Cannon v Saskatchewan (Court of Queen’s Bench), 2021 SKCA 77

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV3708 Citation: Cannon v Saskatchewan (Court of Queen’s Bench) , 2021 SKCA 77 Date: 2021-05-18 Between: Robert Cannon Appellant (Applicant) And Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan, Honourable J.W. Elson, Kathleen Christopherson, Glen Metivier, Provincial Court of Saskatchewan, Honourable Judge M.

Pelletier, The Battlefords Seventh-Day Adventist Church, James Kwon, Gary Lund, Ciprian Bolah, Manitoba-Saskatchewan Conference, Michael Collins, Saskatchewan Health Authority, Rebecca Soy, Public Health Authority, Ken Startup, Battleford Union Hospital, Reginald Cawood, Saskatchewan Hospital, Tonya Browarny, Matrix Law Group, Patricia J. Meiklejohn, Cliff A. Holm, Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Saskatchewan, Robert H.

McDonald, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Constable Burton Roy, Constable Cartier, Chantelle Thompson, Jennifer Schmidt, Mark Clements, Chad Gartner, Brad Appel, Ian McArthur, Bryce Bohun, Kathy Irwin, Jason Panchyshyn, Cary Ransome, OWZW Lawyers LLP, Virgil A. Thomson and Kimberley Richardson Respondents (Respondents) Before: Jackson, Ryan-Froslie and Barrington-Foote JJ.A. Disposition: Appeal dismissed Written reasons by: The Court On appeal from: QBG 921 of 2020, Saskatoon Appeal heard: March 1, 2021 Counsel: Robert Cannon appearing on his own behalf David Stack, Q.C., for the Honourable J.W.

Elson Justin Stevenson for Kathleen Christopherson, Glen Metivier and the Honourable Judge M. Pelletier Clifford Holm for The Battlefords Seventh-Day Adventist Church, James Kwon, Gary Lund, Ciprian Bolah, Manitoba-Saskatchewan Conference, Michael Collins, Matrix Law Group, Patricia J. Meiklejohn, Cliff A. Holm and Kimberley Richardson Chantelle Eisner and Amanda Kimpinski for Saskatchewan Health Authority, Rebecca Soy, Public Health Authority, Ken Startup, Battleford Union Hospital and Saskatchewan Hospital Michael Griffin for Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Saskatchewan, and Robert H.

McDonald Cheryl Giesbrecht and Marlon Miller for Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Constable Burton Roy Lindsay Oliver for Chantelle Thompson, Jennifer Schmidt, Mark Clements, Chad Gartner, Brad Appel, Ian McArthur, Bryce Bohun, Kathy Irwin, Jason Panchyshyn, Cary Ransome, OWZW Lawyers LLP and Virgil A. Thomson Dale Richardson appearing on his own behalf The Court I.

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The appellant, Robert Cannon, appeals against the September 10, 2020, Chambers decision that dismissed his application for habeas corpus with respect to Dale Richardson, Kaysha Dery [Kaysha], Karis Richardson [Karis] and Christy Dawn Pembrun. Contemporaneously with that application, Mr. Cannon had applied for an order dispensing with service of his motion on the respondents. The latter application was dismissed by the Chambers judge, who found notice must be provided. Mr.

Cannon does not challenge that decision in this appeal. [ 2 ] The Chambers judge went on to dismiss the habeas corpus application itself for a number of reasons, including that Mr. Cannon did not have standing to bring the application; that he did not meet the onus of proof imposed on applicants for a writ of habeas corpus ; that the application contained requests for relief that were inappropriate; and that the application itself was moot. Mr. Cannon takes issue with all of those findings. [ 3 ] For the reasons set out herein, Mr. Cannon’s appeal is dismissed with costs. II.

BACKGROUND [ 4 ] To properly understand Mr. Cannon’s position on this appeal, it is necessary to set out in some detail the procedural history of this matter and Mr. Cannon’s allegations against the various respondents. [ 5 ] It is useful to begin by identifying the individuals alleged to have been wrongfully detained. [ 6 ] Mr. Cannon’s application for habeas corpus related to the alleged wrongful detentions of Mr. Richardson, Mr. Richardson’s daughters Kaysha and Karis, and Ms. Pembrun.

Kaysha is an adult but Karis, at the time of the application, was 18 months old and living with her mother, Kimberley Richardson [Kimberley]. While Mr. Cannon describes Ms. Pembrun as an “affiliate” of Mr. Richardson, the exact nature of their relationship is unknown. No evidence was presented with respect to Ms. Pembrun or her alleged detention at the time

the habeas corpus application was heard, though Mr. Cannon seeks to file fresh evidence of her circumstances in this Court. [ 7 ] Mr. Cannon is a friend and business associate of both Mr. Richardson and Kaysha. [ 8 ] The factual context giving rise to Mr. Cannon’s application is of significance. Mr. Richardson incorporated D.S.R. Karis Consulting Inc. [D.S.R. Karis] to help businesses design and install heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems [HVAC systems] that would comply with the standards and recommendations pertaining to pandemic contagion mitigation and the coronavirus.

Kaysha is the Chief Communications Officer for D.S.R. Karis. The Saskatchewan Health Authority [SHA] is allegedly responsible for providing the recommended guidelines with respect to HVAC systems. According to Mr. Cannon’s evidence, those recommendations are set out in the SHA’s Aerosol Generation Procedure Guidelines [ Guidelines ]. Those Guidelines contain a table with no mixing factors. D.S.R. Karis requested from the SHA (and others) a copy of the technical report supporting the Guidelines . D.S.R. Karis and Mr.

Richardson were concerned that the Guidelines did not define the mixing factor or explain how to use it or apply it to the table provided by the SHA. In the view of D.S.R. Karis and Mr. Richardson, the SHA was “criminally negligent” as that flaw in the Guidelines could potentially cause substantial harm to people and pose a risk to human life. Mr. Richardson filed a complaint with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP] to that effect. [ 9 ] On May 20, 2020, D.S.R. Karis wrote to The Battlefords Seventh-Day Adventist Church [Church], of which Mr. Richardson was a member, suggesting the Church hire D.S.R.

Karis “to assess its compliance with recommendations by the government and leading engineering regulators for pandemic and legionellosis mitigation”. Around the same time, Mr. Richardson found himself in conflict with members of the Church over his purported resignation as a ministry assistant. Mr. Richardson denied the resignation and raised issues of racism against the Church. The Church eventually rejected D.S.R. Karis’s proposal. On June 5, 2020, Michael Collins, President of the Manitoba-Saskatchewan Conference of the Church, sent a notice to Mr.

Richardson that he was not “under any circumstances” permitted to access any property owned by the Church. In effect, Mr. Richardson was ousted from the Church. [ 10 ] On June 29, 2020, the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Saskatchewan [APEGS] sent D.S.R. Karis a letter indicating that, if the corporation was providing “engineering services” in the province, it must retain a licensed engineer and obtain a certificate of authorization from APEGS. The letter required D.S.R. Karis to advise APEGS in writing within 30 days of the name(

s) of their Saskatchewan licensed professional engineer(s). The letter was signed by Robert H. McDonald, Executive Director and Registrar of APEGS. [ 11 ] According to Mr. Cannon’s evidence, during the same period, D.S.R. Karis and Mr. Richardson were having issues with the Innovation Credit Union [ICU]. Kimberley, Mr. Richardson’s wife, worked at the ICU and both D.S.R. Karis and Mr. Richardson had bank accounts there. The evidence indicates that Mr. Richardson had been sending lengthy emails to ICU employees that were not viewed by the ICU as being relevant to either D.S.R. Karis or Mr.

Richardson’s financial dealings with them. On July 10, 2020, the lawyers for the ICU (OWZW Lawyers LLP) sent a letter to D.S.R. Karis and Mr. Richardson indicating that the ICU was terminating its relationship with them and closing their accounts. Mr. Richardson, on behalf of D.S.R. Karis and himself, filed an application in the Court of Queen’s Bench for an investigation into the affairs of the ICU. [ 12 ] At the same time as D.S.R. Karis and Mr. Richardson filed their application for an investigation into the ICU, Mr.

Richardson was dealing with a court application pertaining to the breakdown of his marital relationship with Kimberley. Kimberley had retained a lawyer (Patricia Meiklejohn of the Matrix Law Group) and was allegedly denying Mr. Richardson access to Karis. Accordingly, Mr. Richardson filed a custody application in the Court of Queen’s Bench. That application was rejected by the Local Registrar’s Office. The Deputy Registrar, Kathleen Christopherson, allegedly told Mr. Richardson that the application was incomplete and contained inappropriate documents.

In the meantime, Kimberley commenced legal proceedings under the Divorce Act , RSC 1985, c 3 (2d Supp), in which she claimed, among other things, custody of Karis with supervised access to Mr. Richardson. She sought an interim order to that effect. [ 13 ] On July 22, 2020, a warrant to apprehend Mr. Richardson was granted by Pelletier J. of the Provincial Court of Saskatchewan. The warrant was issued pursuant to s. 19(2) of The Mental Health Services Act , SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1 . It authorized Mr.

Richardson’s apprehension so that he could be examined to determine whether he should be admitted to a mental health centre pursuant to s. 24 of that Act . [ 14 ] Just prior to that, on July 16, 2020, a representative of the SHA had verbally communicated with Kaysha and informed her that she had been identified as a close contact of a person who had tested positive for COVID-19. She was advised that she must isolate.

That conversation was followed by a letter from the SHA which indicated Kaysha was “required to remain under mandatory isolation until July 29, 2020” – 14 days from her last contact with the confirmed case. Kaysha was advised that she was “required by law to stay home and avoid situations where there is a potential to spread infection to other people”. [ 15 ] On July 23, 2020, a medical health officer signed a detention order pursuant to s. 45.1 of The Public Health Act , RSS 1978, c P-37 .

The order directed that Kaysha be apprehended and immediately conveyed to a location where she “shall be detained until 8 a.m. 30/07/20”. The order was allegedly made because Kaysha had “not been following required protocols of mandatory isolation”. [ 16 ] On July 23, 2020, Mr. Richardson and Kaysha were apprehended by the RCMP at the court house in Battleford. They were there to participate in the court proceedings pertaining to D.S.R. Karis’s application for an investigation into the ICU and the interim custody application with respect to Karis. [ 17 ] Mr.

Richardson was taken to the Battleford Union Hospital [BUH] where he was examined by two psychiatrists. As a result of those examinations, Mr. Richardson was detained in the psychiatric unit of the BUH. Because he refused to take his medication, Mr. Richardson was allegedly strapped to a bed and forcibly injected. [ 18 ] Kaysha was taken to the Saskatchewan Hospital, a residential mental health facility located near Battleford, where she was housed in the isolation unit. She was allegedly “locked up” for 23 hours a day with no access to a telephone. [ 19 ] When Mr.

Richardson was unable to attend court with respect to Karis’s custody application, Elson J. of the Court of Queen’s

Bench granted interim custody to Kimberley with a provision that the order be reviewed in a month’s time. The application with respect to the ICU was adjourned sine die . [ 20 ] On July 27, 2020, Mr. Cannon signed an application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of Mr. Richardson and Kaysha. The RCMP and the SHA were the only named respondents. On that same date, Currie J. of the Court of Queen’s Bench dismissed Mr. Cannon’s application, indicating that it must be made with notice to the respondents. [ 21 ] On July 29, 2020, Mr.

Cannon amended his application to expand the remedies sought and the grounds supporting those remedies. The application, however, was still described as being “without notice”. He refiled it with the Court. On that date, Currie J. again dismissed the application on the same basis he had indicated earlier, namely that the respondents must be served with notice. [ 22 ] On July 30, 2020, Mr. Cannon amended his application to show a return date of August 28, 2020. The grounds and reasons for the application were also amended. [ 23 ] On August 26, 2020, Mr.

Cannon amended his application for a fourth time, to include a request for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to Karis. He also added 39 respondents to the style of cause and expanded his grounds to include: 38. Respondents are taking

part in terrorist activity and have taken control of the Saskatchewan jurisdiction by holding positions of power in the management of the Covid emergency in all levels of government including law enforcement, health authorities, courts, the law society, and other professional associations. 39. Respondents are taking

part in genocide of those who have demonstrated themselves to hold true to the fundamental beliefs of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. [ 24 ] As a result of the amendments, in addition to the writ of habeas corpus , Mr.

Cannon’s application requested an order for an investigation into the ICU and its affiliates; an order that his company, Wise Work Consulting Inc., be appointed as an “impartial investigator”; that the investigator be paid a $2 million cash non-refundable retainer; that legal costs be paid by the respondents; that the investigator be given certain specified powers; that the RCMP cooperate with the investigator; that necessary contact information be provided to the investigator; that Mr. Richardson’s home not be sold until the investigation was concluded; and that the respondents pay for new premises for D.S.R.

Karis to operate from. [ 25 ] On August 27, 2020, Mr. Cannon amended his application for the last time to include the wrongful detention of Ms. Pembrun. That application was not served on any of the respondents. Mr. Cannon filed his application as an “expedited procedure” and requested an order dispensing with service of the application and supporting documents on the respondents. The habeas corpus application and the application to dispense with service were heard together in Queen’s Bench Chambers on September 10, 2020. At the hearing, four lawyers appeared on behalf of 29 of the named respondents.

Those lawyers indicated to the Chambers judge that their clients had not been served with notice of the application. No material was filed by any of the respondents. [ 26 ] The Chambers judge rendered her decision orally on the day of the hearing. She dismissed both Mr. Cannon’s application to dispense with service on the respondents, and his application for the writ of habeas corpus . Mr. Cannon appeals only that portion of the judgment relating to the writ of habeas corpus . III. THE CHAMBERS JUDGE’S DECISION [ 27 ] The Chambers judge dismissed Mr.

Cannon’s application to dispense with service on the respondents. She found that Mr. Cannon had been ordered twice before to serve his application in accordance with The Queen’s Bench Rules . Despite those orders, he had not done so. Further, she found that the grounds for his request to dispense with service were unsubstantiated. In the circumstances, she was not satisfied that notice of the application should be dispensed with. [ 28 ] The Chambers judge then went on to find that Mr. Cannon’s application for habeas corpus should also be dismissed for the following reasons: (

a) the originating application was not properly served on all of the 41 respondents in compliance with Th e Queen’s Bench Rules. T his is co ntrary to previous ord ers o f the Court. (

b) Mr. Cannon i s the applicant however he has not been deprived of liberty . Instead , he sets out a numb e r of allegations whi ch re late not to himself bu t , rather, to a variety of grievances h el d primarily by Mr. Richardson and Ms . Dery . (

c) Mr. Canno n is not a lawyer and relies on hi s “Chris tian duty” in bringing thi s application; however, the application seeks substantial financial remuneration payable t o the corporation he represents, starting with “a $2,000,000 cash non-refundable retainer” . I would caution Mr. Cannon that he may want to review Th e L ega l Profession Act, 1990, SS 1990 -9 1 , c L-10.1 , and the restrictions on acting on behalf of another party , parti c ular l y where remuneration is sought. [d] The relief that is sought is far beyond the scope of habeas corpus.

It incorporates a number of third-party grievances against a vast range of respondents for a broad array of allegations. The i ss ue s and parties do not establish the criteria for a habeas co rpus application have been met. [e] The application for habeas corpus is moot. There is no deprivation of the applicant’s liberty that would trigger habeas corpus . [f] Although not named applicants in the matter, the evidence does not establish that any of the four individuals Mr. Cannon purports to speak for have had an unlawful deprivation of their liberty or that any past deprivation was without legitimate grounds.

None of these individuals remain in custody, nor am I satisfied any are currently detained as alleged by Mr. Cannon.

[g] I am not satisfied there is a live issue and decline to exercise my discretion to determine the application as I view it as theoretical. [ 29 ] The Chambers judge awarded costs against Mr. Cannon which she fixed at $500. The costs were to be paid within 30 days. IV. ISSUES [ 30 ] In his notice of appeal, Mr.

Cannon sets out the following grounds: 1) The learned trial Judge, having reviewed all the materials submitted, erred by dismissing the application for habeas corpus for the reasons hereafter. 2) The learned trial Judge erred by declaring that evidence does not establish that the four individuals the application was made on behalf of were deprived of liberty thereby putting the onus on the applicant as the applicant was the only party that supplied evidence. 3) The learned trial Judge erred by declaring the application for habeas corpus moot on the assumption that there was no deprivation of liberty of the applicant while ignoring subsection 3-64(2) of The Queen’s Bench Rules as presented by the applicant in chambers with respect to the application on behalf of another person for an order of habeas corpus . 4) The learned trial Judge erred by refusing to allow Dale Richardson to speak on his own behalf in accordance with subsection 3-64(3) of The Queen’s Bench Rules as presented by the applicant in chambers with respect to the application on behalf of another person for an order of habeas corpus . 5) The learned trial Judge erred by ignoring evidence that suggested, with no evidence to the contrary, that The Mental Health Services Act and its misapplication was used to breach Dale Richardson’s charter rights as he was stripped and consistently tied to a table and drugged against his will until an application for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf and served. 6) The learned trial Judge erred by ignoring evidence that suggested, with no evidence to the contrary, that The Public Health Act, 1994 was used to breach Kaysha Dery’s charter rights as she was taken to Saskatchewan Hospital secure side, a maximum security prison, for eight days without trial and subjected to various forms physical and psychological torture. 7) The learned trial Judge erred by ignoring evidence that suggested, with no evidence to the contrary, judicial interference by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Saskatchewan Health Authority, and a provincial mental health warrant interfering with legal proceedings to be held in the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan. 8) The learned trial Judge erred by declaring Karis Richardson is no longer in custody despite evidence that suggested, with no evidence to the contrary, that Karis was detained by Kimberley Ann Richardson using the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while investigations of torture against Kimberley with respect to Karis were ongoing by Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 9) The learned trial Judge, knowing that Dale Richardson and Kaysha Dery were taken by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in front court minutes before a hearing in which Dale on behalf of a federal corporation was to appear against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Saskatchewan Health Authority and others, erred by declaring that evidence did not establish that his deprivation of liberty was without legitimate grounds. [ 31 ] Those grounds give rise to these issues: (

a) Did the Chambers judge err by concluding Mr. Cannon lacked standing to bring the application? (

b) Did the Chambers judge err by refusing to allow Mr. Richardson to speak on his own behalf? (

c) Did the Chambers judge err by ignoring evidence that suggested breaches of Mr. Richardson’s and Kaysha’s Charter rights? (

d) Did the Chambers judge err by ignoring evidence of judicial interference by the RCMP and the SHA? (

e) Did the Chambers judge err by determining the habeas corpus application was moot? (

f) Did the Chambers judge err by shifting the burden of proof to Mr. Cannon to establish that the named individuals were wrongfully deprived of their liberty? (

g) If so, did the Chambers judge err by determining the four named individuals were not unlawfully detained? [ 32 ] Prior to the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Richardson advised the Registrar’s office that he would like to make submissions on the appeal on his own behalf and that of his daughters. After Mr. Cannon had completed his oral representations, the panel asked Mr. Richardson if he had anything to add. He proceeded to stress those aspects of the appeal relating to the effects upon him and his children.

In the course of his submissions, he made extensive reference to the United Nation’s Convention against Torture. The panel determined that insofar as his remarks were relevant, they had already been presented by Mr. Cannon. V. ALLEGATIONS OF BIAS AND REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS A. Mr. Cannon’s position

[33] Mr. Cannon suggested that the panel hearing his appeal, and indeed the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan as a whole, is biasedand is part of what he refers to as the “ICU conspiracy”. As such, Mr. Cannon contends this Court cannot render an impartial decision withrespect to his appeal. He did not, however, ask the panel to recuse itself. Nonetheless, we will address his concerns. [34] In support of his position, Mr. Cannon points to three judges of this Court who have interacted with either him or Mr.Richardson.

He alleges those judges were biased, either because they denied the application before them, or failed to grant all of the reliefrequested. One of the judges was Mr. Cannon’s appeal management judge. While Mr. Cannon acknowledged that judge was of assistanceto him, he nonetheless alleges, without any evidence, that the judge was part of the conspiracy. [35] Mr. Cannon identified no specific concerns with any member of the panel who heard his appeal. He merely states that thisCourt is part of the “conspiracy”. In other words, there is no evidence or suggestion of actual bias by any panel member.

None of the panelmembers know Mr. Cannon, Mr. Richardson or Kaysha, and none of them have ever dealt with those individuals. B. The law [36] All courts owe a duty of procedural fairness to the people who appear before them. One aspect of procedural fairness is thatdecisions be made by impartial decision-makers. [37] There is a presumption in law that judges will act impartially.

The majority in Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC45, [2003] 2 SCR 259 [Wewaykum], explained the presumption in these terms: [59] Viewed in this light, “[i]mpartiality is the fundamental qualification of a judge and the core attribute of the judiciary” (CanadianJudicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (1998), at p. 30). It is the key to our judicial process, and must be presumed.

As was notedby L’Heureux-Dubé J. and McLachlin J. (as she then was) in S. (R.D.), supra, at para. 32, the presumption of impartiality carriesconsiderable weight, and the law should not carelessly evoke the possibility of bias in a judge, whose authority depends upon thatpresumption. Thus, while the requirement of judicial impartiality is a stringent one, the burden is on the party arguing for disqualificationto establish that the circumstances justify a finding that the judge must be disqualified. [38] As Mr.

Cannon has presented no evidence of actual bias, the issue is whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias withrespect to the panel or any member thereof.

The test for reasonable apprehension of bias was set out by de Grandpré J. in his dissent in TheCommittee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National Energy Board), (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 394 [Committee forJustice and Liberty]: …[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the questionand obtaining thereon the required information. …[T]hat test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically andpractically—and having thought the matter through—conclude.

Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker],whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.” (Emphasis added) As de Grandpré J. stated in Committee for Justice and Liberty at page 395, the grounds underpinning such applications must be“substantial”.

He refused the suggestion that the test is related to the “very sensitive or scrupulous” conscience. [39] In Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 39, [2005] 2 SCR 91, the Supreme Court ofCanada stated: [15] …none of the judges who were scheduled to hear and have now heard the appeal were in any way involved in this case. Noreasonable person would think, after Abella J. voluntarily recused herself, that her mere presence on the Court would impair the ability ofthe balance of its members to remain impartial.

If there is a duty on the part of one member of our Court to recuse him or herself, it is anastounding proposition to suggest that the same duty automatically attaches to the rest of the Court or compromises the integrity of thewhole Court. To reach that conclusion would be to ascribe a singular fragility to the impartiality that a judge must necessarily show, and tothe ability of judges to discharge the duties associated with impartiality in accordance with the traditions of our jurisprudence. … (Emphasis added) [40] Mr.

Cannon has provided no evidence to substantiate his allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias by the panel hearinghis appeal. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and havingthought the matter through, would conclude that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists. VI. APPLICATION TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE A. Supplementary appeal book [41] Legal counsel for the SHA, the Public Health Authority [PHA], the Saskatchewan Hospital, the BUH, Rebecca Soy, and KenStartup filed a supplementary appeal book. That appeal book contained six documents: (

a) a Warrant to Apprehend Mr. Richardson dated July 22, 2020; (

b) a Certificate of Medical Practitioner Compulsory Admission of a Person to a Mental Health Centre dated July 23, 2020; (

c) a Detention Order for Kaysha dated July 23, 2020;

(

d) a Decision of Review Panel (re Mr. Richardson’s detention) dated July 28, 2020; (

e) a Discharge Information for Mr. Richardson dated August 7, 2020; and (

f) a Certificate of Medical Practitioner for Compulsory Admission of a Person to a Mental Health Centre dated July 24, 2020. [42] At the hearing of the appeal, the panel raised the question of whether these documents were before the Chambers judge whenshe rendered her decision and, if not, whether an application to adduce fresh evidence was required. Mr. Cannon, however, indicated thathe wanted this Court to receive the documents as evidence. Accordingly, the contents of the supplementary appeal book were accepted bythe Court. B. Mr. Cannon’s application to adduce evidence 1. Mr. Cannon’s position [43] Mr.

Cannon brought an application to adduce evidence, which he suggested would “impact an impartial decision [of his appeal]by this Court”. He contended the evidence demonstrates “a pattern of behaviour to cover up crime and suspend the justice thereof thattranscends national boundaries”. [44] The evidence Mr. Cannon seeks to adduce is as follows: (

a) a transcript of a taped conversation between Chad Gartner, an employee of the ICU, and Mr. Richardson on behalf of D.S.R.Karis, as well as a copy of a non-disclosure agreement between the ICU and D.S.R. Karis; (

b) a photograph of Ms. Pembrun and a transcript of a taped conversation between her and Mr. Cannon; (

c) an ex parte motion submitted by Mr. Cannon on January 29, 2021, for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada for awrit of habeas corpus, including its appendices; and (

d) the arbitrary suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus filed in the United States District Court for the District ofNevada. [45] The evidence Mr. Cannon seeks to adduce includes material that was in existence at the time of the hearing ((

a) and (b)) as wellas new evidence in the form of court applications to the Supreme Court of Canada and the District Court of Nevada which arose after thehearing ((

c) and (d)). [46] The decision to admit further evidence in this Court is a discretionary one. The principles applicable to the exercise of thatdiscretion depend on whether the evidence existed before the hearing or arose thereafter: Maitland v Drozda (1983), (SK CA), 22 Sask R 1 (CA) at para 24 [Maitland]; Turbo Resources Ltd. v Gibson (1988), (SK CA), 60 Sask R 221(CA) at paras 10–11 [Turbo Resources]; and Mental Health and Addictions Services v S.B., 2021 SKCA 18 at para 8 [S.B.]. [47] The Court in Turbo Resources was dealing with what was then Rule 41 of The Court of Appeal Rules.

That Rule has since beenchanged. Rule 59 now governs applications to adduce evidence in this Court. It provides: 59(1) A party desiring to adduce fresh evidence on appeal shall, in accordance with existing law, apply to the court for leave to do so bynotice of motion returnable on the date fixed for hearing the appeal.

(2) The notice of motion shall be served on all parties and filed not later than 10 days before the date fixed for hearing the appeal. The decision to admit evidence remains a discretionary one to be determined in accordance with the principles set out in Maitland andTurbo Resources. [48] In

summary, evidence in existence at the time of a hearing must meet the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R vPalmer, (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 759 at 775 [Palmer]:

(1) The evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial …

(2) The evidence must be relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially decisive issue in the trial.

(3) The evidence must be credible in the sense that it is reasonably capable of belief, and

(4) It must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affectedthe result. [49] Evidence that arises after the hearing need not meet the Palmer test, but the Palmer factors are still relevant to the question ofwhether such evidence should be admitted (C.H. v S.F., 2021 SKCA 24 at para 18 [C.H.]).

The evidence must be admissible and relevantto an issue under appeal “in the sense that it bears upon a decisive, or potentially decisive, issue in the proceeding”; it must be credible;and if believed, it must reasonably have the potential, when taken with the other evidence adduced, to have affected the result (C.H. atpara 18). Further, as stated in S.B. at paragraph 8, “it must not violate the principle of public policy that favours finality to litigation”. [50] With the above principles in mind, we turn to consider the evidence Mr. Cannon wishes to adduce. a.

Transcript of the taped conversation with Chad Gartner and the non-disclosure agreement

[ 51 ] Mr. Cannon contends that the non-disclosure agreement he seeks to file, and the taped conversation with Mr. Gartner, which Mr. Cannon asserts confirms that the ICU breached that agreement, are at the heart of the “ICU conspiracy”. It is his position that the RCMP had no reason to apprehend Mr. Richardson or Kaysha, and thus he speculates that the motivating factor for their apprehensions was the ICU acting to prevent any investigation into its conduct. [ 52 ] We begin by noting that this evidence was in existence when the habeas corpus application was heard. Mr.

Cannon asserts it was not presented to the Court at that time because he did not have permission from D.S.R. Karis to do so. [ 53 ] The evidence does not meet the Palmer test. No explanation was provided as to why D.S.R. Karis would not allow what Mr. Cannon believes to be significant evidence supporting the allegation of a conspiracy of which Mr. Richardson and Kaysha were the alleged victims to be filed with the court. Further, there is no affidavit evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the taping of the conversation with Mr.

Gartner which affects the weight and credibility this Court could ascribe to it. The transcript itself does not necessarily lead to the conclusion drawn by Mr. Cannon and, as such, even if believed, could not when taken with the other evidence adduced be expected to reasonably have affected the result. As the evidence does not meet the Palmer test, it cannot be admitted. b. The photograph of Ms. Pembrun and a transcript of her taped conversation with Mr. Cannon [ 54 ] The photograph of Ms. Pembrun and the transcript of Mr.

Cannon’s conversation with her were in existence at the time the habeas corpus application was heard and, accordingly, for that evidence to be admissible, it must meet the Palmer test. [ 55 ] Mr. Cannon submits the evidence was relevant to the habeas corpus application. It is his position that Ms. Pembrun was “the first independent party to be punished” for Mr. Richardson’s actions. [ 56 ] Mr. Cannon candidly acknowledged that this evidence was not produced through his own inadvertence.

As such, it fails to meet the first requirement of the Palmer test as, with due diligence, it could have been adduced at the habeas corpus hearing. The evidence lacks reliability as the circumstances surrounding the taping were not provided. Further, there is no evidence of how or why Ms. Pembrun was hospitalized or whether she continued to be hospitalized at the time of the hearing. Thus, the evidence, even if believed, could not, when taken with the other evidence adduced, reasonably have affected the result of the application. Accordingly, the evidence cannot be admitted in this Court. c.

The ex parte motion to the Supreme Court of Canada [ 57 ] Mr. Cannon wishes to adduce his ex parte motion to the Supreme Court of Canada and its supporting documentation to advance his assertion of a “masonic conspiracy” to cover up criminal and terrorist activities in both Canada and the United States. [ 58 ] The motion could not have been filed at the time of the hearing of the habeas corpus application as it was not yet in existence. It is new evidence. At least a portion of the documents Mr. Cannon seeks to submit consists of arguments and opinions which are not evidence. The Supreme Court’s rejection of Mr.

Cannon’s motion is not proof of a “masonic conspiracy”. It is a judicial determination of an application that was not properly before that Court. Further, there are no factual underpinnings linking that motion to the issues before this Court. As such, Mr. Cannon has failed to establish its relevance to this appeal. Finally, the evidence, even if admitted, would not be decisive to the determination of any of the issues raised by his appeal. In the circumstances, the Court is not prepared to accept this documentation as evidence. d. United States District Court proceedings in Nevada [ 59 ] Mr.

Cannon submits his application before the United States District Court in Nevada is further evidence of a “conspiracy” to “threaten, coerce and punish him as a member of the Christian Right”. [ 60 ] The documents in issue were created following the hearing of the habeas corpus application and as such constitute new evidence. The documents, however, do not support Mr. Cannon’s conclusions. Much of the documentation is not evidence at all but, rather, Mr. Cannon’s allegations, opinions and arguments in support of his conspiracy theory. Further, Mr.

Cannon has failed to show that the documents are relevant to any matter under appeal. Accordingly, the Court declines to accept the documentation as evidence. [ 61 ] In

summary, Mr. Cannon’s application to adduce evidence is dismissed. VII. NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS [ 62 ] Mr. Cannon filed a notice of constitutional questions in this Court challenging the validity of s. 15(1) of the

Canada Business Corporations Act , RSC 1985, c C-44 ; s. 15(1) of The Business Corporations Act , RSS 1978, c B-10 ; s. 3 - 6(1) of The Provincial Health Authority Act , SS 2017, c P-30.3 ; s. 16(1) of the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act , SC 2009, c 23 ; s. 15(1) of The Non-profit Corporations Act, 1995 , SS 1995, c N-4.2 ; s. 30 of The Legal Profession Act, 1990 , SS 1990-91, c L-10.1 ; ss. 18 , 18.1 , 19 , 20 , 21 and 34 of The Mental Health Services Act ; and ss. 38 , 45 and 45.1 of The Public Health Act, 1994 , SS 1994, c P-37.1 . [ 63 ] Mr. Cannon seeks to have the above identified statutory provisions declared invalid pursuant to s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 , being

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 , “to mitigate the further infringement” of Mr. Richardson’s, Kaysha’s and Karis’s

section 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 28 and 36 Charter rights and as well, Kaysha’s

section 35 Charter rights. He asserts the infringement of those rights is “ongoing” and “perpetuated without limitation” by the “mason conspirators”. In effect, Mr. Cannon contends that the respondents are using the Acts identified to persecute Mr. Richardson, Kaysha and Karis. In the alternative, Mr. Cannon requests remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter and the prosecution of “appropriate parties to prevent the infringement of D.S.R. Karis’s, Mr. Richardson’s, Kaysha’s and Karis’s Charter rights”. [ 64 ] In his notice, Mr. Cannon identified 41 “mason conspirators”, including at least 6 U.S. entities, the Provincial Court of

Saskatchewan, the Court of Queen’s Bench for Saskatchewan, the Chambers judge, who heard his habeas corpus application, this Courtas well as a judge thereof, the Federal Court, the Federal Court of Appeal, the Department of Justice Canada, the Attorney Generals ofCanada and Saskatchewan, the Law Society of Saskatchewan, the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, and at least 23 other individualsor organizations which are not named as respondents in this appeal. [65] While the Attorney Generals of Canada and Saskatchewan were served with Mr.

Cannon’s notice of constitutional questions,that notice was not filed with the Chambers judge who heard the habeas corpus application. Further, no evidence was filed before theChambers judge and no application to adduce evidence with respect to the constitutional questions raised was made to this Court. Thosequestions amount to a general assertion that the legislative provisions identified infringe Mr. Richardson, D.S.R. Karis, Kaysha andKaris’s Charter rights. However, the notice provides no particulars with respect to why this is so or why the remedies Mr.

Cannon seeksare appropriate. [66] In Guindon v Canada, 2015 SCC 41, [2015] 3 SCR 3 [Guindon], the Supreme Court considered when it is appropriate for acourt to deal with a constitutional question when notice has not been provided in the court of first instance. Justices Rothstein andCromwell, writing for the majority, stated: [19] Before turning to the other points, we should be clear what the issue is and what it is not. The issue is not whether this Court (orfor that matter the courts below) can proceed to adjudicate a constitutional question without notice ever having been given to the attorneysgeneral.

Notice requirements serve a vital purpose in ensuring that courts have a full evidentiary record before invalidating legislation andthat governments are given the fullest opportunity to support the validity of legislation: see Eaton, at para. 48. Notice has now been givenin this case. The question is one of whether this Court should address the matter now that notice has been given, not whether this Court orany other can proceed in the absence of notice: see, e.g., Morine v. Parker (L &

J) Equipment Inc., 2001 NSCA 53, 193 N.S.R. (2d) 51;Mohr v. North American Life Assurance Co., (SK CA), [1941] 1 D.L.R. 427 (Sask. C.A.); Citation Industries Ltd. v.C.J.A., Loc. 1928 (1988), (BC CA), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 360 (B.C.C.A.). [20] The principles that must be applied here are essentially those that govern whether this is a suitable case to hear a constitutionalissue that is properly before the court for the first time on appeal. The issue is “new” in the sense that the constitutional issue, by virtue ofthe absence of notice, was not properly raised before either of the courts below.

Whether to hear and decide a constitutional issue when ithas not been properly raised in the courts below is a matter for the Court’s discretion, taking into account all of the circumstances,including the state of the record, fairness to all parties, the importance of having the issue resolved by this Court, its suitability for decisionand the broader interests of the administration of justice. [21] The Court has many times affirmed that it may, in appropriate circumstances, allow parties to raise on appeal an argument, even anew constitutional argument, that was not raised, or was not properly raised in the courts below: see, e.g., R. v.

Brown, (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 918; Corporation professionnelle des médecins du Québec v. Thibault, (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R.1033; Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd., 2002 SCC 19, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 678. The Court has even doneso of its own motion, as we shall see. [22] The test for whether new issues should be considered is a stringent one. As Binnie J. put it in Sylvan Lake, “The Court is free toconsider a new issue of law on the appeal where it is able to do so without procedural prejudice to the opposing party and where therefusal to do so would risk an injustice”: para. 33.

While this Court can hear and decide new issues, this discretion is not exercisedroutinely or lightly. See also: Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Wuttunee, 2008 SKCA 125 at para 11, 314 Sask R 90. [67] To consider the notice of constitutional questions in this Court would cause significant prejudice to the Attorney Generals ofCanada and Saskatchewan. This is so because they have had no opportunity to present evidence with respect to the impugned legislativeprovisions. Mr. Cannon has not indicated how those provisions have breached Mr.

Richardson’s, Kaysha’s or Karis’s Charter rights orhow the alleged breaches are relevant to the habeas corpus application which is the subject of this appeal. In short, he seeks to challenge anumber of federal and provincial statutes without providing a proper legal foundation or setting out the factual circumstances underpinningthe relief he seeks. As stated in Kimoto v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 291 at paras 19–20, 426 NR 69, constitutional questionscannot be determined in a vacuum. Further, we are not satisfied that to refuse to consider the constitutional issues raised by Mr.

Cannonwould risk an injustice. [68] This Court declines to exercise its discretion to hear the notice of constitutional questions. VIII. ANALYSIS [69] It is significant that Mr. Cannon’s grounds for appeal make no mention of the fact the respondents were not properly servedwith notice of the habeas corpus application in accordance with The Queen’s Bench Rules. The Chambers judge’s dismissal of Mr.Cannon’s application to dispense with service on them is dispositive of this appeal. Mr.

Cannon’s application before the Chambers judgecould not succeed without proper notice being given. [70] Despite the issue of service, the Chambers judge went on to determine the habeas corpus application on its merits. A. Did the Chambers judge err by concluding Mr. Cannon lacked standing tobring the application? [71] It is Mr. Cannon’s position that Rule 3-64(2) gave him authority to bring the habeas corpus application on behalf of Mr.Richardson, Mr. Richardson’s daughters, and Ms. Pembrun, and that the Chambers judge erred in concluding otherwise. [72] The Court agrees with Mr. Cannon’s position.

Rule 3-64(2) provides as follows:

Any person is entitled to bring proceedings, on his or her own behalf or on behalf of any other person , to obtain an order of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum . (Emphasis added) Thus, Mr. Cannon had standing to bring the application on behalf of the four individuals identified and the Chambers judge erred by concluding otherwise. That error, however, does not mean the Chambers judge’s order should be set aside. Mr. Cannon’s standing to bring the application was only one of several reasons why the Chambers judge concluded the application must be dismissed. B. Did the Chambers judge err by refusing to allow Mr.

Richardson to speak on his own behalf? [ 73 ] Mr. Cannon contends that the Chambers judge erred by refusing to allow Mr. Richardson to speak on his own behalf at the hearing. [ 74 ] The application in issue was heard in Chambers and, as such, there is no transcript of the proceeding. Mr. Cannon did not apply before this Court to adduce evidence as to the circumstances surrounding this particular allegation. However, Rule 3-64(3) indicates a judge may determine which of the applicant or the subject of the application is to have carriage of the proceedings. Subsection (3) reads as follows:

(3) If an application is brought by a person on behalf of another person, the Court may determine which of the applicant or the subject of the application is to have the carriage of the proceedings. [ 75 ] “[C]arriage of the proceedings” includes making oral submissions to the Court. As such, given the limited factual context provided, it cannot be said that the Chambers judge erred by refusing to let Mr. Richardson speak on his own behalf. She allowed Mr. Cannon to speak for him. She was entitled, pursuant to Rule 3-64(3), to make that choice. The fact that she did so is not an error which would result in Mr.

Cannon’s appeal being allowed. C. Did the Chambers judge err by ignoring evidence that suggested breaches of Mr. Richardson’s and Kaysha’s Charter rights? D. Did the Chambers judge err by ignoring evidence of judicial interference by the RCMP and the SHA? [ 76 ] Issues C and D both allege that the Chambers judge erred by ignoring evidence and, as such, may be addressed together. [ 77 ] It is Mr. Cannon’s position that the Chambers judge was part of a “conspiracy” to wrongfully detain Mr. Richardson and Kaysha, and that all of the respondents, in different ways, had violated their Charter rights.

He asserts that the fact those two individuals were apprehended when they attended the court house in Battleford to participate in legal proceedings involving the ICU and Karis is evidence of a conspiracy, and a blatant interference with the judicial process. In his view, the apprehensions occurred to prevent Mr. Richardson and Kaysha from appearing with respect to those court proceedings. [ 78 ] Aside from the bald assertion that was the reason behind the apprehensions, the evidence does not support Mr. Cannon’s position. There is evidence that Mr.

Richardson was engaged in disruptive behaviour before the warrant for his apprehension was issued. Mr. Cannon also presented evidence that Kaysha was advised by the SHA that she was subject to a mandatory isolation order because she was in close contact with an individual who had tested positive for COVID-19. The fact that the Chambers judge did not agree with Mr. Cannon’s

interpretation of the evidence does not mean she ignored or overlooked it. [ 79 ] Mr. Cannon’s appeal on the above grounds also fails. E. Did the Chambers judge err by determining the habeas corpus application was moot? 1. Mr. Cannon’s position [ 80 ] It is Mr. Cannon’s position that the Chambers judge erred by determining the habeas corpus application was moot on the basis there was no deprivation of liberty. He points to what he calls the ongoing torture of Mr. Richardson and Kaysha by the respondents and others.

He alleges a conspiracy perpetrated by the masons and a religious conflict between the “children of the light” and the “children of the dark”. Mr. Cannon maintains an impartial investigation into everything that has occurred is necessary. 2. The law [ 81 ] In order to assess the Chambers judge’s decision that Mr. Cannon’s habeas corpus application was moot, it is necessary to set out the law pertaining to such applications. [ 82 ]

Section 10 of the Charter states “[e]veryone has the right on arrest or detention…[t]o have the validity of the detention determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful”. [ 83 ] There are two elements to a habeas corpus application: (

a) a deprivation of liberty; and (

b) that the deprivation be unlawful. As

stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82 at para 74, [2005] 3 SCR 809 [May], “the onus ofmaking out a deprivation of liberty rests on the applicant. The onus of establishing the lawfulness of that deprivation rests on the detainingauthority”. [84] In Mission Institute v Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 SCR 502 [Khela], the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with an appealpertaining to an application for habeas corpus by a prison inmate who had been transferred from a medium security institution to amaximum security institution on an emergent and involuntary basis.

Justice LeBel, writing for the Court, reaffirmed its position in Maystating: [30] To be successful, an application for habeas corpus must satisfy the following criteria. First, the applicant must establish that he orshe has been deprived of liberty. Once a deprivation of liberty is proven, the applicant must raise a legitimate ground upon which toquestion its legality.

If the applicant has raised such a ground, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities to show that the deprivation ofliberty was lawful (Farbey, Sharpe and Atrill, at pp. 84-85; May, at paras. 71 and 74). [85] In accordance with the authorities cited, the onus rested with Mr. Cannon to establish that Mr. Richardson, Kaysha, Karis andMs.

Pembrun were all deprived of liberty and that there was a legitimate ground upon which to question the lawfulness of that deprivation.Only at that point would the burden shift to the detaining authority to prove the detentions were lawful. [86] A legal proceeding is “moot” once the issue or issues raised by the proceeding are resolved. In Borowski v Canada (AttorneyGeneral), (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342, the Supreme Court considered the doctrine of mootness.

Justice Sopinka, writingfor the Court, stated at page 353: The doctrine of mootness is an aspect of a general policy or practice that a court may decline to decide a case which raises merely ahypothetical or abstract question. The general principle applies when the decision of the court will not have the effect of resolving somecontroversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties. If the decision of the court will have no practical effect on such rights, thecourt will decline to decide the case.

This essential ingredient must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commenced but atthe time when the court is called upon to reach a decision. Accordingly, if, subsequent to the initiation of the action or proceeding, eventsoccur which affect the relationship of the parties so that no present live controversy exists which affects the rights of the parties, the caseis said to be moot. The general policy or practice is enforced in moot cases unless the court exercises its discretion to depart from itspolicy or practice.

The relevant factors relating to the exercise of the court’s discretion are discussed hereinafter. The approach in recent cases involves a two-step analysis. First, it is necessary to determine whether the required tangible and concretedispute has disappeared and the issues have become academic. Second, if the response to the first question is affirmative, it is necessary todecide if the court should exercise its discretion to hear the case.

The cases do not always make it clear whether the term “moot” applies tocases that do not present a concrete controversy or whether the term applies only to such of those cases as the court declines to hear. In theinterest of clarity, I consider that a case is moot if it fails to meet the “live controversy” test.

A court may nonetheless elect to address amoot issue if the circumstances warrant. [87] In situations where the liberty of a person for whom a writ of habeas corpus has been requested is no longer being infringed,courts generally hold the application is moot. [88] In R v Charley, 2018 ONSC 1163, 405 CRR (2d) 57, Morgan J. explained that habeas corpus is not applicable to a historicaldetention. As he put it: [32] Although it is an ancient and powerful remedy, habeas corpus is not applicable to all situations.

Specifically, it is not applicable tochallenge a historic detention: R v Latham, [2000] OJ No 3720, at paras 21-23. It is the lawfulness of the detention at the date of theApplication that is the focus of the inquiry. As Canada’s leading scholars in the field have explained: It has been held consistently that the relevant time at which the detention of the prisoner must be justified is the time at which the courtconsiders the return of the writ. This rule means that nothing which has happened before the present cause of detention took effect will berelevant to the issue before the court… J. Farbey and R.J.

Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 3d ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011), at pp. 198-99. [33] Since habeas corpus is concerned only with the lawfulness of a person’s current detention, the matter before me lacks a livecontroversy. “This essential ingredient must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commenced but at the time when thecourt is called upon to reach a decision.

Accordingly, if…no present live controversy exists which affects the rights of the parties, the caseis said to be moot”: Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342, at para 15. [34] A change in circumstance which renders the petitioner’s allegedly unlawful situation lawful has the effect of making a habeascorpus application moot.

Thus, for example, granting bail to a remand prisoner, R v Nielsen, 2016 ONCA 635, or removing an inmatefrom separate confinement, Hamer v Vancouver Island Regional Correction Centre (Warden), 2016 BCSC 2380, or reclassifying aninmate as a maximum-security inmate, Skulsh v Katz, 2012 BSC 350, or releasing an inmate from custody, R v Hall, [1997] OJ No 4047(Ont CA), all make a habeas corpus proceeding moot. (Emphasis added) [89] Justice Morgan’s view that where a detention no longer exists at the time a habeas corpus application is heard, the applicationis moot, reflects the predominant approach by Canadian courts.

In Finck v Canada (National Parole Board), 2005 NSCA 107, 235 NSR(2d) 1, the appellant was released shortly after his application for habeas corpus was dismissed by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. Onappeal, Hamilton J.A. held that the matter of the appeal was moot since the appellant had not been incarcerated pursuant to the impugnedwarrant for almost three years. She stated that, “[a] remedy in the nature of habeas corpus [had] long since been impossible to grant in thismatter” (at para 9). [90] Likewise, in R v Hall, 1997 CarswellOnt 4108 (CA), the prisoner appealed a decision refusing habeas corpus. The Crown

argued that the appeal was moot because the prisoner had since been released from custody. The Court of Appeal for Ontario agreed that the appeal was moot and declined to hear it. [ 91 ] Further, in Ross v Warden of Riverbend Institution , 2007 SKQB 232 , aff’d 2009 SKCA 23 , the prisoner sought release from segregation and return to the general population of the institution. Justice Rothery held that the habeas corpus application was moot because the prisoner had already been released from segregation.

On appeal to this Court, Lane J.A. confirmed that the habeas corpus issue was moot: [5] It is my view the essential issue was moot as decided by the Chambers judge and no error has been demonstrated. At the time of the hearing before the Chambers judge the circumstances leading to the application, the appellant’s placement on segregation status, no longer existed. The transfer from the minimum-security institution to administrative segregation in the penitentiary was the action which precipitated the appellant’s application for habeas corpus .

The Chambers judge properly relied on the principles set out in Borowski … . 3. Application of the law [ 92 ] Mr. Cannon’s application was for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with respect to Mr. Richardson, Kaysha, Karis and Ms. Pembrun. He requested that those individuals be brought before the Court to “determine the validity” of their detentions. By the time the application was heard, Mr. Richardson and Kaysha were no longer detained and there was no evidence that their right to liberty continued to be infringed once they were released from detention. In fact, both Mr.

Richardson and Kaysha were present at the Chambers hearing. [ 93 ] The Charter is meant to protect individual rights from state interference. It does not apply to disputes between private individuals. Karis was never apprehended or detained by any government authority. At all times material to the habeas corpus application, she was in the legal custody of her mother. [ 94 ] While habeas corpus was historically the common law remedy to decide questions of custody, it has largely been replaced by provincial and federal legislation which now governs custody disputes between parents. As already indicated, Mr.

Richardson was engaged in such a dispute with his wife, Kimberley. While Elson J. made an order granting Kimberley interim custody of Karis, he did so pursuant to the Divorce Act in the context of a family law dispute, which is a civil proceeding. In short, the proposition that Karis’s custody should be subject to a habeas corpus application is misplaced. Such disputes are properly dealt with under the appropriate provincial or federal legislation. See: S. v Haringey London Borough Council , [2003] EWHC 2734 (Admin).

The Chambers judge did not err in concluding Karis was not deprived of liberty within the meaning of s. 10(

c) of the Charter . [ 95 ] Finally, as already indicated herein, there was no evidence filed before the Chambers judge with respect to Ms. Pembrun’s alleged detention. Accordingly, no order for habeas corpus could be made with respect to her. [ 96 ] Given the case authority, the Chambers judge did not err in holding that Mr. Cannon’s application was moot on the basis that Mr.

Richardson and Kaysha were no longer being detained. [ 97 ] Having said that, courts have the discretion to hear moot matters where it is in the public interest to do so: Khela at para 14 ; Mercredi v Saskatoon Provincial Correctional Centre , 2019 SKCA 86 at para 23 , [2020] 4 WWR 212. [ 98 ] The Chambers judge addressed this discretion at paragraph 6(

h) of her decision where she indicated “I am not satisfied there is a live issue and decline to exercise my discretion to determine the application as I view it as theoretical”. While the Chambers judge did not elaborate on her reasons for refusing to exercise her discretion, it is evident that Mr. Cannon’s application was destined to fail as he had not served the respondents and they had not been given an opportunity to respond. Further, Mr. Cannon had included in his application a number of complaints that he wanted investigated, including allegations of conspiracy, terrorism and torture.

Those matters were not properly included in the habeas corpus application, nor were they substantiated by the evidence he had adduced. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Chambers judge erred by refusing to hear the moot application as Mr. Cannon had not established that it was in the public interest to do so. F. Did the Chambers judge err by shifting the burden of proof to Mr. Cannon to establish that the named individuals were wrongfully deprived of their liberty? G.

Did the Chambers judge err in determining the four named individuals were not unlawfully detained? [ 99 ] Issues F and G both relate to what Mr. Cannon needed to establish to be successful in his habeas corpus application and, accordingly, it is appropriate to deal with those two issues together. [ 100 ] As this Court has determined the Chambers judge did not err by concluding Mr. Cannon’s habeas corpus application was moot, it is unnecessary to address these two grounds of appeal. IX. COSTS [ 101 ] In addressing the issue of costs, it is important to consider the appropriateness of Mr.

Cannon naming 41 respondents in his notice of appeal. [ 102 ] A habeas corpus application should be directed to the person(

s) or the state authority who actually apprehended, detained or

deprived an individual of their liberty. It commands them to bring the detainee before the court to provide evidence. As already pointed out, the Charter , and in this case, s. 10(

c) thereof, is not meant to be a sword against private individuals, organizations or corporations. Rather, the Charter is concerned with state interference of individual rights. As such, the only proper respondents to Mr. Cannon’s application were the RCMP, the SHA, the PHA, the Saskatchewan hospital and the BUH. The evidence does not support that any of the other respondents had anything to do with the alleged deprivation of Mr. Richardson’s or Kaysha’s liberty. While Mr.

Cannon asserts those respondents are guilty of conspiracy, torture and terrorism, he failed to connect their alleged actions to the detentions in issue. [ 103 ] The remaining 36 respondents, other than the Court of Queen’s Bench which neither appeared nor filed material on the appeal, have been put to considerable expense to retain counsel, file material and argue the appeal. Mr. Cannon’s allegations are extremely serious and include corruption, criminal negligence, conspiracy, terrorism and torture. The appeal hearing itself lasted more than four hours.

All the respondents who appeared are seeking costs against Mr. Cannon with the exception of the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. Several of the respondents have requested solicitor-client costs, contending Mr. Cannon’s appeal, which involved them, was vexatious, frivolous and an abuse of process. [ 104 ] Mr. Cannon, on the other hand, opposes any award of costs against him. He views such awards as “punishment” when all he was trying to do was his “Christian duty”. [ 105 ] Whether costs should be awarded rests with the discretion of the Court.

Rule 52 of The Court of Appeal Rules states: “The court may make any order as to the costs of an appeal…that it considers appropriate”. [ 106 ] In British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Okanagan Indian Band , 2003 SCC 71 , [2003] 3 SCR 371, LeBel J. identified the purposes of a costs award, namely (

a) to indemnify the successful party; (

b) to encourage settlement; (

c) to prevent frivolous or vexatious litigation; (

d) to sanction behaviour that increases the duration and expense of litigation; (

e) to ensure the justice system works fairly and efficiently; and (

f) to promote access to justice.

Costs awards that are excessive or too punitive may result in litigants of modest means being denied access to justice. [ 107 ] The factors to be considered in determining whether an award of costs should be made include things such as the result of the proceedings; the amount claimed and recovered or the importance of the issues involved; the complexity of the proceedings; the conduct of the parties that tends to either shorten or extend the proceedings; any unreasonable conduct by a party in advancing their claim; the existence of offers of settlement; and whether the proceedings or any steps associated therewith were frivolous, vexatious or constituted an abuse of process. [ 108 ] Mr.

Cannon was unsuccessful in his appeal which would generally warrant an order for costs being made against him. In addition, a number of the respondents seek solicitor-client costs on the basis that they were improperly added to the litigation as they had nothing to do with the alleged detentions. This Court has some sympathy for their position. In our view, however, given the number of respondents, orders for solicitor-client costs would result in an excessive and crippling costs award. [ 109 ] Mr. Cannon is self-represented. We accept that his motives for bringing the application were well intended.

Where he went wrong was in adding almost every person or organization that came into contact with him, Mr. Richardson, or Kaysha as respondents, and alleging, without any concrete proof, that those individuals or organizations were part of conspiracies aimed at terrorising and torturing Mr. Richardson and his daughters. Mr. Cannon’s application for habeas corpus became lost in a myriad of allegations against anyone who was involved with Mr. Richardson, his daughters or D.S.R. Karis during the time relevant to the application.

This included a judge of the Provincial Court, judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench, APEGS, and other named individuals who were merely doing their jobs. As stated by Slatter J.A. in R v Latham , 2018 ABCA 308 at para 7 , habeas corpus “is a limited remedy designed to address wrongful detentions and loss of liberty only. It is not available as of right for any type of dispute that a person chooses to raise, just because that person is detained”. [ 110 ] Mr. Cannon’s approach to the Chambers application and this appeal was not legally sound and the respondents have paid a significant price for his actions.

In the circumstances, an award of costs is in order. [ 111 ] Mr. Cannon shall pay costs of this appeal to the respondents other than the Attorney General of Saskatchewan who seeks no costs and the Court of Queen’s Bench which did not appear or file materials. The costs are fixed at $12,000 and are to be paid forthwith. They are to be distributed amongst the respondents as follows: (

a) The Attorney General of Canada – $2,000; (

b) Respondents represented by McDougall Gauley LLP – $2,000; (

c) Respondents represented by McKercher LLP – $2,000; (

d) Respondents represented by Olive Waller Zinkhan & Waller LLP – $2,000; (

e) Respondents represented by Matrix Law Group – $2,000; and (

f) Respondents represented by Griffin Toews Maddigan – $2,000. X. CONCLUSION [ 112 ] Mr. Cannon’s application to adduce fresh evidence is dismissed. [ 113 ] The Court declines to hear Mr. Cannon’s notice of constitutional questions. [ 114 ] Mr. Cannon’s appeal is dismissed.

[ 115 ] Mr. Cannon shall forthwith pay to the respondents (other than the Attorney General of Saskatchewan and the Court of Queen’s Bench), costs fixed at $12,000. Those costs shall be distributed amongst the respondents in accordance with paragraph 111 of this judgment. “Jackson J.A.” Jackson J.A. “Ryan-Froslie J.A.” Ryan-Froslie J.A. “Barrington-Foote J.A.” Barrington-Foote J.A.