International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2038 Appellant (Applicant) v. Stuart Olson Industrial, 2023 SKCA 115

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV4170 Citation: International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2038 v Stuart Olson Industrial Contractors Inc. , 2023 SKCA 115 Date: 2023-10-25 Between: International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2038 Appellant (Applicant) And Stuart Olson Industrial Constructors Inc., Stuart Olson Inc., Stuart Olson Industrial Inc., Arc Line Construction Ltd., Tartan Canada Corporation and Studon Industrial Inc. Respondents (Respondents) Before: Leurer C.J.S., Tholl and Kalmakoff JJ.A. Disposition: Appeal dismissed Written reasons by: The Honourable Mr.

Justice Kalmakoff In concurrence: The Honourable Chief Justice Leurer The Honourable Mr. Justice Tholl On appeal from: 2023 SKKB 39 , Regina Appeal heard: September 19, 2023 Counsel: Greg Fingas for the Appellant Steve Seiferling for Stuart Olson Industrial Constructors Inc. Thomas Ross, K.C., and Matthew McCarthy for the remaining Respondents Kalmakoff J.A. I.

Introduction [ 1 ] The question raised in this appeal is whether a particular member of a hearing panel [Member] assigned by the Saskatchewan Labour Relations Board [Board] should have participated in the adjudication of a dispute between a union and an employer. The union took the position that the Member ought to have recused himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias. [ 2 ] The Board found that no reasonable apprehension of bias existed, and that the Member could properly participate in the adjudication. A Court of King’s Bench judge, sitting in Chambers, upheld that decision.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2038 [IBEW 2038] contends that the Chambers judge erred in so doing. For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that is the case. I would dismiss the appeal. II. background [ 3 ] Stuart Olson Industrial Constructors Inc. [SOICI] is a multi-trade general contractor involved primarily in the mining and power generation industries.

IBEW 2038 is the certified bargaining agent for a unit of electricians and electrical workers employed by SOICI in Saskatchewan, south of the 51st parallel. [ 4 ] SOICI is a subsidiary of Stuart Olson Inc. [SOI], as are Stuart Olson Industrial Inc., Arc Line Construction Ltd., Tartan Canada Corporation and Studon Industrial Inc. [collectively, the Respondents].

SOICI is the only one of the Respondents that is subject to a collective agreement; the remainder are non-union companies. [ 5 ] In late 2020, IBEW 2038 applied to the Board for a declaration, pursuant to s. 6 - 79 of The Saskatchewan Employment Act , SS 2013, c S-15.1 [ Act ], that the Respondents were a single unionized employer for collective bargaining purposes. [ 6 ] At the hearing before the Board, IBEW 2038 raised a preliminary objection to the involvement of the Member, who had been assigned to hear the case as a “organized employee” representative member of the panel, under s. 6 - 95(1) (

c) of the Act . IBEW 2038 took the position that the Member had a conflict of interest and asked that he recuse himself from hearing the matter, due to a reasonable apprehension of bias. [ 7 ] IBEW 2038’s objection to the involvement of the Member was premised on the fact that he was employed as the Regional Director and Training Director of the Construction Workers Union, CLAC Local 151 [CLAC 151]. [ 8 ] IBEW 2038 took the view that the Member’s role with CLAC 151 created a reasonable apprehension of bias on two bases.

First, it alleged that a different union, CLAC Local 63, is the certified bargaining agent in Alberta for construction carpenters and labourers employed by two separate companies that are affiliated with the Respondents: Stuart Olson Services Ltd. and Tartan Industrial Services Ltd.

IBEW 2038 contended that the nature of the Member’s employment with an associated Local of CLAC meant that he had an interest in the fortunes of companies affiliated with the Respondents and, because of that, a reasonable observer would be concerned that he would be unable to decide the case fairly. [ 9 ] Second, IBEW 2038 asserted that, in the course of his employment with CLAC 151, the Member had shown open hostility

toward the building trades. In particular, IBEW 2038 referred to a 2018 action before the Board, in which CLAC 151 had applied for acertification of a bargaining unit of employees at Ledcor Industrial Limited [Ledcor] in Saskatoon. The Saskatchewan Building TradesCouncil [SBTC] sought status as an intervenor in that certification application. CLAC 151 opposed SBTC’s application.

As part of its casefor opposing SBTC’s intervenor application, CLAC 151 filed a Reply, in which the Member, in his role as an employee of CLAC 151,swore that, as far as CLAC 151 was aware, “neither Ledcor nor any of its affiliated corporations [had] bargaining relationships with thebuilding trade unions in Saskatchewan”.

The Member also took issue with the fact that the Board’s Executive Coordinator had providednotice of CLAC 151’s certification application to the President of IBEW 2038 and several other parties that he viewed as having “nodirect or apparent connection to the Certification Application” given Ledcor’s lack of relationship with the building trade unions inSaskatchewan. In the Reply, the Member also expressed the view that SBTC should not be granted intervenor status because it was a“complete stranger to the Certification Application” and that it lacked “any direct, exceptional or public interest” in its outcome.

TheMember went on to describe SBTC as a “fierce competitor” of CLAC 151 and suggested that SBTC’s application for intervenor status wasan effort on its part to “meddle, interfere and undermine CLAC 151’s organizing efforts”. [10] Based on all of this, IBEW 2038 asserted that a reasonable person would conclude that the Member possessed an animustowards it that gave rise to a concern that he would not decide the issues raised by the common employer application fairly. [11] The Board rejected IBEW 2038’s request for recusal and determined that it was appropriate for the Member to participate inthe hearing and the decision (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2038 v Stuart Olson Industrial Contractors Inc., (SK LRB) [Board Decision]).

It gave the following reasons for doing so: [11] First, the test to be applied on an application for recusal considers what an informed person, viewing the matter realistically andpractically – and having thought the matter through – would conclude: Lalonde v United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners ofAmerica, Local 1985, (SK LRB) [Lalonde]; Jans Estate v Jans, 2020 SKCA 61 . Is it more likely than notthat the decision-maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide the matter fairly?

In Lalonde, the Board adopted thepractice of having the issue determined by the entire panel, as the Board has done here. [12] Whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias is a question of fact, and it is necessary to examine the circumstances incontext. The test is an objective one and the threshold for finding real or perceived bias is high. Mere suspicion, surmise or conjecture isnot enough.

While outright animosity between a decision-maker and a party to a proceeding may raise a reasonable apprehension of bias,it will not necessarily do so. [13] In our view, [IBEW 2038]’s allegations did not raise an apprehension of bias from the perspective of a reasonably well-informed,right-minded person viewing the matter realistically and practically, with an understanding of the complexity of the issues and the context.First, CLAC has certification orders in Alberta for two affiliated entities.

Neither of those entities are parties to the current matter.Although [IBEW 2038]’s application, by its nature puts in issue the related or associated nature of various entities, it has not includedthese affiliates in its application and there is no indication that these affiliates, and the Alberta local, have a nexus with the factualcircumstances as outlined in the application. [14] Second, before entering the duties of office, every board member shall take the prescribed oath or affirmation, pursuant to section6-93 of the Act.

Members are subject to a conflict of interest policy which recognizes the members’ inherent representative capacity, andthe expectation that members will bring their labour relations expertise and knowledge to Board proceedings.

Members of the Board havea responsibility to conduct themselves in a manner that does not compromise the Board’s mandate or undermine the public’s confidence inthe members’ ability to discharge their responsibilities properly. [15] Finally, the Board carefully considered the issues that counsel raised in relation to the Member’s association with CLAC and theprior proceeding, and was not persuaded that these concerns involved factual matters which were sufficiently current or specific to theissues in the current case.

Nor did the conflict which was described raise concerns about a reasonable apprehension of bias in respect ofthe Member’s deliberations in this case. [12] The Board also unanimously dismissed IBEW 2038’s application for a “common employer” declaration under s. 6-79 of theAct. [13] IBEW 2038 then applied to what is now the Court of King’s Bench for a judicial review of the Board Decision.

In the hearingbefore the Chambers judge, IBEW 2038 argued that it was unreasonable for the Board to have dismissed its s. 6-79 application, and that ithad incorrectly decided the reasonable apprehension of bias question. [14] The Chambers judge dismissed IBEW 2038’s application.

Applying the framework set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenshipand Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653 [Vavilov], she held that the Board’s decision with respect to the commonemployer question was reasonable, and that the Board had correctly determined that the Member was not required to recuse himself(International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2038 v Stuart Olson Industrial Contractors Inc., 2023 SKKB 39, Regina).

Shegave the following reasons for reaching the latter conclusion: [16] I agree with the Board’s conclusion that the Member’s circumstances, as established on the evidence before the Board, did notgive rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. [17] The Board correctly stated the test to be applied on an application for recusal, citing Lalonde v United Brotherhood of Carpentersand Joiners of America, Local 1985, (Sask LRB), and Jans Estate v Jans, 2020 SKCA 61, 59 ETR (4th) 53.

The testasks whether a reasonable person, properly informed and viewing the circumstances realistically and practically, could conclude that thedecision-maker might be prone to bias: Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v National Energy Board et al., (SCC),[1978] 1 SCR 369 at 372. The bias must be more likely than not, and there must be a real likelihood or probability of bias: AgriumVanscoy Potash Operations v United Steel Workers Local 7552, 2014 SKCA 79 at paras 39–43, 48 and 51, [2014] 8 WWR 629. [18] The Board determined that the evidence did not support a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The key evidence [IBEW 2038]pointed to as raising a reasonable apprehension of bias was a Reply the Member swore in a separate proceeding before the Board in which

he opposed an intervenor application made by the Saskatchewan Building Trades Council [Council]. [IBEW 2038] is a member of theCouncil.

In the Member’s Reply, he referred to the Council as a fierce competitor of his union, CLAC, Local 151 [CLAC 151]. [IBEW2038] also alleged that the fact that another union, CLAC, Local 63 [CLAC 63], was the certified bargaining agent in Alberta of StuartOlson Services Ltd., and Tartan Industrial Services Ltd. – companies that were not a party to [IBEW 2038]’s related employer application– also raised a reasonable apprehension of bias. [19] From my review of the record, nothing in the evidence creates a reasonable apprehension of bias respecting the Member’s role inthis case.

My conclusion is based on the following: (

a) The Member’s statements in his sworn Reply in the unrelated matter were directed at the involvement of the Council as an intervenorin a matter that did not involve any of the parties to [IBEW 2038]’s related employer application; (

b) While [IBEW 2038] is affiliated with the Council, the two entities are separate and distinct. [IBEW 2038] was not a party to theintervenor application in which the Member swore a reply. There was no reasonable suggestion that the Member harbours hostility toward[IBEW] 2038 because he opposed an intervenor application in a different case involving the Council; (

c) Trade union locals are separate legal entities: Fullowka v Pinkerton’s of Canada Ltd., 2010 SCC 5 at paras 113–129, [2010] 1 SCR132. The fact that CLAC 63, a separate entity from CLAC 151, had bargaining rights in Alberta for non-electrical trades is not relevant tohow the Member would deal with [IBEW 2038]’s related employer application in Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan union, CLAC 151,which the Member worked for, had no claim to bargaining rights in respect of any of the respondents; and, (

d) There was no evidence that either the Member, or CLAC 151, had any interest in the related employer application or could benefit inany manner from the outcome of the case. [20] I also note that labour tribunals have different expectations of nominees, such as the Member, than of the board chairs or vice-chairs. Nominees serve on the panel to provide their practical experience, expertise and specialized knowledge, and are not required to bestrictly neutral.

It is understood and accepted that their special expertise and experience is gained by their affiliations or prior history withparties, topics and similar issues in the labour relations sphere: see, for example, Yorkton (City) v Yorkton Professional Fire FightersAssn., Local 1527, 2001 SKCA 128 at paras 39–41, 207 DLR (4th) 651. [21] In this context, and upon my review of the evidence and the relevant law, the Board correctly determined that no reasonableapprehension of bias existed which required the Member to recuse himself from the panel hearing the related employer application. [15] It is from that determination that IBEW 2038 appeals.

It says the Chambers judge should have recognized that the evidencegave rise to a reasonable apprehension of both institutional bias and personal bias on the part of the Member, given the nature of hisemployment and his conduct in the matter involving CLAC 151, Ledcor and the SBTC. III. analysis [16] Generally speaking, in an appeal from a judicial review of a decision of an administrative tribunal, there are two issues. Thefirst is whether the reviewing judge correctly identified the standard of review to be applied to the review of the decision of theadministrative body in question.

The second is whether the judge correctly applied that standard of review (Dr.

Q v College of Physiciansand Surgeons of British Columbia, 2003 SCC 19 at paras 43–44, [2003] 1 SCR 226; Danychuk v University of Regina, 2022 SKCA 146 atpara 26). [17] In this case, the parties agree that the Chambers judge identified the proper standard of review to apply to the Board Decision.That is to say, she recognized that a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of a decision maker amounts to a breach of natural justiceand/or renders a hearing procedurally unfair and, as such, she was required to determine whether the Board had answered that questioncorrectly (see: Vavilov at para 23). [18] In terms of the application of the standard of review, in an appeal of this nature, no deference is owed to the Chambers judge’sconclusions.

In other words, we step into her shoes and review the Board Decision on the same standard that she was required to apply.As I will explain, I reach the same conclusion the Chambers judge reached about the correctness of the Board Decision on the question ofreasonable apprehension of bias, for largely similar reasons. [19] As a starting point, the Board’s reasons demonstrate that it understood the legal test it was to apply in deciding whether theMember was required to recuse himself from the hearing.

In that vein, the Board referred to this Court’s decision in Jans Estate v Jans,2020 SKCA 61, 59 ETR (4th) 53 [Jans], where Tholl J.A. wrote: [127] One of the fundamental principles of the Canadian judicial system is the right of every party to have his or her matter determinedby an impartial judge.

This basic tenet of our legal system was succinctly described in Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45,[2003] 2 SCR 259 [Wewaykum], where the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, stated, “Simply put, public confidence in our legalsystem is rooted in the fundamental belief that those who adjudicate in law must always do so without bias or prejudice and must beperceived to do so” (at para 57). [128] Appellants are not required to demonstrate actual bias in order to succeed in an appeal where a lack of partiality is alleged.

Theyare only required to establish the existence of a reasonable apprehension of bias in order to successfully raise this ground of appeal. Thetest to be applied in evaluating such an allegation was set out by de Grandpré J. in Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (NationalEnergy Board), (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369 (at 394): The proper test to be applied in a matter of this type was correctly expressed by the Court of Appeal.

As already seen by the quotationabove, the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to thequestion and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person,

viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likelythan not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. While de Grandpré J.’s articulation of the test was set out in his dissenting reasons, the majority adopted his formulation.

This expressionof the test has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court and this Court and continues to be utilized when examining whether therewas a reasonable apprehension of bias in relation to a trial judge: R v S.(R.D.), (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 484 atpara 31; Wewaykum at para 60; Albers v Albers, 2013 SKCA 64 at paras 74–75, 387 DLR (4th) 473; Yukon Francophone School Board,Education Area No. 23 v Yukon Territory (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at para 20, [2015] 2 SCR 282; and R v T.F., 2019 SKCA 82 atpara 30 [T.F.]. [20] The legal test for reasonable apprehension of bias, as described in Jans, applies to administrative tribunals just as it does to thecourts, with necessary adjustments for the relevant context, as Richards C.J.S. explained in Agrium Vanscoy Potash Operations v UnitedSteel Workers Local 7552, 2014 SKCA 79, [2014] 8 WWR 629 [Agrium]: [41] Accordingly, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias in this appeal is whether reasonable and right-minded people, apprised ofthe relevant information and viewing the matter realistically and practically, would think it more likely than not that the arbitrator wouldnot fairly decide the remedies issue remitted to her. [42] In making that assessment, it is necessary to bear in mind three other points which emerge from the case law.

The first point isthat, as is typical in the administrative law field, the question of bias is contextual and will depend, among other things, on the nature ofthe decision-maker. See: Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, supra at p. 395; Newfoundland Telephone Co. v.Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623 at pp. 638-639. Second, a meresuspicion of bias, or a mere concern about bias, is not enough to satisfy the test. Bias must be “more likely than not” (Committee forJustice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, supra at p. 394).

There must be “a real likelihood or probability of bias” (R. v. S. (R.D.),supra at para. 112). Third, the “reasonable person” contemplated by the test is an informed person, with knowledge of all of the relevantcircumstances, including relevant traditions of integrity and impartiality. See: R. v.

S. (R.D.), supra at paras. 48 and 111. [21] While the Board did not explicitly cite Agrium in its reasons, I am satisfied from reading the Board Decision as a whole that itwas aware of the need to examine the relevant facts in the labour relations context, and that it understood the onus IBEW 2038 wasrequired to meet to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias. [22] IBEW 2038 contends that the Board, and subsequently the Chambers judge, erred by failing to recognize the institutionalconcerns raised by the fact that the Member’s employer was a party whose interests were indirectly at stake, given the nature of IBEW2038’s common employer application.

This, so the argument goes, is because IBEW 2038 was seeking an order that would expand itsbargaining rights vis-à-vis various companies associated to SOI. IBEW 2038 asserts that because the member was employed by anotherunion (CLAC 151) that was the certified bargaining agent for other entities employed by different subsidiaries of SOI, it could reasonablybe concluded that he (i.e., the Member) had an interest in not seeing IBEW 2038’s bargaining rights further extended.

Coming at this fromanother angle, IBEW 2038 posits that, even though CLAC 151 was not a party to this matter, the evidence demonstrated that CLAC 151was generally adverse in interest to SBTC, an entity with which IBEW 2038 is affiliated. Because of the intricate and interrelated nature ofthe labour relations world, says IBEW 2038, a decision that may benefit it would also indirectly benefit SBTC and thus there was areasonable apprehension that, for this reason, the Member would not decide the case fairly. [23] I am unable to accept this argument.

As a starting point, it ignores the very nature of the administrative decision-makingprocess established under the Act. In that respect, Division 16 of

Part VI of the Act defines and governs the role of the Board. Of particularimportance here, s. 6-95(1), in relevant part, provides as follows with respect to the composition of the panel for matters adjudicated bythe Board: 6-95(1) …[T]he board shall sit in a panel of three members of whom: (

a) one must be the chairperson or a vice-chairperson; (

b) one must be from members appointed to represent employers; and (

c) one must be from members appointed to represent organized employees. [24] On the face of the section, one of the members is to be “appointed to represent employers” (s. 6-95(1)(b), emphasis added).Another is to “represent organized employees” (s. 6-95(1)(c), emphasis added). The purpose of provisions such as these was discussed bythis Court in Yorkton (City) v Yorkton Professional Fire Fighters Assn. Local 1527, 2001 SKCA 128 at paras 21–30 and 39–41, 207 DLR(4th) 651.

Among other things, they ensure that the Board’s panels are composed of persons who bring to the table expertise, experience,and specialized knowledge in the field of labour relations. In other words, the very structure of the Act means that members of the panelsadjudicating matters before the Board may have certain affiliations or prior history with the parties or the issues in dispute.

The fact that apanel, by legislative decree, contains representative decision-makers means that those persons are not expected to be free from influencesand perspectives that might, in a different context, give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The “reasonable and informed person”,from whose perspective the reasonable apprehension of bias question is to be analysed, must be taken as being a person who is aware ofthis structure. [25] A reasonable and informed person would also be aware that members of the Board’s hearing panels have taken an oath oraffirmation binding them to carry out the duties of their office appropriately and that they are subject to a conflict-of-interest policy thatrequires them to refrain from adjudicating matters in which they have a direct interest.

A reasonable apprehension of bias is not establishedsimply because it is possible to identify a scenario in which a representative member of a panel may be seen as having an indirect interestin a matter, or because they may have certain knowledge or preconceptions (see, for example: Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. vNational Energy Board et al., (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369 at 396–397; Bussiere v Grain Services Union (1992), 710 Sask R256 at paras 13–21 (QB); Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public and Private Employees v Memorial University (Fisheriesand Marine Institute), 2017 NLTD(G) 131 at paras 23–42; and Terceira v Labourers International Union of North America, 2014 ONCA

839 at paras 29–35 , 122 OR (3d) 521). [ 26 ] In this case, the Board correctly took all of this into account. It recognized that the mere fact the Member in question had an affiliation to a particular labour union that may have taken a position contrary to an affiliate of IBEW 2038 did not automatically raise a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Board’s reasons demonstrate that it was well aware of the need to examine the facts before it in context, and to filter IBEW 2038’s arguments through the regime established under the Act , including that “[m]embers of the Board have a responsibility to conduct themselves in a manner that does not compromise the Board’s mandate or undermine the public’s confidence in the members’ ability to discharge their responsibilities properly” ( Board Decision at para 14 ).

Importantly, the Board observed that there was no evidence before it that established any factual nexus between IBEW 2038’s common employer application and any of the parties, or the subject matter, implicated in the action concerning SBTC, in which the Member had filed his sworn Reply. I see no factual error in this conclusion and no basis in law to interfere with it. [ 27 ] The second arm of IBEW 2038’s argument is that both the Board and the Chambers judge erred by overlooking what it describes as prominent and troubling evidence of personal bias on the part of the Member.

IBEW 2038 roots this submission in portions of the Reply that the Member swore in the 2018 proceeding that it characterizes as personal attacks on its president, Jeff Sweet, and on the building trades in general. IBEW 2038 describes these statements as being “as stark an example as you can get of a panel member with a sworn opposition to a party”. [ 28 ] With respect, in my view, IBEW 2038’s position rests upon a significant mischaracterization of what the Member actually said in the Reply in question. I see nothing in the Reply that is directed specifically at IBEW 2038 or any of its members.

At most, the Member describes SBTC as a “fierce competitor” of CLAC 151. As is obvious, that comment is not directed at IBEW 2038 or any of its individual members, and to read it as a personal attack, in any sense, strains credulity. [ 29 ] Moreover, as I see it, there is nothing in the Reply that can be reasonably read as evincing a pervasive or continuing hostility on the part of the Member towards IBEW 2038. In that document, the Member was speaking about SBTC’s role in relation to the specific facts of an intervenor application.

Viewed in context, this cannot reasonably be interpreted as a blanket statement of his views regarding SBTC as a whole.

More importantly, in the context of the present case, there is absolutely no basis to view his comments as extending to IBEW 2038. [ 30 ] In short, I am unable to see how the statements the Member made in the unrelated matter between SBTC and Ledcor could lead a reasonable and right-minded person, apprised of the relevant information and viewing the matter realistically and practically, to think that it would be more likely than not that the Member would not fairly decide the issues between IBEW 2038 and the Respondents in this case. The Board viewed it the same way, and I see no error in its conclusion.

I would also reject this arm of IBEW 2038’s argument. IV. conclusion [ 31 ] In sum, I conclude that the Board’s understanding of the law it was to apply in answering the reasonable apprehension of bias question was correct, and I see no error in the way it applied the law to the factual matrix before it. It follows that Chambers judge did not err in upholding the Board Decision. [ 32 ] Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal. [ 33 ] SOICI asserts that enhanced costs are appropriate, given the serious and unfounded nature of IBEW 2038’s claim of bias.

I see no basis to award enhanced costs in the circumstances of this case. Given the outcome of the appeal, I would award one set of costs to SOICI and one set of costs to the remaining Respondents collectively, calculated in the usual way. “Kalmakoff J.A.” Kalmakoff J.A. I concur. “Leurer C.J.S.” Leurer C.J.S. I concur. “Tholl J.A.” Tholl J.A.