the attempt to move animal parts across the border at Osoyoos: one conviction for exporting wildlife without a licence, contrary to s. 31(1)(

a) of The Wildlife Act (count 14 in Information 24168333); one conviction for unlawfully transporting wildlife parts, contrary to s. 7 of WAPPRIITA (count 10 in Information 24168333); and three convictions for furnishing false or misleading information, contrary to s. 11 of WAPPRIITA (counts 2, 3, and 4 in Information 24164583). [ 19 ] The trial judge sentenced Mr. Nordstrom by imposing fines totalling $29,502 plus applicable surcharges. IV. The Appeal Decision [ 20 ] As indicated above, Mr. Nordstrom appealed both his convictions and his sentences to the Court of Queen’s Bench.

The appeal judge set aside the conviction for obstruction and one of the convictions for furnishing false or misleading information (count 3 in Information 24164583). He otherwise sustained the convictions entered at trial. The appeal judge adjusted Mr. Nordstrom’s sentence to reflect the fact two convictions had been set aside, but otherwise dismissed the sentence appeals (See: 2014 SKQB 26 ). V. Issues [ 21 ] Mr. Nordstrom was not represented by counsel on the argument of his case in this Court.

However, he did file a factum (or a draft factum) that had been prepared by a lawyer and indicated he relied on the arguments advanced in it. [ 22 ] Accordingly, in order to address the points raised in the factum and to thereby decide this appeal, it is necessary to consider the following issues: (

a) Were the elk and white-tailed deer parts exported by Mr. Nordstrom “wildlife” within the meaning of The Wildlife Act ? (

b) Was Mr. Nordstrom exempt from the export licence requirements of The Wildlife Act by virtue of s. 13(2) of The Captive Wildlife Regulations ? (

c) Did Poundmaker First Nation By-law No. 5 and Band Council Resolution Nos. 38 and 39 allow Mr. Nordstrom to export wildlife without a licence? (

d) Did Mr. Nordstrom have to comply with the labelling requirements in s. 18(2) of The Game Farm Regulations? (

e) Did Mr. Nordstrom “export or cause to be exported” wildlife in those situations where he did not personally transport animal parts? (

f) Does s. 8(

a) of WAPPRIITA apply to white-tailed deer? (

g) Did Mr. Nordstrom have a defence of due diligence to the charges brought against him? (

h) Were errors made in sentencing Mr. Nordstrom? VI. Analysis [ 23 ] I will deal with each of the issues raised by Mr. Nordstrom in turn.

A. Are elk and deer parts “wildlife”? [24] Mr. Nordstrom contends that animal parts are not “wildlife” within the meaning of The Wildlife Act. As a result, he submits thoseof his convictions which are contingent on him being in possession of elk and deer parts should be set aside. [25] In order to address this argument, it is convenient to begin by repeating the definition of “wildlife” found in s. 2 of The Wildlife Act: 2 In this Act: … “wildlife” means a vertebrate animal of any species, excluding fish, that is wild by nature in Saskatchewan and includes: (

a) any part, tissue, genetic material, eggs, sperm, embryos or other forms of developmental life; and (

b) any exotic wildlife found in Saskatchewan; [26] Mr. Nordstrom submits that “part” at the beginning of para. (

a) of this definition should be read as being qualified or limited by thebalance of the paragraph, with the result that “part” should be taken as referring only to substances in the nature of “developmental life”rather than to things like meat or antlers. In Mr. Nordstrom’s submission, this reading of the Act is consistent with its purpose. Hesuggests that purpose—the protection, management and conservation of wildlife—can be fully realized by protecting live animals andparts of animals involved in reproduction.

In his view, interpreting “wildlife” as including animal parts such as antlers, meat and capesdoes not advance the objectives of the Act. [27] I am not persuaded by this line of argument and conclude that the appeal judge acted correctly in rejecting it. [28] Mr. Nordstrom’s view of the definition of “wildlife” must be assessed with reference to the so-called modern approach to statutoryinterpretation endorsed by the Supreme Court in numerous cases including Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC),[1998] 1 SCR 27 at 41. It provides as follows: … the words of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme ofthe Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. [29] It is necessary to begin, therefore, with the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used in para. (

a) of the definition of“wildlife”. In my view, the meaning of those words is not that “part” is somehow limited by the balance of the paragraph. Rather, itseems obvious that “tissue, genetic material, eggs, sperm, embryos or other forms of developmental life” were included in the definitionto ensure that “part” is not read so narrowly as to exclude developmental life forms from the reach of the Act. In other words, the finalportion of para. (

a) was not included to limit or restrict the meaning of “part”. [30] Further, Mr. Nordstrom’s view of “wildlife” does not fit well with the overall scheme of The Wildlife Act. Several of the Act’sfeatures would be substantially undercut if the term “wildlife” carried only the limited meaning he urges on the Court: (

a) Section 24 says a person who is in possession of wildlife and who has a licence authorizing such possession has property rights inthe wildlife. Mr. Nordstrom’s approach would mean that the Act does not create property rights in antlers, meat and capes—the verythings in which a hunter would most want to have property rights. (

b) Section 33 says no person shall possess wildlife without a licence where a licence is required. But, on Mr. Nordstrom’s view ofthe Act, this prohibition would not apply as soon as an animal had been cut into two or more parts. (

c) Section 34 says no person other than an Indian shall accept or have in his possession “wildlife that has been taken by an Indianfor food” pursuant to s. 12 of the Natural Resources Transfer Agreement. The notion of “wildlife that has been taken for food” is clearlyintended to include meat and not just intact live animals. However, Mr. Nordstrom’s

interpretation of “wildlife” would deny this obviousmeaning. (d) Section 83(1) contemplates the Lieutenant Governor in Council making regulations concerning tanners and taxidermists. Bothoccupations are defined in s. 2 of The Wildlife Act as involving work with pelts or skins of wildlife. None of this would make sense if“wildlife” is defined in the way proposed by Mr. Nordstrom. [31] Finally, Mr. Nordstrom’s reading of the definition of “wildlife” would significantly frustrate the overall object and purpose of TheWildlife Act. The point here is quite obvious.

An inability to control the export and trade of animal parts would leave a large gap in theProvince’s ability to protect, manage and conserve wildlife. The appeal judge made this point effectively by noting as follows: [29] The Wildlife Act is entitled, “An Act respecting the Protection of Wildlife ...”. [Mr. Nordstrom] concedes that the purpose of TheWildlife Act is the protection, management and conservation of wildlife.

The well known market for the gall bladder of black bear andthe killing of black bear to harvest this organ for sale is but one clear illustration of why the protection and conservation of wildliferequires the ability to be able to control the trade in animal parts. Under the

interpretation argued by [Mr. Nordstrom], a bear’s gallbladder, since not a part of reproduction potential, would not be a part of the bear and thus not wildlife.

[30] I take judicial notice of the fact that there is a significant market for larger antlers of elk, white-tailed and mule deer. This is, in part, the reason hunt farms exist. Clearly controlling access to and trade in so-called trophies is a legitimate means of protecting and conserving wildlife. If the Province did not control and enforce the trade in the antlers and meat of wildlife, poaching of wildlife and the trade in such parts would proliferate and the conservation and protection of the species in the Province would suffer. [ 32 ] In the end, I conclude there is no merit in Mr.

Nordstrom’s argument with respect to the meaning of “wildlife”. His position does not reflect the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used in the definition of that term and it is not consistent with either the scheme of The Wildlife Act nor the obvious purpose of the Act . There can be no doubt that the elk and white-tailed deer parts exported by Mr. Nordstrom were “wildlife” within the meaning of The Wildlife Act . B. Does s. 13(2) of The Captive Wildlife Regulations provide an exemption? [ 33 ] Mr.

Nordstrom’s next argument relates to those convictions where he was found guilty of exporting animal parts contrary to s. 31(1) of The Wildlife Act . He submits that, even if the definition of “wildlife” does include animal parts, he was nonetheless exempt from the export licence requirements of s. 31(1) because of s. 13 of The Captive Wildlife Regulations . That latter provision, it will be recalled, reads as follows: 13(1) Any person importing or exporting wildlife or parts of wildlife shall obtain an import or export licence, as the case requires, pursuant to

section 30 of the Act.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) but subject to subsection (3), a person who holds a valid licence pursuant to The Domestic Game Farm Animal Regulations may export domestic game farm animals without an export licence.

(3) A person who holds a valid and subsisting licence described in subsection (2) who imports or exports wildlife for a purpose other than that mentioned in subsection (2) shall comply with subsection (1). [emphasis added] [ 34 ] Mr. Nordstrom’s submission is to this effect. He contends he was operating a game farm pursuant to a Band bylaw and thus, as a result of a representation or agreement made by Saskatchewan Environment, he was neither required to licence that operation pursuant to The Captive Wildlife Regulations nor obliged to obtain a licence before exporting parts of wildlife killed on the farm.

In other words, as I understand it, Mr. Nordstrom submits there was an agreement with Saskatchewan Environment and that, if he operated his game farm in compliance with the agreement, he would be able to take advantage of s. 13(2) of The Captive Wildlife Regulations and export animal parts without a licence. [ 35 ] The Crown accepts as a matter of general principle that, pursuant to s. 9 of The Wildlife Act , the Minister could have entered into an agreement to effect the result sought by Mr. Nordstrom.

Section 9 reads as follows: 9 Subject to the regulations, the minister may enter into an agreement with any person, Indian band or government for any of the following purposes: (

a) protecting, managing, conserving, reintroducing or encouraging the propagation of wildlife and wild species and protecting, managing and conserving their habitats; (

b) establishing and promoting programs respecting public safety, education about wildlife or wild species or other conservation-oriented programs; (

c) respecting any matter considered to be necessary by the minister to carry out the provisions of this Act or the regulations. [ 36 ] The trial judge had his doubts about all of this and, while indicating he would adjudicate the case on the basis that such agreements were possible, he said he did not want to be taken as having decided that an approach of this sort was correct as a matter of law. I too have reservations about whether an “agreement” within the meaning of s. 9 can, in effect, create exceptions to the Act or the regulations made pursuant to the Act . But, as will become apparent, Mr.

Nordstrom’s argument concerning the need for export licences cannot succeed even if such agreements can have the effect described by the Crown. As a result, I am prepared to proceed on the view of s. 9 that it advances. This said, I would not want to be taken to have decided, one way or the other, whether such an approach is legally correct. [ 37 ] I return now to the particulars of Mr. Nordstrom’s argument. In order to assess it properly, it is necessary first to lay out the “agreement” between Saskatchewan Environment and Mr.

Nordstrom and then to examine the relevant Poundmaker Band bylaws and resolutions. [ 38 ] The agreement that Mr. Nordstrom relies on is set out in an October 16, 2002 letter to him from Don Farrer, the Director of the Inspections and Regulatory Management Branch of Saskatchewan Environment. It is to the effect that, if Mr. Nordstrom had permission

from his Reserve to operate a game farm and an appropriately comprehensive Reserve bylaw concerning game farms was in place, he would not need to obtain a licence pursuant to The Game Farm Regulations . The relevant parts of Mr. Farrer’s letter reads as follows: A domestic game farm license is not required if the animals are confined on land with full Indian Reserve status and if there is specific permission from the Band along with a comprehensive Indian Band bylaw in place that relates to the operation of domestic game farms.

To protect both your domestic herd, free-ranging wild deer and elk and provincially licensed domestic game farms, the bylaws should require, at least, the following: 1. An eight-foot high perimeter fence to prevent escapes of farmed deer and elk, and to prevent the entry of wild free-ranging deer and elk; 2. Removal of all free-ranging wildlife prior to stocking the fenced area with farmed deer and elk; 3. Maintenance of unique animal identification tags (provincial tag plus one other tag) of all farmed deer and elk moved to the farm; 4.

Submission of the heads, including ear tags, from all animal deaths (either died on-farm or harvested on-farm) to Prairie Diagnostic Services, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, for Chronic Wasting Disease testing, and; 5. Tagging of product(

s) from animals harvested on the farm in order to distinguish domestic game farm animal products from free- ranging wildlife. (i.e. Use different seals than used for your outfitting operation.) [ 39 ] Accordingly, Mr. Farrer’s letter requires that, in order to escape the licencing requirements of The Game Farm Regulations , there must have been in place “… a comprehensive Indian Band bylaw … that relates to the operation of domestic game farms” and that any such bylaw should require, at a minimum: (

a) an eight-foot high perimeter fence, (

b) removal of free-ranging wildlife prior to stocking, (

c) use of an animal identification tag system, (

d) submission of heads for testing, and (

e) tagging of products from animals harvested on the farm. [ 40 ] What then of the Poundmaker Band’s relevant bylaws and resolutions? The bylaw in issue here, By-law No. 5, was enacted by the Band on August 8, 2000. It is entitled “A By-law for the Preservation, Protection And Management of Fur Bearing Animals And Other Game”. Significantly, it says nothing about game or hunt farms. Rather, it speaks generally to hunting on the Reserve.

The By-law does this by, among other things, providing that persons who are not members of the Band may apply for a permit to hunt on the Reserve and by prescribing various hunting rules such as prohibitions against the use of traps and poisons. [ 41 ] The provisions of By-law No. 5 which deal with hunting by non-members of the Band are as follows: 7.1 A person who is not a member of the POUNDMAKER First Nation and is of the age of majority (18 years old) may apply to the Council for a permit to hunt Game on POUNDMAKER Band lands and such a person shall be subject to a permit fee which can be increased when needed to address changes of conditions, circumstances related to this by-law. … 7.5 Notwithstanding the criteria and considerations in 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, the POUNDMAKER Band may from time to time issue a special permit to allow a non-band member to hunt on POUNDMAKER Band lands under the supervision of trained Band outfitters and guides according to hunting seasons as stipulated in the “Saskatchewan Hunting and Trapping Guide” which is published on a yearly basis. [ 42 ] Mr.

Nordstrom also relies on Poundmaker Band Resolution Nos. 38 and 39 in his effort to bring himself within the scope of Mr. Farrer’s letter. Resolution No. 38, enacted at a Council meeting held on August 19, 2002, authorizes the use of specified Reserve lands by Mr. Nordstrom for the purpose of operating a game farming business. In relevant part, it reads as follows: WHEREAS Chief and Council has decided to allow Carlin Darcey Nordstrom to do outfitting & game-farming on Poundmaker Cree Nation lands (Wilkie area) as listed below: … And Poundmaker Cree Nation lands (Highridge area) as listed below: …

WHEREAS Chief and Council has agreed with Carlin Darcey Nordstrom to pay Poundmaker Cree Nation $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) annually for the duration of this privilege; WHEREAS Chief and Council recognizes that Carlin Darcey Nordstrom is a Band member of Poundmaker Cree Nation – Treaty Number 3450080401; WHEREAS Poundmaker Cree Nation has its own by-laws regarding hunting, fishing, trapping and environmental regulations; WHEREAS Chief and Council expects Carlin Darcey Nordstrom to comply with federal and provincial rules and laws regarding outfitting; THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that Poundmaker Cree Nation Chief and Council authorizes the usage of reserve lands to Carlin Darcey Nordstrom for the purposes of doing an outfitting and game-farming business. [emphasis added] [ 43 ] As is apparent, this Resolution does contain a clause stating that the Council “expects” Mr.

Nordstrom to “comply with federal and provincial rules and laws regarding outfitting”. However, in my view, this is not enough to bring Mr. Nordstrom’s operations within the terms of the Farrer letter. Let me explain. [ 44 ] First, Resolution No. 38 is just that. It is a resolution and not a Band bylaw as required by the Farrer letter and, in any event, it does not purport to amend By-law No. 5. Second, the reference to compliance with federal and provincial laws in the Resolution speaks only to laws regarding “outfitting”.

This reference would not seem to include game farming because the Resolution itself uses “outfitting” and “game-farming” as separate terms with apparently different meanings. Third, the reference to compliance with federal and provincial laws, as noted, appears only in a “whereas” clause and such clauses are not normally seen to create substantive legal effects. [ 45 ] I turn, therefore, to Band Council Resolution No. 39, also enacted in August of 2002.

It speaks to fencing requirements for game farms and, as well, addresses to some extent the import and export of big game animals: WHEREAS Chief and Council of the Poundmaker First Nation met August 19, 2002 to discuss Poundmaker Bylaws; THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that Chief and Council of Poundmaker First Nation hereby authorize the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to amend Poundmaker Bylaws to include the following amendment to Game-farming Bylaw #5 as #32: That 183 cm (6 foot fence) or higher would be allowed to import domestic Big Game Animals on Poundmaker First Nation.

The Big Game stock would be for means of game farming. The Big Game Animals (live, harvested, or any other genetic preservation) shall with a hand written letter from Poundmaker Chief and Council, be imported from any other jurisdiction in the country of Canada or USA for the use of Game Farming as listed on the described land location. Domestic Big Game Animals shall, with hand written approval from Chief or Council be exported to any other jurisdiction within Saskatchewan for the purpose of Game Farming by approved Poundmaker members or employee of that member. Amendment to Poundmaker First Nations Export Seal.

Wildlife and Wildlife products derived from Wildlife harvested from Poundmaker First Nations Lands would include Domestic Big Game farmed animals that were imported to Poundmaker from any other judisdiction to be exported with this seal supplied from Poundmaker First Nation. [ 46 ] This Resolution is also unhelpful to Mr. Nordstrom’s cause. It does refer to By-law No. 5 and purports to set out an “amendment” to that By-law. However, the meaning and effect of the so-called amendment is not entirely clear.

The first paragraph of the Resolution appears to say that someone with a 183 centimetre (6 foot) fence can import big game stock for game farming. ( The Game Farm Regulations require a 2.44 metre (8 foot) fence for deer and a 2.1 metre (7 foot) fence for elk.) The first paragraph of the Resolution also seems to authorize the importation of big game animals from Canada or the United States. [ 47 ] The second paragraph of the Resolution appears to say that, with the approval of the Chief or Council, big game animals can be exported from the Reserve to destinations within Saskatchewan, providing the export is for game farming purposes. [ 48 ] The last paragraph of the Resolution concerns “seals”.

It contemplates that a Poundmaker permit or seal can carry the authority to export animals and animal products that were imported from other jurisdictions.

[ 49 ] Thus, as is apparent, nothing in Band Council Resolution No. 39 would bring Mr. Nordstrom’s operations into compliance with the terms of the Farrer letter. While they authorize Mr. Nordstrom to run a game farm, they do not impose the sorts of operating requirements prescribed by Mr. Farrer. [ 50 ] In addition to the various problems with respect to the way in which By-law No. 5 and Resolution Nos. 38 and 39 are drafted, there was no evidence presented at trial to the effect that, as a matter of fact, Mr. Nordstrom’s game farm operated in a way which complied with the terms of the Farrer letter.

Indeed, as the trial judge found at para. 62 of his decision, Mr. Nordstrom was “far” from meeting these requirements. First, he did not comply with the obligation that game farm lands be cleared of free-ranging wildlife. Second, the unique animal identification tag system was not implemented or followed. Third, Mr. Nordstrom was not prepared to either send in heads for testing or to send them to the designated laboratory. [ 51 ] Accordingly, in the end, I am unable to see how Mr. Nordstrom can bring himself within the terms of the Farrer letter.

It follows, on the logic of his own argument, that he had no basis to claim an exemption from the export licence requirements found in s. 31 of The Wildlife Act . Both the trial judge and the appeal judge reached the correct conclusion on this point. C. Do Poundmaker bylaws and resolutions displace The Wildlife Act ? [ 52 ] Mr.

Nordstrom further submits, as I understand his position, that By-law No. 5 and Band Council Resolution Nos. 38 and 39, somehow in combination, authorized the export of wildlife in a way that trumped or displaced the applicable provisions of The Wildlife Act and its regulations. [ 53 ] I am not persuaded by this submission. In coming to that conclusion, I find it unnecessary to decide whether both Band Council bylaws and resolutions can operate in the manner contended by Mr. Nordstrom.

Even assuming he is correct about the ability of such instruments to override provincial legislation, By-law No. 5 and Resolution Nos. 38 and 39 clearly do not authorize the export of animal parts. [ 54 ] By-law No. 5, as discussed above, is completely silent on the questions of game farming and the export of wildlife. Band Council Resolution No. 38 also says nothing on this front, except perhaps for what appears in the “whereas” clause which says the Council expects Mr. Nordstrom “to comply with federal and provincial rules and laws regarding outfitting”. However, if anything, that reference hurts Mr.

Nordstrom’s position because the relevant federal and provincial laws impose limitations on wildlife exports. [ 55 ] Resolution No. 39 does speak to the question of exports. As noted above, among other things, it says this: Domestic Big Game Animals shall, with hand written approval from Chief or Council be exported to any other jurisdiction within Saskatchewan for the purpose of Game Farming by approved Poundmaker members or employee of that member. [ 56 ] This provision is self-evidently not helpful to Mr. Nordstrom.

First, the relevant reference is only to exports “to any other jurisdiction within Saskatchewan …”. As a result, it does not speak to exports to the United States, the subject of the charges in issue here. Second, the exports described in Resolution No. 39 are exports “… for the purpose of Game Farming …”. Accordingly, the Resolution appears to be addressed to the export of live animals and is certainly not applicable to the export of antlers, capes and meat as is the case here. Third, the relevant part of Resolution No. 39 only engages with the “… hand written approval from Chief or Council …”.

No such approval was put in evidence. [ 57 ] Thus, even if Band Council resolutions and bylaws can override provincial hunting laws of general application, that is not the effect of By-law No. 5 and Band Council Resolution Nos. 38 and 39. D. Did the labelling obligations in s. 18(2) of The Game Farm Regulations apply here? [ 58 ] As will be recalled, s. 18(2) of The Game Farm Regulations says game farm operators must ensure that antlers, hides and carcasses from animals on their farms are labelled with various particulars.

These particulars are the date of slaughter, the unique identification number of the animal, the species and sex of the animal, and the game farm licence number or the name of the game farm operator. [ 59 ] The trial judge concluded, at para. 120 of his decision, that this labelling obligation must be complied with by a game farm operator, even one who is entitled to take advantage of an export licencing exemption under s. 13(2) of The Captive Wildlife Regulations . The appeal judge, at para. 50 of his decision, came to the same conclusion. Mr.

Nordstrom suggests all of this was an error. [ 60 ] I begin by noting that, because Mr. Nordstrom had not brought himself within the terms of Mr. Farrer’s letter, he was obliged (by s. 31(1) of The Wildlife Act ) to obtain a licence before exporting animal parts. And, of course, s. 31(1) was the foundation of the charges brought against him in relation to exporting. Significantly, Mr. Nordstrom was not charged or convicted of breaching s. 18(2) of The Game Farm Regulations .

As a result, s. 18(2) is really beside the point for purposes of resolving this appeal. [ 61 ] Nonetheless, because this issue was argued before us, it may be appropriate to comment on it. In my view, the trial judge and the appeal judge were both entirely correct. Section 13(2) of The Captive Wildlife Regulations does not purport to give licenced game farm operators an exemption from every sort of licencing, tagging and labelling obligation. It says only that a person who holds a valid licence pursuant to The Game Farm Regulations “may export domestic game farm animals without an export licence ”.

This is important because s. 18(2) of The Game Farm Regulations does not concern itself with “licences” or anything in the nature of licences. Rather, it speaks to labelling requirements. Further, those requirements apply to all animals removed from a game farm, whether for export or not. [ 62 ] As a consequence, it simply does not follow that, because a licenced game farm is exempt from export licencing requirements by virtue of s. 13(2) of The Captive Wildlife Regulations , it is also exempt from labelling requirements such as those prescribed by s. 18(2) of The Game Farm Regulations . E. Did Mr.

Nordstrom “export or cause to be exported”?

[ 63 ] As explained above, Mr. Nordstrom was convicted on various counts of exporting wildlife contrary to s. 31(1) of The Wildlife Act . In each case, the charge alleged that he had “export[ed] or caused to be exported” the animal parts in issue. In relation to four of these exporting convictions (counts 2, 4 and 6 in Information 24163588 and count 3 in Information 24168333), Mr. Nordstrom did not personally move the products across the border. Rather, the products were transported by his clients after successful hunts on the game farm. [ 64 ] Mr.

Nordstrom submits that the appeal judge erred in his treatment of this matter. He argues that, although he knew his clients would be exporting the animal parts in question, he did not “cause” the exportation of those parts. [ 65 ] I am unable to accept this proposition. As the appeal judge pointed out, it ignores the law concerning parties to offences as set out in s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code . Section 21(1) is made applicable to provincial offences by virtue of s. 4(4) of The

Summary Offences Procedure Act, 1990 , SS 1990-91, c S-63.1. It reads as follows: 21.

(1) Every one is a party to an offence who (

a) actually commits it; (

b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding any person to commit it; or (

c) abets any person in committing it. [ 66 ] In this case, the trial judge’s findings of fact confirmed that Mr. Nordstrom knowingly aided the illegal export of wildlife. He did this by, among other things, issuing his clients tags and seals which he knew to be invalid. He knew, and indeed intended, that those tags and seals would be used to facilitate the export of wildlife. [ 67 ] As a result, the appeal judge made no error in upholding Mr. Nordstrom’s convictions for violating s. 31(1) of The Wildlife Act in those circumstances where he did not personally take wildlife across the border. F. Does s. 8(

a) of WAPPRIITA apply to white-tailed deer? [ 68 ] Mr. Nordstrom was convicted on one count (count 6 of Information 24168333) of violating s. 8 (

a) of WAPPRIITA by knowingly possessing an animal that was imported or transported in contravention of WAPPRIITA . He acknowledges that he imported white-tailed deer from Alberta without a licence or permit but says he should not have been convicted of the offence because white-tailed deer do not fall within the applicable definition of “animal” in WAPPRIITA . [ 69 ] In order to unravel this argument, it is necessary to begin with s. 6(3) of WAPPRIITA . It speaks to the inter-provincial transport of animals in these terms:

(3) Subject to the regulations, no person shall, except under and in accordance with a permit issued pursuant to subsection 10(1), transport from one province to another province any animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant. [ 70 ]

Section 8 (

a) of WAPPRIITA , the provision which is the focus of this aspect of Mr. Nordstrom’s argument, then goes on to prohibit the possession of animals transported contrary to the Act : 8. Subject to the regulations, no person shall knowingly possess an animal or plant, or any part or derivative of an animal or plant, (

a) that has been imported or transported in contravention of this Act; … [ 71 ] Mr. Nordstrom’s argument is grounded in the definition of “animal” in s. 2 of WAPPRIITA : “animal” means any specimen, whether living or dead, of any species of animal that is listed as “fauna” in an appendix to the Convention, and includes any egg, sperm, tissue culture or embryo of any such animal; He says that white-tailed deer are not listed in the Convention and, therefore, are not “animals” within the meaning of this definition. The Crown accepts this point. [ 72 ] However, that is not the end of the story. Pursuant to s. 21(1) (

c) of WAPPRIITA , regulations may be made for the purposes of defining “animal” in ss. 6, 7 and 8 of that Act . Pursuant to that authority, s. 10 (

a) of the Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations , SOR/96-263 defines “animal,” for the purposes of s. 6(3) of WAPPRIITA , without reference to the Convention: 10. For the purposes of subsection 6(3) of the Act and in respect of a province into which an animal or plant is to be transported,

( a ) “animal” means any specimen, whether living or dead, of any wild species of the animal kingdom (kingdom Animalia ) the transportation of which into that province is regulated or prohibited by the province, and includes any egg, sperm, tissue culture or embryo of any such animal; and … [ 73 ] As is obvious, this definition means that the term “animal” in s. 6(3) of WAPPRIITA includes white-tailed deer. This is so because the transportation of such deer into Saskatchewan is regulated by the Province by s. 31(1) of The Wildlife Act .

It says, of course, that (unless somehow otherwise exempted) wildlife (a term which includes white-tailed deer) shall not be exported from or imported to Saskatchewan without a WAPPRIITA licence. [ 74 ] However, Mr. Nordstrom goes on to emphasize that the Wild Animal and Plant Trade Regulations do not define “animal” for purposes of s. 8(

a) of WAPPRIITA —the provision under which he was convicted. Accordingly, so his argument goes, s. 8 (

a) can operate only with respect to an “animal” as that term is defined in s. 2 of WAPPRIITA . And, as indicated above, that definition does not include white-tailed deer. [ 75 ] In my view, this is a contorted

interpretation of WAPPRIITA .

Section 8 (

a) is intended to create an offence of possessing animals imported or transported contrary to WAPPRIITA itself. There is no doubt that Mr. Nordstrom imported deer in contravention of s. 6(3) and no doubt that he possessed them. As a result, the overall logic of WAPPRIITA would strongly suggest that his actions would and should engage s. 8 (a).

There would appear to be no policy rationale of any sort to explain why WAPPRIITA should be read differently, i.e. be read as being concerned about the inter-provincial import and transportation of white-tailed deer but not concerned about the possession of such deer after they have been illegally imported or transported. [ 76 ] I conclude that, in the absence of a definition in the Regulations indicating otherwise, “animal” in s. 8 (

a) of WAPPRIITA must be read so as to reflect the definition of that term which operates in ss. 6(1) and 6(3) . The plain words of s. 8 (

a) can readily bear this meaning and no other

interpretation of them is consistent with the scheme and objective of WAPPRIITA . [ 77 ] In the end, therefore, Mr. Nordstrom’s argument must fail. He was in possession of white-tailed deer that had been imported into Saskatchewan without the required permit. As a result, those deer had been “imported or transported in contravention of this Act ” as per s. 8 (

a) of WAPPRIITA . G. Did Mr. Nordstrom have a defence of due diligence? [ 78 ] Mr. Nordstrom also submits that, in any event, he had a defence of due diligence to the various offences for which he stands convicted. [ 79 ] It is common ground that this defence would be available if (

a) Mr. Nordstrom exercised due diligence and took all reasonable steps to avoid the commission of the offences, or (

b) Mr. Nordstrom held a reasonable belief in a set of facts which, if true, would render his acts or omissions innocent. See: Merchant v Law Society (Saskatchewan) , 2009 SKCA 33 at para 47 , [2009] 5 WWR 478. I will, therefore, proceed on this basis. [ 80 ] The central difficulty with Mr. Nordstrom’s submission on this front is that there is no evidence to support a defence of due diligence. The trial judge found, at para. 46 of his decision, that Mr. Nordstrom had made a conscious effort to avoid the scrutiny of Saskatchewan Environment officials by using Waterhen First Nation licences.

The trial judge also concluded this was done deliberately and with the goal of deceiving Saskatchewan Environment officials and anyone else who might be monitoring his operation. As the appeal judge observed, “This is the antithesis of the exercise of due diligence.” [ 81 ] Largely the same line of thinking holds true with respect to the convictions in relation to the importation of white-tailed deer. Mr. Nordstrom says he took all reasonable steps to avoid the commission of those offences by obtaining Canadian Food Inspection Agency Transportation permits.

However, he took this step only because he believed that he could not obtain an import permit from Saskatchewan Environment. As is self-evident, an attempt to sidestep Saskatchewan Environment in this way does not constitute due diligence. I agree with the appeal judge’s observation that, in circumstances such as the ones in question here, Mr. Nordstrom’s duty was to either obtain the required permits or not import.

If he believed Saskatchewan Environment had improperly refused to issue permits to him, his recourse was by way of a judicial review application. [ 82 ] Similarly, the trial judge found that the Poundmaker First Nation licences and seals associated with five sets of antlers and hides, related to the hunt of the Smith party, were false documents and that Mr. Nordstrom knew they were false. The trial judge concluded that Mr.

Nordstrom had created the documents, or directed their creation, for the express purpose of deceiving officials on both sides of the border. [ 83 ] In the result, I conclude that the appeal judge acted correctly in rejecting Mr. Nordstrom’s argument about due diligence. H. Were errors made in sentencing Mr. Nordstrom? [ 84 ] Mr. Nordstrom’s final set of arguments relates to the sentences imposed on him. As noted above, they amounted to $29,502 of fines in aggregate plus surcharges for a total of $38,177. In light of the decision of the appeal judge, this amount now appears to be $37,552. [ 85 ] In this Court, Mr.

Nordstrom contends that the appeal judge erred by failing to find the sentences had been imposed without proper weight being attached to the relevant sentencing principles. More particularly, he stresses that everything he did could have been done legally if he had obtained the requisite licences with the result that his actions caused little net harm. Mr. Nordstrom also suggests there is an unwarranted disparity among the individual sentences imposed on him and, as well, between those sentences and the sentences

imposed on other individuals who have committed similar offences. [86] Mr. Nordstrom faces a preliminary problem with all of this. It flows from the fact that this appeal is brought pursuant to s. 839 ofthe Criminal Code and, as a result, must be restricted to questions of law. There are several decisions of this Court which indicate that theappropriateness or fitness of a sentence is not a question of law.

Vancise J.A., for the Court, wrote as follows in R v Nistor, 2010 SKCA62, 350 Sask R 238: [4] We agree that the appropriateness or fitness of a sentence is not a question of law and for that reason leave to appeal on groundnumber three is denied. As this Court noted in R. v. Thue (1995), (SK CA), 134 Sask. R. 187 (Sask.

C.A.), it is onlywhen a sentence is not permitted by statute, and therefore illegal, or where there is an error of law so bound up with the sentence that it isinherent in the sentence, that it constitutes an error of law and permits the Court to consider a sentence appeal, on the grounds of fitness,from the

summary conviction appeal court. See also: R v Thue (1995), (SK CA), 134 Sask R 187 (CA) at paras 7-10; R v Coates, 2010 SKCA 152 at para 6; R vLanglois, 2008 MBCA 72, 228 Man R (2d) 256; R v Ranahan (1996), (BC CA), 84 BCAC 153 (CA) at para 4. [87] This said, and in the hope of assisting Mr. Nordstrom to understand that the sentences imposed by the trial judge were notinappropriate, illegal or unfair, I will nonetheless go on to comment briefly on each of his arguments. [88] First, there is little logic in the notion that the offences were not particularly serious because, if Mr.

Nordstrom had been properlylicenced, he could have lawfully done the very same things. The whole point here is that he was not licenced and this, of course, waswhat attracted the charges in issue. As I read the sentencing decision, the trial judge was very alert to Mr. Nordstrom’s overallcircumstances, the reasons why he proceeded without the necessary licences and the like. I see nothing to suggest that either he or theappeal judge misapprehended the seriousness of the offences committed by Mr. Nordstrom. [89] I also do not see any error in relation to how the various sentences imposed on Mr.

Nordstrom compare to one another. The trialjudge’s reasons indicated that he was both attempting to impose fines at a level that would reflect the importance of maintaining theregulatory regime for wildlife and take account of Mr. Nordstrom’s ability to pay them. For his part, the appeal judge examined the finesimposed on Mr. Nordstrom for each offence at paras. 88 to 95 of his decision. His analysis quite satisfactorily explains the basis for eachof the individual fines. I will not repeat it here. [90] Finally, let me deal briefly with the suggestion that the fines imposed on Mr.

Nordstrom were fatally out of line with those imposedin similar circumstances. In this regard, Mr. Nordstrom points to R v McLeod (1997), (SK KB), 160 Sask R 26 (QB);R v Charles (1997), (SK KB), [1998] 1 WWR 515 (Sask QB); R v Marsland, 2012 SKCA 47, 393 Sask R 175; andR v Alsager, 2013 SKCA 129, 427 Sask R 80. Doing the appropriate math in each case, Mr. Nordstrom arrives at the conclusion that afine for illegally trafficking wildlife should be in the range of $500 to $1,000 per set of antlers. In my view, this an overly simplistic viewof the proper sentencing approach in cases of this kind.

Each sentencing decision must take account of, and weigh, a variety of factors inarriving at a fit penalty. A tariff-like approach based on the number of antlers involved in a Wildlife Act offence will not suffice. [91] In any event, there are other Saskatchewan decisions in this area which involve substantially higher fines than those imposed in thecases cited by Mr. Nordstrom. For example, in R v Gladue (23 March 2009) Meadow Lake, Nightingale P.C.J. (Sask Prov Ct), theaccused pled guilty to the illegal export of one set of white-tailed deer antlers contrary to the provisions of The Wildlife Act.

He was anoutfitter and had taken the deer under his treaty rights and sold them to an American hunter and then facilitated their export. A jointsubmission for fines and surcharges of $3,250 and $5,200 respectively was accepted by the Court. See also R v Wolfe, 2008 SKPC 25,318 Sask R 284 (sentencing decision unreported (4 March 2008) Meadow Lake, Nightingale P.C.J. (Sask Prov Ct)); R v Smith (7September 2006) North Battleford, Deshaye P.C.J. (Sask Prov Ct). [92] In the result, even if the questions raised by Mr.

Nordstrom are questions of law, there would be no basis on which this Court couldinterfere with the sentences imposed by the trial judge. VII. Conclusion [93] Mr. Nordstrom is granted leave to appeal his convictions but those appeals are dismissed. He is not granted leave to appeal hissentences. DATED at the City of Regina, in the Province of Saskatchewan, this 27th day of November, A.D. 2014. “Richards C.J.S.” Richards C.J.S. I concur “Caldwell J.A.” Caldwell J.A.

I concur “Whitmore J.A.” Whitmore J.A.