Docket: CACR 2375 Ian Gerald Clark Appellant - v. -, 2014 SKCA 42

THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN Citation: 2014 SKCA 42 Date: 2014-04-16 Between: Docket: CACR 2375 Ian Gerald Clark Appellant - and - Her Majesty the Queen Respondent Coram: Richards C.J.S., Jackson and Ryan-Froslie JJ.A. Counsel: Mr. Ian Clark appearing on his own behalf Mr. Andrew Davis for the crown Appeal: From: 2013 SKQB 413 Heard: April 16, 2014 Disposition: Appeal dismissed (orally)

Written Reasons: April 17, 2014 By: The Honourable Madam Justice Jackson In Concurrence: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards The Honourable Madam Justice Ryan-Froslie Jackson J.A. [ 1 ] On this appeal pursuant to s. 839 of the Criminal Code , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, Ian Clark raises the following question of law: whether The Traffic Safety Act , S.S. 2004, c. T-18.1 requires the City of Regina to indicate the rate of speed for a school zone on the side streets entering it or, in other words, whether posting an official sign at the entry and exit of the school zone meets the legislative requirements. [ 2 ] McMurtry J., sitting as a

summary conviction appeal judge, held that The Traffic Safety Act does not require the City of Regina to post an official sign on the side streets entering a school zone (see R. v. Clark , 2013 SKQB 413 ). It is from this decision that Mr. Clark appeals. [ 3 ]

Section 839 of the Criminal Code requires that Mr. Clark persuade the Court that it should grant him leave as a pre-condition to the hearing of his appeal. The question of leave is measured in terms of the sufficiency of the merits of the appeal and its importance. Since Mr. Clark raises an issue that this Court has not previously passed upon, the Court grants him leave.

As to the merits of the appeal, however, his appeal must be dismissed. [ 4 ] The issue placed before McMurtry J. and this Court is strictly a question of determining the intention of the legislature as expressed in the words of The Traffic Safety Act and as reflected in a consideration of the purpose of that Act . Clause 199(1)(

b) of that Act provides that “no person shall drive a vehicle on a highway … at a speed greater than the maximum speed indicated by any signs that are erected on the highway in accordance with

section 200.” Subsection 200(2) of the Act provides that “no person shall drive a vehicle in a school zone at a speed greater than the maximum speed indicated by any official sign.” “School zone” is defined to mean the area between : “(

a) the traffic control device or official sign identifying an area as a school zone; and (

b) the traffic control device or official sign indicating a greater rate of speed or the end of the area as a school zone” (see s. 200(1)(a)–(

b) of the Act ). “Official sign” means “a sign … erected, placed, used or painted on the roadway or right of way of a highway for the legal control, warning, guidance, direction or information of traffic on the highway …” (see s. 2(

u) of the Act ). Unlike s. 199(1)(

b) which requires, with respect to parks, that the maximum speed be “placed at the entrance to a park in accordance with

section 202,” the Act is silent with respect to the streets that enter a school zone. [ 5 ] McMurtry J. referred to all of the most relevant authorities on point and she properly applied them. As she ably demonstrated, no court in Canada interpreting similar legislation has imposed an obligation on a municipality to do more than post signs identifying the beginning and the end of a speed zone. This Court agrees. The Traffic Safety Act does not require the City of Regina to indicate the rate of speed on the side streets entering a school zone. [ 6 ] In short, we find no error in the decision under appeal. [ 7 ] For these reasons, Mr. Clarke’s appeal is dismissed.