Phillips v Vo, 2023 SKCA 20

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV3983 Citation: Phillips v Vo , 2023 SKCA 20 Date: 2023-02-02 Between: Mervin C. Phillips and Phillips Legal Professional Corporation Appellants (Respondents) And Thao Thi Thu Vo and Phu Thanh Vo Respondents (Applicants) Before: Richards C.J.S., Schwann and Kalmakoff JJ.A. Disposition: Appeal allowed Written reasons by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards In concurrence: The Honourable Madam Justice Schwann The Honourable Mr.

Justice Kalmakoff On appeal from: 2022 SKQB 41 , Regina Appeal heard: June 16, 2022 Counsel: Merrilee Rasmussen, K.C., for the Appellants No one appearing for the Respondents Timothy Huber for the Law Society of Saskatchewan Richards C.J.S. I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] Rule 9-34 of The Queen’s Bench Rules governs access to the recordings of proceedings in the Court of King’s Bench. [ 2 ] Relying on Rule 9-34, Mervin Phillips’s professional corporation sought a copy of the audio recording of an assessment hearing. It did so in order that Mr.

Phillips could use the recording to defend himself against Law Society allegations of professional misconduct. [ 3 ] The application was dismissed by a Queen’s Bench judge. Broadly speaking, the judge held that Mr. Phillips had not adequately shown why the recording is necessary to his defence. Mr. Phillips and his corporation now appeal from that decision. [ 4 ] I conclude that the Chambers judge took an improperly restrictive approach to the application of Rule 9-34. As explained below, it follows that this appeal must be allowed. II. RULE 9-34 [ 5 ] It is useful to begin the analysis of Mr.

Phillips’s arguments by setting out Rule 9-34 in its entirety: 9-34(1) In this rule, ‘recording of a proceeding’ means an audio or video recording of a proceeding made by or on behalf of the Court, but does not include a recording made of a chamber application, a pre-trial conference or a case management conference.

(2) Court recordings of chamber applications, pre-trial conferences and case management conferences do not form part of the Court record, and no access to these recordings shall be granted by the Court to any party, lawyer of record, member of the media, or member of the public.

(3) Subject to subsection (4) and to any enactment, rule or order restricting access to a proceeding, no person shall obtain or make a copy of a recording of a proceeding except by order of the Court.

(4) The local registrar may provide a copy of the recording of a proceeding to a lawyer of record who files a request with the Court in Form 9-34A.

(5) Any person, other than a lawyer of record, seeking a copy of the recording of a proceeding must file an application with the Court in Form 9-34B.

(6) On receipt of an application pursuant to subrule (5), the Court may do any of the following: (

a) require that notice of the application be given to the other parties to the proceeding or to other interested persons; (

b) set the matter down for a hearing; (

c) grant the application, on any terms and conditions that the Court may direct; (

d) dismiss the application.

(7) An order granting a request for a copy of the recording of a proceeding shall be in Form 9-34C, with any additional terms and conditions that the Court may direct. [ 6 ] The forms referred to in Rule 9-34(4), (5) and (7) are also important. In the interests of clarity of presentation, I will not reproduce them here. Rather, Forms 9-34A, 9-34B and 9-34C are set out in an appendix to these reasons. III. BACKGROUND [ 7 ] This appeal is rooted in a somewhat involved procedural background. As summarized by the Chambers judge, the main features of that background are as follows: (

a) In 2014, Mr. Phillips’ client, Thao Vo, applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench for an order to assess the legal accounts she had received from Mr. Phillips. (

b) In May of 2014, Ball J. made an order requiring the legal accounts to be assessed by the Local Registrar pursuant to s. 67 of The Legal Profession Act, 1990 , SS 1990-91, c L-10.1 ( Vo v Phillips Legal Professional Corporation , 2014 SKQB 149 , 445 Sask R 260). (

c) An assessment hearing was conducted on December 4, 2014. I will refer to it as the “Hearing”. In May of 2015, the Local Registrar issued a Certificate of Assessment and directed Mr. Phillips to return the sum of $23,501.66 to Ms. Vo. (

d) Mr. Phillips appealed the ruling of the Local Registrar to the Court of Queen’s Bench. In dealing with the appeal, Ball J. ordered a Supplementary Certificate of Assessment in order to resolve some factual issues that had arisen between counsel about what had transpired during the Hearing. In the Supplementary Certificate, the Local Registrar answered a variety of specific questions, including whether she had told counsel that the December 4, 2014, proceeding would be a preliminary meeting, and when the December 4, 2014, proceedings had begun and concluded. Justice Ball dismissed Mr.

Phillips’s appeal after receiving the Supplementary Certificate. In so doing, he built the Local Registrar’s answers into his decision. He ordered solicitor-client costs payable by Mr. Phillips ( Phillips Legal Professional Corporation v Vo , 2015 SKQB 248 , 473 Sask R 48 [ Phillips QB ]). Justice Ball wrote critically of Mr. Phillips’s conduct stating, for example, that his submission with respect to having an opportunity to reconvene the assessment proceedings after the Hearing was “disingenuous at best” (at para 52). (

e) Mr. Phillips then appealed Ball J.’s ruling to this Court. He applied to have the Court order a transcript of the recording of the Hearing so that it could be introduced as fresh evidence. The application was dismissed because the Court was not satisfied that a transcript would assist it in determining whether Ball J. had erred or, given the Supplementary Certificate, in deciding whether the Hearing had been conducted fairly. In response to one aspect of Mr. Phillips’s argument, the Court said this: [94] As an additional argument, Mr.

Phillips submits that because his credibility, and perhaps his professional reputation, is at stake a transcript is necessary. However, this case is not about Mr. Phillips’s professional reputation. It is about the value of his services to Ms. Vo and what is a fair and reasonable bill for those services. Resolution of factual issues in relation to that subject does not compel the production of the recording and preparation of a transcript. Such factual issues were readily resolved by the process used by the Chambers judge. As to how those factual issues affect Mr.

Phillips’s reputation and any Law Society issues that might arise therefrom, that is for another forum and another day. (Emphasis added) (

f) Mr. Phillips’s appeal was dismissed in July of 2017, again with solicitor-client costs payable by him ( Phillips Legal Professional Corporation v Vo , 2017 SKCA 58 , [2017] 12 WWR 779 [ Phillips CA ]). [ 8 ] Following the release of Phillips CA , the Law Society filed a complaint against Mr. Phillips alleging ten counts of professional misconduct. The two counts said to be relevant for present purposes are as follows: 8. [Mr. Phillips] [d]id, in the appeal of the [Ms. Vo] Assessment decision, knowingly assert as true facts when their truth could not reasonably be supported by the evidence; … 10. [Mr.

Phillips] [e]ngaged in frivolous and vexatious litigation tactics in the assessment process and subsequent appeals. IV. THE CHAMBERS PROCEEDING [ 9 ] It is necessary to begin the review of the Chambers proceeding with a word about the parties. The materials filed in connection with the application for a copy of the audio recording of the Hearing, including the notice of application and the draft order, were presented in the name of “Phillips Legal Professional Corporation”.

The style of cause for the Chambers judge’s fiat features only “Phillips Legal Professional Corporation” as being a party but the Chambers judge began the fiat by referring just to Mr. Phillips himself and saying, “Mervin C. Phillips…seeks a copy of the audio recording” (at para 1). Then, in this Court, the notice of appeal, the factum and appeal book filed on the appellant’s side of the case show both Mr. Phillips and his professional corporation as parties. None of this was the subject of any comment or explanation by counsel. [ 10 ] In the circumstances, it seems appropriate that Mr.

Phillips himself be a party to the proceedings and I will therefore go forward on that basis, i.e., on the basis that both Mr. Phillips and his corporation sought a copy of the recording of the Hearing and that both are appellants in this Court. That said, I will make no further mention of the corporation in the discussion that follows and will refer

only to Mr. Phillips. His interests, and those of his corporation, are identical. [11] Mr. Phillips’s application was self-described as being brought “pursuant to Rule 9-34”. The Notice indicated that Mr. Phillipsintended to use a copy of the recording, and a transcript of it prepared by Court Services, “exclusively as evidence in the said Law Societyproceeding”. [12] Mr.

Phillips also filed a draft order, as per Form 9-34C, specifying that he would “use the recording solely and exclusively” forthe purpose of the pending Law Society proceedings and that he would not share the recording with any person except the Law Societyand except as necessary for its use in the disciplinary proceedings. In addition, Mr. Phillips provided the Court with an affidavit whereinhe averred to his understanding that the Law Society intended to rely on Phillips QB and Phillips CA for what he referred to as “primafacie evidence of the allegations that arise from those decisions”.

He confirmed his understanding that he had the onus of displacing thoseallegations. In a separate affidavit, Mr. Phillips advised that he sought a copy of the recording of the Hearing so that he could “respond toand defend [himself] against the charges”. In his written submissions to the Chambers judge, Mr.

Phillips argued that a transcript of theHearing would allow him to “displace” the findings contained in Ball J.’s decision on which the Law Society intended to rely and, by wayof example, explained how a transcript or transcripts would allow him to establish that he had made no misrepresentation in telling Ball J.that the Hearing had lasted no more than 140 minutes. [13] As indicated, the Chambers judge dismissed Mr. Phillips’s application. See: Vo v Phillips Legal Professional Corporation,2022 SKQB 41. He began his decision by summarizing the relevant factual background and reviewing Rule 9-34 and its origins.

In sodoing, he made no reference to the forms that are to be used in applications made pursuant to Rule 9-34. [14] In assessing the merits of Mr. Phillips’s application, the Chambers judge made three main points. First, while acknowledgingMr. Phillips’s right to make full answer and defence to the Law Society’s allegations, he underlined that the statements made in theSupplementary Certificate and in Phillips QB could operate only as prima facie evidence of misconduct and that Mr. Phillips had “theright to contest the allegations and call evidence to challenge or refute the earlier findings” (at para 45).

As a result, the Chambers judgefound that the absence of a transcript would not deprive Mr. Phillips of his right to defend himself. [15] Second, the Chambers judge emphasized that Mr. Phillips had not alleged that the Supplementary Certificate was inaccurateeven though two members of his firm had previously availed themselves of an opportunity to listen to the recording. This meant, in theview of the Chambers judge, that Mr. Phillips had not done or shown enough to warrant production of the recording.

In making this point,the Chambers judge relied on R v Urbanoski (1993), (SK KB), 107 Sask R 316 (QB), a case that had not been referredto him by counsel. [16] Third, and in something of an overlap with the other two points that he had made, the Chambers judge looked in more detail atthe ways that Mr. Phillips had said the recording would be useful to his defence. In this regard, the Chambers judge concluded thatMr. Phillips had not advanced “a sufficient basis…to establish the recording is necessary for him to make full answer and defence” (atpara 70). [17] In the end, the Chambers judge dismissed Mr.

Phillips’s application, saying that Mr. Phillips’s declaration that he needed therecording to defend himself was not enough and that he had failed to show “an appropriate basis, grounded in law and supported byadmissible evidence, for [an order directing the release of a copy of the recording]” (at para 76). V. ANALYSIS [18] Mr. Phillips submits that the Chambers judge committed a variety of errors in coming to the bottom line of his decision.

Moreparticularly, he says the Chambers judge improperly resolved the application on a theory and a related case authority that had not beenreferenced in argument, identified and applied the wrong test for deciding whether a copy of the recording should be released, andmisapprehended or overlooked aspects of the affidavit evidence. I find it necessary to focus only on the second of these submissions. [19] The proper place to start is with Rule 9-34 itself. It has two broad streams. One stream concerns the recordings of a Chambersapplication, pre-trial conference or case management conference.

No access to such recordings is available to anyone – parties, lawyers ofrecord, or members of the public (Rule 9-34(2)). [20] The other stream flowing through Rule 9-34 concerns the recordings of all other proceedings, i.e., recordings of proceedingsmade by or on behalf of the Court, but excluding recordings of a Chambers application, pre-trial conference or case managementconference. Access to such recordings is authorized in accordance with two protocols. [21] The first protocol applies to lawyers of record. They may request a copy of a recording by filing an application in Form 9-34A(Rule 9-34(4)).

That Form requires, among other things, the lawyer to undertake that they will use the recording only for proper purposesin connection with the performance of their duties as counsel. The Local Registrar is given the authority to deal with such requests. [22] The second protocol dealing with access to recordings of proceedings operates with respect to any person other than a lawyer ofrecord, i.e., a party, a member of the media, a member of the public, and so forth. They are required to file an application that will beconsidered by a judge. The application must be in Form 9-34B (Rule 9-34(5)).

It requires the person to specify the purpose for which acopy of the recording is sought, the manner in which they intend to use the copy of the recording, and how long they need the copy of therecording. The part of the Forms that spells out the content of an order authorizing release of a copy of a recording requires the judge, ifthe applicant is a party or a member of the public, to specify that the copy of the recording may only be used for the purposes prescribed inthe order and directing that the person not publish, broadcast, share or copy the recording.

Form 9-34B also requires the person whorequests a copy of a recording to confirm that they have read the order providing for the release of a copy of the recording and toacknowledge their understanding that they may be held in contempt if they do not comply with the terms and conditions of the order. [23] The Chambers judge found that the recording of the Hearing is a “recording of a proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 9-34(1). This, quite properly, is accepted as being correct by both Mr. Phillips and the Law Society.

[24] It follows that Mr. Phillips, not being a lawyer of record with respect to the Hearing, was obliged to apply for a copy of therecording pursuant to Rule 9-34(5) and to do so as per Form 9-34B. This is what he did. [25] With all of that by way of background, I turn to the reasoning of the Chambers judge. In my respectful view, and briefly put, heerred in principle by failing to factor the Forms into his consideration of Rule 9-34(5), and thereby misapprehending how that provision isdesigned to operate. As noted, an application pursuant to Rule 9-34(5) must be made using Form 9-34B.

In relevant part, that formspecifies only that an individual in Mr. Phillips’s position identify the “purposes” for which a copy of a recording is sought, the “manner”in which a copy of the recording will be used, and the length of time for which the copy is required. Notably, there is no requirement foran applicant to provide information as to the importance of the recording with respect to the purpose for which it will be employed or toestablish that a copy of the recording is somehow necessary or essential to the realization of the purpose for which it is sought.

Unlike thesituation with a notice of application brought pursuant to Rule 6-5, there is no anticipation that evidence of some kind will be provided tothe Court. [26] Rather, the scheme of Rule 9-34(5) and the Forms themselves is to the clear effect that a copy of a recording should be releasedif it is sought for an acceptable purpose, if the proposed manner of its use will not be problematic and if its use will be limited to thepurpose in question. This is apparent from three allied facts.

The first, as mentioned, is that there is no requirement for an applicant toindicate how important or necessary a copy of the recording will be to whatever endeavour has led them to make the application. Thesecond is that an applicant must acknowledge they have read the terms and conditions of the draft order and that they may be held incontempt if they do not comply with those terms and conditions.

The third fact is that the prescribed order says the applicant may use thecopy of the recording solely for the identified purpose and may not publish or otherwise make the recording available to other persons.The limited scope of a judge’s mandate in dealing with an application under Rule 9-34 is perhaps underlined by that fact that suchapplications can be made without notice to other possibly interested parties. [27] This appeal concerns only the “purpose” aspect of Form 9-34B, i.e., there is no issue about whether the “manner” in which acopy of the recording would be used by Mr.

Phillips is problematic or about whether the use of the recording would be limited to thepurpose described by Mr. Phillips. [28] With respect to “purpose”, and as indicated above, Mr. Phillips sought a copy of the recording of the Hearing so that he coulduse it in defending himself against the Law Society’s allegations of professional misconduct. There is no suggestion that this was not hisreal or true objective. Further, there can be no doubt that defending against a Law Society proceeding is a purpose that would warrant therelease of a copy of the recording.

In my view, those realities should have been the effective end of the Chambers judge’s inquiry. Rule 9-34(5) and the related Forms did not contemplate him going further, as he did, to examine how important the recording was toMr. Phillips’s defence or to require Mr. Phillips to establish that the recording was necessary to his defence. Those are questions moreproperly left to the Law Society hearing committee in its consideration of the allegations that have been made against Mr. Phillips. [29] It follows, therefore, that the Chambers judge’s rather rigorous inquiry into the extent to which Mr.

Phillips needed a copy ofthe recording in order to defend himself against the Law Society’s allegations was misplaced. Let me note, however, that in coming to thisconclusion, I do not intend to suggest that the question of the relevance of a recording to an applicant’s avowed purpose is something thatcannot be considered by a judge faced with an application under Rule 9-34(5). For example, imagine that Mr. Phillips had represented thathe needed a copy of the recording of the Hearing to defend himself against a charge of driving over the legal speed limit.

In that situation,the Chambers judge would have been entitled to deny the application because there would self-evidently have been no reasonable basis onwhich the recording could have had any bearing on the charge or could have been of assistance to Mr. Phillips in defending against it. But,that is not the case here. Mr. Phillips plans to use the recording of the Hearing to take issue with the aspects of the SupplementaryCertificate dealing with the length of the Hearing and whether the proceedings were represented by the Local Registrar as being in thenature of a preliminary meeting.

He may or may not be successful in convincing the hearing committee on these points but that issomething that remains to be seen. [30] Thus, as for the terms of Rule 9-34(5) and the Forms themselves, the bottom line is this: in circumstances where a copy of arecording is requested so that it may be used in a legal proceeding, including as here the defence of professional discipline charges, aChambers judge should avoid being drawn into a de facto adjudication of matters that will be sorted out in the other proceeding.

So longas it is reasonable to believe that a copy of the recording could be of some relevance in the legal proceeding, the judge should grant theapplication. They should resist making an assessment of how important or necessary the recording will be to the applicant’s case and thengranting access to the recording on the basis of that assessment. [31] All of that said, I also note that, in circumstances such as the one here, the “open court principle” might require a level ofanalysis going beyond what is contemplated by The Queen’s Bench Rules on their face.

The open court principle is to the effect that courthearings and court files are presumptively open to the public. The Supreme Court has instructed that a discretionary limit on this opennessis permissible only when: (

a) openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest; (

b) the order sought is necessary to prevent therisk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent it; and (

c) as a matter of proportionality, the benefitsof the order outweigh its negative effects. See: Sherman Estate v Donovan, 2021 SCC 25 at para 38, 458 DLR (4th) 361 [ShermanEstate].

Thus, if engaged with respect to the exercise of discretionary authority under Rule 9-34(5), the open court principle would requirea judge faced with an application for a copy of a recording to order that the copy be provided unless doing so would pose a serious risk toan important public interest and so forth, as per Sherman Estate. [32] The matters normally seen as engaging the open court principle are ones that exclude the public from a hearing or that limitaccess to a court file by, for example, providing for a sealing order, a publication ban or redactions in a file or decision.

See, for example:Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 SCR 522; R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 SCR 442;Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v New Brunswick (Attorney General), (SCC), [1996] 3 SCR 480. It is therefore notentirely clear whether the principle is engaged by a limitation on access to the recording of a court proceeding where the proceeding itself,as here, was open to the public.

On one hand, it might be argued that recordings extend the principle beyond its boundaries, i.e., beyondthe idea that it is court proceedings and court files that are presumptively open to the public. In addition, it could be contended that,because Mr. Phillips seeks not just access to the recording but also a copy of it, those facts stand even further outside the proper limits ofthe principle.

On the other hand, it could also be contended that access to recordings and copies of recordings should be included withinthe scope of the open court principle because such access would serve to advance public understanding of the work of the courts, and

hence public confidence in them and in the legitimacy of their work, just as does access to hearings themselves. [ 33 ] Unfortunately, the open court principle was not raised before the Chambers judge. He did not consider it and therefore we do not have the benefit of his assessment of its applicability. Further, although Sherman Estate was referenced in Mr. Phillips’s factum, there was no analysis in the submissions of either Mr. Phillips or the Law Society of how the open court principle might operate here.

In all of those circumstances, and because this appeal can be decided without dealing with the open court principle, I choose to do no more than note its possible application and to leave its further consideration to another day and another case. [ 34 ] In the end, therefore, I find that the Chambers judge erred in principle by applying Rule 9-34(5) as if it required him to be persuaded of the efficacy of Mr. Phillips’s proposed use of the recording before a copy of it could be made available to him. VI.

CONCLUSION [ 35 ] I conclude, for the reasons given above, that this appeal must be allowed and an order issued in the form of the draft order filed with the Chambers judge save that both Phillips Legal Professional Corporation and Mr. Phillips himself should be included as parties so as to be bound by the order. [ 36 ] There will be no order with respect to costs because Mr. Phillips has asked in the Relief

section of his factum that “no costs shall be recoverable in relation to this proceeding for or against the Appellants”. “Richards C.J.S.” Richards C.J.S. I concur. “Schwann J.A.” Schwann J.A. I concur. “Kalmakoff J.A.” Kalmakoff J.A. APPENDIX Form 9-34A (Subrule 9-34(4)) COURT FILE NUMBER COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN JUDICIAL CENTRE PLAINTIFF(

S) DEFENDANT(

S) REQUEST BY LAWYER OF RECORD FOR A COPY OF THE RECORDING OF A PROCEEDING TO: The Local Registrar I, , am the lawyer of record for ( party) , and I request a copy of the recording of the proceeding that occurred on ( or that will occur on) , 20  in its entirety or  limited to:

[ specify times or other limiting parameters (example: the testimony of a certain witness) ] As the lawyer of record and as an officer of the Court, I undertake to comply with the following conditions: 1. I will use the recording of the proceeding, and the contents thereof, only for proper purposes in connection with the performance of my duties as counsel in this matter. 2. I will not, except as is necessary and incidental to the performance of my role as counsel in this matter, transcribe, copy or convert to text any of the data contained in the recording of the proceeding. 3.

I will not publish, broadcast, distribute, share, sell or disseminate, in any form or format, any of the data contained in the recording of the proceeding. 4. I will at all times retain possession or control of the data storage device containing the recording of the proceeding, and any copies of the recording, and not permit any persons, other than members of my office or firm acting under my direction, access to the recording or the copies. 5.

When my need for the recording of the proceeding has ended, and in any event within 90 days after my receipt of the same, I will return the data storage device containing the recording of the proceeding, and any copies of the recording, to the local registrar unless I have obtained an order of the Court extending the time that I may retain the data storage device containing the recording of the proceeding.

DATED at , Saskatchewan, this day of , 2 . (signature of lawyer of record) CONTACT INFORMATION AND ADDRESS FOR SERVICE Name of firm: Name of lawyer in charge of file: Address of legal firm: (set out the street address) Telephone number: Fax number (if any) : E-mail address (if any) : Form 9-34B (Subrule 9-34(5)) COURT FILE NUMBER COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN JUDICIAL CENTRE PLAINTIFF(

S) DEFENDANT(

S) APPLICATION WITHOUT NOTICE FOR A COPY OF THE RECORDING OF A PROCEEDING This application is being made without notice Applicant 1. I, , of , Saskatchewan (name of applicant) make this application in my capacity as:  a party to the action  an accredited member of the media  a member of the public  other ( specify ) Copy sought 2. I seek a copy of the recording of the proceeding that occurred on ( or that will occur on) , 20 (select applicable clause)  in its entirety or  limited to: [ specify times or other limiting parameters (example: the testimony of a certain witness) ] Purposes and Manner of Use 3.

I seek a copy of the recording of the proceeding for the following purposes: 4. I intend to use the copy of the recording of the proceeding only in the following manner: 5. I require the copy of the recording of the proceeding for the following length of time: (If the applicant requires more than 90 days, explain why the amount of time requested is needed.) for the following reasons: Draft Order 6. In support of this application, a draft order in Form 9-34C is attached. Applicant’s understanding and promise 7. I have read the attached draft order and understand the terms and conditions set out in the order.

I further understand that I may be held to be in contempt of court if I fail to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the order. 8. If an order is issued granting me a copy of the recording of the proceeding, I will fully comply with the terms and conditions of the order. DATED at , Saskatchewan, this day of , 2 .

(signature of applicant) CONTACT INFORMATION AND ADDRESS FOR SERVICE Name of applicant: Address: (set out the street address) Telephone number: Fax number (if any) : E-mail address (if any) : Form 9-34C (Subrule 9-34(7)) COURT FILE NUMBER COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH FOR SASKATCHEWAN JUDICIAL CENTRE PLAINTIFF(

S) DEFENDANT(

S) ORDER (pursuant to Rule 9-34) Order made this day of , 2 . Before the Honourable in chambers, the day of , 2 . On having read the application of , in their capacity as: The Court orders that: 1. The local registrar may provide the applicant with a data storage device containing a copy of the recording of the following proceeding:

Court Seal recorded on the following date(s): (hereafter referred to as ‘the recording’). 2. The applicant, on accepting receipt of a copy of the recording, shall: (select the applicable paragraph)  (If applicant is an accredited member of the media) (

a) use the recording only to verify the accuracy of reporting done in relation to the proceeding; (

b) not in any manner publish, broadcast or otherwise make available the recording; (

c) not distribute, share, sell or disseminate, in any form or format, the data contained in the recording; (

d) at all times retain possession or control of the data storage device containing the recording, and any copies of the recording, and not permit other persons, other than employees of the applicant’s accredited media outlet acting under the applicant’s direction, access to the recording or the copies; and (

e) return the data storage device and the recording, and any copy made thereof, to the local registrar within 90 days after receipt of the data storage device or such sooner time as the local registrar may direct.  (If applicant is a party to the action or a member of the public) (

a) use the recording solely for the following purpose(s): (

b) not in any manner publish, broadcast, post on the Internet or otherwise make available the recording; (

c) not share the data storage device or the recording with any other person except for the following persons or in the following circumstances: (

d) not make a copy of the data storage device or the recording in any form or format; (

e) not transcribe, convert to text, sell or disseminate, in any form or format, the recording or any part of the recording; and (

f) return the data storage device and the recording to the local registrar within 90 days after receipt of the data storage device or such sooner time as the local registrar may direct. 3. The local registrar shall notify the Court if the applicant is or is alleged to be in contempt of court for failing to comply with any of the terms of this order, and on further direction of the Court, the local registrar shall notify the applicant to attend before the Court to show cause why the applicant should not be declared to be in civil contempt of court. ISSUED at , Saskatchewan, this day of , 2 . Local Registrar