Patel v Saskatchewan Health Authority, 2023 SKCA 93

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV3866 Citation: Patel v Saskatchewan Health Authority , 2023 SKCA 93 Date: 2023-08-11 Between: Dr. Satyam Patel Applicant/Prospective Appellant (Respondent) And The Saskatchewan Health Authority Respondent/Prospective Appellant (Applicant) And The Practitioner Staff Appeals Tribunal Non-party/Prospective Respondent Before: Richards C.J.S., Caldwell and Tholl JJ.A. Disposition: Application dismissed Written reasons by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards In concurrence: The Honourable Mr. Justice Caldwell The Honourable Mr.

Justice Tholl Decision under review: 2021 SKCA 140 , Regina Application heard: January 16, 2023 Counsel: Satyam Patel appearing on his own behalf Scott Spencer and Ryan Kitzul for the Saskatchewan Health Authority Faith Baron for the Practitioner Staff Appeals Tribunal Richards C.J.S. I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The Saskatchewan Health Authority [SHA] applied for an order that Dr. Satyam Patel be prohibited from commencing proceedings in this Court without leave of a judge or the Court. It did so on the basis that Dr.

Patel had, as per Rule 46.2(1) of The Court of Appeal Rules , “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings in the court”. [ 2 ] Justice Kalmakoff, sitting in Chambers, granted the relief requested [Order]. See: Saskatchewan Health Authority v Patel , 2021 SKCA 140 . Dr. Patel now applies, pursuant to s. 20(3) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 , SS 2000, c C-42.1 , to have the Order discharged or varied.

He makes a number of submissions in this regard, including that Kalmakoff J.A. lacked jurisdiction to deal with the SHA’s application. [ 3 ] As explained below, Dr. Patel’s arguments are largely misplaced. However, the Order must nonetheless be narrowed to a degree. II. BACKGROUND [ 4 ] Dr. Patel and the SHA have a long and complicated litigation history. It is rooted in Dr. Patel’s disagreement with the SHA’s decision to suspend his surgical privileges due to quality-of-care concerns. The particulars of this story were canvassed by Kalmakoff J.A. in his decision and, as a result, I need not set them out here.

Suffice it to say that Dr. Patel launched numerous proceedings in what was then the Court of Queen’s Bench and initiated proceedings in this Court that played out through ten separate files. [ 5 ] It was against this background that the SHA applied, under Rule 46.2(1), for an order that Dr. Patel be managed as a vexatious litigant.

Rule 46.2(1) reads as follows: 46.2(1) If, on application of any person or at the request of the registrar made in accordance with Rule 46.3, the court or a judge is satisfied that a person has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced frivolous or vexatious proceedings in the court, the court or a judge may make an order prohibiting the commencement of proceedings without leave of the court or a judge. [ 6 ] In his decision, Kalmakoff J.A. confirmed the legal principles that govern a vexatious litigant application and then undertook a detailed review of the various proceedings initiated by Dr.

Patel in this Court. He went on to apply the considerations identified in Barth v Saskatchewan (Social Services) , 2021 SKCA 41 , [2021] 12 WWR 460 [ Barth ], and concluded as follows: [134] In the final analysis, when all the relevant factors are weighed and considered, I am persuaded that Dr. Patel has taken himself across the line. He has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause commenced and conducted vexatious proceedings in this Court.

He has engaged in a pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of this Court’s process and, as such, an order under Rule 46.2(1) is warranted. [135] Even where Dr. Patel has commenced a proceeding of arguable merit, his conduct during the course of the proceeding has inevitably devolved into that which can be described as vexatious. He has repeatedly complicated proceedings by bringing meritless and improper applications, repeatedly attempted to file inappropriate fresh evidence, repeatedly sought relief that cannot be granted, and

repeatedly accused opposing counsel, members of the Panel, judges, and court officials of improper conduct in the absence of anyevidence to support such accusations. These repeated and unmeritorious actions have caused delay, increased the level of conflict and,undoubtedly, added substantially to the costs incurred by SHA in these matters. In addition to that, Dr. Patel’s actions in this court havecaused the needless expenditure of judicial resources that would otherwise have been available to meet the needs of other litigants.

In lightof all of that, I am satisfied that this case warrants an order under Rule 46.2(1). [7] Justice Kalmakoff reached a bottom line providing, in relevant part, as follows: [136] … (

a) Dr. Satyam Patel is prohibited from commencing any proceedings in this Court without leave of the Court or a judge thereof; (

b) Registry staff are hereby authorized to reject any document Dr. Patel attempts to file in contravention of this order; … III. ANALYSIS [8] Dr. Patel attacks the Order from a number of angles. He submits that: (

a) Kalmakoff J.A. had no authority or jurisdiction tomake it; (

b) he should not have been found to be a vexatious litigant; and (

c) the Order is overly broad. I will deal with each of thesesubmissions in turn. First, however, it is necessary to consider the SHA’s argument that this application should be dismissed because ofDr. Patel’s delay in bringing it. A. The delay issue [9] The SHA contends that Dr. Patel’s application should be dismissed on the basis of undue delay. [10] The key facts relevant to this submission are as follows: (

a) the Order was released on October 29, 2021; (

b) on January 28,2022, Dr. Patel filed an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada; (

c) on March 10, 2022, the Registrar of theSupreme Court wrote to Dr. Patel and advised him that his application for leave may be premature and suggested that he seek legal advice;and (

d) on November 2, 2022, Dr. Patel filed the application under s. 20(3) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 that is now before the Court. [11] Section 20(3) provides that “[a]n order made by a judge in chambers, other than an order granting or denying leave to appeal,may be discharged or varied by the court”. It does not specify a time within which an application to discharge or vary must be brought.See: Patel v Saskatchewan Health Authority, 2022 SKCA 84 at para 16. That said, I agree with the SHA that undue delay can be a reasonfor dismissing an application of this sort.

This is a well-established principle in the realm of discretionary decision-making. See, forexample, Henry v Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board) (1999), (SK CA), 172 DLR (4th) 73 (Sask CA) atpara 80 [Henry]. [12] The factors that bear on whether an application should be dismissed for undue delay have been extensively examined in thejudicial review context. In my opinion, the considerations identified there are also applicable here.

As a result, when assessing whetherthe delay in bringing an application under s. 20(3) is such that it should be dismissed, the factors to be taken into account will normallyinclude, most centrally: (

a) the length of the delay; (

b) any justification offered for the delay; and (

c) the impact of the delay on therespondent or any third party. See: Donald J.M. Brown & The Honourable John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action inCanada, loose-leaf (Rel 2, June 2023) vol 1 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 1998) at §3:41–§3:46. In the specific context of theSaskatchewan Court of King’s Bench Rules, see: Henry. The significance of the Chambers decision that is under review – in this case anorder requiring Dr.

Patel to obtain leave before commencing a proceeding in this Court– should also be taken into account. [13] The delay here, overall, was from October 29, 2021, the date that the Order was released, to November 2, 2022, the date whenDr. Patel filed his application to discharge or vary the Order. This amounts to roughly twelve months in total. The first four months of thatperiod, i.e., from October 29, 2021, to March 10, 2022, are fully explained by the fact that, during this interval, Dr. Patel was attemptingto seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

He has offered no explanation for the part of the delay running from March 10,2022, to the date when he filed his application, November 2, 2022, other than advising by way of an oral submission that he was busyworking and dealing with his other legal files. Dr. Patel’s failure to provide a more complete or formally presented explanation may be, atleast in part, because the delay issue was first raised by the SHA in its factum and, being self-represented, Dr. Patel may not haveunderstood the importance of explaining the delay.

I also note that, significantly, the SHA has not suggested that it has suffered anyprejudice because of the delay. [14] The question of whether Dr. Patel’s application should be dismissed on the basis of undue delay is a close-run thing. However,in view of the importance of the Order and the fact that the delay in issue has caused no prejudice of any kind to the SHA, I am notpersuaded that it should be derailed because of his failure to move more promptly. B. The arguments about jurisdiction [15] Dr.

Patel advances what amounts to a four-tiered argument in support of his contention that Kalmakoff J.A. lacked the authorityto make the Order. [16] First, Dr. Patel submits that Kalmakoff J.A. somehow lost jurisdiction over the vexatious litigant application when he, that isDr. Patel, withdrew his application for leave to appeal in CACV3866. The background relevant to this argument is as follows: (

a) Court ofAppeal file CACV3866 concerned an application by Dr. Patel, filed on August 5, 2021, wherein he sought leave to appeal from a Court ofQueen’s Bench scheduling decision; (

b) on August 13, 2021, the SHA filed its vexatious litigant application under the umbrella ofCACV3866, i.e., using CACV3866 as the Court file number; (

c) on August 25, 2021, Kalmakoff J.A. heard argument on the vexatiouslitigant application and reserved his decision; (

d) on October 7, 2021, Dr. Patel served a notice of abandonment in respect of the

application for leave to appeal that underpinned CACV3866; and (

e) the Order was released on October 29, 2021. Dr. Patel contends that, because he abandoned his leave to appeal application before Kalmakoff J.A. made the Order, the foundation of the vexatious litigant application had disappeared with the result that Kalmakoff J.A. had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. [ 17 ] I see no merit in this argument. The SHA chose to file its vexatious litigant application using the CACV3866 file number. However, the application was effectively freestanding and was not in any way dependent on Dr.

Patel’s leave application under that file number being an active or live issue. [ 18 ] Second, Dr. Patel submits that Kalmakoff J.A. had no jurisdiction to make the Order because The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 says nothing about vexatious litigants and confers no express authority on the Court to make an order of the sort in issue, i.e., an order providing that a litigant must receive the permission of the Court or a judge before initiating a proceeding. In this regard, Dr.

Patel indicates that, in several jurisdictions, the legislation establishing the court of appeal makes specific reference to an authority to deal with vexatious litigants. See, for example: Court of Appeal Act , SBC 2021, c 6 , s 22; Judicature Act , RSNWT 1988, c J-1 , s 21. [ 19 ] I am not persuaded by this line of argument. This is so because, most fundamentally, I see no reason why the authority to manage a vexatious litigant must be conferred by the Legislature through an express provision in a statute. Dr.

Patel suggests, as I understand it, that this is required because of the significance of an order restricting the right of a citizen to commence legal proceedings. This point, however, is not grounded in any cognizable legal principle. It may have some policy-type appeal, but Dr. Patel has not rooted it in the law. [ 20 ] In any event, s. 22 of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 expressly contemplates, and provides for, the judges of this Court making a broad range of rules. In relevant part, it says this: 22 The judges, or a majority of them present at any meeting held for that purpose, may make rules of court: (

a) regulating the practice and procedure relating to all appeals or matters coming before the court, the duties of the officers of the court and, subject to subsection 21(3), the costs of proceedings in the court; … (

f) providing for any other thing that the judges consider expedient for better attaining the ends of justice, advancing the remedies of parties, carrying into effect the provisions of this Act or providing for any subject that is not sufficiently provided for in this Act. [ 21 ]

Section 22(

f) is self-evidently broad enough to authorize the making of Rule 46.2(1). It follows, therefore, that the Order is, in fact, grounded in an authority conferred by the Legislature. That is a full answer to this aspect of Dr. Patel’s argument. As a result, it is not necessary to consider the question of whether the Court has the inherent authority to make a vexatious litigant order regardless of what The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 does or does not say.

That said, I note the helpful analysis of the Court of Appeal of Alberta on this point in Jonsson v Lymer , 2020 ABCA 167 , 448 DLR (4th) 275 [ Jonsson ], and this Court’s observation in Barth at paragraph 10 , to the effect that, prior to Rule 46.2 being adopted, the Court had confirmed that it had inherent jurisdiction to declare litigants vexatious and to the prohibit them from commencing proceedings without leave. [ 22 ] The third tier of Dr.

Patel’s jurisdiction-type argument is that, even if the Court has the authority to make a vexatious litigant order, that authority can be exercised only by the Court itself and not by a single judge of the Court sitting in Chambers. In this regard, Dr. Patel points to s. 20(1) and (2) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 . They read as follows: 20(1) A single judge sitting in chambers may hear and dispose of an application or motion that is incidental to an appeal or matter pending in the court and that does not involve the decision of the appeal on the merits.

(2) A single judge sitting in chambers may hear and dispose of an application for leave to appeal. [ 23 ] The essence of Dr. Patel’s submission, as I understand it, is that s. 20 somehow fully defines the scope of the authority of a judge sitting in Chambers and therefore precludes such a judge from dealing with anything other than matters incidental to an extant appeal and applications for leave to appeal. It follows, according to Dr.

Patel, that a Chambers judge cannot make a decision, like the Order, dealing with a litigant’s ability to bring proceedings yet to be commenced because doing so would go beyond what is incidental to an existing appeal. [ 24 ] This argument is not entirely ill-founded but, ultimately, it must fail.

Section 20 of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 sets out the authority of a Chambers judge to deal with some issues but, in my view, it does not exhaustively prescribe the authority of a judge acting in that capacity.

Section 20 must be read in the context of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 as a whole and, more particularly, it must be read alongside s. 22 . That section, as noted above, anticipates the judges of the Court making rules on a variety of matters including “any other thing that the judges consider expedient for better attaining the ends of justice … or providing for any subject that is not sufficiently provided for in this Act”. It is obvious that a rule falling within the scope of this language could contemplate a Chambers judge exercising authority beyond what is set out in s. 20 .

As a result, I am not persuaded by Dr. Patel’s argument that a Chambers judge has no authority to make a vexatious litigant order. [ 25 ] The fourth and final tier of Dr. Patel’s argument about jurisdiction is that, even if they have the authority to make a vexatious litigant order, a Chambers judge should not exercise that authority because of the significance of a decision restricting access to the Court. This is the sort of authority, he submits, that should only be exercised by the Court itself. I cannot accept this submission. Rule 46.2(1) says what it says.

A judge presented with an application made pursuant to that Rule is entitled, in fact is obliged, to make such order as is warranted by the circumstances at hand. [ 26 ] In

summary, therefore, I am not persuaded that Kalmakoff J.A. lacked the jurisdiction to make the Order. C. The merits of the vexatious litigant determination

[ 27 ] Dr. Patel advances a number of arguments, or makes a number of points, aimed in one way or another at establishing that he should not have been found to be a vexatious litigant. [ 28 ] In dealing with these various concerns, it is important to first confirm the governing standard of review. That standard is deferential. It was described as follows in Mann v Mann , 2022 SKCA 138 : [4] The standard of review applicable here is deferential.

We may interfere with Leurer J.A.’s decision only if he made an error in principle, disregarded or misapprehended [a] material matter of fact or failed to act judicially or rendered a decision so plainly wrong as to amount to an injustice. See: Kowalczyk v Saskatchewan Government Insurance , 2015 SKCA 47 at para 9 . [ 29 ] That said, let me comment briefly on the various points made by Dr. Patel: (

a) Dr. Patel indicates that he has frequently been represented by counsel or that counsel have generally been somehow involved in his proceedings. Building on this, he emphasizes that lawyers have an obligation not to bring frivolous proceedings and attempts to use this fact to suggest that the proceedings he has brought therefore cannot have been frivolous. This is not a compelling point. To begin, counsel appear to have been less present or obvious in Dr. Patel’s proceedings than what I take him to suggest and they have often acted under a limited retainer. Further, as Kalmakoff J.A. found, “[e]ven where Dr.

Patel has commenced a proceeding of arguable merit, his conduct during the course of the proceeding has inevitably devolved into that which can be described as vexatious” (at para 135). (

b) Dr. Patel says that he has never changed counsel in order to obtain an adjournment for strategic reasons. He advises that he has only sought adjournments when advised by counsel that they needed more time to prepare and that, even then, he has often chosen to self-represent in order to avoid delays. I am unable to see the significance of this point because I do not understand Dr. Patel’s changes of counsel to have been part of the reasoning underpinning the Order. (

c) Dr. Patel submits that he has not launched multiple appeals or proceedings over the same issue. I see no merit in this point either. That is because Kalmakoff J.A. carefully examined the question of whether Dr. Patel had brought more than one appeal seeking to determine the same issue. He effectively resolved this consideration in Dr. Patel’s favour by concluding that it could not be seen as “tilting the balance toward making [a vexatious litigant order]” (at para 101). (

d) Dr. Patel stresses the fact that several of the matters he has presented to the Court have been reserved for decision. He argues that, as a result, those proceedings cannot be seen to have been meritless, i.e., a meritless application or appeal would have been dismissed from the bench. This reads far too much into a decision to reserve. The Court can choose not to make a ruling from the bench for many reasons including: (

a) the need to work out how to properly express the reason why an obviously meritless appeal or application is in fact meritless; (

b) the need to confirm a point or authority before disposing of what, all other matters aside, appears to be a meritless submission; or (

c) a desire to relieve litigants of any impression that matters have not been carefully considered by the Court. Further, and in any event, as explained by Kalmakoff J.A. at paragraphs 114–119 of his decision, certain aspects of Dr. Patel’s appeals were manifestly without merit, not because he stood no chance of showing that the Court of Queen’s Bench had erred, but because it was plainly obvious that the relief he sought could not be granted. Dr.

Patel suggests that this was not an appropriate view of the remedies issue in light of Pearlman v University of Saskatchewan (College of Medicine) , 2006 SKCA 105 , 273 DLR (4th) 414. I am unable to see, however, how Pearlman assists Dr. Patel on this front. (

e) Dr. Patel says that, because he withdrew or abandoned his appeal in CACV3866, that proceeding should not be weighed into the vexatious litigant analysis. That matter involved his application for leave to appeal from a Queen’s Bench Chambers decision that had adjourned the hearing date for several of his files due to the unavailability of one of the lawyers. Dr. Patel raised prospective grounds of appeal relating to procedural fairness and also filed a Charter application alleging that the Registrar and the Court of Queen’s Bench had discriminated against him on the basis of race. The fact that Dr.

Patel ultimately abandoned his application for leave to appeal does not mean that this proceeding should or must have been treated as if it had never been launched. In any event, given that the application for leave to appeal was abandoned while Kalmakoff J.A. had the vexatious litigant application under reserve, and that Dr. Patel did not ask that the abandonment be drawn to Kalmakoff J.A.’s attention, I am unable to see any reason here for taking issue with Kalmakoff J.A.’s decision-making. (

f) Dr. Patel stresses that he has paid all of the costs awards that have been made against him. This point also fails to offer a basis for interfering with the Order. Justice Kalmakoff was well aware of this circumstance and specifically noted, at paragraph 133 of his decision, that “[t]here is no evidence that Dr. Patel has failed to pay the costs orders that have been made against him where the orders in question have been taken out”. (

g) Dr. Patel submits that “intent” is a threshold question in a vexatious litigant proceeding and that his only goal has been to get reinstated and move on with his life. He says that he has had no intention to harass the SHA or anyone else. I see nothing in this point either. As Kalmakoff J.A. explained at paragraph 14 of his decision, “[t]he question of whether a proceeding is vexatious is properly resolved by the application of objective rather than subjective standards”. He then went on to conclude that “[n]otwithstanding the obvious and repeated flaws in Dr.

Patel’s approach, I am not persuaded that his purpose has been improper” (at para 129, emphasis in original). In other words, Kalmakoff J.A. did not base his decision on any idea that Dr. Patel had intended to be vexatious. (

h) Dr. Patel contends that he has initiated fewer proceedings than were initiated in other reported cases that he has reviewed where vexatious litigation proceedings have been commenced. This argument cannot succeed. While the number of proceedings initiated by the respondent in a vexatious litigant proceeding is certainly a relevant consideration, the exercise is obviously far more than a simple numbers game, i.e., vexatiousness does not depend on whether some particular number of proceedings has been commenced. As Kalmakoff J.A. indicated in his decision, the vexatious litigant inquiry is a “holistic determination that takes into consideration a variety of factors” (at para 14). (

i) Dr. Patel takes issue with Kalmakoff J.A.’s comments about him having made allegations against judges, court officials and lawyers. He does so by noting that Leurer J.A. recused himself when he raised a concern in CACV3517, CACV3527 and CACV3679 about the fact that Leurer J.A.’s former law firm had acted for the SHA. I am not moved by this submission. Justice Kalmakoff’s concerns went far beyond an arguable reasonable apprehension of bias issue relating to a specific judge in a particular appeal. At paragraph 132 of

his decision, he noted that Dr. Patel had made spurious allegations about the conduct of opposing counsel, launched improper attacks against decision-makers including members of the hearing panel and judges of the Court of Queen’s Bench. (

j) Dr. Patel notes that, in CACV3751 and CACV3752, the SHA took positive steps to become involved in the Queen’s Bench proceedings. He suggests that, as a result, the SHA is in no position to complain about his commencement or conduct of those proceedings. I see no error here on the part of Kalmakoff J.A. Briefly put, appeals CACV3751 and CACV3732 concerned a summons issued by the hearing panel to one of Dr. Patel’s former patients directing that the patient appear before the panel and disclose certain documents to Dr. Patel. The patient applied to the Court of Queen’s Bench to quash the subpoena and Dr.

Patel then applied for an order enforcing it. The Queen’s Bench judge who heard the matter granted the SHA standing to appear and make submissions. The judge ultimately dismissed Dr. Patel’s application, calling it “utterly unnecessary, resulting in unwarranted expense to all the parties” ( Patel v The Practitioners Staff Appeals Tribunal and C.L (30 November 2020) Regina, QBG 1792/2020 (Sask QB)). Dr. Patel then appealed both the decision that gave the SHA standing and the decision that dismissed his application. Those appeals were ultimately quashed ( Patel v Saskatchewan Health Authority , 2021 SKCA 115 ).

I see no reason why those proceedings should not be placed on the vexatious litigant scales. The fact that the SHA took the initiative to become involved in the proceedings in order to protect or advance its interests says nothing about whether those proceedings should be considered in determining if Dr. Patel is a vexatious litigant. [ 30 ] Overall, I am not persuaded that Kalmakoff J.A. erred in making the Order. He identified the controlling legal principles and thoroughly examined Dr. Patel’s conduct before coming to a conclusion. Dr.

Patel would, in effect, have the Court reconsider or remake Kalmakoff J.A.’s reasoning from the ground up. We cannot do this in light of the governing standard of review. D. The breadth of the Order [ 31 ] Dr. Patel contends, by way of a last line of attack, that the Order is unjustifiably broad. This submission is perhaps best seen as having two dimensions. As for the first of these, Dr.

Patel submits that a direction that he obtain leave before commencing a “proceeding” is so wide that it could encompass not just the filing of a notice of appeal but also such things as an application to amend a notice of appeal, an application to request a stay of execution, an application to intervene, and an application to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution. I am not persuaded that any of this is a problem. Dr. Patel’s conduct has been such that Kalmakoff J.A. no doubt deliberately chose language in the Order that would allow the Court to ensure, not just that Dr.

Patel could not launch new appeals without leave, but that his actions within the four corners of existing appeals were also brought under the supervision of the Court. I acknowledge that there might be some uncertainty, at the margins of the Court’s operations, as to what is or is not a “proceeding” but any such difficulty in that regard can be addressed when and if necessary. This is precisely what Caldwell J.A. did in Patel v Saskatchewan Health Authority , 2022 SKCA 114 , where an issue arose as to whether Dr. Patel needed leave to apply for leave to appeal. [ 32 ] The second dimension of Dr.

Patel’s argument about the breadth of the Order relates to the fact that the concerns about his litigation activity are tied exclusively to the ongoing dispute flowing from the suspension of his surgical privileges. Why then, says Dr. Patel, should he have to seek leave if, for example, he might want to appeal a wholly unrelated matter such as a parenting order or a ruling about the breach of a rental agreement or a decision with respect to injuries sustained in an accident? There is considerable merit in this submission. [ 33 ] A decision that limits a citizen’s access to the courts is of obvious significance.

As a result, a judge who makes a vexatious litigant order should adjust the scope of the order to match the nature of the vexatious conduct in issue. This was explained as follows by Ryan-Froslie J.A. in Yashcheshen v Teva Canada Ltd. , 2022 SKCA 49 , [2022] 8 WWR 60: [96] As the principles that underpin vexatious litigant rules and the Fabian factors suggest, vexatious litigant orders should be tailored to address the nature of the abuse in question and to protect the proper administration of justice in the circumstances.

Because such orders affect a litigant’s access to justice they should be directed at the offending conduct. For example, if the litigant’s vexatious proceedings relate to specific defendants, then an order preventing the commencement of further litigation against those defendants without leave may be more appropriate than an order prohibiting the commencement of all legal proceedings without leave.

Similarly, an order that requires a vexatious litigant to obtain leave for all applications, including interlocutory ones, may be unnecessary if the bringing of interlocutory applications has not been a problem in the past. The context in which such orders are sought will clearly impact the breadth of the order made and the nature of the controls it imposes. See also: Jonsson at para 63 . [ 34 ] This means that here, where Dr.

Patel’s litigation activities are all tied back to the suspension of his surgical privileges by the SHA and relate to nothing else, the vexatious litigant order should have been aimed only at proceedings concerned with those issues. This point does not seem to have been raised for the consideration of Kalmakoff J.A. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to give effect to it and to narrow the scope of the Order so that it operates only in relation to the sorts of matters where Dr. Patel’s conduct has been problematic or is likely to be problematic. IV.

CONCLUSION [ 35 ] As indicated, I see no merit in the great majority of the arguments advanced by Dr. Patel. I would, however, narrow the terms of the Order so that paragraph 136(

a) of Kalmakoff J.A.’s decision reads: “Dr. Satyam Patel is prohibited from commencing any proceeding in this Court that is related to, or grounded in or traceable to, the dispute about the suspension of his surgical privileges by the Saskatchewan Health Authority, regardless of whether the Saskatchewan Health Authority is a party thereto, without leave of the Court or a judge thereof”. [ 36 ] Dr. Patel’s application has largely failed. I would grant the SHA costs fixed in the amount of $2,500.00. Given its limited role in this appeal, I would not award costs to the Practitioner Staff Appeals Tribunal. “Richards C.J.S.”

Richards C.J.S. I concur. “Caldwell J.A.” Caldwell J.A. I concur. “Tholl J.A.” Tholl J.A.