R v Stone, 2019 SKCA 123

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACR3136 Citation: R v Stone , 2019 SKCA 123 Date: 2019-10-15 Between: Sheldon Isiah Grant Stone Appellant And Her Majesty the Queen Respondent Before: Caldwell, Schwann and Kalmakoff JJ.A. Disposition: Appeal dismissed (orally) Written reasons by: The Honourable Madam Justice Schwann In concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Caldwell The Honourable Mr. Justice Kalmakoff On Appeal From: Provincial Court, Saskatoon Appeal Heard: October 15, 2019 Counsel: Sheldon Stone on his own behalf Dean Sinclair, Q.C., for the Respondent Schwann J.A. [ 1 ] Sheldon Stone was convicted of two counts of robbery with a firearm contrary to s. 344(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm contrary to s. 91(1) . Mr. Stone was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment on each of the robbery charges, and six months’ imprisonment on the unlawful possession charge. The sentences were made concurrent with each other. After credit for time spent in pre-trial custody, Mr. Stone’s global sentence was five years and four months’ imprisonment. [ 2 ] Mr. Stone appeals against both his convictions and his sentence. His appeal was dismissed following oral argument with the promise of written reasons to follow. These are those reasons. I.

Background [ 3 ] The offences in question involved two other co-accused, who were identified as William Whitebear and Jeremy Lemay. Although involved in the robbery as the driver of the getaway vehicle, Heather Ross became a Crown witness. The essential facts in relation to this matter are as follows. [ 4 ] At Mr. Whitebear’s request, Ms. Ross and her mother picked him up in her mother’s SUV at some point on November 12, 2016. They drove to Ms. Ross’s brother’s apartment, where they spent some time. Ms. Ross testified that Mr.

Whitebear was on and off his mobile device throughout the day, but that she did not inquire about his activity. While they were together, Mr. Whitebear showed Ms. Ross a sawed-off shotgun that he had in his possession and disclosed his intention to rob Deryk Ball. Mr. Whitebear knew Mr. Ball from previous dealings with him. [ 5 ] Later that evening, Mr. Whitebear and Ms. Ross left her apartment in the SUV. Ms. Ross drove and Mr. Whitebear sat in the passenger seat. Mr. Whitebear directed Ms. Ross to first pick up Mr. Lemay and then Mr. Stone. She did so in that order. While she was driving, Ms.

Ross overheard her passengers discuss a plan to rob Mr. Ball. [ 6 ] Mr. Whitebear had Ms. Ross drive the three co-accused to a location near Mr. Ball’s apartment building. On their arrival, the co-accused exited the vehicle, but Ms. Ross stayed in the SUV. Mr. Whitebear took the shotgun with him. Ms. Ross testified that she saw them go into a back alley. [ 7 ] Meanwhile, sometime during that day, Mr. Ball had exchanged messages with Mr. Whitebear. Mr. Whitebear wanted to meet up with him, but that did not happen because Mr. Ball was busy. However, after midnight when Mr.

Ball checked his messages, he noticed that Mr. Whitebear still wanted to get together; but no specific time was arranged. Hoping to see him in the neighbourhood, Mr. Ball left his apartment and searched for him on bicycle, but he did not chance upon Mr. Whitebear. On his way home, Mr. Ball noticed a dark van or SUV parked near a walkway close to his home. The vehicle was running and someone was in the driver’s seat, but it was too dark to notice any details. But he thought it looked suspicious. To get to his basement apartment, Mr. Ball had to go down a back alley.

In doing so, he noticed two or perhaps three men, one of whom was Mr. Whitebear. Mr. Ball testified that the second man was armed with a long, bladed weapon, which he referred to as a very large knife, and that Mr. Whitebear had what appeared to be a shotgun. The man carrying the knife took Mr. Ball’s cell phone from his pocket. The assailants demanded to know where Mr. Ball kept his money and drugs and then, somewhat forcefully, took Mr. Ball to the apartment he shared with Benjamin Fineday. Over Mr. Ball’s warning and objection, Mr. Fineday let them into the apartment. [ 8 ] Mr. Fineday was acquainted with Mr.

Whitebear. He testified that Mr. Whitebear entered the apartment along with one other person who brandished a machete. He said the second person wore a red hoodie and had a bandana covering his face. [ 9 ] Mr. Fineday testified that Mr. Whitebear pointed the shotgun at Mr. Ball and threatened to shoot him if he did not disclose the location of his money. Mr. Ball relented and told them that it was in his top dresser drawer in his bedroom. According to Mr. Fineday, the individual armed with the machete took the money from the dresser drawer together with Mr. Fineday’s cell phone, some jewelry, clothing

and an iPad, which he stuffed into a backpack belonging to Mr. Fineday. Mr. Ball testified that Mr. Whitebear took his television and alaptop and a brown backpack belonging to him. [10] Mr. Whitebear left the apartment first. Once he left, Mr. Ball saw this as his opportunity to seek assistance, so he made a dashto the neighbour’s apartment and called 911. The other assailant remained in the apartment with Mr. Fineday and continued to ransack thebedroom. He eventually left the apartment with Mr. Fineday’s backpack and told Mr. Fineday that he was lucky to be alive. [11] Mr. Whitebear and Mr.

Lemay returned to the SUV immediately following the robbery, but Mr. Stone did not. The people inthe SUV waited a short time, but then drove off. The police were on the scene within minutes of the robbery and pulled the SUV overbecause it matched the description of the vehicle that had been provided to them. A search of the SUV revealed a computer, someelectronics, a television and a sawed-off shotgun. None of the property identified as taken by the other individual who had been armedwith the machete was found in the SUV, nor was it in the possession of any of the occupants when they were searched.

The police neverrecovered the missing cash, cell phones, jewelry, Mr. Fineday’s backpack or the machete. [12] Both Mr. Ball and Mr. Fineday identified Mr. Whitebear as one of the assailants but they were unable to identify Mr. Stone orMr. Lemay as the other person who had entered their apartment with a machete. Ms. Ross, who had met Mr. Stone on one previousoccasion, identified Mr. Stone as the third person she had picked up that evening. [13] Mr. Whitebear entered a guilty plea to the robbery and related offences part way through the trial. The trial continued againstMr. Lemay and Mr. Stone.

None of the accused testified. The primary issue at trial was identity. Mr. Stone argued the Crown had failed toprove that he had participated in the robbery and suggested that it was possible he left the scene before the robbery was committed.Mr. Lemay argued the evidence established that it was Mr. Stone and not he who accompanied Mr. Whitebear to Mr. Ball’s apartment. [14] The trial judge accepted the testimony of Ms. Ross and Mr. Ball. She found as fact that all three accused had formed a commonintent to rob Mr. Ball and that both Mr. Stone and Mr. Lemay knew that Mr.

Whitebear was armed with a shotgun before the offence wascommitted. [15] On the evidence before her, and the inferences she drew from that evidence, the trial judge concluded Mr. Stone was the otherindividual who had entered Mr. Ball’s apartment. She found Mr. Stone guilty of the armed robberies and of unlawful possession of asawed-off firearm. Her finding was largely based on circumstantial evidence as discussed below. II. Conviction Appeal [16] In the notice of appeal filed with this Court, Mr.

Stone argues the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantialevidence alone, without any direct evidence of his participation in the robbery. Mr. Stone broadened this argument somewhat at the timeof the appeal hearing, submitting that Ms. Ross, a key Crown witness and the driver of the SUV, lied in Court to frame him for therobbery. Mr. Stone points to a number of places in the trial transcript that, he argues, make no sense or evince an obvious inconsistency inher testimony. Seen in this light, the trial judge should not have accepted Ms.

Ross’s testimony and, without it, he would not have beenfound guilty. [17] I will deal with each argument, beginning with the credibility of Ms. Ross. A. Credibility of the witness [18] Before turning to the specific arguments raised by Mr. Stone, I find it useful to identify the standard of review associated withmatters of witness credibility. [19] The credibility findings made by a trial judge are entitled to a high degree of deference and ought not be lightly interfered withby an appellate court: R v Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17 at para 24, 1 SCR 621, and R v Francois, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 827 at838.

A trial judge’s perceptions of credibility should be respected in the absence of an error in law or in principle or a palpable andoverriding error with respect to the evidence: see Gagnon at para 20 and R v Pelletier, 2019 SKCA 113 at para 116. [20] With the deferential standard of review in mind, I turn to the specific passages from the trial transcript that were identified byMr. Stone to support his argument that Ms. Ross should not have been believed and that the trial judge should have accepted his theory ofwhat happened on the night of the incident. [21] Ms.

Ross testified that she was intimidated before trial by one of the accused “face to face” in an effort to discourage her fromtestifying. She said she was repeatedly threatened and was told she would be killed if she testified. Ms. Ross did not identify the personwho had threatened her. Mr. Stone argues her testimony was untrue because it could not have been possible for any of the accused tothreaten Ms. Ross face to face since all three men were held on remand at the time of the alleged threats. [22] In my view, Mr. Stone misinterprets Ms. Ross’s testimony. Ms.

Ross testified that, on one occasion, she was threatened inperson while she was in custody. She didn’t say it was Mr. Stone who had threatened her. Ms. Ross also testified that she had beenthreatened a second time three months prior to the trial in Saskatoon. She refused to answer Crown counsel’s question as to the identity ofthe accused who had threatened her in the face to face encounter. In light of her refusal, Crown counsel asked the trial judge to remandMs. Ross into custody over the noon break. When the trial resumed in the afternoon, Crown counsel did not continue with this line ofquestioning.

From the transcript, it is clear Ms. Ross had refused to identify the person who threatened her on either occasion, other thanto say it was one of the three people she was testifying against. It was therefore possible the threat came from one of the co-accused andnot Mr. Stone. In any event, there was no evidence the person who threatened Ms. Ross was held on remand pending trial or had beenreleased on bail. [23] By way of this second argument, Mr. Stone points to Ms. Ross’s evidence where she testified that when Mr. Whitebear and

Mr. Lemay returned to the SUV after the robbery, they asked her to drive around in circles looking for Mr. Stone for five to ten minutes. Mr. Stone says this pattern of behavior was non-sensical. As such, he argues, this part of her testimony strained the overall believability of her testimony and thus undermined her credibility. [ 24 ] Respectfully, the fact that Ms. Ross’s action following the robbery makes no sense to Mr. Stone does not diminish her credibility. As Ms. Ross went on to explain, she kept circling around on the instruction of Mr. Whitebear because he and Mr. Lemay were concerned about Mr.

Stone, who they said had the money. [ 25 ] In his third submission, Mr. Stone submits that he only caught a ride with Ms. Ross, but left the scene as soon as they arrived at Mr. Ball’s apartment. Mr. Stone did not testify at trial but, on appeal, asserts – as he did at trial – that all he did was simply walk away and that he did not participate in the robbery. Mr. Stone points to two parts of Ms. Ross’s testimony that he says supports his assertion. [ 26 ] In my view, the segments from Ms. Ross’s testimony, identified by Mr. Stone, are isolated answers devoid of broader context.

With respect to the first, while it is true Ms. Ross testified that only Messrs. Whitebear and Lemay returned to the SUV following the robbery, importantly, she also testified that, upon their return to the vehicle, Messrs. Whitebear and Lemay expressed concern for Mr. Stone’s absence and that he had the money. The same can be said with respect to the second passage, which had come up in re- examination by the Crown. [ 27 ] For example, Mr. Stone points out that only Mr. Whitebear and Mr. Lemay returned to the SUV after the robbery. The second passage from the transcript relates to an answer Ms.

Ross gave about what she saw after the three accused left the vehicle: Q Okay. The last question I have for you. You told us … the three people got out of your vehicle, they went -- and I may get this slightly wrong, but they went to a house or behind a house? A They went behind a house. Q Behind a house. And was that all three of them going together or otherwise, at that time? A All three of them. Q Okay. And where did they go from there? A They came back out and then two went walking that way, one went walking the other way. Q Okay. And at what point -- you said that there was an alley involved at one point?

A Yeah, because that’s -- they mentioned an alley, these guys. Q Okay. And did you see how many people went down the alley, do you recall? A They said that three -- Q No, I’m asking -- A Three and three. Q I’m asking what you saw? A Three. [ 28 ] As evidenced by the above passage, Ms. Ross was asked if the three accused went behind a house or into an alley. She answered in the affirmative then said, “They came back out and then two went walking that way, one went walking the other way”. Following this exchange, Ms. Ross was asked to confirm her recollection of how many people she saw go down the back alley.

She confirmed it was three. [ 29 ] In any event, even if there were only two people who were present in the back alley, it is possible the other person was Mr. Stone. The trial judge accepted that only two people entered Mr. Ball’s apartment, with Mr. Whitebear being one of them. From the facts and testimony presented at trial, the trial judge was called upon to determine if the other person was Mr. Lemay or Mr. Stone. Based on the evidence and, as discussed below, the trial judge found Mr. Stone was the person who had accompanied Mr. Whitebear into Mr. Ball’s apartment. [ 30 ] Finally, Mr.

Stone points to portions of Ms. Ross’s testimony that he says supports his contention that he was not in the SUV when Messrs. Whitebear and Lemay finalized their plan to rob Mr. Ball. Mr. Stone claims Ms. Ross subsequently amended her testimony after a short break in the trial. He argues the questions put to Ms. Ross by Crown counsel were leading and suggestive and submitted that Crown counsel coached this witness. [ 31 ] Contrary to Mr. Stone’s submission, the events at trial progressed the other way around. Ms. Ross’s examination-in-chief began during the morning session of October 12, 2017. When Ms.

Ross initially testified about the conversation that took place in the SUV, she stated that the third person (whom she later identified as Mr. Stone) entered the vehicle before the conversation about robbing Mr. Ball: Q Okay. And when that third male came into the car, was that before or after there was discussion about going to rob Deryk Ball of his drugs? A Before. Q Okay. So if I have it right, the third person came into the car and then after that was a discussion about going to rob Deryk Ball? A Yeah. [ 32 ] The discussion about robbing Mr. Ball came up later in Ms. Ross’ testimony. This time, Ms.

Ross testified that the third person entered the vehicle after the conversation about robbing Mr. Ball: Q Who was he talking to when he was talking about robbing Deryk Ball of drugs? A The second person.

Q Okay. And was the third person in the vehicle at that time? A No. Q Okay. Was there any further part of that conversation after the third person arrived in the vehicle later on? Was there any further discussion of robbing Deryk Ball of his drugs? A No. [ 33 ] While Mr. Stone is correct in suggesting that Ms. Ross gave contradictory evidence about the conversation to rob Mr. Ball, he has reversed the sequence of her testimony. Ms. Ross initially testified all three accused were in the SUV when the discussion took place but, later, she said just two were there.

The trial judge did not comment on this seeming inconsistency. However, she did not convict Mr. Stone on the basis of the conversation that took place in the back seat of the SUV prior to the robbery, and, in any event, the trial judge is entitled to accept some, none or all of a witnesses’ testimony. In the end, although Ms. Ross was somewhat inconsistent on this point, I am satisfied the conversation that took place in the vehicle did not form the basis for conviction. [ 34 ] Neither do I see any basis for the suggestion that Crown counsel coached this witness. As noted, the inconsistency came after Ms.

Ross testified that the robbery discussion had taken place and, in any event, there was no break in the trial between the time of her initial testimony on the topic and the second occasion when Crown counsel returned to it later on. Thus, from the record, there was no opportunity for coaching and, as such, the suggestion is without foundation. [ 35 ] On the whole of it, I see nothing in Mr. Stone’s arguments that leads me to conclude the trial judge erred with regard to her credibility findings in relation to Ms. Ross. Although the trial judge found Ms.

Ross to be a reluctant witness who, at times, was defensive and argumentative with defence counsel, she also commented that Ms. Ross did not appear to exaggerate her evidence and, if anything, tended to minimize the accused’s prior discussion of the robbery and the presence of the gun in the vehicle. The believability of Ms. Ross’s testimony, the trial judge said, was augmented by the fact she did not attempt to divert blame, acknowledged her participation in the robbery and was largely consistent with the testimony of Mr.

Ball. [ 36 ] Given the deferential standard of review with respect to credibility findings and Mr. Stone’s inability to point to any palpable or overriding error in that regard, there is no basis for appellate intervention. B. Conviction on circumstantial evidence [ 37 ] The law permits a trial judge to take both direct and circumstantial evidence into account in convicting an accused. Direct evidence is evidence that comes from the testimony of a witness who tells the trial judge what he or she personally saw or felt or heard.

If a trial judge accepts a witness’s testimony, then that evidence directly proves the fact to which the witness testified. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is evidence that proves a fact or circumstances from which the trial judge draws an inference. An inference is a conclusion of fact that logically and reasonably flows from other facts that are accepted.

The inference cannot be conjecture or speculation but must be a natural and logical inference compelled by the proven facts. [ 38 ] However, before basing a verdict of guilt on circumstantial evidence, the trial judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the whole of the evidence.

The Supreme Court addressed this point in R v Villaroman , 2016 SCC 33 , [2016] SCR 1000 [ Villaroman ]: “The inferences that may be drawn from this observation must be considered in light of all of the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense” (at para 30). [ 39 ] Based on the testimony of both Mr. Ball and Ms. Ross, which the trial judge accepted as credible and reliable, she found that Mr. Stone, Mr. Whitebear and Mr. Lemay had formed a common intention to rob Mr. Ball and that the three of them exited the SUV and entered the alley near Mr.

Ball’s home for that very purpose. When the three accused left the SUV, Mr. Whitebear took the sawed-off shotgun with him, which, the trial judge remarked, would have been apparent to Mr. Stone and Mr. Lemay. [ 40 ] Mid way through the trial, Mr. Whitebear pleaded guilty to the offences as charged. The trial continued against Mr. Stone and Mr. Lemay, with the issue largely narrowed to who had accompanied Mr. Whitebear into Mr. Ball’s apartment. Based on the discussion that took place between Mr. Whitebear and Mr.

Lemay in the SUV after the robbery, the trial judge had no difficulty concluding that it was either Mr. Stone or Mr. Lemay who had entered Mr. Ball’s apartment with Mr. Whitebear. I see no error with how the trial judge assessed the evidence based on the testimony from the key Crown witnesses, which, as I have indicated, she accepted. [ 41 ] The central issue at trial – and indeed argued on appeal – is whether it was Mr. Stone or Mr. Lemay who carried the machete and entered Mr. Ball’s apartment with Mr. Whitehead. While it is true to say no one was able to positively identify Mr.

Stone as that person in the apartment who carried the machete and took the cash, the trial judge drew an inference from the following evidence to conclude it was Mr. Stone: (

a) the person who held the machete took Mr. Ball’s cell phone and his partner’s cell phone, some cash and jewelry; (

b) both Mr. Whitebear and Mr. Lemay returned to the SUV after the robbery, but Mr. Stone did not. The police searched the SUV shortly after the robbery but only found the sawed-off shotgun (not the machete) and some electronics (but not the jewelry or cash). The jewelry, cash and cell phones were taken by the second person in the apartment; and (

c) Mr. Fineday testified that the other person – the one who brandished the machete – appeared Indigenous insofar as his skin was darker than his own. Based on the trial judge’s in-court observations, she observed that Mr. Stone’s complexion was darker than Mr. Fineday’s. [ 42 ] While the trial judge did not specifically mention this fact, there was a further piece of circumstantial evidence that augmented the other evidence and supported the inference she drew. Ms. Ross testified that after Mr. Whitebear and Mr. Lemay returned to the SUV without Mr. Stone following the robbery, she overheard their conversation.

She said Mr. Whitebear and Mr. Lemay appeared to be concerned with Mr. Stone’s absence and that she heard Mr. Whitebear tell Mr. Lemay that it was Mr. Stone who had the money:

Q Okay. And who did he say that to? A To Jeremy [Mr. Lemay]. Q And who was he saying had money? A Sheldon [Mr. Stone]. Q And what were -- what were they acting like, what was their demeanor when they were talking about Sheldon having the money and not being there? A I don’t know. They seemed worried that they couldn’t find him. Q Now is that one of them or both of them? A Both. [ 43 ] In my view, the trial judge properly instructed herself on the law with regard to circumstantial evidence: I have reviewed the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. V. Villaroman .

There, it was made clear by the Supreme Court of Canada that when assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider other plausible theories and other reasonable possibilities which are inconsistent with guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada stated as follows at paragraph 38: (As read) [38] Of course, the line between a plausible theory and speculation is not always easy to draw, but the basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty. [ 44 ] The trial judge did not ignore Mr. Stone’s argument that he decided to leave the scene immediately after he exited the SUV and did not participate in the robbery.

The trial judge recognized this was a possible alternative inference that could be drawn from the facts. However, she ultimately discounted Mr. Stone’s version of the events because it did not rise beyond the level of speculation: Defence counsel for Mr. Stone argued at trial that after exiting the vehicle with Mr. Lemay and Mr. Whitebear, Mr. Stone decided to leave and did not participate in the robbery. This is an alternative inference that is possible. However, alternative inferences must be reasonable, not just possible.

In the absence of any other evidence, I find it would be an unreasonable inference to draw. It constitutes sheer speculation as opposed to a plausible theory. The evidence presented at trial, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is not reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that Mr.

Stone is guilty. [ 45 ] As the Supreme Court noted in Villaroman , the line between plausible theory and speculation is not always easy to draw, but the basic question is whether the circumstantial evidence, “viewed logically and in light of human experience” (at para 38), is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty.

In other words, the circumstances assessed in light of human experience should be such that it “excludes other reasonable alternative” (at para 41). [ 46 ] I see no error with the trial judge’s identification of the applicable law, the use she made of the circumstantial evidence or, more importantly, the inferences she drew from that evidence. The compelling circumstantial evidence – viewed logically and in light of human experience – was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt. III. Sentence Appeal [ 47 ] Mr. Stone urges this Court to impose a sentence of five years on the robbery charges.

Because he was unable to point to any error on the part of the trial judge, I take him to argue the sentence is demonstrably unfit and that the Court should sentence him afresh. [ 48 ] Mr. Stone’s arguments must be assessed in light of the standard of review for a sentence appeal: (

a) the sentence is demonstrably unfit, or (

b) the sentencing judge erred in principle, failed to consider a relevant factor or overemphasized an appropriate factor and that error had an impact on the sentence imposed ( R v Lacasse , 2015 SCC 64 at paras 41 and 44 , [2015] 3 SCR 1089) – also see R v L.V. , 2016 SKCA 74 at para 74 , 480 Sask R 181). [ 49 ] With the standard of review in mind, I turn to how the trial judge dealt with the sentence for Mr. Stone. [ 50 ] The trial judge began by noting the principles and purpose of sentencing and that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. In terms of aggravating factors, she observed the following of Mr. Stone: (

a) he was an active participant in a home invasion; (

b) he carried a weapon (a large machete); (

c) he threatened Mr. Ball and Mr. Fineday with it; (

d) he has a lengthy criminal record; and (

e) he is a member of a street gang. [ 51 ] With regard to mitigating factors, the trial judge went through Mr. Stone’s personal circumstance, took note of the pre-sentence report and commented on the Gladue factors at play in his case. [ 52 ] The trial judge next highlighted the sentencing jurisprudence, noting the range for home invasion robbery is 4–15 years of incarceration with no starting point sentence. Since this robbery involved the use of a prohibited firearm, the trial judge correctly identified the mandatory minimum 5-year sentence prescribed by s. 344(1) (

a) of the Criminal Code . [ 53 ] As to Gladue factors, the trial judge said, “The link between Gladue considerations and the offending behavior, which I believe

is rooted in addictions, is comprehensible and Mr. Stone’s moral blameworthiness is reduced to some real extent”. On the basis of her assessment, the trial judge reduced the robbery sentence – which she said would normally be in the range of 8 years – to 7 years. The Crown had asked for 7.5 years. [ 54 ] In the end, I see no error in principle with the sentence imposed, nor do I find the sentence to be demonstrably unfit. The trial judge found the Gladue factors reduced Mr.

Stone’s moral blameworthiness and this caused her to sentence him toward the lower end of the range. [ 55 ] To conclude, in light of the gravity of the offences, Mr. Stone’s involvement in the commission of these offences, his lengthy and violent offending history, the other aggravating factors, including the use of a weapon during a home invasion, the sentencing jurisprudence and the deferential standard of review, I see no basis for appellate intervention. IV. Conclusion [ 56 ] For the above reasons, Mr. Stone’s appeals against his convictions and his sentence were dismissed.