Stephens v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2021 SKCA 155

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV3589 Citation: Stephens v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce , 2021 SKCA 155 Date: 2021-11-30 Between: Brenda Elaine Stephens Appellant (Applicant) And Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Respondent (Respondent) And Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan Non-Party (Non-party) Before: Schwann, Leurer and Kalmakoff JJ.A.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed Written reasons by: The Court On appeal from: QBG 672 of 2018, Saskatoon Appeal heard: November 4, 2021 Counsel: Brenda Elaine Stephens appearing on her own behalf Troy Baril for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Lindsay Oliver for Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan The Court I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Brenda Stephens appeals the decision of a Court of Queen’s Bench judge, sitting in Chambers ( Stephens v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (28 January 2020) Saskatoon, QBG 672/2018 (Sask QB) [ Chambers Decision ]). The Chambers Decision dismissed Ms.

Stephens’ application to review the Local Registrar’s assessment of costs against her in favour of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce [CIBC]. [ 2 ] The costs assessment followed the unilateral discontinuance by Ms. Stephens of a civil action that she had commenced against CIBC. Pursuant to Rules 4-49(1) and (4) of The Queen’s Bench Rules [ QB Rules ], Ms. Stephens had a right to discontinue her civil action against CIBC without its consent.

However, having done so, CIBC became entitled to the costs of that action, in accordance with Rule 4- 49(2). [ 3 ] Importantly, both before the Chambers judge and again in this Court, Ms. Stephens confirmed that she did not object to any specific item in CIBC’s bill of costs. Instead, all of Ms. Stephens’ arguments arise out of various complaints she has against CIBC and others, including against Pierre Hawkins, a lawyer with Pro Bono Law Saskatchewan Inc. [PBLS] who assisted her in the preparation of her claim against CIBC. The Chambers judge found that Ms. Stephens’ complaints and concerns against Mr.

Hawkins could be properly raised by her in a different forum, and do not provide a basis to oppose the payment by her of the costs to which CIBC is entitled in accordance with the QB Rules . The Chambers judge committed no reviewable error in reaching this conclusion. [ 4 ] For this reason, and the additional reasons that follow, we are therefore compelled to dismiss Ms. Stephens’ appeal. I. BACKGROUND A. The 2018 Action [ 5 ] According to Ms. Stephens, on March 23, 2018, she met with Mr. Hawkins of PBLS seeking assistance in the preparation of a lawsuit against CIBC. It is uncontested that Mr.

Hawkins provided some assistance to her, and a statement of claim was prepared, signed by Ms. Stephens and filed and issued by the Court of Queen’s Bench on May 4, 2018 [the 2018 Action]. [ 6 ] In her statement of claim, Ms. Stephens alleged that she and her then husband had borrowed a sum of money from CIBC in 1996. A memorandum to the loan agreement contained a term that permitted CIBC to register a caveat against certain property owned by Ms. Stephens and her husband. In 2002, CIBC obtained a default judgment against Ms.

Stephens for defaulting on the loan and, in order to realize on the judgment, took enforcement steps to seize the property and sell it to a third party. In her statement of claim, Ms. Stephens alleged that she had not been served with the proceedings that led to the default judgment in favour of CIBC or provided with any notice of its enforcement efforts, and that CIBC had failed to comply with the statutory requirements governing the seizure, possession, and disposition of the property. She alleged that she only learned of the seizure of the property by CIBC years later, in 2016.

Based on all of that, the statement of claim asserted several causes of action and sought general, special, aggravated, and punitive damages against CIBC. [ 7 ] CIBC defended the 2018 Action and, over the course of the next year, both CIBC and Ms. Stephens took a number of other steps in relation to it.

[ 8 ] A mandatory mediation session was held on January 21, 2019. Both parties attended. [ 9 ] On April 1, 2019, without the assistance of a lawyer, Ms. Stephens filed an amended statement of claim and served it on counsel for CIBC. In it, she added several new details, and pleaded new causes of action including conspiracy (involving CIBC, the manager of its branch in the Village of Lucky Lake and various officials of the Village), forgery, fraudulent concealment, and defamation. [ 10 ] On May 10, 2019, Ms. Stephens served CIBC with written questions and a notice to produce documents.

CIBC provided responses to both shortly thereafter. [ 11 ] On May 22, 2019, CIBC filed an application to strike Ms. Stephens’ claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under The Limitations Act , SS 2004, c L-16.1 or, alternatively, because it disclosed no reasonable cause of action. [ 12 ] Ms. Stephens filed two affidavits in response to the application. She also filed further written questions, sought admissions of fact from CIBC, and sought further inspection of documents. CIBC provided responses; it objected to answering some of Ms.

Stephens’ questions and objected to inspection of the documents she sought on the basis that they were not in its possession. CIBC also objected to making the factual admissions that Ms. Stephens requested. [ 13 ] On June 12, 2019, Ms. Stephens filed a notice of application to set aside the default judgment that CIBC had obtained in 2002. [ 14 ] Following communication between Ms. Stephens and counsel for CIBC, both CIBC’s application to strike Ms. Stephens’ claim and her application to set aside the default judgment were adjourned by consent to August 13, 2019. [ 15 ] On July 29, 2019, Ms.

Stephens served CIBC with a discontinuance of claim in the 2018 Action, and filed it in the Court of Queen’s Bench on August 1, 2019. She had neither sought CIBC’s consent nor obtained leave of the Court prior to doing so. B. The 2019 Action [ 16 ] On August 12, 2019, Ms. Stephens filed a statement of claim to commence a new action, naming CIBC’s legal counsel, MLT Aikins LLP, Wells Fargo Financial Corporation Canada, PBLS, Deloitte Restructuring Inc., the Village of Lucky Lake, David Jessiman, Rick Couch and Andy Ruckaber as defendants. This action was assigned QBG No. 1049 of 2019 [the 2019 Action].

Without diving deeply into the particulars, the statement of claim in the 2019 Action alleged that the various defendants had conspired together using fraud, forgery, bad faith, and other unlawful means to deprive Ms. Stephens and her former husband of their property. Ms. Stephens also alleged that the nefarious dealings of these parties had led to her former husband’s untimely death in 2005.

She pleaded various causes of action, including breach of contract, mortgage fraud, forgery, fraudulent concealment, conspiracy, trespass, conversion, unjust enrichment, negligence, defamation, and wrongful death. [ 17 ] As against Pierre Hawkins in particular, Ms. Stephens’ claim in the 2019 Action alleged that, in drafting her claim in the 2018 Action as her assigned lawyer from PBLS, he “Spoliated necessary Parties and Facts in bad faith to determine the real issues in dispute” and that “this further Concealed and Shielded the Cause of Action” (emphasis in original).

She also alleged that PBLS’s involvement in the matter “aided MLT Aikins, CIBC and the Village of Lucky Lake”, in bad faith, in a “cover up scheme” that “compromised, confused, delayed and put Brenda Stephens Claim at risk”. C. CIBC’s application for an assessment of costs in the 2018 Action [ 18 ] On August 22, 2019, CIBC submitted a bill of costs in the amount of $3,830.77, to the Local Registrar, in accordance with Rule 4-49(3), in relation to the discontinued 2018 Action. On September 3, 2019, an assessment officer certified the bill of costs, making it enforceable against Ms. Stephens. D. Ms.

Stephens’ application for a review of the assessment of costs [ 19 ] On September 11, 2019, Ms. Stephens served CIBC with an application for a review of the assessment of costs, in accordance with Rule 11-22. Her application also sought an order, pursuant to Rule 11-24(1) and (2) that Pierre Hawkins be personally liable for CIBC’s costs. The basis for the application was her allegation that Mr.

Hawkins had, in drafting her statement of claim in the 2018 Action, failed to include relevant material facts regarding the “true” discovery date of her cause of action and that he had failed to join all relevant parties and plead all the causes of action that the facts of her case supported. [ 20 ] In her notice of application, Ms. Stephens did not specify any particular item in the bill of costs to which she objected. The affidavit she filed in support of her application focused on her allegation that she had received ineffective and improper representation from Mr.

Hawkins and PBLS and asserted that this poor representation had been responsible for the costs incurred by CIBC. E. The Chambers Decision [ 21 ] The Chambers judge dismissed Ms. Stephens’ application. He began by citing Rule 11-22, the relevant portions of which read as follows: 11-22

(1) A person with a pecuniary interest in the result of an assessment of costs who is dissatisfied with an assessment may apply to the Court for a review of the assessment of costs. …

(3) A review of the assessment of costs:

(

a) must be limited to items that have been objected to before the assessment officer; and (

b) may include items in which the assessment officer exercised discretion. …

(5) A notice of application for review must specify any item objected to and the grounds of the objection.

(6) Unless the Court otherwise orders, a review of assessment of costs must be: (

a) limited to the items and grounds specified in the notice of application; and (

b) heard on the evidence presented before the assessment officer.

(7) On a review of an assessment of costs, the Court may: (

a) review any discretion exercised by the assessment officer; and (

b) grant any order, including the costs of review and assessment, that the Court considers just. [ 22 ] The Chambers judge observed that Ms. Stephens “has not specified any item to which she objected or objects, and she has not specified the grounds of her objection” (at para 3). Accordingly, he confirmed the Local Registrar’s assessment of costs. [ 23 ] The Chambers judge then turned to Ms. Stephens’ application for an order under Rule 11-24. Once again, he began by citing the Rule, the relevant portion of which reads: 11-24

(1) If the Court considers that a lawyer for a party has caused costs to be incurred improperly or without reasonable cause or has caused costs to be wasted through delay, neglect or some other fault, the Court may do any one or more of the following: (

a) order that the lawyer indemnify his or her client for all or part of any costs that the client has been ordered to pay to another party; (

b) order that the lawyer be personally liable for all or part of any costs that his or her client has been ordered to pay to another party; (

c) make any other order it considers appropriate. … [ 24 ] The Chambers judge noted the nature of the grounds for Ms. Stephens’ request that Mr. Hawkins pay the costs and observed that where such allegations are made against a lawyer or law firm, they are typically pursued in a separate court action against the lawyer or law firm. He then went on to say: [7] There have been cases, however, in which the court has addressed such allegations in the context of an application under Rule 11- 24 and its predecessor.

In those cases, though, the court has been prepared to deal with the allegations because the lawyer’s misconduct either was admitted or was proved overwhelmingly in the supporting materials. [8] Here, the alleged misconduct is strongly denied and the material before the court is far from overwhelming in suggesting negligence or misconduct. Nonetheless, it may be that Ms. Stephens is correct in alleging negligence or misconduct on the part of Mr. Hawkins and Pro Bono. She is entitled to pursue that allegation, and in fact she has begun doing to by commencing [the 2019 Action].

Included in that action are her allegations against Pro Bono, which encompass her claims against Pro Bono’s employee, Mr. Hawkins. [9] In these circumstances, it is preferable for Ms. Stephens’ allegations against Mr. Hawkins to be dealt with in [the 2019 Action] – rather than in this action – because: (

a) the alleged misconduct on the part of Mr. Hawkins is not clearly established in the material before the court on this application; (b) [the 2019 Action] is already commenced, including the same allegations against Pro Bono as the party responsible for Mr.

Hawkins’ defective conduct, and so this application is duplicative – and the court strives to avoid multiplicity in court proceedings, in order to avoid duplication of proceedings and to avoid the possibility of contradictory decisions; and (c) [the 2019 Action] affords a fuller opportunity for the parties to amass the facts and for the court to analyze what was done – it is a full court action (which will involve complete production of documents and questioning) as opposed to a chambers motion based on affidavit evidence. [10] For these reasons Ms.

Stephens’ application under Rule 11-24 is dismissed, without prejudice to her right to pursue her claim in [the 2019 Action]. [ 25 ] The Chambers judge also ordered that Ms. Stephens pay $500 in costs for the application to each of CIBC and PBLS. II. THE ISSUES ON APPEAL [ 26 ] In light of how the parties have structured their arguments, both oral and written, the following issues arise on this appeal: (

a) Should the additional evidence that Ms. Stephens seeks to introduce be admitted? (

b) Did the Chambers judge err by failing to determine whether Ms. Stephens’ claim in the 2018 Action had been properly served

on CIBC, or whether she had authorized its service? (

c) Did the Chambers judge err by giving undue weight to the fact that Ms. Stephens had commenced a separate action againstMr. Hawkins, when determining the application under Rule 11-24? (

d) Did the Chambers judge err by upholding the assessment of costs in the discontinued 2018 Action, as opposed to ordering thatthose costs be applied in the 2019 Action? (

e) Did the Chambers judge apply the QB Rules too strictly, in light of the fact that Ms. Stephens is a self-represented litigant? A. Should the additional evidence that Ms. Stephens seeks to introduce beadmitted? [27] Ms. Stephens has filed three applications to introduce as evidence before this Court various affidavits and other material thatwas not before the Chambers judge.

The first issue is whether this evidence and other material should be admitted for the purposes ofconsidering her appeal. [28] Applications to adduce fresh evidence in civil appeals are governed by Rule 59 of The Court of Appeal Rules [CA Rules]. Inapplying that Rule, this Court has consistently employed the test set out in cases such as Maitland v Drozda (1983), (SK CA), 22 Sask R 1 (CA) [Maitland] and R v Palmer, (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 759 [Palmer]. Where the evidence inquestion existed at the time of the decision under appeal, the test is as follows: (

a) the evidence will not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced in the hearing that led to the decision under appeal; (

b) the evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive, or potentially decisive, issue in the action; (

c) the evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief; and (

d) it must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at the hearing in the court below, beexpected to have affected the result. [29] Where the evidence a party seeks to introduce on appeal came into existence after the hearing in the court below, the test isslightly different. To be received on appeal in that circumstance, the evidence must be admissible and relevant to an issue under appeal, inthe sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the proceeding.

It must also be credible and, if believed, there mustbe a reasonable potential for it to have affected the result. Its admission also must not violate the principle that favours finality in litigation(see, for example: Cannon v Saskatchewan (Court of Queen’s Bench), 2021 SKCA 77 at para 49 [Cannon]). [30] In our view, considering the applicable criteria, none of the evidence that Ms. Stephens seeks to introduce on this appeal shouldbe admitted. As for the first three applications, none of the material meets the criteria set out in Maitland, Palmer and Cannon. [31] Ms.

Stephens’ first application is dated June 23, 2021, and seeks the admission of three affidavits sworn by her, on May 12,2021, May 15, 2021, and June 23, 2021, respectively. It also includes portions of the Court record and correspondence between Ms.Stephens and the Registrar of the Court of Queen’s Bench, and between Ms. Stephens and various lawyers. [32] This material fails to meet the criteria for admission on appeal for several reasons. [33] First, much of the material attached to the application is already part of the court record. It is not fresh evidence. Second, thecorrespondence involving Ms.

Stephens and various lawyers has no relevance to the relatively narrow issues at play in this appeal.Moreover, as for Ms. Stephens’ affidavits, her May 12, 2021, affidavit simply states that she did not serve the statement of claim in the2018 Action on CIBC. As will be explained later in this judgment - and leaving aside the question of whether her assertion is credible inlight of the full record - this is not evidence that could reasonably be expected to have affected the result. In the May 15, 2021, affidavit,Ms.

Stephens deposes that she did not “officially authorize anyone including Pierre Hawkins” to serve the statement of claim on CIBC.Again, while the court record and the steps that Ms. Stephens took once the claim had been served belie that statement, it is also notevidence that bears on a potentially decisive issue. As for her June 23, 2021, affidavit, it simply contains nothing that is relevant to the liveissues in this appeal. [34] Ms. Stephens’ second application is dated July 2, 2021. It seeks the admission of an affidavit sworn by Ms.

Stephens on July 2,2021, which attaches a report from a document examiner, dated December 1, 2020. The document examiner opines that Ms. Stephens’signature was forged on the document that purports to be a chattel mortgage dated May 25, 1999. The report of the document examinerhas no bearing on the issues in this appeal. It is not relevant. [35] Ms. Stephens’ third application, dated July 6, 2021, contains the same three affidavits rejected above in relation to the June 23,2021, application, as well as the July 2, 2021, affidavit filed in connection with her second application.

The July 2, 2021, affidavit lays outthe particulars underlying her action against CIBC and her complaints against PBLS and Mr. Hawkins. This is all evidence that existed atthe time of the hearing before the Chambers judge, so the diligence criterion under Maitland and Palmer has not been satisfied. Moreimportantly, though, nothing in this affidavit could reasonably be expected to have affected the result. Her July 2, 2021, affidavit alsoattaches a letter from MLT Aikins LLP to PBLS. As this letter is already part of the court file, it need not be received as evidence on theappeal. Ms.

Stephens’ questions regarding the letter are matters properly raised in argument; they are not evidence. [36] Finally, Ms. Stephens has also attempted to file two more fresh evidence applications, by way of notices of motion datedNovember 3, 2021. The “evidence” in these applications is comprised of complaints she has made to the Law Society of Saskatchewanagainst fifteen different lawyers who have been involved in her matters in one form or another. She also seeks to introduce another seriesof documents which purports to lay out the particulars of her claims of negligence against those lawyers.

None of this material was filed incompliance with the time requirement set out in Rule 59(2) of the CA Rules. In addition, even if we were to accept these applications for

filing, none of the material contained in them meets the criteria for admission as fresh evidence, as none of it has any relevance whatsoever to the issues before us on this appeal. [ 37 ] Accordingly, Ms. Stephens’ applications to introduce evidence and other material that was not before the Chambers judge are all dismissed. B. Did the Chambers judge err by failing to determine whether Ms. Stephens’ claim in the 2018 Action had been properly served on CIBC, or whether she had authorized its service? [ 38 ] Ms.

Stephens advances two arguments regarding service of her statement of claim. [ 39 ] First, she contends that the Chambers judge erred in upholding the assessment of costs because there was no evidence proving that her claim in the 2018 Action had ever been served on CIBC . Without there being proper proof of service of her claim, she says, her action should never have been permitted to proceed and, if it had not been allowed to proceed, CIBC would not have incurred the costs that it sought to recover under Rule 4-49(3). [ 40 ] Second, Ms.

Stephens contends that, even if the trial judge had been able to conclude that her claim had been served on CIBC, he failed to consider the question of whether Mr. Hawkins had been authorized to effect service on her behalf. In this respect, we understand Ms. Stephens to be asserting that a finding that Mr. Hawkins had acted without her authorization would amount to “neglect or other fault” within the meaning of Rule 11-24(1) and, as such, justify an order that he be held personally responsible for the costs. [ 41 ] Respectfully, the first of Ms.

Stephens’ arguments proceeds on a misunderstanding of the QB Rules . Her second argument also cannot succeed. It is contradicted by Ms. Stephens’ own communications with Mr. Hawkins. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the many steps taken by Ms. Stephens without the assistance of Mr. Hawkins in prosecution of the 2018 action after CIBC defended the claim against it. [ 42 ] As to the first argument, Ms.

Stephens relies on Rule 12-15(1) of the QB Rules , which reads, in part, that “…service of a document must be proved by an affidavit of service…”, and points to the fact that, in the Court of Queen’s Bench file relating to the 2018 Action, no affidavit of service accompanied her statement of claim. However, contrary to what she asserts, the absence of an affidavit of service does not mean that an action cannot proceed.

The purpose of the rules regarding service of documents such as statements of claim is to ensure that a party being sued has notice of the claim being made against them, has notice of the temporal requirements for filing a defence, and has notice that default judgment may be granted against them if they do not respond to the claim.

Proof of service of a statement of claim is not a precondition to permitting an action to proceed; it is required if a plaintiff wishes to seek remedies against a defendant who has not responded. [ 43 ] Moreover, although the Chambers judge made no specific finding on the question of service, it is clear from the court record that CIBC had filed a statement of defence in the 2018 Action on June 19, 2018.

Rule 12-2(5) provides that “[a] commencement document is deemed to have been personally served if the person to be served has delivered a statement of defence or taken any action that is necessary to participate in the proceeding”. Therefore, no affidavit of service was necessary to prove that Ms. Stephens’ claim had been served; proper service was deemed to have occurred when CIBC filed its statement of defence. [ 44 ] Regarding Ms. Stephens’ second argument, the record as a whole strongly contradicts her assertion that Mr. Hawkins acted without her authorization in serving the claim on CIBC.

Part of the evidence on the record was an affidavit of documents sworn by Ms. Stephens on January 20, 2020. Attached to it were printouts of e-mail correspondence between Ms. Stephens and Mr. Hawkins from May 4, 2018, in which they were clearly discussing service of her statement of claim on CIBC, where this exchange occurred: Mr. Hawkins : Received! Thank you very much. The mail has gone out today, but I will have it served by registered mail on Monday. Then, we wait. Enjoy your weekend. Ms. Stephens : Well I’m sure glad that’s done thanks Pierre.

After its served then they have 20 days to respond and they will send me a response will they? Sorry I don’t know the procedure. Mr. Hawkins : That’s right. They may send it to you or they may send it to our office. If they do the latter, I will let you know immediately. I should warn you that it is very common for defendants to ask for extra time. As a matter of course, it is usually a good idea for plaintiffs to grant that extension. If plaintiffs don’t, then the court will and may penalize the plaintiff for the refusal.

I suspect that they will seek extra time, especially because their lawyer is going to see this file and wonder what on earth happened in 2002. We’ll serve them, see what they do, and I’ll lay out your options. I just thought I’d let you know that this is a possibility. Ms. Stephens : Thanks for the info Pierre, what is a typical extension we can expect? Sorry I have so many questions! Mr. Hawkins : It’s largely up to us and them. Because we’ll be dealing with them more in the future, particularly in negotiations, it’s a good idea to give them a reasonable amount of time.

I’m not sure what would be reasonable in the circumstances, so we’ll have to see what they ask for. Sorry I can’t give you a great answer there. No problem! I’m happy to answer your questions. Ms. Stephens: Thank you for your patients! ( sic ). Do the negotiations come before there ( sic ) statement of claim response or after? Mr. Hawkins: Negotiations will come after the Statement of Defence. Once we receive it, we will assess the strength of the defence, compare it to the strength of our claim, and see how our weaknesses measure up to our strengths.

Based on that information, we will have a sense of our bargaining position. Ms. Stephens: Sounds good Pierre I understand now thank you! Have a good weekend also, please let me know once you have served them.

[45] This exchange, standing alone, strongly supports the conclusion that Ms. Stephens had instructed Mr. Hawkins to serve thestatement of claim on CIBC in the 2018 Action. Moreover, less than a month later, Ms. Stephens personally signed the acknowledgmentof service of CIBC’s notice of intent to defend. Then, as set out above, over the course of the next year, Ms. Stephens took a number ofactive steps, on her own, to attempt to advance the 2018 Action against CIBC.

Until she discontinued the 2018 Action, there is nothing inthe record to indicate that she had any intention other than proceeding with her claim and actively pursuing it to a resolution. Consideringall of that, her assertion that the Chambers judge erred by failing to determine whether she had authorized Mr. Hawkins to serve the claimat the outset rings hollow. In the result, this ground of appeal must be rejected. C. Did the Chambers judge err by giving undue weight to the fact that Ms.Stephens had commenced a separate action against Mr.

Hawkins, when determiningthe application under Rule 11-24? [46] In support of her application for an order that Mr. Hawkins be required to pay CIBC’s bill of costs, Ms. Stephens filed anaffidavit sworn on September 11, 2019. In it, she made a number of allegations about Mr. Hawkins’ conduct, but her chief complaintrelated to the fact that he had advised her to name CIBC as the only defendant in the 2018 Action. She deposed that she “later came torealize that Pro Bono Law had Spoliated all the relevant Parties and Facts that could and would determine the real issues in dispute,including the Cause of Action”.

She also made allegations against other lawyers who worked for PBLS. [47] After Ms. Stephens discontinued the 2018 Action, she filed a statement of claim to commence the 2019 Action, as set outabove. It named various parties as defendants, including PBLS, accused them of conspiring together by using fraud, bad faith and otherunlawful means to deprive her and her former husband of their property. This new claim, of course, was filed before her application underRule 11-24 was heard. [48] The Chambers judge found that the fact Ms.

Stephens had commenced the 2019 Action weighed against making the order thatshe sought under Rule 11-24, for the reasons set out in the portion of the decision reproduced above. Ms. Stephens contends that theChambers judge erred by giving this factor too much weight in his analysis. [49] With respect, we come to the opposite conclusion. The Chambers judge’s reasons, in our view, demonstrate that he correctlyrecognized the legal principles governing the exercise of his discretion and balanced the relevant factors appropriately.

We see no error inthat respect that would permit this Court to intervene. [50] As a starting point, while Rule 11-24 provides a judge with discretion to order that a lawyer be personally responsible for costsincurred by an opposing party, it is not a discretion to be exercised lightly. The lawyer’s conduct must amount to a “serious dereliction ofduty or behaviour” before such an order will be made (Waters v DaimlerChrysler Services Canada Inc., 2011 SKCA 53 at para 10, [2011]8 WWR 241; see also: Patel v Saskatchewan Health Authority, 2021 SKCA 115 at para 167).

Generally, mere lack of attention, or evennegligence, will not be enough to meet this standard (Dillon v Dillon, 2019 SKQB 20 at para 80). [51] Cases in which orders under Rule 11-24(1) have been made have generally involved clear evidence that permitted the court tofind, as a fact, that there had been highly improper conduct on the part of the lawyer.

Examples of where this standard has been metinclude cases in which the lawyer in question admitted that their neglect and error was responsible for the cost incurred (Murch v DanLeonard Auto Sales Ltd., 2013 SKQB 314, 429 Sask R 16); or the conduct of the lawyer in question was grossly negligent and included anattempt to perpetrate a fraud on the court (Seitz v Walker, 2000 SKQB 342, 196 Sask R 111); or the lawyer was “the guiding force behind… litigation which … was totally without justification” and amounted to “a gross dereliction of his duty owed to his clients and the court”(Orleski and Kruger v Reid (1985), (SK KB), 38 Sask R 38 at paras 44–45 (QB)); or the lawyer drafted pleadingsalleging fraud or criminal activity on the part of the defendant without instruction or authorization (Royal Bank v Kwiatkowski (1989), (SK KB), 78 Sask R 107 (QB), aff’d (SK KB), 81 Sask R 241 (QB)); or the lawyer was found tohave been pursuing their own financial interests rather than representing the interests of the client (Phillips Legal Professional Corp. v Vo,2015 SKQB 248, 473 Sask R 48). [52] In the present case, there was no clear evidence before the Chambers judge that Mr.

Hawkins was guilty of any conductamounting to a serious dereliction of duty or behaviour. In fact, there was little evidence on the record of any conduct at all on the part ofMr. Hawkins in relation to the 2018 Action. He was never counsel of record for Ms. Stephens and there was no evidence to indicate thathe participated in the action beyond assisting Ms. Stephens in drafting, filing, and serving the statement of claim. While Ms. Stephens hadmade allegations regarding Mr. Hawkins’ conduct in both her September 11, 2019, affidavit, and in the statement of claim in the 2019Action, PBLS and Mr.

Hawkins disputed those allegations. [53] Considering those circumstances and the governing jurisprudence, we are not persuaded that the Chambers judge gave undueweight to the fact that Ms. Stephens had commenced the 2019 Action. In light of the sparse evidentiary record regarding Mr. Hawkins’conduct and the disputed nature of the allegations that would provide a basis upon which to award costs against him personally, the factthat Ms.

Stephens had made the same allegations in the 2019 Action was a highly relevant consideration and entitled to significant weight.In our view, the Chambers judge exercised his discretion appropriately; there is no basis to interfere. D. Did the Chambers judge err by upholding the assessment of costs in thediscontinued 2018 Action, as opposed to ordering that those costs be applied in the2019 Action? [54] As we understand Ms. Stephens’ argument on this point, it is that the 2019 Action is essentially a full rendition of the claimshe had intended to make against CIBC in the discontinued 2018 Action.

To put that another way, she says her business with CIBC is notfinished and, because of the financial hardship that she will suffer by having to pay costs in the discontinued action, it would have beenmore appropriate for the Chambers judge to have ordered that the costs from the discontinued action be applied to the 2019 Action.

[55] There are at least two problems with Ms. Stephens’ argument on this front. The first is her acknowledgment before theChambers judge that she was not disputing CIBC’s entitlement to costs in the 2018 Action. In fact, she made the same concession beforethis Court. This is not only a fair concession, but a proper one. Rule 4-49(2)(

a) provides that where, as here, a plaintiff serves and files anotice of discontinuance that wholly discontinues an action, the defendant is entitled to the costs of the action.

There is authority for theproposition that, in special circumstances, each party may be ordered to bear their own costs in a discontinued action (see, for example:Community Health Services Association (Regina) Limited v Grosch (1963), (SK KB), 41 WWR (NS) 438 (Sask QB);and Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. v Barton, 2010 SKQB 35 at para 92, 348 Sask R 251, rev’d 2011 SKCA 96, 336 DLR (4th)248), but we are not persuaded that such circumstances exist here. [56] Furthermore, while there is some connection between the two actions commenced by Ms. Stephens, the 2019 Action is notconfined to her and CIBC.

It involves additional defendants who were not part of the 2018 Action. The 2019 Action also pleads severaldifferent causes of action and raises different legal issues. We are not persuaded that there was any legal basis for the Chambers judge tohave ordered that the costs CIBC sought in the discontinued 2018 Action - and to which it was fully entitled, given the outcome of thataction - be applied to the 2019 Action. We see no error here. E. Did the Chambers judge apply the QB Rules too strictly, in light of the factthat Ms. Stephens is a self-represented litigant? [57] Ms.

Stephens contends that the Chambers judge erred by failing to properly recognize the fact that she is a self-representedlitigant.

We understand this to be a submission that, in ruling on her applications, the Chambers judge applied the QB Rules too strictly andfailed to make the allowances that fairness required to compensate for her unfamiliarity with court procedures and her inability to properlyrecognize the legal issues at play. [58] We are not persuaded that the Chambers judge made any such error. [59] It is correct to say that judges in civil proceedings have an obligation to ensure that a hearing is fair to all parties—includingthose who are self-represented—and that this obligation must be borne in mind when exercising the discretion to relieve a party from strictcompliance with the Rules (see: Yashcheshen v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 SKCA 116 at para 83).

However, while courts maysometimes properly afford greater leeway to self-represented litigants on procedural matters to ensure that procedural rules are not unjustlyused to hinder their legal interests, this does not mean that self-represented litigants are entitled to a free pass in every respect.

Self-represented litigants have a responsibility to familiarize themselves with the relevant legal principles and procedures pertaining to theircase and to make reasonable efforts, in a manner consistent with their abilities, to comply with the Court’s rules (See: Canadian JudicialCouncil, Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons, 2006 CanLIIDocs 691; Williams v Williams, 2015ABCA 246 at para 38, 23 Alta LR (6th) 303; Malton v Attia, 2016 ABCA 130 at para 31, 35 Alta LR (6th) 27; and Clark v Pezzente, 2017ABCA 220 at para 13).

This sentiment is echoed in Rule 1-2(2) of the QB Rules, which states that “the rules govern all persons who cometo the Court for resolution of a claim, whether the person is a self represented litigant or is represented by a lawyer”. [60] In that respect, in an application for an assessment of costs under Rule 11-22, the issues are narrow and the requirements thatmust be met by the applicant are very clear: the review must be limited to items that have been objected to before the assessment officer(Rule 11-22(3)); and the notice of application for review must specify any item objected to and the grounds of the objection (Rule 11-22(5)).

The Court’s role is to review the discretion exercised by the assessment officer and to grant any orders it considers just (Rule 11-22(7)). When considering an application under Rule 11-22, Chambers judges are required to apply a deferential standard of review to thelocal registrar’s assessment of costs; they are not permitted to retry the matter and substitute their own opinion for that of the assessmentofficer, absent an error in principle or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment officer’s consideration of the evidence (Stevensonv O’Byrne, 2018 SKCA 88 at para 26). [61] In this case, Ms.

Stephens’ application was deficient in the sense that it did not specify any item of costs to which she objected.Moreover, she acknowledged before the Chambers judge, as she did before this Court, that she did not object to any specific item inCIBC’s bill of costs. Her assertion was that Mr. Hawkins should be responsible for the costs, rather than her. In light of all that andbearing in mind the standard of review that the Chambers judge was required to apply, there is no basis to conclude that he failed to dowhat was necessary to “level the playing field” for Ms.

Stephens as a self-represented litigant in the context of her application under Rule11-22. [62] We reach the same conclusion with respect to Ms. Stephens’ application under Rule 11-24(1). From the material filed, sheclearly understood that she had the ability to seek an order that Mr. Hawkins be required to pay the costs that had been assessed againsther. It is also clear that such an order could have properly been grounded on a finding that it was Mr. Hawkins’ improper conduct that hadcaused CIBC to incur the costs in question. While the disposition of this portion of Ms.

Stephens’ application is arguably more complexand nuanced than the portion dealing with Rule 11-22, we see nothing in the record or the Chambers Decision to persuade us that Ms.Stephens was not treated fairly or that the Chambers judge failed to provide any accommodation necessary to permit a fair hearing. [63] This argument cannot succeed. III. CONCLUSION [64] Ms. Stephens passionately believes that she was the victim of a fraud in relation to the judgment that CIBC obtained andenforced against her in 2002. But whether such a fraud actually occurred was not the issue before the Chambers judge.

Nor is it the issuebefore us. [65] There were only two issues before the Chambers judge. The first was whether he should interfere with or uphold the LocalRegistrar’s assessment of costs in relation to the 2018 Action that Ms. Stephens had discontinued against CIBC. The second was whetherhe should order Mr. Hawkins to pay those costs instead of Ms. Stephens. Based on the record, we are not persuaded that the Chambers

judge made any error in the disposition of those issues. Accordingly, Ms. Stephens’ appeal must be dismissed. [ 66 ] As to the question of costs for this appeal, CIBC and PBLS were wholly successful on the appeal proper and, as such, they are entitled to costs. Ms. Stephens filed three applications to introduce fresh evidence and attempted to late-file two others, along with an additional late-filed batch of other materials. She was unsuccessful in having any of that material admitted as evidence on the appeal. CIBC and PBLS are properly entitled to costs in relation to those applications as well.

Considering all of the circumstances, we find it appropriate to fix the costs at an amount somewhat lower than the applicable tariff. In relation to the fresh evidence applications, we order that Ms. Stephens pay costs of $750 to each of CIBC and PBLS. For the appeal proper, we order that Ms. Stephens pay costs of $1,500 to each of CIBC and PBLS. “Schwann J.A.” Schwann J.A. “Leurer J.A.” Leurer J.A.. “Kalmakoff J.A.” Kalmakoff J.A.