Richardson v Richardson, 2021 SKCA 58

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV3745 Citation: Richardson v Richardson , 2021 SKCA 58 Date: 2021-04-09 Between: Dale Richardson Applicant/Appellant (Respondent) And Kimberley Richardson Respondent/Respondent (Petitioner) Before: Whitmore, Leurer and Tholl JJ.A. Disposition: Applications denied Written reasons by: The Court On application for review from: Chambers fiat (8 March 2021) Regina, CACV3745 Application heard: April 1, 2021 Counsel: Dale Richardson on his own behalf No one appearing for the Respondent The Court I.

Introduction [ 1 ] Two matters have come before us preliminary to an appeal from a Chambers decision of a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench dated December 11, 2020: Richardson v Richardson (11 December 2020) Battleford, DIV 70 of 2020 (Sask QB) [ December QB Fiat ]. The December QB Fiat is but one of several orders made by judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench in relation to ongoing family law proceedings between the appellant, Dale Richardson, and the respondent, Kimberley Richardson. [ 2 ] On December 15, 2020, Mr. Richardson filed a notice of appeal of the December QB Fiat .

To move forward with an appeal, an appellant, such as Mr. Richardson, must take certain steps. The appellant must file an appeal book consisting of the record of proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench relating to the order that is under appeal. The appellant must also file a written argument or factum. All of this is referred to as “perfecting an appeal”. The details of all of this are spelled out in The Court of Appeal Rules . To date, the documents Mr. Richardson has sought to file with the Registrar of this Court to perfect his appeal have not followed The Court of Appeal Rules . Once Mr.

Richardson has met the filing requirements, Ms. Richardson will be obligated to file her respondent’s factum and a date will be set to hear Mr. Richardson’s appeal. [ 3 ] Apart from his unsuccessful efforts to perfect his appeal, in February of 2021, Mr. Richardson filed two applications that were styled as being in relation to his appeal from the December QB Fiat . The first was a “Motion for Writ of Certiorari” [Certiorari Application]. The Certiorari Application requested the following relief: (1) [J]udicial review of decisions of the actions and decisions of Justice J.

Zuk in hindering the Appellant from having his torture complaint heard, and summarily made “assumptions” that had no basis in fact and had evidence that plainly contradicted his “assumptions”

(2) Justice R.W. Elson’s interim order which contained final decisions that are extremely prejudicial, and were upheld by virtue of Justice J. Zuk stating as much when he refused to alter the custody order of Justice R.W. Elson when issuing his orders. (3) the serious nature of the allegations, that have been consistently repeated by the Appellant, and others, and have attempted to have his complaint heard by numerous competent authorities who have refused him in violation of the UN Torture Convention, (4) the Appellant has consistently been denied the right to complain to, and has not has his case promptly heard under

article 13 of the UN Torture Convention, (5) the Appellant has had no protection from intimidation or ill-treatment as a consequences of his complaint or any evidence given (6) given the unusual nature of this matter and the threat of being forcibly returned to Saskatchewan by way of a Writ of Habeas Corpus which would put the Appellant, and his daughter Kaysha F.N.

Dery at risk for torture and death, a writ of mandamus is necessary to prevent such further acts of torture or murder being executed by any party alleged to have been party to the crimes, especially the freemasons (7) interim compensation for expenses arising from the violations of the UN Torture Convention, terrorism, or any other criminal or unlawful activity that would be necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and to protect the Appellant from any intimidation or ill-treatment as a consequence of his complaint of torture and any evidence provided in the amount of $250,000.00 (8) restore possession of the family home at 1292 95th Street North Battleford, and all decision making authority to the Appellant (9) to remove Patricia J.

Meiklejohn as counsel for Kimberley A. Richardson due to criminal activity, and remove any other such counsel relative to this proceeding for any participation in criminal activity which has been named in this motion and the attached appendices, and to sanction them for their participation in criminal activity (10) a protection order from the following parties without limitation, Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Health Authority, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, Matrix Law Group LLP, Justice J.A. Caldwell, Justice J.A.

Schwann, the freemasons and any such person as the Appellant deems just (11) waiving compliance with the rules of this Court for the foregoing pursuant to subsection 4(1) of the rules of this Court, which includes dispensing with service for the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan, and

(12) Interim Custody of Karis K.N. Richardson[.] (Emphasis in original) [ 4 ] The second application was styled as an “Ex Parte Motion for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition” [Mandamus and Prohibition Application]. The Mandamus and Prohibition Application sought the following relief: (1) [T]o order the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan to admit and file all rejected evidence that it unlawfully used the rules of the

court to cover its terrorist activity and that of the rogue agents of Innovation Credit Union (2) to refer this matter to Parliament, as there are terrorists in this court and the only reasonable manner is to have this matter disposed of publicly in the House of Commons, and both the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Saskatchewan are implicated in the foregoing terrorist activity, and it must be brought before the House of Commons to order an investigation as both offices are compromised (3) to quash all divorce proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan relating to the Appellant as they are tied to conspiracy and terrorism (4) to adduce all evidence used in this motion, or any other motion relating to CACV3745, and any other evidence as needed to demonstrate the terrorism and torture violations in the appeal as the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan has suppressed evidence to cover their complicity in the forgoing torture and terrorist activity (5) to have complaint of the Appellant heard by the only competent authority in Canada that has yet to refuse him, as all other authorities have refused him in violation of

article 13 of the UN Torture Convention, (6) to protect the Appellant from any further intimidation or ill-treatment as a consequences of his complaint or any evidence given, as he is continually subjected to such unlawful consequences (7) given the unusual nature of this matter and the threat of being forcibly returned to Saskatchewan by way of a Writ of Habeas Corpus which would put the Appellant, and his daughter Kaysha F.N.

Dery at risk for torture and death, a writ of mandamus and prohibition is necessary to prevent such further acts of torture or murder being executed by any party alleged to have been party to the crimes, especially the freemasons, and conferring on them protected person status given the severe threat to their life and safety for exposing the forgoing terrorist activity (8) interim expenses arising from the violations of the UN Torture Convention, terrorism, or any other laws in the amount of $2,000,000 (9) an order to pay the legal costs of the Appellant arising from the forgoing terrorist activity in the amount of $10,000,000 (10) to seize the family home at 1292 95th Street North Battleford, from the possession of terrorists and return it to the Appellant immediately (11) to order an investigation into the Innovation Credit Union with an impartial investigator that is known to the Appellant and that he trusts (12) to remove Patricia J.

Meiklejohn as counsel for Kimberley A.

Richardson due to criminal activity, and remove any other such counsel relative to this proceeding for any participation in criminal activity which has been named in this motion and the attached appendices, and to sanction them for their participation in criminal activity (13) remove all counsel that is associated with the terrorist activity from acting in any capacity in any matter that relates to the Appellant (14) a protection order from the following terrorist parties without limitation, Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Health Authority, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, Matrix Law Group LLP, Justice J.A.

Caldwell, Justice J.A. Schwann, Justice R. Ottenbreit[,] CARY RANSOME, CHAD GARTNER JENNIFER SCHMIDT, CHANTALLE THOMPSON, MARK CLEMENTS, BRYCE BOHUN, KATHY IRWIN, BRAD APPEL, IAN McARTHUR, APEGS, Virgil Thomson, Tonya Browarny, Cora Swerid, Clifford A. Holm, Cheryl Giesbrecht, Gary Lund, Mazel Holm, Dawn Lund, Jeannie Johnson, Ciprian Bolah, the freemasons and any such person as the Appellant deems just (15) waiving compliance with the rules of this Court for the foregoing pursuant to subsection 4(1) of the rules of this Court; and

(16) Interim Custody of Karis K.N. Richardson[.] (Emphasis in original) [ 5 ] These two applications came before Kalmakoff J.A. of this Court in Chambers on February 24, 2021. Justice Kalmakoff dismissed both applications: Richardson v Richardson (8 March 2021) Regina, CACV3745 [ CA Chambers Fiat ]. Justice Kalmakoff also ordered costs in favour of Ms. Richardson, which he fixed at $1,500 and ordered to be paid forthwith. [ 6 ] Mr. Richardson has now filed what he has styled as an “Appeal of the Orders of Justice J. Kalmakoff” [Application]. In the Application, Mr. Richardson seeks the following relief: (

a) an order setting aside the orders made by Kalmakoff J.A.; (

b) a grant of the orders requested by him in the Certiorari Application and the Mandamus and Prohibition Application; (

c) an interim order of costs; and (

d) an order that his proceedings be “heard in a public manner”. [ 7 ] Mr. Richardson has also filed an “ Affidavit [ sic ] for Dispensing with Service Without Notice ”. This document, which we understand to be an application (supported by Mr. Richardson’s affidavit), seeks an order dispensing with service of the Application on the Court of Queen’s Bench. II. Application to review the CA Chambers Fiat A. Request to have the matter heard in a public manner [ 8 ] All proceedings in this Court are open to the public unless otherwise ordered.

The way members of the public may attend hearings has broadened because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Because of public health concerns, at present, all hearings in this Court are by videoconference or teleconference unless the Court orders otherwise. Members of the public are permitted to watch and listen to hearings conducted in these manners. The details of all of this are set out in a Notice to the Profession, the Public and the Media Concerning Electronic Hearings , published by the Court on April 17, 2020 [ Notice ].

The Notice is accessible on the Court’s website (www.sasklawcourts.ca). [ 9 ] In accordance with the Notice , the hearing before Kalmakoff J.A. was open to the public, as was the hearing of Mr. Richardson’s two most recent applications that form the subject of this decision. Because all proceedings are open to the public unless otherwise ordered, no order is, or will be, required in order for the public to be able to attend the hearing of Mr.

Richardson’s appeal from the December QB Fiat , when that hearing is held. [ 10 ] We wish to reiterate the continued applicability, in the context of hearings held by videoconference and teleconference, of the rules and procedures that govern the recording of proceedings in this Court. In this regard, Rule 73 of The Court of Appeal Rules states that, unless otherwise ordered, “no person shall record by any device, machine, or system the proceedings in the court or in chambers without leave of the court or a judge, as the case may be”.

Further, at the hearing of these matters, the Court made an order directing that there be no unofficial recording, by any device, machine or system, by any person, of these proceedings.

B. Request to set aside the orders made by Kalmakoff J.A. and for this Courtto make the orders, it is said, should have been made by him [11] Mr. Richardson has framed his Application to the Court as being “pursuant to

section 11, 20(3) of the Court of Appeal Act, 3-56 of the Queen’s Bench Rules and

article 1, 2, 13, 16 of the [United Nations] Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman orDegrading Treatment or Punishment”. He also references ss. 7, 9, 10(c), 12 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms asbeing “grounds as well”. [12] Although Mr.

Richardson has referred to the provisions of an international convention, the Charter and The Queen’s BenchRules, the sole authority for his Application is found at s. 20(3) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000, SS 2000, c C-42.1 [Court of AppealAct], which provides: 20(3) An order made by a judge in chambers, other than an order granting or denying leave to appeal, may be discharged or varied by thecourt. [13] Justice Kalmakoff gave extensive reasons for dismissing the two applications that came before him.

In relation to the CertiorariApplication, these reasons included the following: [18] To begin, the argument relating to the alleged violations of [the Richardsons’ daughter’s] rights under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charteris misplaced.

Those sections apply only to situations where persons are arrested or detained by agents of the state. [The daughter] is in thecustody of her mother; she is not detained or under arrest within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter. [19] It must also be observed that the Court of Appeal is not a court of first instance, meaning it has very limited original jurisdiction.In that regard, the Court of Appeal Act provides the Court with discretion to grant relief in the nature of a prerogative writ.

In that regard, s.11 reads as follows: Original jurisdiction 11 The court may, in its discretion, exercise original jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of at prerogative writ. [20] As s. 11 clearly states, the power to grant prerogative relief is a power that can only be exercised by “the court”, meaning a panelof judges and not a single judge sitting in Chambers (Haug v Dorchester Institution, 2016 SKCA 55 at para 17, [2016] 10 WWR 484). [21] Moreover, even if the Court of Appeal Act could be read as giving a single judge of this Court sitting in Chambers the power togrant prerogative relief in first instance, the very nature of the remedy of certiorari means that it would not be an appropriate exercise ofmy discretion to grant the relief Mr.

Richardson seeks. Certiorari is a form of relief that a superior court grants vis-à-vis an inferior courtor tribunal; it is not a remedy that is available against a superior court, as Vancise J.A. observed in R v Balfour Moss, 2006 SKCA 35, 279Sask R 152: [9] The application for a writ of certiorari to quash the decision of a superior court judge is misconceived.

Certiorari is a prerogativeremedy used to bring decisions of lower tribunals before a superior court where the decision can be quashed if the tribunal has actedwithout or has exceeded jurisdiction. … [10] This Court does not have jurisdiction to bring before it a decision of a superior court. … At best, we have concurrent jurisdictionwith the superior court. A concurrent jurisdiction, which we might add, is rarely used. [22] This is because certiorari, at its core, deals with matters of jurisdiction.

If the Court or decision maker against whom certiorari issought has the jurisdiction to make the decision it makes, and exercises that jurisdiction within the bounds of the law, certiorari will not lieas a remedy (see, for example, R v Jonsson, 2001 SKCA 53 at para 7, 207 Sask R 107). In this case, the decisions from which Mr.Richardson seeks relief in the nature of certiorari are all decisions of the Court of Queen’s Bench, which that Court had the jurisdiction tomake.

On that basis alone, certiorari is not available. [23] Even it is possible to grant relief in the form of certiorari, that does not mean certiorari is necessarily an appropriate remedy.Where the decision from which relief is sought is one that can be appealed, or there is another adequate remedy, certiorari will generallybe unavailable (Bayne (Rural Municipality No. 371) v Saskatchewan Water Corp. (1990), (SK CA), 90 Sask R 102(CA); and Arch Transco Ltd. v Regina (City), 2002 SKCA 126 at para 1, 227 Sask R 139). [24] The decisions in relation to which Mr.

Richardson seeks prerogative relief are all decisions from which a right of appeal exists orexisted. Accordingly, even if it were possible for this Court to bring those decisions before it on the basis of certiorari, to the extent thatthe relief Mr. Richardson seeks purports to review or challenge the validity of those decisions, an adequate remedy exists through theappeal process and certiorari should not be granted. [25] To the extent that Mr.

Richardson seeks other forms of relief, which do not purport to review or challenge the decisions of theCourt of Queen’s Bench mentioned in his application for certiorari (for example, “interim compensation for expenses arising from theviolations of the UN Torture Convention” and “a protection order” from various parties “without limitation”), there is simply no properlegal basis for me to grant the relief he seeks in an application of this sort. [14] Justice Kalmakoff gave the following reasons for dismissing the Mandamus and Prohibition Application: [30] Dealing first with Mr.

Richardson’s allegations that the Court of Queen’s Bench and other proper authorities have failed in theirduty under Articles 12 and 13 of the [United Nations Convention Against Torture [Convention]] to promptly investigate or examine hisclaim of torture, I observe that Mr. Richardson takes an overly broad view of what amounts to torture under that Convention. In

Part I, theConvention defines torture as follows:

Article 1 1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, isintentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing himfor

an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or forany reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent oracquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. (Emphasis added) [31] In making his argument about alleged violations of the Convention, Mr.

Richardson overlooks the fact that the acts he terms astorture (including his detention on the mental health warrant and the custody and parenting order made in [Richardson v Richardson (23July 2020) Battleford, DIV 70 of 2020 (Sask QB)]) are all things that arose from, were inherent in, or were incidental to measures that areauthorized by law. The provisions of the Convention are not invoked simply because Mr.

Richardson does not agree with the orders thatwere made or the consequences that resulted from them. [32] Moreover, as set out above, s. 11 of the Court of Appeal Act does not give a single judge of this Court, sitting in Chambers, theauthority to grant prerogative relief in first instance and, even if such authority existed, mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary anddiscretionary remedies that can be granted only in limited circumstances. [33] Mandamus is a remedy used to secure the performance of legal duties by an inferior court or tribunal or to overcome misconductof a person charged with the performance of duties of a public nature.

Mandamus generally does not lie against a decision maker unlessthere is a duty in respect of which the decision maker has no discretion whether or not to perform the act sought to be compelled (AttorneyGeneral of Saskatchewan, ex. rel. Ridge and MCC Design Ltd. v Saskatchewan Association of Architects, (SK CA),[1980] 2 WWR 242 (Sask CA) at paras 1314). Nor is mandamus available to force a tribunal to exercise its discretion in a particular way(Alie-Kirkpatrick v Saskatoon (City), 2019 SKCA 92 at para 60, [2020] WWR 629).

But, perhaps most importantly in the circumstancesat hand, mandamus does not lie against a superior court such as the Court of Queen’s Bench. In that regard, in Branco v American HomeAssurance Company, 2011 SKCA 79, 375 Sask R 129 [Branco], this Court said as follows: [11] As stated, the applicants’ position is without merit. It is a long-standing principle mandamus does not lie against a superior court: The writ of mandamus is a proper remedy to compel inferior tribunals to perform the duties required of them by law.

But it will not begranted unless the petition alleges facts sufficient, if proved, to show that such court has omitted a manifest duty. It must contain not onlythe affirmative allegations of proceedings necessary to entitle the party to the process prayed for, but it must also be averred that otherfacts, which would justify the omission complained of, do not exist. (Hoxie v. County Commissioners of Somerset, 25 Maine 333.) It was at one time doubted whether the writ would lie to an inferior court, commanding it to sign a bill of exceptions.

But the case of Ex-parte Crane et al., 5 Peters’ Rep., 189, decided that it did. [12] It is trite to state that the both the Court of Appeal and the Court of Queen’s Bench are courts of superior jurisdiction as set out inthe governing legislation … (Emphasis added) [34] The prerogative remedy of prohibition is a judicial writ that may issue from a superior court, directed to an inferior court ortribunal, for the purpose of preventing the inferior court or tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.Prohibition lies to prevent further proceedings where further conduct in a proceeding would be beyond the jurisdiction of the court ortribunal. [35] In general terms, prohibition is available on the same grounds as certiorari.

That is to say, it is available only where the decision ofa lower court or tribunal constitutes jurisdictional error. Prohibition is not a device for resolving alleged errors of law, mixed law and factor fact alone, as such errors do not cause a judge to lose jurisdiction (Branco at para 8). [36] Applying these principles to the case at hand, it is clear that Mr. Richardson’s application cannot succeed. Simply put, an order ofmandamus cannot be made against the Court of Queen’s Bench. As for the remedy of prohibition, Mr.

Richardson has failed to identifyany decision or anticipated decision relating to him in which the Court of Queen’s Bench might exceed its jurisdiction. At most, Mr.Richardson alleges errors of law, fact, or mixed law and fact in relation to decisions already made. Such errors are properly addressedthrough appeal mechanisms and not by prerogative writ. [37] As to the other forms of relief Mr.

Richardson seeks in this application, while I can appreciate that he may feel that the warrantissued under The Mental Health Services Act [SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1] should not have been issued and that the conditions under whichMs. Dery [Mr. Richardson’s adult daughter] was detained were not proper, he has not persuaded me that there is any basis in law forgranting the relief he seeks in these circumstances. (Emphasis in original) [15] It is important to recognize that these comments were offered by Kalmakoff J.A. in the context of deciding the two applicationsthat were before him.

Some statements made in these quoted passages may require qualification. For example, certiorari is sometimesavailable notwithstanding that no jurisdictional question is at stake. However, we have identified no error that implicates the reasons givenby Kalmakoff J.A. for dismissing Mr. Richardson’s two applications and see no error in his reasons that would cause us to discharge orvary his orders. We also see nothing in the record to support Mr. Richardson’s argument that Kalmakoff J.A. acted in a way that wasinappropriate for a neutral adjudicator of the matters that came before him. [16] Many of Mr.

Richardson’s arguments are attempts to challenge the merits of various orders made by judges of the Court of

Queen’s Bench that predate the December QB Fiat. The merits of these orders are not before this Court. Also not before us in the presentcontext are the merits of Mr. Richardson’s appeal of the December QB Fiat. Submissions that are directed to the appropriateness of theDecember QB Fiat should be advanced when Mr. Richardson presents argument at the hearing of his appeal. As we have explained, thishearing will be scheduled after Mr. Richardson has perfected it and Ms. Richardson has filed her respondent’s factum. [17] We understand that one reason Mr.

Richardson applied to the Court to review the CA Chambers Fiat was because s. 11 of theCourt of Appeal Act gives to the Court, as opposed to a single judge of this Court, the authority to grant prerogative relief.

In this regard,s. 11 states as follows: Original jurisdiction 11 The court may, in its discretion, exercise original jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of a prerogative writ. [18] While we, sitting as the Court, have authority to exercise original jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of a prerogative writ,which is jurisdiction that a single judge of this Court sitting in Chambers does not enjoy, this does not change the character of this Courtfrom being an appellate body into something else.

In this regard, s. 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Act states as follows: Court continued 3(1) The Court of Appeal is continued as the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan, and is a superior court of record having appellatejurisdiction. [19]

Section 10 of the Court of Appeal Act is also relevant in this regard. It states as follows: Appellate jurisdiction 10 The court has appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters where an appeal lies to the court, with any original jurisdiction that isnecessary or incidental to the hearing and determination of an appeal. [20] The Honourable Stuart J. Cameron in Civil Appeals in Saskatchewan: The Court of Appeal Act & Rules Annotated, 1st ed(Regina: Law Society of Saskatchewan Library, 2015) [Annotated Act and Rules], has provided helpful guidance as to when, incidental toan appeal, this Court may exercise its original jurisdiction (at 63): To the extent

section 10 confers such jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal, it does so only to the extent this jurisdiction is necessary orincidental to the hearing and determination of a properly constituted appeal.

The effect is to supplement the appellate jurisdiction of thecourt to the end of ensuring, to the extent reasonably possible, that the whole of the matter in issue on appeal may be efficiently andeffectively determined without the need, unless this should prove unavoidable, of having to direct a new hearing or to remit the matter tothe court or tribunal of first instance. (Emphasis in original) [21] Justice Cameron explained, in Geller v Saskatchewan (1985), (SK CA), 48 Sask R 239 (CA) at paragraph 4,that, because this Court’s primary jurisdiction is appellate, it is only in “extraordinary circumstances [that this Court should] entertain, inthe first instance, an application inviting the exercise of its concurrent original jurisdiction” pursuant to s. 11.

The Annotated Act and Rulesprovides several examples of cases where s. 11 jurisdiction has been exercised (at 69): For special cases or exceptional circumstances in which the court exercised this jurisdiction, see: • Maurice v Priel (1987), (SK CA), 46 DLR (4th) 416, 60 Sask R 241 (CA) (Queen’s Bench judge a party to anapplication for prohibition, thus making this a special case for the Court of Appeal to exercise its original supervisory jurisdiction). • Royal Canadian Mounted Police v Saskatchewan (Commission of Inquiry), (SK CA), [1992] 6 WWR 62, 100 Sask R313 (CA) (Queen’s Bench represented at inquiry, making it unseemly for the application for review of a ruling by the commission to beheard in that court). • Hartwig v Saskatchewan (Minister of Justice), 2007 SKCA 41 (Queen’s Bench judge acting as a commission of inquiry, making this aspecial case for the Court of Appeal to entertain an application by way of certiorari to quash portions of the inquiry report). • Pearlman v University of Saskatchewan, 2006 SKCA 105, 273 DLR (4th) 414 (Queen’s Bench judge deciding a matter qua UniversityVisitor, making this a special case for the Court of Appeal to exercise its original supervisory jurisdiction and entertain an application forjudicial review by way of certiorari). [22] The common denominator among these cases is that there was a good reason in each as to why the request for prerogativerelief should not have been heard in first instance by a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench.

This is not the case here. While we do notforeclose the possibility of other types of circumstances where s. 11 jurisdiction might be exercised, we see no reason to depart fromgeneral rule that this Court is an appellate body. [23] In conclusion, we agree with the reasons given by Kalmakoff J.A. for dismissing Mr. Richardson’s application.

Therefore,although s. 11 of the Court of Appeal Act gives to the Court authority that Kalmakoff J.A. did not have when sitting in Chambers, we donot consider this case to be a circumstance in which it would be appropriate for us to exercise that authority nor do we see any other reasonto interfere with Kalmakoff J.A.’s disposition of Mr. Richardson’s two applications. C. Application to review the costs order and the request for interim costsorder

[ 24 ] Mr. Richardson applies for a review of the order of costs made by Kalmakoff J.A. An order of costs is inherently discretionary. We see no basis to interfere with this exercise of discretion. [ 25 ] The issue of costs in relation to Mr. Richardson’s appeal from the December QB Fiat is a matter that is properly dealt with by the panel that hears the appeal from that order. D. Conclusion on application to discharge or vary CA Chambers Fiat [ 26 ] For all these reasons, we are not persuaded to discharge or vary the CA Chambers Fiat . III.

Application for Dispensing with Service Without Notice [ 27 ] Because we have dismissed Mr. Richardson’s Application to discharge or vary the CA Chambers Fiat , there is no need to consider Mr. Richardson’s application for an order dispensing with service of his Application documents. IV. Conclusion [ 28 ] Mr. Richardson’s Application is dismissed. Because no one appeared on behalf of Ms. Richardson, we make no order of costs in relation to these matters. “Whitmore J.A.” Whitmore J.A. “Leurer J.A.” Leurer J.A. “Tholl J.A.”‘ Tholl J.A.