R v Groshok, 2019 SKCA 39

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACR3070 Citation: R v Groshok , 2019 SKCA 39 Date: 2019-05-03 Between: Sharon Lorne Groshok Appellant And Her Majesty the Queen Respondent Before: Ottenbreit, Caldwell and Schwann JJ.A. Disposition: Appeal dismissed Written reasons by: The Honourable Mr. Justice Ottenbreit In concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Caldwell The Honourable Madam Justice Schwann On Appeal From: Provincial Court, Saskatoon Appeal Heard: October 17, 2018 Counsel: Kathy L. Hodgson-Smith for the Appellant Wade McBride, Q.C., for the Respondent Ottenbreit J.A. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] Sharon Lorne Groshok appeals her convictions in the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan for possession of hydromorphone for the purposes of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , SC 1996, c 19 [ CDSA ], and possession of property obtained by crime contrary to ss. 354(1) and 355 (

b) of the Criminal Code . Ms. Groshok was jointly tried with her husband, Edward Groshok, who was also found guilty of the same offences. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, Ms. Groshok’s appeal is dismissed. II. Facts and Background [ 2 ] On April 21, 2016, the Saskatoon Police Service searched the residence of Ms. Groshok and her husband. Two locked safes were located within a full closet of their master bedroom. A cardboard box was located in the larger of the two safes. In the box was $2,610 wrapped with an elastic band, consisting of five $100 bills, twenty-seven $50 bills and thirty-eight $20 bills.

There were also three unlabelled pill bottles, containing eighty-seven 24 mg gray prescription-grade hydromorphone pills, ninety-one 24 mg gray prescription-grade hydromorphone pills and one-hundred and eighty-nine 4 mg yellow prescription-grade hydromorphone pills. The second safe held an old can containing coins. Neither the safe nor any of the contents was fingerprinted. [ 3 ] The sum of $1,700, comprised of eighty-five $20 bills, was found on the bed in the master bedroom. Two cellphones – one on the dresser and the other on the night stand – were located in the master bedroom as well. Cannabis marijuana (4.9

g) and methamphetamine (0.5

g) were seized from the ensuite bathroom, which contained both female and male toiletries. An empty household cleanser bottle with a false bottom was located in the vanity of the bathroom. [ 4 ] Ms. Groshok admitted the bedroom belonged to her and her husband and that she was aware of the safe in the closet in which the drugs were found, but said it belonged to Kelly Hanson, her husband’s friend. She said that she was not present when he brought the safe into their home, she did not have the combination to the safe and did not know what was in it.

At the time of the search, the safe had been in her bedroom for a month or two. [ 5 ] Mr. Hanson claimed ownership of the safe and the contents. He testified that because other people had access to his residence, he gave the safe to Mr. Groshok, a non-user of drugs, who he trusted to store the safe, the hydromorphone and the money. Mr. Hanson testified that only he had the combination to the safe and Mr. Groshok did not know what was inside. He explained it was simpler to give the safe to Mr.

Groshok than to give him just the contents of the safe because he might not have taken the contents on their own. [ 6 ] Mr. Hanson explained that he had, in the past, suffered injuries resulting in a disability and, since 2015, had managed chronic pain from these injuries with various types of morphine pills prescribed by his doctor. It was the prescription pills that were in the safe. He testified that he used three 12 mg hydromorphone pills and two 4 mg morphine pills on a daily basis. He confirmed that his usage differed per day but was “never less than 36 and two 4s”.

He indicated he bought as many prescriptions as he could and was always trying to buy more to stockpile as he needed the pills. He testified that he placed the beads from his 12 mg hydromorphone prescription into a single 24 mg capsule as it was more convenient to take or carry one pill rather than two pills. He always carried at least one day’s worth of drugs with him. [ 7 ] Ms. Groshok testified that, just prior to April 2016, she was not fully employed other than working for her landlord and was home on a regular basis.

She said the cash on the bed was from her husband’s job as a subcontractor and had been given to her for rent.

She explained he gave her cash because he had banking difficulties in the past and did not have a bank account. [8] The Crown’s expert witness on the pricing and usage of hydromorphone, drug trafficking and proceeds of crime testified asfollows: (

a) the hydromorphone seized was for the purposes of trafficking, given the quantity that was seized and the presence of cash; (

b) a normal or average recreational user of hydromorphone would consume 4 to 8 mg per day to avoid withdrawal symptoms; (

c) those addicted to hydromorphone would use more than 4 to 8 mg per day, depending on their level of tolerance; (

d) tolerance is dependent upon consumption patterns and the manner in which hydromorphone is ingested – intravenousinjections would result in a more immediate effect that would affect tolerance, so less hydromorphone would be used; (

e) intravenous use is the most common for both recreational and addicted users, followed by insufflation (or snorting throughthe nose) – ingestion by mouth is least common; (

f) drugs are sold for cash as drug traffickers want to eliminate any paper trail linking them to drug transactions; (

g) a household cleanser can with a false bottom is used by drug traffickers to store drugs or items associated with drugtrafficking – the intention in using this item is to permit the hiding of items “in the open”; and (

h) the value of a 24 mg hydromorphone pill on the street is $40–$50. A 4 mg morphine pill on the street is worth $10–$20. III. Decision of the Trial Judge [9] The trial judge began his decision by referring to R v W.(D.), (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 742 [W.(D.)], and theimport of weighing credibility and believability when evaluating all the evidence. [10] He then addressed the evidence of Mr. Hanson and found that his evidence was incapable of belief in a number of respects. Hefound it very difficult to believe that Mr. Hanson would give his safe containing the drugs to Mr.

Groshok to keep for him if he neededhis morphine daily. The trial judge also found Mr. Hanson’s story about how he reloaded the beads of hydromorphone from 12 mgcapsules into 24 mg capsules, and his rationale for doing so, incapable of belief. He stated that Mr. Hanson tailored his evidence to thephysical evidence that he was presented. He found Mr. Hanson not credible. [11] The trial judge then dealt with Ms. Groshok’s testimony. He noted that, because Ms. Groshok was home on a regular basis,she would have been in a position to say whether Mr.

Hanson came to her home to get the drugs; yet her testimony (that he did notreattend after delivering the safe) was implausible, given he was highly addicted and therefore would have to come back and forth to thehouse. He also noted other problems with her credibility. She denied using drugs then later admitted she used marijuana. As well, shewas evasive when asked questions about why her husband did not have a bank account. [12] The trial judge determined that, because there were enough internal inconsistencies in Ms. Groshok’s evidence,inconsistencies with the evidence of Mr.

Hanson and the theory of the defence, and because she was evasive, he could safely reject herevidence. [13] The trial judge then looked at the evidence to determine if, on all of it he accepted, the elements of the offences had beenproven beyond a reasonable doubt. [14] Having dismissed Mr. Hanson’s and Ms. Groshok’s evidence of how and why the drugs were in the safe, the trial judge notedthat he was left with evidence of a safe containing hundreds of hydromorphone pills and thousands of dollars, which were found in abedroom jointly-occupied by Ms. Groshok and her husband.

He indicated the only reasonable inference to be drawn, having rejected thedefence’s explanations given for the presence of the drugs and money, was that both Mr. and Ms. Groshok had knowledge of the itemscontained in the safe and control of the safe. Accordingly, he found beyond a reasonable doubt they were in possession of the drugs andthe money. [15] He noted that there was no evidence of intravenous use of the drugs found in the house.

The quantity of drugs, money and thehousehold cleanser container, with a false bottom, led him to conclude the only reasonable inference was that the drugs were possessedfor the purpose of trafficking and that Mr. and Ms. Groshok jointly-possessed the drugs. [16] With respect to the proceeds of crime offence, the trial judge noted evidence of trafficking in the large quantity of drugs, afalse-bottomed household cleanser container, no evidence of personal consumption and close proximity of the drugs to a large amount ofcash. Noting that he had rejected Ms.

Groshok’s evidence, he found the only reasonable inference to draw from the evidence he didaccept was that Mr. and Ms. Groshok were also in possession of the proceeds of crime, i.e., the money on the bed and the money in thesafe. [17] Accordingly, he convicted Ms. Groshok on the trafficking and proceeds of crime counts. IV. Points in Issue

[ 18 ] The issues raised by Ms. Groshok can be distilled into the following: (

a) Did the trial judge misapply W.(D.) ? (

b) Was the trial judge’s finding that Ms. Groshok possessed or was jointly in possession of hydromorphone unreasonable? V. Analysis A. Did the trial judge misapply W.(D.) ? [ 19 ] Ms. Groshok argues that the trial judge failed to properly apply W.(D.) . She makes a number of arguments in this regard. She submits that he erred by dealing with Mr. Hanson’s evidence first. She also argues that even if the trial judge did not believe her testimony or the testimony of Mr.

Hanson for purposes of the third step of W.D. , nevertheless, the Crown failed to adduce direct evidence that showed possession and knowledge of the drugs by her beyond a reasonable doubt. She submits that the trial judge’s finding of her lack of credibility was, for the purposes of the third step of W.(D.) , neutral at most. [ 20 ] I turn first to the governing law; the test from W.(D.) (at 757–758): First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit. Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.

Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. [ 21 ] In R v Vuradin , 2013 SCC 38 , [2013] 2 SCR 639, the Court commented as follows: [21] The paramount question in a criminal case is whether, on the whole of the evidence, the trier of fact is left with a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused: W.(D . ) , at p. 758.

The order in which a trial judge makes credibility findings of witnesses is inconsequential as long as the principle of reasonable doubt remains the central consideration. A verdict of guilt must not be based on a choice between the accused’s evidence and the Crown’s evidence: R. v. C.L.Y. , 2008 SCC 2 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 5, at paras. 6–8 . However, trial judges are not required to explain in detail the process they followed to reach a verdict: see R. v.

Boucher , 2005 SCC 72 , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 499, at para. 29 . [ 22 ] A precise articulation of the W.(D.) test is not required by a trial judge ( R v Thompson , 2017 SKCA 33 at para 23 ). Likewise, compartmentalization of the analysis into three distinct steps is not necessary as long as the reasons reflect that the correct analysis was undertaken ( R v Griffin , 2018 ABCA 277 at paras 3 and 19 , 366 CCC (3d) 309). [ 23 ] The trial judge, although mentioning W.(D.) , did not articulate the test. It is conceded by Ms. Groshok that he addressed at least the first step of the test. In doing so, he turned first to Mr.

Hanson’s evidence. [ 24 ] This evidence provided the framework on which hung Ms. Groshok’s evidence and the theory of her defence, i.e., that Mr. Hanson stored his drug stash at her house in a safe and, although she knew about the safe, she did not know about its contents. Indeed, her evidence dovetailed with that of Mr. Hanson in that the safe belonged to him and that she had allowed him to store it in her closet. [ 25 ] The trial judge, turning to Mr. Hanson’s evidence first, appropriately set the context in which he could, under W.(D.) , evaluate Ms.

Groshok’s testimony relevant to the matter of knowledge and control of the drugs and whether he believed her evidence in that respect. [ 26 ] To assess whether he believed Ms. Groshok, he considered evidence that was both direct and circumstantial. The direct evidence was Ms. Groshok’s admission of her knowledge of the safe, but a denial of knowledge and control of the pills and the money in the safe. The trial judge, in assessing her credibility on this point, had to consider Mr.

Hanson’s testimony, which dovetailed with hers, that he, as a daily user of drugs, had brought the drugs to the Groshok home to prevent them from being stolen by third parties. The trial judge proceeded to consider the plausibility of this story. [ 27 ] He first drew the inference from Mr. Hanson’s evidence that he was an addict and used pain medication on a daily basis. Mr. Hanson had testified he carried at least one day’s worth of drugs with him. As a result, the trial judge inferred that Mr. Hanson would have needed regular access to the safe. The trial judge also noted the evidence of Ms.

Groshok: she was at home “pretty regularly” during the time the safe was in the closet. He fairly inferred that she would have been in a position, while at home, to observe Mr. Hanson’s comings and goings to access the drugs that he needed on a day-to-day basis. He also noted the evidence of Ms. Groshok that Mr. Hanson did not access the safe after he delivered it to their home. The implausibility of all this obviously raised credibility concerns with Ms. Groshok’s evidence, given the theory of the defence. [ 28 ] Additionally, the trial judge noted the inconsistency in Ms.

Groshok’s testimony regarding her use of drugs. Although this was not a determinative factor, this further diminished her credibility. The trial judge found she was evasive when answering a number of questions. This also diminished her credibility. In the result, the trial judge rejected her evidence: “I think quite frankly there are enough internal inconsistencies and inconsistencies with the evidence I heard from Mr. Hanson and -- and the theory of the defence that I

can -- and her general evasiveness, that I can safely reject her evidence in its entirety as well”. This concluded the first step in the W.(D.)analysis. I see nothing inconsistent with W.(D.) in this part of the analysis. [29] Having concluded that he did not believe Ms.

Groshok, it may be inferred from the foregoing that the trial judge was, as well,not left in a reasonable doubt by her testimony because he immediately went on to the third step, i.e., after looking at all the evidence andthe evidence he did accept, had the offences been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [30] The trial judge then combined the second and the third step of the W.(D.) analysis: “Now, of course that doesn’t end theinquiry.

I still have to look at all of the evidence and determine all the evidence that I have accepted and determine if all of the elementsof these offences have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt”. [31] As part of the third step, he was, again, entitled to take into account Mr. Hanson’s evidence of how and why he stored thedrugs in the Groshok home and the implausibility of that story. [32] Having determined that Mr.

Hanson’s explanation as a whole was not credible, he stated: So what I am left with is evidence of a safe in a bedroom that is jointly occupied by both accused and that safe contains literallyhundreds of Hydromorphone pills and thousands of dollars. … [T]he only reasonable inference to draw is that both individuals hadknowledge of the items contained in the safe and they had control of the safe. As a result I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt thatthey were, in fact, in possession of the Hydromorphone and the -- and the money in question.

In so stating, he rightly focused on the remaining evidence, taking into account that he found the defence evidence to be incredible. [33] The trial judge bolstered his conclusion with the following: “And as we’re dealing with a situation where it’s located in -- in aplace that is jointly occupied by both Sharon and Edward Groshok, the only reasonable inference for me to draw is that they are both inpossession of that hydromorphone”. [34] Ms. Groshok argues that after the trial judge discounted her and Mr.

Hanson’s testimony, there was no evidence of knowledgeand possession for the purposes of the third step of W.(D.). However, this is not so. Such evidence need not be direct. It can becircumstantial. In R v Pham (2005), (ON CA), 204 OAC 299 (CA) [Pham] (aff’d 2006 SCC 26, [2006] 1 SCR 940),the Court said the following: [18] The onus is on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements of the offence of possession. This can beaccomplished by direct evidence or may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. In R. v.

Chambers, supra, at p. 448 C.C.C., MartinJ.A. noted that the court may draw “appropriate inferences from evidence that a prohibited drug is found in a room under the control ofan accused and where there is also evidence from which an inference may properly be drawn that the accused was aware of the presenceof the drug”.

See also R v Aiello (1978), (ON CA), 38 CCC (2d) 485 (Ont CA), appeal dismissed, (SCC), [1979] 2SCR 15. [35] The above excerpts from the trial judge’s reasons set forth the circumstantial evidence that he did accept, as required by thethird step of W.(D.), i.e., the quantity of drugs, their location in the bedroom and Ms. Groshok’s admitted control of the bedroom. Thiswas evidence from which he could infer Ms. Groshok’s knowledge and possession of the drugs.

This, along with the evidence as awhole, was a proper basis for him to determine that knowledge and possession had been proven. [36] In short, I see no error in the trial judge’s application of the W.(D.) test. B. Was the trial judge’s finding that Ms. Groshok possessed or was jointly inpossession of hydromorphone unreasonable ? [37] Ms. Groshok again submits that there was no direct evidence she was aware of the hydromorphone in the safe or,alternatively, that she consented to its presence in the safe. She argues that, at most, the Crown had proven she was in possession of alocked safe. Ms.

Groshok submits the trial judge drew unreasonable inferences from the evidence, which led him to conclude that shehad knowledge and control and, therefore, was in possession of the drugs. She submits these inferences are not supported by theevidence. [38] The Crown submits that Ms. Groshok’s argument rests on differing

interpretations of the evidence, not a logical flaw ordemonstrated incompatibility with uncontroverted facts. The Crown argues that this is merely an attempt to have this Court substitute itsown view of the facts for that of the trial judge. [39] To assess the arguments of Ms.

Groshok, I turn first to the law governing unreasonable verdict as it involves circumstantialevidence, unreasonable inferences and credibility assessments. [40] The governing standard of review to determine whether a verdict based on circumstantial evidence is unreasonable was statedby Cromwell J. in R v Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 SCR 1000 [Villaroman]: [37] When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and “other reasonablepossibilities” which are inconsistent with guilt: R. v.

Comba, (ON CA), [1938] O.R. 200 (C.A.), at pp. 205 and 211, perMiddleton J.A., aff’d (SCC), [1938] S.C.R. 396; R. v. Baigent, 2013 BCCA 28, 335 B.C.A.C. 11, at para. 20; R. v.Mitchell, [2008] QCA 394 (AustLII), at para. 35. I agree with the appellant that the Crown thus may need to negative these reasonablepossibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might beconsistent with the innocence of the accused”: R. v. Bagshaw, (SCC), [1972] S.C.R. 2, at p. 8. “Other plausible theories”

or “other reasonable possibilities” must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not onspeculation. [38] Of course, the line between a “plausible theory” and “speculation” is not always easy to draw. But the basic question is whether thecircumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, is reasonably capable of supporting an inference other thanthat the accused is guilty. … [55] A verdict is reasonable if it is one that a properly instructed jury acting judicially could reasonably have rendered: R. v. Biniaris,2000 SCC 15, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381.

Applying this standard requires the appellate court to re-examine and to some extent reweigh andconsider the effect of the evidence: R. v. Yebes, (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 168, at p. 186. This limited weighing of theevidence on appeal must be done in light of the standard of proof in a criminal case. Where the Crown’s case depends on circumstantialevidence, the question becomes whether the trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused’s guilt was theonly reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence: Yebes, at p. 186; R. v.

Mars (2006), (ON CA),205 C.C.C. (3d) 376 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4; R. v. Liu (1989), 1989 ABCA 95 , 95 A.R. 201 (C.A.), at para. 13; R. v. S.L.R.,2003 ABCA 148; R. v. Cardinal (1990), 1990 ABCA 115 , 106 A.R. 91 (C.A.); R. v. Kaysaywaysemat (1992), (SK CA), 97 Sask.

R. 66 (C.A.), at paras. 28 and 31. (Emphasis added) [41] In R v Dunford, 2017 SKCA 1, 345 CCC (3d) 374, this Court explained the standard of review in circumstances where it isargued the trial judge made unreasonable inferences that resulted in a verdict that was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence: [50] This argument must be assessed against the overarching governing law in R v Yebes, (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR 168 at186 [Yebes], i.e., whether a properly instructed trier of fact, acting judicially, could reasonably have rendered the verdict.

Thereasonableness of a trial judge’s verdict based on inferences drawn from the evidence is governed by R v Sinclair, 2011 SCC 40 atparas 4, 16, 19-21, [2011] 3 SCR 3; R v Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5, [2007] 1 SCR 190. A verdict can be overturned where a finding of factessential to the verdict is plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on for that purpose by the judge or is demonstrably incompatiblewith evidence that is not otherwise contradicted or rejected by the judge.

See also R v Johnson, 2014 SKCA 10 at para 4. [42] In R v P.R., 2018 SKCA 27, 365 CCC (3d) 120, in respect of an argument of unreasonable verdict made on the basis ofcredibility assessments, this Court said the following: [49] It is well understood that an appellate court must show “great deference” to a trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility: R v W.(R.), (SCC), [1992] 2 SCR 122 at 131; R v François, (SCC), [1994] 2 SCR 827; R v Baxter, 2013SKCA 52 at para 46, 414 Sask R 184.

Where an unreasonable verdict is alleged and the verdict is based on a credibility assessment, anappellate court may only interfere if the verdict “cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence”: R v Frances, 2017 SKCA109 at para 3; R v Burke, (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 474 at para 7; R v R.P., 2012 SCC 22 at para 10, [2012] 1 SCR 746. [43] The crux of Ms. Groshok’s submission is that the trial judge unreasonably inferred from the quantity of drugs, their locationin Ms. Groshok’s bedroom and the admitted control of the bedroom by Ms.

Groshok that she had either constructive or joint possessionof the drugs and money found. [44] The CDSA, by virtue of s. 2 thereof, incorporates s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code, which sets out three categories of possession,i.e., personal, constructive and joint. All three types of possession require some element of knowledge and control (R v Morelli, 2010SCC 8 at para 17, [2010] 1 SCR 253; Pham at paras 15–16; R v Savory (1996), (ON CA), 94 OAC 318 (CA) atparas 6–7, leave to appeal refused [1997] 2 SCR xv).

As noted above, knowledge and control can be proven by circumstantial evidence(Pham). [45] With this background, I turn to Ms. Groshok’s argument that knowledge and control had not been proven. She first challengesthe trial judge’s finding that she was not credible. The trial judge implicitly rejected her evidence that she did not know what was in thesafe. As explained above, he did so for a number of reasons, including internal inconsistencies in her evidence, inconsistencies in herevidence with the theory of the defence based on Mr.

Hanson’s testimony and her evasiveness. [46] The trial judge then turned to the evidence of Mr. Hanson. Ms. Groshok submits that the trial judge, in arriving at hisconclusion that there were inconsistencies in her evidence with the theory of her defence, unreasonably inferred Mr. Hanson needed to goback and forth to the house to access the drugs in the safe and that she would have been in a position to say whether Mr. Hanson hadreattended to access the drug stash. [47] The trial judge appropriately dealt with the available inferences in the context of determining the plausibility of the defencetheory.

There was strong direct evidence from which the trial judge could conclude that Mr. Hanson was addicted to the kind of drugs inthe safe. He required them on a daily basis and only kept about one day’s supply of drugs with him. It was not an unreasonable inferencethat such an addiction would require him to access those drugs at the Groshok home on a frequent basis if they were indeed his. Asmentioned, there was direct evidence from Ms. Groshok that she was regularly at home. From this, it was open to the trial judge toreasonably infer that she would therefore have been in a good position to observe whether Mr.

Hanson accessed the safe as a result of hisaddiction. The testimony of Ms. Groshok that she did not observe Mr. Hanson reattend to access the drugs, which he rejected, was atodds with the logical inference that he would have been a frequent visitor to her home if his story that the drugs were his were credible. Isee nothing unreasonable in this process of analysis and the inferences drawn by the trial judge. From all this, the trial judge was entitledto infer that Ms. Groshok was not credible when she said she was unaware of what was in the safe. Such an inference was notunreasonable.

[ 48 ] Ms. Groshok also challenges the trial judge’s finding that Mr. Hanson was not credible. The trial judge found Mr. Hanson’s testimony that he reloaded 12 mg beads into 24 mg drug capsules, in order to take one or several fewer pills a day, ludicrous and incapable of belief. He also found no evidence of wear and tear on the capsules, which would indicate that a reloading had taken place. He found it impossible to believe that Mr. Hanson, who needed morphine daily, would store a significant stockpile of it with another person. This was an assessment of Mr. Hanson’s credibility, based on his testimony.

It was within the trial judge’s purview to reject Mr. Hanson’s evidence as incredible. [ 49 ] Insofar as the argument of unreasonable verdict relies on the credibility assessments of Ms. Groshok and Mr. Hanson, I am not satisfied they cannot be supported on any reasonable view of the evidence. [ 50 ] Ms. Groshok further argues that even if the trial judge found her and Mr. Hanson not credible, the remaining evidence would not support an inference she had knowledge and control of the drugs. Ms.

Groshok essentially argues the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence was that she did not know about the pills and money in the safe. [ 51 ] Ms. Groshok submits that she was not at home at the time the safe was delivered, inviting an inference that she, therefore, would not have known what was in it. She also argues the safe was buried under many clothes in the closet inviting the inference that the safe was not accessed on a regular basis. Unfortunately, Ms. Groshok’s approach to the evidence, and the inferences to be drawn from it, is piecemeal.

The trial judge was required to look at the totality of the circumstances and evidence. The trial judge’s conclusions regarding possession, and ultimately guilt, must be looked at on the basis of whether it was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence ( Villaroman at para 55 ). [ 52 ] As stated in Villaroman , “‘other plausible theories’ or other ‘reasonable possibilities’ must be based on logic and experience applied to the evidence or lack of evidence, not on speculation” (at para 37).

Put another way, was the circumstantial evidence, viewed logically and in light of human experience, reasonably capable of supporting an inference other than that the accused is guilty (see para 41)? [ 53 ] On concluding he could reject Ms. Groshok’s evidence, the trial judge implicitly rejected the defence theory that, although she knew about the safe, she was unaware of the drugs in it. This left the trial judge with no direct evidence of knowledge.

The evidence that was left, which might be capable of informing the issue of knowledge, was the quantity of drugs and their value, their location in the bedroom closet, Ms. Groshok’s admitted knowledge of the safe and an admission that she had control of the bedroom and, at least, the safe. Admittedly, this is circumstantial evidence of knowledge and control. However, it was compelling circumstantial evidence, i.e., a substantial quantity of hard drugs with no other explanation of why they would be there.

It was not an unreasonable inference for the trial judge to draw from the circumstantial evidence “viewed logically and in the light of human experience” ( Villaroman at para 38 ) that Ms. Groshok had knowledge and control of the drugs, pointing to either constructive or joint possession and that there were no other reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence. [ 54 ] Looking at the evidence as a whole, and at the inferences of the trial judge, it cannot be said that his findings of fact, essential to the verdict, are plainly contradicted by the evidence relied on for that purpose by the trial judge.

Nor are the findings of fact from which the inferences are drawn demonstrably incompatible with or otherwise contradicted by the evidence relied on by the trial judge. In short, I cannot find that the verdict is unreasonable based on the standard of review. VI. Conclusion [ 55 ] The appeal is dismissed. “Ottenbreit J.A.” Ottenbreit J.A. I concur. “Caldwell J.A.” Caldwell J.A. I concur. “Schwann J.A.” Schwann J.A.