Jastek Master Builder, 2021 SKCA 57

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV3781 Citation: Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc. v Holmes , 2021 SKCA 57 Date: 2021-04-08 Between: Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc., Jastek Valencia Project Inc. and 585323 Saskatchewan Ltd. Applicants/Prospective Appellants (Defendants) And Michael Holmes and Joseph Bichel Respondents/Prospective Respondents (Plaintiffs) Before: Leurer J.A. (in Chambers) Disposition: Application denied Written reasons by: The Honourable Mr. Justice Leurer On application from: 2021 SKQB 32 , Saskatoon Application heard: March 10, 2021 Counsel: Faith H.C. Baron for the Applicants George A.

Green and Curtis J. Onishenko for the Respondents Leurer J.A. I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc., Jastek Valencia Project Inc., and 585323 Saskatchewan Ltd. [collectively Jastek defendants] seek leave to appeal two orders made together by a Court of Queen’s Bench judge in Chambers: Holmes v Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc. , 2021 SKQB 32 [ Chambers Decision ]. [ 2 ] The Chambers judge (

a) dismissed an application by the Jastek defendants for an order that, if granted, would have pre- empted the plaintiffs from proceeding with a

summary judgment application, and (

b) ordered the Jastek defendants to disclose to the plaintiffs their financial statements and the financial statements of their subsidiary companies for the years 2007 to 2020. [ 3 ] I am not prepared to grant the Jastek defendants’ application for leave to appeal either order. My reasons follow. II. BACKGROUND [ 4 ] The Chambers Decision is the most recent

chapter in a long-running class action involving a Saskatoon, Saskatchewan condominium project [Valencia project]. [ 5 ] In 2007, Michael Holmes and Joseph Bichel sued the Jastek defendants as well as several other parties in a proposed class action pursuant to The Class Actions Act , SS 2001, c C-12.01 . Their statement of claim asserted various causes of action arising out of the cancellation of their, and other purchasers’, contracts to purchase units in the Valencia project. The dispute largely centered on whether the defendants had used their best efforts to obtain a required building permit.

Justice Mills was appointed to manage the proposed class action and hear the certification application. [ 6 ] The plaintiffs’ claim was eventually certified by Mills J. as a class action: Holmes v Jastek Builder 2004 Inc , 2009 SKQB 421 , 345 Sask R 121, leave to appeal refused, GDP Construction Corp. 626040 Saskatchewan Ltd. v Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc. , 2010 SKCA 115 , 362 Sask R 114. The certification order, issued June 8, 2010, named Mr. Holmes and Mr.

Bichel as representative plaintiffs on behalf of a class defined as “all persons who have entered into condominium purchase agreements with Jastek Valencia Project Inc. and/or Jastek Builder 2004 Inc. between November 2006 and March 2007, for the construction and sale of condominiums at 103 Wellman Crescent, Saskatoon, SK”. The certification order identified common issues relating to breach of the condominium purchase agreements, inducing breach of contract and conspiracy.

Issues relating to whether a fiduciary duty existed and, if so, whether it was breached, as well as questions relating to the quantification of damages, were left for determination after the common issues were decided. [ 7 ] After various procedural skirmishes, the representative plaintiffs and the defendants brought competing

summary judgment applications. In an unreported judgment dated January 13, 2017, Mills J. found that Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc. and Jastek Valencia Project Inc. were “responsible for breaching a contract with the plaintiffs”, but dismissed the claims against the other parties ( Holmes v Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc. (13 January 2017) Saskatoon, QBG 477 of 2007 at para 146(1) [ First

Summary Judgment Decision ]). As part of this, Mills J. also identified several “periphery [ sic ] issues”, including “whether the breach of fiduciary duty claim made on behalf of the plaintiffs against the Jastek defendants can be determined on a

summary basis” (at para 147). The assessment of damages was also left for later determination. [ 8 ] On appeal, this Court held that the plaintiffs were additionally entitled to

summary judgment against 585323 Saskatchewan Ltd. Justice Ottenbreit, writing for the Court, concluded that the corporate veil of that corporation should be “lifted to make it liable for the breach of the Agreement by Jastek Valencia [Project Inc.]” ( Holmes v Jastek Master Builder 2004 Inc. , 2019 SKCA 132 at para 205 , [2020] 6 WWR 386 [ First

Summary Judgment Appeal Decision ]). Otherwise, this Court left the remainder of the First

Summary Judgment Decision undisturbed.

[ 9 ] Justice Mills was later replaced as case management judge by the Chambers judge. In December of 2020, the plaintiffs brought two applications. The first application, pursuant to

Part 7 of The Queen’s Bench Rules [ Rules ], sought

summary judgment in favour of each individual class member against the Jastek defendants for damages and costs. The claim for relief included a request for punitive damages, based on the alleged breaches by the Jastek defendants of the duty of honest performance of its contracts and alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. Affidavits from each class member were filed in support of this

summary judgment request. [ 10 ] The second application was for an order, pursuant to Rule 5-12, requiring the Jastek defendants to disclose their financial statements and the financial statements of their subsidiary companies for the years 2007 to 2020. These financial records were said to be relevant to the quantification of the claimed punitive damages. [ 11 ] The Jastek defendants filed no evidence in reply to the plaintiffs’ two applications. Instead, they brought their own application for an order “dismissing the plaintiffs’ application for

summary judgment” and “directing that the matter proceed to trial in the ordinary way” ( Chambers Decision at para 8). The essence of their position was that it was premature for the court to even entertain a hearing to decide the plaintiffs’ application for

summary judgment or to order the requested financial documents. In support, they relied on the evidence filed in connection with prior proceedings in the action. [ 12 ] The plaintiffs’ application for disclosure of the financial records and the Jastek defendants’ application that the plaintiffs’

summary judgment be dismissed came before the Chambers judge. It assists in understanding the Chambers Decision , as well as these reasons, to know that the Chambers judge did not have before him, for determination, the plaintiffs’ application for

summary judgment. Although the reason for this was not stated in the Chambers Decision , this was in keeping with Rule 4-9, which provides that “[u]nless every party and the judge agree, a case management judge shall not hear an application for

summary judgment or preside at the trial of the action for which the case management judge is appointed”. [ 13 ] As already noted, the Chambers judge dismissed the Jastek defendants’ application and granted the plaintiffs’ application for an order directing the production of the requested financial records. III. ISSUE [ 14 ] The only issue in connection with both requests for leave is whether the Jastek defendants should be granted leave to appeal either, or both, of the orders made by the Chambers judge.

It is common ground that their application for leave to appeal is to be assessed against the principles set out in Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v Saskatchewan , 2002 SKCA 119 at para 6 , 227 Sask R 121 [ Rothmans ]. Broadly speaking, in order for leave to be granted, the proposed appeal must be: (a) “of sufficient merit to warrant the attention of the Court of Appeal”; and (b) “of sufficient importance to the proceedings before the court, or to the field of practice or the state of the law, or to the administration of justice generally, to warrant determination by the Court of Appeal”.

These “constitute conventional considerations rather than fixed rules”, are “case sensitive”, and “their point by point reduction is not exhaustive” (at para 6, emphasis in original). IV. ORDER DISMISSING THE JASTEK DEFENDANTS’ APPLICATION A. The Chambers Decision [ 15 ] The Chambers judge concluded that the question of whether

summary judgment was appropriate was “a decision to be made by a

summary judgment judge and not by some other judge on a pre-emptory application” ( Chambers Decision at para 30). The core of his reasoning is found in the following passage: [31] What the defendants are effectively asking me to do is make a preliminary ruling that

summary judgment is not appropriate in the circumstances. This they ask me to do in the absence of the evidence that is to be placed before the

summary judgment judge and ignoring the clear intention and direction of the Rules, [ Hryniak v Mauldin , 2014 SCC 7 , [2014] 1 SCR 87)] and [ Tchozewski v Lamontagne , 2014 SKQB 71 , [2014] 7 WWR 397] that, with both parties having put their best evidentiary position forward, the assigned

summary judgment judge decides whether or not: (

i) based solely on the evidence before the court there appears to be a no genuine issue requiring conventional trial; (ii) based upon the affidavit and other evidence the judge is able to make a fair and just determination on the merits; and (iii) the

summary process is a more proportionate, expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result than holding a trial. [32] The determination of whether or not the

summary process is a more proportionate, expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result than holding a trial can only be made when the parties have put there best evidence before the court, which is not the case here. Further and in any event, that determination is expressly assigned to a

summary judgment judge on the evidence before him or her. End runs around this clearly established process should not be permitted. In [ Minier v Conexus Credit Union 2006 , 2020 SKQB 250 ], I addressed this same issue. There, both parties were requesting a preliminary ruling that

summary determination was appropriate, so as to avoid their perceived risk that the assigned

summary judgment judge might view it differently and, thus, the time and expense of preparing for and conducting the

summary hearing would be wasted. Despite this agreement, I held that I was not prepared to order that

summary judgment was appropriate since that decision was to be made by the judge who hears the

summary judgment application.

[ 16 ] The Chambers judge added that, even if the

summary judgment application judge’s jurisdiction is not exclusive and he had discretion to decide the issue as to whether the

summary judgment application was premature, he would not exercise that authority since “the assigned

summary judgment judge, with the benefit of the full evidentiary record for the application, is in the best position to make that decision and, thus, [he] would not grant the relief sought on such discretionary grounds” (at para 35). [ 17 ] The result of the Chambers judge’s decision was to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their

summary judgment application. B. Analysis [ 18 ] The Jastek defendants argue their appeal has merit and is important to the parties and the litigation bar generally. As for merit, they say that the Chambers judge erred in principle by taking an inappropriately expansive view as to when

summary judgment is available. They refer to the following paragraphs from the Chambers Decision as evincing this error: [21] I start my analysis by addressing defendant counsel’s submission that

summary judgment is an exception to the general rule that litigation will proceed in the normal course. By that, I take her submission to be that when an action is commenced by statement of claim, the normal course and presumptive procedure is that such claim(

s) will be determined by judgment after what has been described as a conventional trial, preceded by all of the disclosure and questioning procedures available under The Queen’s Bench Rules . [22] It may be, in the now increasingly distant past, that this was viewed as the normal course and the presumptive procedure. However,

summary proceedings have long existed. Rules 3-2 and 3-49, and their predecessors, provided that various types of actions may be commenced by originating application. Originating applications are a longstanding form of

summary proceeding that usually do not involve disclosure, questioning and a conventional trial. The entire purpose of the

summary judgment rule was to provide a

summary judgment as an alternative to a full-blown trial, thereby eliminating any presumption as to what the appropriate procedure is. … [27] I do not accept that counsel’s submission that

summary judgment is an exception to the general rule that litigation will proceed in the normal course. The pendulum has swung. In the present era, the so-called conventional trial preceded by comprehensive disclosure of documents and questioning is, in fact, the exception rather than the rule.

Thus, it is not, in my opinion, correct to posit that there is any form of general rule or presumption that litigation will proceed on the historical model of a conventional trial. [ 19 ] The Jastek defendants’ point of attack is against the Chambers judge’s rejection of the idea that “summary judgment is an exception to the general rule that litigation will proceed in the normal course” (at para 27). The Jastek defendants further say that the dismissal of their application creates procedural unfairness.

They contend that the “summary judgment process is not an appropriate way to move the individual issues forward, at least at this premature stage”. They point out, for example, that individual class members have not produced affidavits of documents with respect to their individual damages. They also note that, except for the representative plaintiffs, none of the class members have been subject to questioning. Beyond this, I understand them to argue that they are being drawn down an expensive and time-consuming path that will eventually be proven to be procedurally futile.

The Jastek defendants say that the approach taken by the Chambers judge has implications outside of the four corners of this case. In this regard, they submit “there is growing concern that the pendulum may have swung too far in favour of

summary judgment proceedings and that fairness is being compromised”. [ 20 ] The plaintiffs oppose the grant of leave to appeal, arguing that the proposed appeal lacks merit and importance. [ 21 ] Dealing first with merit, I note that the Jastek defendants are seeking what amounts, in effect, to a pre-determination that the plaintiffs’

summary judgment application will fail. Nothing in the Rules expressly contemplates the making of such an order. Instead, the structure of the Rules is that a determination of whether

summary judgment is, or is not, appropriate is to be made in the context of a determination of the

summary judgment application itself. [ 22 ] Setting off to one side whether

summary judgment is exceptional or not, there is great sense to the Chambers judge’s conclusion that a determination as to whether, in the context of a specific case , a

summary judgment application is an appropriate procedural vehicle to determine the merits of a litigated issue is a question that is properly addressed only when the

summary judgment application is heard. This point was made by the plaintiffs in their brief when they invoked the following passage from McCorriston v Hunter , 2019 SKCA 106 , 33 RFL (8th) 310 [ McCorriston ]: [44] The assessment of whether

summary judgment is appropriate as a process and whether there is a genuine issue requiring trial must generally be answered at the same time , because in most cases they are two sides of the same coin.

Summary judgment can be granted if “there is no genuine issue requiring trial with respect to a claim or defence” (Rule 7-5(1)(a)). In connection with this, the existence of a “genuine issue” is seldom in dispute. Instead, in most cases, the issue at large when a motion for

summary judgment is presented is whether the resolution of that issue requires a trial in order to sort out the facts. To assess if a trial is required, a Chambers judge must get into the detail of how the issue and evidence interrelate, and then decide if the evidence allows the issue to be fairly resolved. … (Italicized emphasis in original; underlined emphasis added by the plaintiffs) [ 23 ] McCorriston concerned whether

summary judgment should have been granted in the context of the circumstances before the court. This Court tested this having regard to the evidence that was available to make a fair and just determination of the dispute in that case. Therefore, while the facts of McCorriston are distinguishable from those here, the difference between it and the present case does not render unpersuasive the dicta the plaintiffs point to from it. In contrast, the Jastek defendants referred to no case in which an order of the specific type they are seeking has been granted. [ 24 ] The closest analogue is Fourney v Manson , 2020 SKQB 215 [ Fourney ]. In that case, Danyliuk J. refused to

schedule a

summary judgment application. However, he did so because the parties had already certified their readiness to proceed to trial – a fact that was central to his reasoning. In this regard, Danyliuk J. introduced his reasons by stating that “ the timing of this application within these particular circumstances leads me to conclude that use of the

summary judgment procedure is inappropriate” (at para 2). At paragraph 11,

he explained the issue in the application before him to be: “Having already completed the pre-trial process (including management) and given that the pre-trial judge directed the matter to be set down for trial, can a

summary judgment application be brought?” The reasoning that followed this statement of the issue was predicated on the matter having been pre-tried and set down for trial. [ 25 ] The Jastek defendants also rely on cases such as Mason v Perras Mongenais , 2018 ONCA 978 [ Mason ]. In Mason , Nordheimer J.A. stated that “summary judgment remains the exception, not the rule” (at para 44). They also refer to a line of cases represented by Royal Bank of Canada v 189836 Ontario Inc. , 2020 ONSC 6048 , that have cautioned about the use of

summary judgment to decide questions that turn on credibility. However, these and the other cases relied on by the Jastek defendants were all decisions on the merits of a

summary judgment application. Other than Fourney, none of them involved a request to stop a

summary judgment application from proceeding to be heard. [ 26 ] Based on all of this, I have significant doubts about the merits of the Jastek defendants’ proposed appeal. However, because the merits bar under the Rothmans test is not set high, I would not dismiss the application for leave to appeal solely because of its dubious merit. The proposed appeal also lacks importance. [ 27 ] I would turn first to the importance of the dismissal of the Jastek defendants’ application to the parties.

In Rothmans , Cameron J.A. suggested that this might be tested by asking if the decision “ bear[s] heavily and potentially prejudicially upon the course or outcome of the particular proceedings” (at para 6). In this regard, as I see it, the only effect of the Chambers Decision is to preserve a procedural foothold for the real issue – whether there are genuine issues requiring trial – to be decided on its merit. The Chambers judge has not ruled that

summary judgment is an appropriate procedure to determine the issues presented by the plaintiffs for final judgment. To the contrary, he has simply rejected the Jastek defendants’ argument that the hearing of the

summary judgment application should be pre-empted. It remains open to the Jastek defendants to argue that there is a genuine issue requiring trial and that

summary judgment should not be granted. [ 28 ] Similarly, the fairness concerns expressed by the Jastek defendants are premature and, therefore, the Chambers Decision on this point cannot be said to bear heavily and potentially prejudicially upon the course or outcome of these proceedings. In this regard, the Jastek defendants have not requested, let alone been refused, any of the procedural rights they say they must enjoy in order to respond to the

summary judgment application. [ 29 ] Finally, if the

summary judgment application proceeds, but judgment is not granted, it is unlikely that the efforts of the parties will have put into that application will be wasted. Rather, both sides will have marshalled evidence that, presumably, will be of use at the trial. [ 30 ] All of this informs my decision that the proposed appeal is not important to the parties’ legitimate expectations for the conduct of this action. In short, I can see no material purpose that would be served by the grant of leave to appeal other than to cause delay and expense to the parties.

This is not a reason to grant leave in any case. [ 31 ] As for the suggestion that this case has importance beyond the four corners of this litigation, I see no contradiction between the Chambers Decision and any existing jurisprudence. None of the cases the Jastek defendants have referred to involve similar facts. Rather, each is distinguishable, as I have already explained. [ 32 ] Overall, the situation here is much like that in Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation v Saskatchewan , 2018 SKCA 90 .

The issue there was whether leave should be given to appeal a decision by a Chambers judge that had allowed an amendment to a pleading. Justice Caldwell referred to several reasons for rejecting the leave request in that case: [8] The proposed appeal finds little to shore up its footing under the other aspects of the Rothmans framework. If leave is granted, the resulting appeal will further delay the already long-delayed proceedings and add unduly to the cost of the matter for all parties.

In terms of Rule 3-72, the alleged errors that PBCN seeks to address on appeal are particular to the QB Fiat and to proceedings between the parties. I am not persuaded that the decision under the QB Fiat bears heavily or potentially prejudicially on the course or outcome of the proceedings. As Saskatchewan observed, much of the record or evidence that bears upon the issue framed by the amendments forms an integral part of the existing proceedings. The QB Fiat does not raise a new, uncertain or unsettled point of law, or a new, controversial or unusual issue of practice.

Finally, the QB Fiat does not bar PBCN from raising its res judicata and issue estoppel arguments before the Court of Queen’s Bench This reasoning resonates with me in this case. [ 33 ] For all these reasons, I am not prepared to grant the Jastek defendants’ leave to appeal the order dismissing their application to pre-empt the plaintiffs’

summary judgment application. V. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ DISCLOSURE APPLICATION A. The Chambers Decision [ 34 ] The plaintiffs sought disclosure of the financial statements of the Jastek defendants and their subsidiaries because of their relevance to the quantification of punitive damages. [ 35 ] T he Chambers judge concluded that there was a “real and not insignificant probability that the plaintiffs will establish an entitlement to punitive damages”.

He also accepted that if “entitlement to punitive damages is established, the financial statements of the defendants and potentially their subsidiaries becomes [ sic ] relevant in the proper assessment of appropriate punitive damages” (at para 40).

[ 36 ] The Jastek defendants’ position before the Chambers judge was that the disclosure of the financial records should only be made after the plaintiffs had proven their entitlement to punitive damages. They relied principally on Dufour v Saskatoon StarPhoenix Group Inc. , 2007 SKQB 293 , 300 Sask R 200 [ Dufour ]. Dufour involved an action for defamation. The plaintiff sought disclosure of the defendant’s financial statements. Justice Konkin held that “the application for the financial statements is premature, and not related to the issue of a determination of liability”.

He went on to conclude that while it “may well be that if liability is determined, the financial stability and profitability of the StarPhoenix may come into issue on the question of punitive damages” (at para 7). [ 37 ] The Chambers judge distinguished Dufour from the facts before him, explaining as follows: [42] I am of the opinion that the Dufour decision is distinguishable on various grounds. In that case, the claim being advanced was in defamation. No determination had yet been made that the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix [ sic ] Group Inc. had in any respect done anything wrong or breached any duty owed to Mr.

Dufour. Here, there has already been a finding that the Jastek defendants have breached their contractual obligation to expend its best efforts to obtain the building permit, which gives rise to a present right to assessment of compensatory damages. Existing findings of fact made by Mills J. in his judgment that on April 9, 2007, Jastek withdrew their application for a building permit may provide bases for the claims the plaintiffs make for punitive damages. When Dufour was decided in 2007, Rule 7-2 and the direction provided in Hryniak and Tchozewski with respect to the need for a cultural shift to

summary determinations did not exist. [43] I am unable to find any decision where the Dufour decision was either cited or followed in any Canadian court following the introduction of

summary judgment rules into Canadian practice or, indeed, at any time. I am of the opinion that Rule 7-2 and the direction provided in Hryniak and Tchozewski result in a significant change in the weight to be given to relevant factors since the decision in Dufour . In Dufour , the concerns with respect to delay, expense and access to justice that exist here were not under consideration. [44] There is a claim for punitive damages that is far from frivolous or vexatious. It is a claim that, on the face of it and the facts that have already been found, has prospects of success.

The action is already nearly fourteen years old. Delaying production of the financial records until after a finding of entitlement to punitive damages would likely add significant additional delay and expense to the conclusion of this claim. It will be much more efficient for a

summary judgment judge to hear the evidence and argument on all damage entitlement and quantum issues at the same time, as it will be for counsel to present all such evidence and argument within one hearing. [ 38 ] The Chambers judge went on to provide additional reasons for ordering that the financial statements be disclosed at this time: [45] I have no evidence from the defendants that they will in any way be prejudiced by having to make disclosure now.

The implied undertaking of maintaining the information obtained in confidence would apply to any and all disclosure made. [46] Considering the Foundational Rules and their directions regarding using the Rules to facilitate the quickest means of resolving claims at the least expense in conjunction with Rule 7-2 and the direction provided in Hryniak and Tchozewski , I am satisfied that the interests of justice are best served by ordering the production sought. Given the implied undertakings of confidentiality applicable, I have no concerns of potential mischief. B.

Analysis [ 39 ] The Jastek defendants argue that there is merit and importance to their proposed appeal from the production order made by the Chambers judge. I cannot agree. [ 40 ] The Jastek defendants acknowledge in their brief of law that “the financial position of the defendant can be relevant to the issue of determining the quantum of punitive damages” (emphasis in original). Their point is that the financial statements “are never relevant to the determination of whether punitive damages should be ordered” (emphasis added).

However, both the entitlement to, and quantification of, punitive damages is at stake in the

summary judgment application. Therefore, one aspect of what the Jastek defendants seek, through the backdoor of a delayed disclosure, is to bifurcate the

summary judgment application itself. Put into the language of Rothmans , the potential merit to their proposed appeal is tied directly to whether the plaintiffs are entitled, at this juncture, to proceed with their

summary judgment application in which they seek, in part, to quantify the purchasers’ claim for punitive damages. For the reasons I have given in rejecting the first leave to appeal request, it is my view that there is no basis to stop the

summary judgment application from going ahead. [ 41 ] To be clear, some courts have made the point that, while the financial means of the defendant are relevant to the quantification of any award of punitive damages, they are not automatically produced. Similarly, there are cases that state that it may be appropriate to bifurcate the issue of quantum of punitive damages until after a finding of liability.

However, the Chambers judge explained why he was not prepared to delay the disclosure in this case – including because a finding of liability for breach of contract had already been made and this finding itself supported the view that the claim for punitive damages was “far from frivolous or vexatious” (at para 44). [ 42 ] The Jastek defendants argue that there is additional, or greater, merit to their proposed appeal from the order that they produce the financial statements of their subsidiary corporations.

However, the Chambers judge explained the relevance of these records in paragraph 46 of his reasons, quoted earlier. This Court, in the First

Summary Judgment Appeal Decision , provided further background for this order, when it found that Mr. Pichler (the principal of the Jastek defendants) and 585323 Saskatchewan Ltd. “ exercised clear domination and control over the Valencia Project through a stable of companies that included Jastek Valencia [Project Inc.], Jastek [Master Builder 2004 Inc.], and Jastek Management [Inc.]” (at para 136). [ 43 ] The Jastek defendants also argue that the order is a “highly invasive order to make and there is a potential for mischief”.

However, this same argument was answered by the Chambers judge at paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Chambers Decision , quoted earlier. The Chambers judge’s determination in this regard was reasoned and fact specific. [ 44 ] The resolution of disclosure issues is the stock-in-trade of a case management judge’s responsibilities. This proposed appeal would seem to involve the application of generally settled principles, as opposed to require the development of the law, diminishing its potential importance.

To the extent that the proposed appeal involves the exercise of discretionary authority, the disclosure order would be subject to a deferential standard of review: Saskatchewan Trust Co. (Liquidator of) v Coopers & Lybrand Inc. , 2003 SKCA 75 at para 7 ,

238 Sask R 191; and Jorgenson v ASL Paving Ltd. , 2007 SKCA 143 at para 26 , 302 Sask R 281. All this also weighs against the grant of leave to appeal. [ 45 ] For all these reasons, I decline to grant leave to appeal from the disclosure order. VI. CONCLUSION [ 46 ] The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. The plaintiffs are entitled to one set of costs against the Jastek defendants jointly and severally, taxed based on Column 4, which I order to be payable forthwith. “Leurer J.A.” Leurer J.A.