Richardson v Richardson, 2022 SKCA 142

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Citation: Richardson v Richardson , 2022 SKCA 142 Date: 2022-12-09 Docket: CACV3745 Between: Dale Richardson Appellant (Respondent) And Kimberley Richardson Respondent (Petitioner) Docket: CACV3798 Between: Dale James Richardson Appellant (Respondent) And Kimberley Anne Richardson Respondent (Petitioner) Docket: CACV4048 Between: Dale J. Richardson Applicant/Appellant (Respondent) And Kimberley Anne Richardson Respondent/Respondent (Petitioner) Before: Richards C.J.S., Schwann and McCreary JJ.A.

Disposition: Order made pursuant to Rule 46.2(1) of The Court of Appeal Rules Written reasons by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards In concurrence: The Honourable Madam Justice Schwann The Honourable Madam Justice McCreary Application heard: November 3, 2022 Counsel: Dale Richardson appearing on his own behalf Richards C.J.S. I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Dale Richardson has been determined to be a “vexatious litigant” by the Federal Court and tight limits have been imposed on his right to access the Federal Court of Appeal. In Alberta, Mr.

Richardson has been found to have engaged in a pattern of aggressive and abusive litigation that warranted the imposition of significant gatekeeping safeguards to control and limit his activities in the Court of King’s Bench. Mr. Richardson has also commenced many proceedings in this Court. Those that have been resolved have been determined to be without merit. [ 2 ] On October 3, 2022, the Registrar of this Court made a request, pursuant to Rule 46.2(1) of The Court of Appeal Rules [ Rules ], that the Court consider whether Mr.

Richardson has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings in the Court of Appeal such that the Court should make an order prohibiting the commencement of proceedings without leave of the Court or a judge”. This decision is written in response to that request. [ 3 ] I have no difficulty concluding that an order of the sort contemplated by Rule 46.2(1) should be made. Mr. Richardson has persistently commenced and prosecuted proceedings in this Court that are frivolous, vexatious and abusive. Mr.

Richardson has a right to bring matters before the Court but, that said, it is obvious that significant constraints must be placed on his conduct in order to protect other litigants, the Court and Court staff from his misuse of the litigation process. II. BACKGROUND [ 4 ] To set the context for the Registrar’s request pursuant to Rule 46.2(1), it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the various proceedings that Mr. Richardson has commenced in this Court.

A. CACV3745 – Dale Richardson v Kimberley Richardson [ 5 ] Court file CACV3745 was grounded in a December 11, 2020, fiat of Zuk J. wherein he declined to vary an interim parenting order and directed that Mr. Richardson pay child support to his now former spouse, Kimberley Richardson. The key developments with respect to this file are as follows: (

a) December 15, 2020: Mr. Richardson filed a ten-page notice of appeal. (

b) February 9, 2021: Mr. Richardson filed a 22-page “Motion for Writ of Certiorari” [First Application]. It was aimed at, among other things, overturning parenting orders made by the Court of Queen’s Bench. The motion made a variety of unsupported allegations about violations of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and was supported by 964 pages of affidavits and other materials. The motion also appeared to take issue with the way in which a mental health warrant involving Mr. Richardson had been issued and executed in July of 2020. (

c) February 18, 2021: Mr. Richardson filed a 50-page “Ex Parte Motion for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition” [Second Application]. It was accompanied by 254 pages of affidavits and other materials. The motion raised unsupported allegations of terrorist activity on the part of a wide range of actors including judges of this Court and the Court of Queen’s Bench, Saskatchewan Health Authority, Ms. Richardson’s law firm, and the freemasons. By way of relief, the motion sought, among other things, to have the activities of the Court of Queen’s Bench, and so-called rogue agents of Innovation Credit Union, referred to Parliament. (

d) March 8, 2021: Justice Kalmakoff, in Chambers, dismissed both the First Application and the Second Application. He ordered that Mr. Richardson pay Ms. Richardson costs in the amount of $1,500. (

e) March 11, 2021: Mr. Richardson filed a 55-page application styled as “Appeal of the Orders of Justice J. Kalmakoff” [Third Application] wherein he requested an order setting aside Kalmakoff J.A.’s decision and granting the orders sought by him in the First Application and the Second Application. The Third Application was supported by 114 pages of affidavits and exhibits. On the same day, Mr. Richardson also filed a 5-page “Application for Dispensing With Service Without Notice” [Fourth Application]. The Fourth Application was accompanied by the 55-page Third Application and the same 114 pages of affidavits and exhibits that had been filed in support of the Third Application. (

f) April 9, 2021: The Court dismissed the Third Application by way of a written decision. In so doing, it framed matters procedurally in Mr. Richardson’s favour by characterizing the Third Application as having been brought pursuant to s. 20(3) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 , SS 2000, c C-42.1 , i.e., it treated the proceeding as an application to vary or discharge an order made by a judge in Chambers. The Court found it was therefore unnecessary to consider the Fourth Application. (

g) January 31, 2022: Mr. Richardson filed a 17-page written argument and a two-volume appeal book. As per its usual practice, the Registry issued a receipt documenting the payment of the fees associated with these filings. A very involved series of exchanges with the Registrar followed because in CACV3798, an appeal from a decision of Hildebrandt J. filed on March 19, 2021, Mr. Richardson insisted on treating DSR Karis Consulting Inc. as the appellant even though that corporation had not been a party to the proceedings before Hildebrandt J. All of this ultimately led to Mr.

Richardson demanding the refund of his filing fees. As a result, the written arguments and appeal book in both CACV3798 and CACV3745 were returned to Mr. Richardson. In returning them, the Registrar reminded Mr. Richardson of his obligation to move the appeals forward and warned that failure to diligently prosecute the appeals could lead to their dismissal for want of prosecution. (

h) February 16, 2022: Mr. Richardson filed a 17-page written argument and a two-volume appeal book, and paid the requisite filing fees. Emails were then exchanged with Registry staff because Mr. Richardson was displeased with the information contained in the filing fee receipt. (

i) February 17, 2022: At his request, the filing fee for this appeal was refunded to Mr. Richardson. (

j) March 9, 2022: A prehearing conference was held. It was aimed at determining the status of the appeal and Mr. Richardson’s plans going forward. He advised that he did not intend to advance the appeal until he had received what he described as a “protective order” from the Alberta courts. (

k) April 28, 2022: The Supreme Court denied Mr. Richardson’s application for leave to appeal this Court’s decision of April 9, 2021. (

l) September 27, 2022: A show cause notice was sent to Mr. Richardson. (

m) November 18, 2022: The Court dismissed Mr. Richardson’s appeal on the basis that he had failed to show cause why he should be allowed to pursue it. B. CACV3798 – Dale James Richardson v Kimberley Anne Richardson [ 6 ] Court file CACV3798 was rooted in a February 19, 2021, decision by Hildebrandt J. wherein she directed the Registrar of Titles to transfer the title of the Richardsons’ family home to its purchasers. The essential aspects of the proceedings under this file can be summarized as follows: (

a) March 19, 2021: Mr. Richardson filed a six-page notice of appeal. (

b) March 23, 2021: Mr. Richardson filed a seven-page application [Fifth Application] to impose a stay with respect to Hildebrandt J.’s decision. Other than a draft order, no supporting materials were placed before the Court. On the same day, Mr. Richardson also filed a 79-page application for prerogative relief. It was accompanied by 219 pages of affidavit and other materials.

Mr. Richardson was advised that the prerogative relief application would be scheduled to be heard with the appeal proper. (

c) March 29, 2021: Mr. Richardson’s stay application was dismissed by Schwann J.A. (

d) January 31, 2022: Mr. Richardson filed a 17-page written argument and a two-volume appeal book. He insisted that the receipt for the filing fee show DSR Karis Consulting Inc. as the appellant, even though that corporation was not a party in the proceedings before Hildebrandt J. (

e) February 3, 2022: Mr. Richardson’s filing fee was refunded and his written argument and appeal book were returned to him. The Registrar reminded Mr. Richardson of his obligation to move the appeal forward. (

f) July 14, 2022: Mr. Richardson uploaded a 1-page letter and 19 pages of attachments detailing his position as to why DSR Karis Consulting Inc. should be identified as the appellant in the style of cause and, by extension, why the family home (which was the subject of Hildebrandt J.’s February 19, 2021, order) should be identified as Mr. Richardson’s address for service. (

g) September 27, 2022: A show cause notice was sent to Mr. Richardson. (

h) November 18, 2022: Mr. Richardson’s appeal was dismissed because he had failed to show cause why he should be allowed to pursue it. C. CACV4048 – Dale J. Richardson v Kimberley Anne Richardson [ 7 ] Court file CACV4048 arises out of a July 22, 2022, fiat of Zuk J. that addressed the disposal of six applications. The notice of appeal was filed on July 25, 2022. Since that time, two applications for prerogative relief have been filed by Mr. Richardson. The principal features of these proceedings are set out below: (

a) September 11, 2022: Mr. Richardson filed a 48-page application for prerogative relief [Sixth Application] naming as respondents: (

i) Amy Groothuis, the Registrar of this Court; (ii) “Unknown registrars of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan”; (iii) Justice Zuk; (iv) the Registrar of Titles; and (

v) the Attorney General of Saskatchewan. It was accompanied by 318 pages of affidavits and other materials. The application sought relief in a variety of forms including: (

i) an order directing the Registrar of Titles to deliver information relating to the “fraudulent transfer” of Mr. Richardson’s family home and transferring that property back to him; (ii) an order directing Zuk J. to place certain materials on the Court file and to recuse himself from any matter relating to Mr. Richardson; (iii) an order requiring the Executive Council of Saskatchewan to file and process an “Application for Access for the Return of the Child” dated April 8, 2022; (iv) an order compelling the Registrar to place on the Court record all the documents that Mr. Richardson had attempted to file and recusing herself from any matter relating to Mr. Richardson; (

v) an order compelling the Attorney General of Saskatchewan to provide Mr. Richardson with responses to various access to information requests; (vi) an order prohibiting any registrar of the Court of King’s Bench or this Court from rejecting any document or any evidence submitted by Mr. Richardson; and (vii) an order for “a writ of Certiorari to examine the judicial actions of Justice J. Zuk and any other judge related to this matter”. (

b) September 18, 2022: Mr. Richardson filed a 50-page application for prerogative relief [Seventh Application] identifying as respondents: (

i) Assistant Commissioner Rhonda Blackmore of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; (ii) Jessica Karam; (iii) the Ministry of Health; and (iv) the Saskatchewan Health Authority. It was supported by 320 pages of affidavits and other materials. Mr. Richardson sought a variety of relief including: (

i) an order requiring Assistant Commissioner Blackmore to “issue arrest warrants for every person involved in the torture, criminal negligence, child trafficking and other related complaints in Canada and the United States” and to seize Mr.

Richardson’s family home; (ii) an order requiring the Saskatchewan Health Authority and the Ministry of Health to “end all covid related mandates in the province of Saskatchewan effective immediately”; (iii) an order compelling the Executive Council of Saskatchewan to file and process “the Application for Access for the Return of the Child” dated April 8, 2022; (iv) an order requiring the Registrar of this Court to place all communications with Mr. Richardson on the Court record and to recuse herself from any matter relating to Mr. Richardson; (

v) an order compelling the Attorney General of Saskatchewan to provide Mr. Richardson with all information requested by way of his access to information requests; and (vi) an order prohibiting Assistant Commissioner Blackmore and other members of the RCMP from “interfering with, harassing or torturing” Mr. Richardson. (

c) November 18, 2022: The Court dismissed the Sixth and Seventh Applications on the basis that Mr. Richardson had not established a coherent basis for the relief that he sought. III. ANALYSIS [ 8 ] In considering the Registrar’s request, it is necessary to begin by identifying the approach that the Court should take to the inquiry it has been asked to conduct. That done, I will examine whether Mr. Richardson’s conduct warrants an order restraining his access to the Court. Finally, I will consider the nature of the remedial order that is appropriate here. A.

The approach [ 9 ] Rule 46.2 of the Rules reads as follows: 46.2(1) If, on application of any person or at the request of the registrar made in accordance with Rule 46.3, the court or a judge is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings in the court, the court or a judge may make an order prohibiting the commencement of proceedings without leave of the court or a judge.

(2) Before an order is made under Subrule (1), the person against whom such an order may be made shall be given an opportunity to be heard in accordance with

Part 15.

[ 10 ] A “frivolous” proceeding is one “where it is ‘plain and obvious’ or ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that the claims it advances are ‘groundless and cannot succeed’” ( Yashcheshen v Janssen Inc. , 2022 SKCA 140 at para 20 [ Yashcheshen ], quoting Siemens v Baker , 2019 SKQB 99 at paras 23–25 , [2019] 5 CTC 129. See also: Harpold v Saskatchewan (Corrections and Policing) , 2020 SKCA 98 at para 63 ).

A pleading is vexatious when it is “commenced for an ulterior motive (other than to enforce a true legal claim) or maliciously for the purposes of delay or simply to annoy the defendants” ( Siemens at para 24 ; Yashcheshen at para 20 ). [ 11 ] The feature of Rule 46.2 that allows for what might be called a “vexatious litigant inquiry” to be initiated by the Registrar is new, having come into force only on October 3, 2022.

The balance of the Rule has been in place since 2007. [ 12 ] The recent amendment was considered necessary because it had become apparent that, as things stood, Rule 46.2 did not offer an adequately broad response to the problems posed by vexatious litigants. The Rule assumed that there would always be a person with enough resources and fortitude, and enough at stake, to make an application to bring a vexatious litigant to heel. However, it proved to often be the case that no such person existed.

Sometimes, it can be surmised, the individual or individuals on the receiving end of the vexatious litigation did not have the resources to prosecute an application under the Rule. Alternatively, sometimes such individuals might have been unwilling to take a step that would attract the ire of the vexatious litigant.

Further, in situations where a vexatious litigant did not repeatedly engage the same respondent but instead brought an ongoing series of proceedings against different individuals, no one person had a sufficiently large interest – enough skin in the game – for it to make sense for them to prosecute a proceeding under Rule 46.2(1).

As a result, there were situations where no vexatious litigant proceedings were commenced notwithstanding that the actions of an individual called out for something to be done to rein in their abusive behaviour. [ 13 ] The Registrar, of course, has an excellent frontline view of the activity in the Court and is thereby well positioned to identify those situations where it may be appropriate to somehow constrain the ability of an individual to initiate or pursue proceedings in the Court.

It was determined, therefore, that the Registrar should be given the authority and the responsibility to, in effect, flag situations where a litigant habitually and persistently commences frivolous and vexatious proceedings for the review and consideration of the Court. [ 14 ] The Registrar’s new authority under Rule 46.2(1) is self-evidently a tool to be used sparingly and with care. But, that said, this aspect of the Rule does allow for action to be taken in those cases where a litigant is acting abusively but where no person has stepped forward to seek relief under Rule 46.2(1).

In my view, the Registrar should resort to Rule 46.2(1) when, in their opinion, there is a prima facie case for the Court to find that, as per the Rule itself, a person has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings in the court” and it appears that no person involved in the proceedings can or will initiate an application under the Rule. The Registrar’s present request with respect to Mr.

Richardson and his conduct is a textbook example of when the exercise of the authority under Rule 46.2(1) is appropriate. [ 15 ] Barth v Saskatchewan (Social Services) , 2021 SKCA 41 , [2021] 12 WWR 460 [ Barth ], is the leading decision on Rule 46.2(1) as it read before the recent amendment adding the Registrar into the equation. In Barth , at paragraph 15 , the Court indicated that, when considering an application brought under the Rule, it is appropriate to take account of the following non-exhaustive list of factors: (

a) whether the appellant has brought more than one appeal seeking to determine the same issue; (

b) whether one or more of the appeals discloses no right of appeal (Rule 46.1(1)(b)); (

c) whether one or more of the appeals is manifestly without merit (Rule 46.1(1)(c)); (

d) whether the appellant’s conduct in appealing against a tribunal’s decisions can be considered an abuse of the process of the Court (Rule 46.1(1)(d)); (

e) whether it appears one or more of the appeals was brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of a respondent through multiple proceedings brought for purposes other than the legitimate assertion of a statutory right of appeal or a cause of action; (

f) whether the grounds raised in one appeal tend to be rolled forward into subsequent appeals, where they are repeated or supplemented; (

g) whether the appellant has made accusations against or alleges malfeasance on the part of lawyers who acted for or against the appellant in other proceedings; and (

h) whether the appellant has failed to pay costs orders awarded in favour of parties opposite. [ 16 ] It is obvious that this approach is also applicable when considering a request made by the Registrar under Rule 46.2(1). The substance of the inquiry under the Rule is the same whether it is initiated by an application or by a request from the Registrar. B. Assessment of Mr. Richardson’s actions [ 17 ] An examination of the Court files relating to the numerous proceedings in which Mr. Richardson is or has been involved reveals several themes. [ 18 ] First, the proceedings that Mr.

Richardson has commenced and that have been resolved in this Court to date have been self- evidently without merit in that they have been grounded on such things as unfounded allegations of “torture” and difficult-to-understand concerns about the transmission of the COVID-19 virus. They have featured little if anything by way of a coherent legal or factual basis for the relief sought and all have been readily decided against him. [ 19 ] Second, there is overlap between and among the proceedings commenced by Mr. Richardson and between and among the materials filed in support of them.

For instance, the Sixth Application and the Seventh Application are supported by the same 67-page affidavit sworn by Mr. Richardson. By way of further example, on each of CACV3745, CACV3798 and CACV4048, Mr. Richardson has

filed what he styles as an “Affidavit for Dispensing with Service”. [ 20 ] Third, Mr. Richardson often files prolix and unnecessarily extensive materials in connection with the proceedings that he initiates. For example, and as noted above, his 50-page “Ex Parte Motion for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition” filed February 18, 2021, featured a rambling and disjointed 254 pages of affidavits and other materials, most of which were of no apparent relevance. Mr.

Richardson also mailed to the Court a five-volume report titled “The Engineering of Bioterrorism, Child Trafficking, Treason and the Crime of Aggression Update (A Preliminary Report and Analysis of Risk)”, of some approximately 2,500 pages in length. [ 21 ] Fourth, Mr. Richardson ignores decisions of the Court that are made against him. For example, the Court explained in its decision of April 9, 2021, that it exercises its jurisdiction in relation to prerogative relief only in extraordinary circumstances and dismissed Mr. Richardson’s application on that basis. Mr.

Richardson, undeterred, then proceeded to file the Sixth Application and the Seventh Application. [ 22 ] Fifth, Mr. Richardson habitually makes unsubstantiated allegations of malfeasance against, it would seem, anyone who acts contrary to his perceived interests. This includes judges, court officials, government officials, and counsel acting in opposition to him. [ 23 ] Sixth, it is apparent that Mr. Richardson is commencing proceedings in this Court for the purpose of intimidating and harassing not only Ms. Richardson but also various individuals both in the justice system and outside of it.

In this regard, let me refer to just two of Mr. Richardson’s many emails. First, he wrote in an email dated March 24, 2022, to “the defendants” that “[y]ou can either give me the child back that you stole, or I will continue to bring a legal hell storm in every court that I possibly can”. Second, in an email dated February 17, 2022, Mr. Richardson said, “I am not dealing with your court any more…I am going to ensure every one of you go to prison”. [ 24 ] It is not difficult to conclude that, in light of these six factors and the number of proceedings that he has initiated, Mr.

Richardson has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings” in this Court as per Rule 46.2(1). The various appeals and applications he has advanced have been meritless, largely incoherent, duplicative and overlapping, disrespectful of the Court’s prior decisions and often characterized by unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing. [ 25 ] In addition, I would note that Mr. Richardson’s communications with the Court and personnel in the Registrar’s office are very often aggressive and disrespectful. By way of only three examples: (

a) in an email to the Registrar on March 11, 2021, and copied to over 160 people, Mr. Richardson wrote, “I will not permit you to torture and mentally sodomize me in secret”; (

b) in an email to the Registrar on February 17, 2022, concerning the receipt issued for the payment of the filing fee with respect to his written argument and appeal book, Mr. Richardson wrote, “Every one of you are inflicting torture on me and I am going to ensure everyone of you go to prison and get pulled in front of The Hague”; and (

c) in an email to the Registrar on September 12, 2022, and copied to over 190 people, Mr.

Richardson (referring to himself in the third person) wrote, “The CEO has advised DSR Karis that deception has been used continually to perpetrate crime within the Court and that ‘Court Rules’ have been used to commit the following crimes without limitation, mortgage fraud, concealing, harbouring, facilitating terrorist activity, trafficking of a person under the age of 18 years, criminal negligence causing death, torture, treason, the crime of aggression and the insurrection in the United States by way of infiltration that effected the overthrow of the government of the United States”. [ 26 ] Also, Mr.

Richardson’s inclination to act with or through what might be called litigation proxies should not be overlooked. Those proxies include: his company, DSR Karis Consulting Inc.; his daughter, Kaysha Dery Richardson; his mother, Agatha Richardson; his sister, Astra Richardson-Pereira; and his friend, Robert Cannon. He has done some of that in this Court. For example, Mr. Cannon appealed against the September 10, 2020, Queen’s Bench Chambers decision that dismissed his application for habeas corpus with respect to, among other individuals, Dale Richardson and Kaysha Dery.

See: Cannon v Saskatchewan (Court of Queen’s Bench) , 2021 SKCA 77 . Mr. Richardson’s sister has also emailed the Registry and made demands with respect to what address for service may or may not be used. Just as significantly, Mr. Richardson has a track record in other courts of using proxies and it is therefore entirely reasonable to expect that he will employ that technique more extensively in this Court if restrictions are placed on his personal ability to commence proceedings and so forth. [ 27 ] Having concluded that Mr.

Richardson is a vexatious litigant within the meaning of Rule 46.2(1), I turn to the question of the order that should be made in this case. IV. ORDER [ 28 ] The request from the Registrar asks, as per the wording of Rule 46.2(1), whether, if Mr. Richardson is found to be a vexatious litigant, an order should be made “prohibiting the commencement of proceedings without leave of the court or a judge”.

However, in instances where a person has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings in the court”, the Court’s remedial power is not narrowly limited to making an order regulating the commencement of proceedings. I say this because the Court has an inherent authority to make such orders as are necessary “to protect the proper administration of justice and to prevent an abuse of its process”. See: Barth at para 10 .

It follows that it has the ability to make such order or orders as are necessary to ensure that a litigant does not take inappropriate advantage of its processes, to shield other litigants from improper proceedings and to protect its own staff from abusive behaviour. Any such order should, obviously, be tailored to respond to the particular sorts of problems posed by the vexatious litigant in issue. [ 29 ] Here, an appropriate remedial order must, of course, preserve Mr. Richardson’s right to advance his legitimate interests by way of legal proceedings. But, at the same time, the order must be concerned with: (

a) preventing Mr. Richardson from commencing meritless proceedings and burdening the Court and other parties with such proceedings; (

b) preventing Mr. Richardson from obliging the Court and other litigants to deal with prolix and unnecessary filings and communications; (

c) preventing Mr. Richardson from acting through litigation proxies; and (

d) protecting the Registry staff from threatening and abusive behaviour. The orders recently made by the Federal Court of Appeal and the Alberta Court of King’s Bench are very instructive in this regard and I have drawn on them in fashioning the order set out below. See: Re DSR Karis Consulting Inc. and Dale J. Richardson (filed 2022 October 18) FCA docket 22-A-19; and Richardson v MacDonald , 2022 ABKB 732 .

[ 30 ] I would order as follows: (

a) Dale J. Richardson and those acting as his proxies and agents and those representing his interests, including but not limited to DSR Karis Consulting Inc., Kaysha Dery Richardson, Astra Richardson-Pereira, Agatha Richardson, and Robert Cannon [collectively referred to herein as the Richardson Parties] are all subject to this Order. (

b) No further proceedings shall be commenced in this Court by a Richardson Party except by leave of a judge of the Court. For greater certainty, the Richardson Parties are prohibited from commencing any appeal, interlocutory procedure, review of a decision made in Chambers, or application for prerogative relief, either in their own names or through those representing their interests, except by leave of a judge of this Court and in accordance with the terms of this Order. (

c) Except as otherwise provided for in this Order, when submitting any document(

s) for filing in this Court, whether on an existing court file or with respect to a proposed new proceeding, a Richardson Party must first present a copy of the document to the Registry, prior to service of the document(

s) on the opposing party or parties, and in such case the following process will apply: (

i) The document(

s) submitted for review prior to service and filing shall first be sent by email to caregistrar@sasklawcourts.ca. Neither the email correspondence to which the document(

s) submitted for filing are attached, nor the document(

s) themselves, shall be copied to any other email address and the text of the accompanying email shall be limited to listing the document(

s) being submitted for review prior to filing, without any other information or content. If a Richardson Party fails to provide a copy of the document(

s) to the Registry for review, copies other parties or persons on the email to the Registry, and/or uses abusive, intemperate or scandalous language in their email to the Registry, the document(

s) shall not be reviewed and the Richardson Party shall be so advised by email. For greater clarity, prior to any document(

s) being deemed acceptable for filing by the Registry, no respondent has any legal obligation to accept service of the document(

s) or to review them or provide any response to it (them). (ii) Any document submitted to the Registry for review by a Richardson Party must fully comply with the Rules , must relate directly to the particular proceeding in connection with which it is being submitted, and must be concise. (iii) For any originating document, a Richardson Party must identify the order, judgment or decision appealed from or in issue and describe it with particularity. Any originating document must also be accompanied by a formal application for leave to commence a proceeding that is fully compliant with the Rules .

If this is not done, the document will not be reviewed and the Richardson party shall be so advised by email. (iv) Registry staff will review the document(

s) submitted for filing and advise the Richardson Party, by email, whether the document(

s) is (are) acceptable and may be served on the responding parties and filed with proof of service. The Registry’s email to the Richardson party, and a copy of this Order, shall accompany the document(

s) when they are served on the respondent(

s) by the Richardson Party. Upon receipt of acceptable proof of service, the Registry shall file the document(

s) deemed acceptable, subject to the Richardson Parties’ obligation to pay any resulting filing fee. (

v) In respect of any document submitted to the Registry for review by a Richardson Party, the filing date of the document shall be deemed to be the date it was submitted for review, provided that the document is ultimately approved for filing, served on the other party or parties as prescribed by this Order, and then presented for filing. (vi) If the Registry is in doubt as to whether a document satisfies this Order, the Registry may refer the document to a judge for a ruling on whether the document may be accepted for filing. A Richardson Party will not be a party to any such review.

Where the Registry or a judge determines that a document may not be accepted for filing and the document is rejected, notice of the reason for rejection shall be given by email to the Richardson Party presenting the document to the Registry. (vii) For greater certainty, a Richardson Party shall not file or present for filing a document, report or affidavit that is unreasonably long, repetitious, or that clearly has no bearing to the underlying proceeding before the Court. (

d) Any email communication from a Richardson Party that does not seek to submit a document for filing in accordance with subparagraph (

c) shall be deleted by the Registry unless the Registry concludes that the email communication meets the following preconditions: (

i) It is addressed to the Registry and relates to a procedural question, such as scheduling an outstanding application, or confirming the manner of appearance before the Court, or it otherwise legitimately concerns some other issue relating to the proceeding.

Any such email must not be copied to any other email address except, where appropriate, to the address of opposing counsel, or if a party is unrepresented, to the address of that party; and (ii) It is not offensively worded, is succinct, and does not contain unfounded allegations of improper or scandalous actions by any individual, including but not limited to members of the Court staff or judiciary, opposing counsel, or other parties involved in the proceeding, in which case the email communication from the Richardson Party shall be accepted for filing and put on the Court file. (

e) After the Registry or a judge, as the case may be, has approved a document for filing, the Richardson Party shall file such paper copies as are required by the Rules . No other paper documents of any kind may be filed with the Court by a Richardson Party. (

f) Except as outlined herein, the Richardson Parties are prohibited from conducting proceedings in this Court or dealing with the Registry through other persons or entities. Where the Registrar has reason to believe that a Richardson Party is attempting to access the Court process for Mr. Richardson’s benefit through other persons or entities, the Registrar shall forward all of the relevant information in the possession of the Registry to a judge or the Court and the judge or the Court will consider whether: (

i) proceedings for contempt are warranted against a Richardson Party or anyone assisting them in the violation of this Order;

(ii) this Order should be extended to other persons; and (iii) any proceedings brought in the name of other persons or entities should be summarily dismissed for failing to abide by the Order requiring that leave be granted prior to the Richardson Parties commencing any proceeding in this Court. (

g) In any circumstance where the terms of this Order prescribe an approach or action different than what is provided for by the Rules , this Order prevails. (

h) The Registry staff are at liberty, at any time, to refuse to deal with a Richardson Party in person, by telephone or otherwise, if the Richardson Party engages in rude, insulting, harassing or threatening behaviour or if the Richardson Party seeks to engage with respect to a matter that is not properly before the Court or with respect to an issue that is not properly the subject of dealings with the Registry. [ 31 ] The Registrar shall prepare a formal order giving effect to this decision, without the necessity of obtaining approval as to its form and content from Mr.

Richardson or the other Richardson Parties or other parties involved in their litigation. The Registrar is authorized to send the formal order, along with a copy of this decision, to Mr. Richardson at the email addresses he commonly uses: unity@dsrkarisconsulting.com and dale.richardson@dsrkarisconsulting.com. If that is done, Mr. Richardson and the other Richardson Parties will be deemed to have knowledge of this Order. “Richards C.J.S.” Richards C.J.S. I concur. “Schwann J.A.” Schwann J.A. I concur. “McCreary J.A.” McCreary J.A.