Mandziak v Animal Protection Services of Saskatchewan, 2023 SKCA 95

Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan Docket: CACV4009 Citation: Mandziak v Animal Protection Services of Saskatchewan , 2023 SKCA 95 Date: 2023-08-18 Between: Andrew Mandziak Appellant/Respondent on cross-appeal (Applicant) And Animal Protection Services of Saskatchewan Respondent/Appellant on cross-appeal (Defendant) Before: Richards C.J.S., Jackson and Drennan JJ.A.

Disposition: Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed Written reasons by: The Honourable Chief Justice Richards In concurrence: The Honourable Madam Justice Jackson The Honourable Madam Justice Drennan On appeal from: 2022 SKQB 75 , Regina Appeal heard: May 3, 2023 Counsel: W. Timothy Stodalka and Chelsea Fielding for the Appellant Meagan Bortis for the Respondent Richards C.J.S. I. INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] This appeal concerns a dispute between the appellant, Andrew Mandziak, and the respondent, Animal Protection Services of Saskatchewan [Animal Protection]. [ 2 ] Animal Protection seized 135 cattle belonging to Mr.

Mandziak on the basis that they were in distress. They were ultimately sold by Animal Protection at a price that Mr. Mandziak says was well below their value. Animal Protection returned to him the amount yielded by the sale less the expenses it had incurred in seizing the animals. [ 3 ] Mr. Mandziak went to the Court of Queen’s Bench, in part under the appeal provisions of The Animal Protection Act, 2018 , SS 2018, c A-21.2 [ Act ], and in part by way of judicial review proceedings, to contest the actions taken by Animal Protection with respect to the seizure and sale of his stock.

A Queen’s Bench judge dismissed the majority of Mr. Mandziak’s arguments but did accept his request for a declaration that Animal Protection had acted procedurally unfairly with respect to the sale of the cattle. The Chambers judge provided Mr. Mandziak with no relief beyond her finding in this regard. [ 4 ] Mr. Mandziak now appeals to this Court, asking us to confirm that Animal Protection breached his right to procedural fairness when it sold the cattle. He also wants the Court to find various other kinds of legal impropriety in much of what was done by Animal Protection during his dealings with it.

By way of a bottom line, Mr. Mandziak asks the Court to award him damages in the amount of the difference between what the cattle were sold for by Animal Protection and his sense of their value, less the seizure expenses. [ 5 ] Mr. Mandziak’s arguments are not persuasive. He did not seek an award of damages in the Court of Queen’s Bench and, in any event, damages are not available in the context of a judicial review application. As explained below, his appeal must be dismissed. [ 6 ] Animal Protection cross-appeals with respect to the Chambers judge’s finding that it breached Mr.

Mandziak’s right to procedural fairness in the course of selling his cattle. I would also dismiss the cross-appeal. The Chambers judge made no reviewable error in her treatment of that issue. II. THE LEGISLATIVE SCHEME [ 7 ] The Act underpins this appeal. For present purposes, I will do no more than briefly flag the provisions that bear most directly on the arguments advanced by Mr. Mandziak and Animal Protection: (

a) Section 3 imposes an obligation on a person who is responsible for an animal to provide it with food and water sufficient to maintain it in good health. (

b) Section 4 says that no person shall cause or permit an animal to be in distress. (

c) Sections 8 and 9 contemplate the designation of animal protection agencies and the appointment of animal protection officers to enforce and administer the Act . (

d) Section 12 prescribes the circumstances in which an animal protection officer can enter places or premises, without a warrant, for the purpose of enforcing the Act . (

e) Section 13 sets out the authority of an animal protection officer who finds an animal in distress. That authority includes taking custody of the animal and arranging for such things as food, water and medical care.

(f) Section 13(3)(

d) provides that, if the person responsible for the animal is present or can be promptly found, an animal protection officer can order that the person take any corrective action that is necessary to relieve or prevent the animal’s distress. (g) Section 13(9) empowers an animal protection officer to destroy an animal if it is in distress and cannot be relieved of that distress. (

h) Section 14 provides for the issuance of search warrants authorizing an animal protection officer to enter and search places and premises where there are reasonable grounds to believe an animal is, or is likely to be, in distress. (

i) Section 17 sets out the terms and conditions under which an animal in custody may be sold by an animal protection agency. (j) Section 21(1) indicates that a person affected by an order made by an animal protection officer pursuant to clause 13(3)(

d) may appeal to a judge of the Court of King’s Bench, and s. 22 says an appeal may be taken from an order of that Court to the Court of Appeal, on a question of law, within 20 days of the order. [ 8 ] The Animal Protection Regulations, 2018 , RRS c A-21.2, Reg 1 [ Regulations ], should also be noted.

Section 13 thereof specifies the steps that an animal protection agency must take before selling a seized animal. Section 13(10) is worthy of particular note. It says that a person responsible for a seized animal may reclaim it at any time before it is sold by satisfying the animal protection agency that they have complied with any corrective action order and by paying the animal protection agency the expenses incurred with respect to the animal. III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [ 9 ] The factual background of this appeal is established by the affidavits filed in what was then the Court of Queen’s Bench.

The story is somewhat involved but there is no real dispute about the bulk of its essential elements. The Events of June 8 [ 10 ] Mr. Mandziak was 83 years old at the time of the events in issue. He had operated a cattle ranch for his entire working life. [ 11 ] On or about June 8, 2020, Animal Protection received information from a confidential informant that many of Mr. Mandziak’s cattle were thin and in distress. That day, Animal Protection Officer Stacey Greke [APO Greke], who did not yet know Mr. Mandziak’s identity, went to his ranch.

She knocked on the door of his house but it appeared that nobody was home. She then affixed a notice on a nearby fencepost. The notice requested that its recipient contact her within two days to discuss concerns about a violation of the Act . While at the ranch, APO Greke saw about 30 cattle across the road from the house. They appeared to be in good condition. As she was leaving, she saw a dead cow in the pasture just north of the farmyard. [ 12 ] No one contacted APO Greke. On or about June 22, she was able to speak to the confidential informant and was told that Mr.

Mandziak had advised the informant that his cattle had been out of water for two or three days and that he had animals down as a result. The informant also forwarded pictures of Mr. Mandziak’s cattle taken in March, April and June of 2020. The Events of June 23 [ 13 ] APO Greke attended again at Mr. Mandziak’s ranch on June 23, 2020. This time she had with her another animal protection officer and an RCMP officer. APO Greke observed that the notice had been removed from the fencepost but no one answered her knock on the house door.

She then heard what sounded to her like a vehicle south of the house and drove, with her counterparts, to corrals located in that direction. [ 14 ] There were two men, one of whom was Mr. Mandziak, at the corrals. APO Greke saw three cows lying on their sides. They appeared to be dead. On closer inspection, one of them was still alive but foaming at the mouth and a second was still alive but struggling to breathe. The third cow, lying in a feed trough, was in fact dead. APO Greke advised Mr. Mandziak that the two cows in distress had to be euthanized immediately. Mr.

Mandziak disagreed, saying that he had someone coming the next day to do that. Mr. Mandziak also spontaneously offered that the cows had been down two or three days because he was out of water. APO Greke advised Mr. Mandziak at that point to stop talking. She read him the standard form caution and advised him of his right to counsel. [ 15 ] APO Greke then formally seized the two cows that were in distress and the RCMP officer euthanized them by gunshot.

APO Greke took leg samples from the two cows, and the one that was already dead, so that the samples could be sent for necropsies. [ 16 ] From her position by one of the dead cows, APO Greke saw a very thin cow in a cattle squeeze and 12 other very thin cows in the corrals. She advised Mr. Mandziak of her view that his cattle were not in good condition. Mr. Mandziak took issue with this and asked that she look at the whole of his herd before making any decisions. Mr. Mandziak said that he had access to “four sections of land and had cattle on several of these quarters”.

APO Greke asked him for his permission to search the land and Mr. Mandziak executed a written “consent to search” form. [ 17 ] Mr. Mandziak and APO Greke then checked his cattle. The condition of the cattle, in APO Greke’s assessment, ranged from very thin to good. The animals in good condition were out on pasture. The animals in poor condition were in corrals. APO Greke nonetheless had concerns that the pastured animals were not receiving enough feed as the grass was very grazed down. [ 18 ] APO Greke advised Mr.

Mandziak of her views about the condition of his animals but he dismissed them, saying that he would not be purchasing additional feed because it was too expensive. APO Greke averred that he also told her that he did not have access to any other pasture. [ 19 ] Mr. Mandziak advised APO Greke that his veterinarian had been to the ranch to check on two dead cows and had told him that

there was nothing more he could have fed them to prevent their deaths. He then insisted that APO Greke contact the veterinarian, Dr. Leuraunt Trach. On that basis, APO Greke called Dr. Trach and was advised by him that he had attended Mr. Mandziak’s ranch on June 15, 2020, and performed necropsies on two dead cows. Contrary to what Mr. Mandziak had indicated, Dr. Trach advised that one of the animals had been severely impacted in all four stomachs and that the other cow had a mummified calf inside of her. He stated that he had spoken to Mr.

Mandziak and advised him that these two animals appeared to have needed more feed. [ 20 ] APO Greke advised Mr. Mandziak of her conversation with Dr. Trach and said that Mr. Mandziak needed to improve the amount and quality of the feed available to his cattle. She issued Mr. Mandziak a Corrective Action Order [June 23 Order]. It stated that Mr. Mandziak was to have a veterinarian of his choosing come to the ranch and assess the herd within 48 hours and to then follow the veterinarian’s directions.

The June 23 Order also stated that any animals that could not be humanely relieved of their distress had to be euthanized in a timely manner. It further indicated that the conditions specified therein had to be satisfied by June 26, 2020. APO Greke advised Mr. Mandziak that she would be following up with him at that time. The Events of June 26 [ 21 ] Mr. Mandziak averred that, in response to the June 23 Order, he retained Dr. Deana Schenher, a veterinarian from Melville. She prepared a report dated June 25, 2020, that was provided to him on June 26, 2020. It detailed recommendations that included ensuring (

a) animals in corrals have access to green forage, (

b) all animals have access to water at all times, (

c) all animals be provided with salt blocks and mineral supplements, and (

d) bulls not used for breeding be sold. [ 22 ] In the meantime, APO Greke swore an information to obtain a search warrant for Mr. Mandziak’s ranch. She received the warrant on June 26, 2020, and, on that day, again attended at the ranch. She was accompanied by five other animal protection officers and by Dr. Ramdath Changar, a veterinarian, and an RCMP constable. Mr.

Mandziak was initially not at the ranch but was served with a copy of the warrant, and warned and cautioned, when he returned during the noon hour. [ 23 ] APO Greke averred that she and her colleagues observed approximately 400 head of cattle in various corrals and pastures. Many of the animals in the corrals were in poor condition. Some of them were eating fresh-cut alfalfa, which can be dangerous because it causes bloat. In the farmyard, she saw a very thin cow with an injured hip and twin calves that were also very thin. Just northeast of the yard, APO Greke saw a cow, suffering from bloat, go down and die.

At this point, she decided to remove the cattle that were in a green alfalfa field. [ 24 ] APO Greke indicated in her affidavit that there were so many distressed animals that it was difficult to get a thorough overall assessment of the situation before the warrant expired. She issued a notice for the seizure of 135 animals – those in the worst condition – and arranged for them to be transported to a caretaker facility [Seizure Notice]. This included calves, cows and bulls. She said that she would have seized the entire herd if she had possessed the means to do so. The Seizure Notice was addressed to Mr.

Mandziak and stated: You must contact the undersigned Animal Protection Officer within 5 business days (business days – means a day other than Saturday, Sunday or a holiday) of this seizure or above animal(

s) will be disposed of. Animal Protection Services of Saskatchewan has a lien on the above animal(

s) for all expenses incurred with respect to the animal(s). Where the person responsible for an animal(s)… is found he does not within 5 business days after the animal(

s) came into the custody of the Society pay or undertake to pay to the Society within an agreed time the expense properly incurred the Society may sell or give the animal(

s) to any person, or may cause the animal(

s) to be destroyed. (Emphasis in original) It is unclear why the words “the Society” were used in the Seizure Notice but, in any event, Mr. Mandziak and Animal Protection both proceeded on the basis that the seizure costs were payable to Animal Protection. [ 25 ] APO Greke also issued a Corrective Action Order addressed to Mr. Mandziak stating, “you MUST follow ALL veterinarian recommendations provided to you on Friday, June 26, 2020” (emphasis in original) [June 26 Order]. Dr. Changar’s recommendations were appended to the June 26 Order.

They spoke to removing the thin cows from one of the pastures, providing treatment to a lame cow in another pasture, removing animals from the areas where there was access to the green alfalfa, feeding hay (not straw) to the animals in the corrals or letting them out onto grass, sorting the thin bulls from the rest of the animals in the bull pen, and sorting the heifers and bulls and keeping them in separate pens. [ 26 ] Mr. Mandziak averred that, following receipt of Dr. Schenher’s report, he worked with family members to implement her recommendations.

According to his cousin, Cheryl Mandziak, this included the selling of 80 head of cattle to reduce the size of the herd. On July 7, 2020, Mr. Mandziak retained Dr. Trach to look over his operations. Dr. Trach provided a report that, with a limited exception relating to a suspected lice problem for the cows in one pasture, was favourable. He described the pastures as having adequate amounts of grass and water. The Events of July 8 [ 27 ] On July 8, 2020, Dr. Changar and APO Greke returned to Mr. Mandziak’s ranch to reassess the herd. Shortly put, it appeared to APO Greke and Dr. Changar that Mr.

Mandziak had taken the steps necessary to ensure the welfare of his cattle. APO Greke was satisfied that Mr. Mandziak had met the requirements of good animal husbandry and the recommendations of both Dr. Changar and Dr. Schenher. Cheryl Mandziak was at the ranch that day. Her uncontroverted averment is that Animal Protection staff commented favourably on the quality of grass in the pastures and the quality of alfalfa on the ranch. [ 28 ] APO Greke provided Mr. Mandziak with requirements to continue to monitor his animals for signs of illness or injury and to seek veterinary care or euthanize them as needed. Mr.

Mandziak was also instructed to monitor grazing and water sources for the animals on pasture. She then provided a written confirmation that the June 26 Order had been cancelled. Cheryl Mandziak, who was also at the ranch, averred that Animal Protection gave “every indication” that Dr. Schenher’s recommendations had been satisfied. The Sale of the Cattle

[ 29 ] Counsel for Animal Protection sent a letter dated Friday, July 3, 2020, via fax to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel. The letter carries a fax stamp indicating that it was sent on the morning of Monday, July 6, 2020. The letter advised Mr. Mandziak’s counsel that, as of July 3, Animal Protection’s expenses in relation to the seizure of Mr. Mandziak’s cattle totalled $26,718.34. The relevant paragraph of the letter reads as follows: Please find attached hereto an expense sheet setting out the expenses of [Animal Protection] in relation to the seizure.

The total expenses as of today’s date is $26,718 . 34. [Animal Protection] has previously advised Mr . Mandziak that he ha s until today, July 6, 2020 @ 5:00 pm to pay these expenses or the animals that have been seized will become the property of [Animal Protection] and will be sold at auction pur s uant to

section 17 of the Animal Protection Act, 2018 . Should Mr. Mandziak wish to pay these expense s , [Animal Protection] will require verified funds which may be paid to our office in trust. [ 30 ] Cheryl Mandziak averred that, on July 3, 2020, Mr. Mandziak learned that Animal Protection was demanding $26,718.34 to cover seizure expenses. She says that, with Mr. Mandziak’s counsel on the line, she and Mr. Mandziak spoke by telephone with Animal Protection to arrange payment. She indicated that a cheque was sent by courier to Animal Protection on July 7, 2020. This was confirmed by Mr.

Mandziak himself. [ 31 ] By letter dated July 8, 2020, and received by Mr. Mandziak’s counsel on July 10, 2020, Animal Protection’s counsel advised that their office had received a certified cheque in the amount of $24,886.09 from Mr. Mandziak but that the cheque would be returned because “[f]urther to our conversation of yesterday’s date…the position of [Animal Protection] is that the cattle will not be returned”. [ 32 ] On July 10, 2020, Animal Protection’s counsel sent another letter to Mr.

Mandziak’s counsel indicating that the reason the cattle would not be returned was because of a “density issue”, i.e., a concern about the total number of cattle under Mr. Mandziak’s care. The key parts of the letter read as follows: Please be advised that our client has advised that a follow up inspection under the June 26, 2020 Corrective Action Order occurred on Wednesday, June 8, 2020, by consent. [Animal Protection] has advised that Mr. Mandziak has implemented the recommendations of the veterinarian to a satisfactory degree and that the Corrective Action Order issued on the above noted date was cancelled.

I can further advise that it is the position of [Animal Protection] that the 135 head of cattle that were seized June 26, 2020 will not be returned to Mr. Mandziak but will be sold at auction on July 14, 2020. [Animal Protection] has concerns that return of these animals would create a density issue which would result in placing these animals in distress. Upon sale, our office will provide an accounting of expenses and proceeds in due course. IV. MR. MANDZIAK’S APPLICATIONS [ 33 ] Mr. Mandziak responded to the actions of Animal Protection by commencing legal proceedings.

His counsel for that purpose was not the counsel who acts for him on this appeal. [ 34 ] By way of an “originating application” filed on June 30, 2020, he purported to appeal, pursuant to s. 21 of the Act , the June 23 Order and the Seizure Notice, saying that the grounds for the application were that he had been given no opportunity to meet the demands of the June 23 Order and that, contrary to s. 13 of the Act , APO Greke had seized numerous healthy cattle. [ 35 ] Mr. Mandziak then filed what was styled as an “originating application (appeal by motion)” on August 14, 2020.

This was an amended version of the originating application. It was framed as an appeal, pursuant to s. 21 of the Act , of the June 23 Order, the Seizure Notice, and the July 8, 2020, decision of Animal Protection to not return the seized cattle. Although the amended application was not clearly drafted, it appears that Mr. Mandziak sought, by way of relief, to have the Court of Queen’s Bench quash the June 23 Order, the Seizure Notice, and the July 8, 2020 decision not to return the cattle. [ 36 ] On August 25, 2020, Mr.

Mandziak also filed a very involved “amended originating application”, 116 paragraphs in length. It sought orders quashing, or declaring to be in breach of Mr. Mandziak’s rights of procedural fairness, almost every step taken by APO Greke and Animal Protection throughout the full course of their interactions with him. It also sought such things as declarations that s. 12 of the Act is unconstitutional and that Animal Protection’s attendance at Mr. Mandziak’s ranch on June 23, 2020, had been an unreasonable search. In addition, Mr.

Mandziak asked for orders quashing the June 23 and June 26 Orders, the decision to issue a search warrant on June 25, 2020, the notice of seizure dated June 26, 2020, and the decision of Animal Protection not to return his cattle. V. THE DECISION UNDER APPEAL [ 37 ] The Chambers judge began her decision by reviewing the facts in some depth. She then attempted to sort through Mr. Mandziak’s pleadings by pointing out that there were two avenues by which he could have Animal Protection’s actions reviewed. The first was by way of an appeal of the June 23 Order pursuant to s. 21(1) of the Act .

The second was through a judicial review of the actions taken by Animal Protection that were not covered by a right of appeal under the Act . She characterized Mr. Mandziak’s August 14, 2020, amended originating application as being concerned with those latter sorts of actions, i.e., ones that were not subject to appeal but open to judicial review. [ 38 ] Having set the table in this way, the Chambers judge dealt first with the appeal of the June 23 Order. On this front, she rejected Mr.

Mandziak’s suggestion that warrantless searches and inspections were not permitted by the Act , noting that ss. 12 and 14 thereof expressly provide for the warrantless entry of premises other than private dwellings. The Chambers judge went on to also reject Mr. Mandziak’s contention that APO Greke needed a warrant to enter his farmyard on June 8 and June 23, 2020. She saw the June 8, 2020, visit as being concerned only with the initiation of an investigation that APO Greke was statutorily bound to conduct after having received information that Mr. Mandziak’s cattle were in distress.

She viewed that inspection as involving nothing more than APO Greke observing, as she was leaving the ranch, that 30 or so cattle across the road appeared to be in adequate condition.

[ 39 ] The Chambers judge characterized the June 23, 2020, visit to the ranch as an attempt by APO Greke to continue the investigation by speaking to Mr. Mandziak. In her view, the fact that APO Greke travelled further onto Mr. Mandziak’s property, i.e., to the corrals, changed nothing. APO Greke did not enter on Mr. Mandziak’s property for the purpose of obtaining evidence and, once at the corrals, she had acted properly pursuant to s. 14(3) of the Act to end the suffering of the two cows that were down.

The Chambers judge said that, by this point, APO Greke had seen other animals in distress and observed that it was then that Mr. Mandziak gave his written consent for her to search his pastures and check the rest of his herd. She noted there was no evidence that Mr. Mandziak’s consent was not informed and, as a result, she concluded that APO Greke had been entitled to conduct the search. [ 40 ] Dealing further with the June 23 Order, the Chambers judge had no difficulty rejecting Mr. Mandziak’s argument that he should have been told the identity of the anonymous informant. She also rejected an argument that Mr.

Mandziak had been denied procedural fairness in connection with APO Greke’s decision to euthanize the two cows. [ 41 ] The Chambers judge then dealt with Mr. Mandziak’s challenges to the June 26, 2020, seizure of his cattle. She was not moved by his arguments, noting that, although he took issue with the validity of the warrant that APO Greke had obtained, his basis for doing so was unclear. In her assessment, the warrant had been properly issued under s. 14 of the Act and APO Greke had acted validly pursuant to s. 13 of the Act in taking custody of the animals. The Chambers judge also rejected an argument by Mr.

Mandziak to the effect that he had been entitled to have a lawyer present on June 26, 2020, noting that there was little to no evidence tendered on this issue and no indication that Mr. Mandziak had wanted to contact a lawyer. [ 42 ] Next, the Chambers judge considered Mr. Mandziak’s procedural fairness challenge to Animal Protection’s decision not to return his cattle. She found that Mr. Mandziak had reasonably understood that, if he complied with Dr. Schenher’s recommendations as per the June 26 Order, and paid the seizure costs, the cattle would be returned to him.

The Chambers judge also found there was no evidence that anyone ever discussed Dr. Changar’s concerns about the overall number of cattle owned by Mr. Mandziak, i.e., about the density of the herd, and that as a result Mr. Mandziak had been given no chance to address that issue. She concluded that Animal Protection had breached the duty of fairness it owed to Mr.

Mandziak by not according to him an opportunity to respond to the concern about density if the seized cattle were returned and by not giving him a chance to demonstrate that he could sustain the herd if that was done. [ 43 ] The Chambers judge also dealt, in closing, with challenges made by Mr. Mandziak to the constitutional validity of ss. 12 and 14(3) of the Act . She upheld both provisions and, because Mr.

Mandziak does not contest those conclusions on appeal, I will say no more about this issue. [ 44 ] The Chambers judge ended her decision by writing as follows under the heading “Conclusion”: [115] I dismiss the appeal of the June 23 [Order]. [116] I have found that [Animal Protection] owed some degree of procedural fairness to the applicant before deciding not to return the seized animals to him. [Animal Protection] violated their duty to be fair by not advising him that there remained density concerns and not giving him an opportunity to respond to those concerns before selling the animals. [117] The application to have ss. 12 and 14(3) declared unconstitutional is dismissed. [118] All other claims for relief are denied.

The applicant made numerous allegations against [Animal Protection] that they acted in bad faith, were biased and engaged in trickery. The applicant also alleged Dr. Changar was biased. I did not deal with these allegations as there was absolutely no merit to them. [119] The applicant was unsuccessful on the appeal, many of his complaints regarding procedural fairness and the application to have ss. 12 and 14(3) declared unconstitutional [ sic ]. Thus, there will be no order as to costs. VI. ANALYSIS [ 45 ] As indicated above, Mr.

Mandziak appeals the decision of the Chambers judge and Animal Protection cross-appeals from her decision. I will deal with each of their submissions in turn. A. Mr. Mandziak’s appeal [ 46 ] Mr. Mandziak’s appeal is framed around his contention that Animal Protection sold his stock for substantially less than what they were worth. He seeks to be compensated for the difference between the sale price of $84,461 and the value of the cattle, some $350,000 in his estimation, less seizure costs. [ 47 ] In order to get to this bottom line, Mr.

Mandziak’s argument follows a long and twisting road along which he invites the Court to do such things as: (

a) find that the Chambers judge misread Dr. Schenher’s report on the issue of whether the size of his herd should be reduced; (

b) determine that he was denied procedural fairness in relation to the sale of the cattle by way of Animal Protection’s imposition of unrealistically short timelines; (

c) conclude that, when she considered the level of procedural fairness that was owed to him by Animal Protection, the Chambers judge erred by reasoning that his, that is Mr. Mandziak’s, career had not been put at risk by Animal Protection’s decision to sell his cattle; (

d) find that the seizure of his cattle violated the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure found in s. 8 of the Charter ; (

e) determine that APO Greke’s actions on June 23, 2020, amounted to a breach of his s. 8 rights; (

f) hold that the Chambers judge had misapplied the doctrine of the implied right to knock; (

g) find that the Chambers judge erred by concluding he had acted in a voluntary and informed manner when, on June 30, 2020, he had signed the form consenting to a search of his ranch; (

h) conclude that the Chambers judge should have quashed the June 26, 2020, search warrant; and (

i) find that the Chambers judge erred in her assessment of whether circumstances at the time of the seizure of his cattle had been exigent.

[ 48 ] I am unable to understand how or why it is necessary to follow this route. Mr. Mandziak’s objective is to receive more compensation for the loss of the cattle that were seized and sold by Animal Protection. In oral argument, it was confirmed that he does not seek damages under s. 24 of the Charter for how he was treated. Rather, the alleged Charter breaches are said to do no more than support or fold into the idea that his right to procedural fairness, in the administrative law sense, was denied. [ 49 ] Accordingly, expressed in terms of its essentials, Mr.

Mandziak’s submission is that he was denied procedural fairness in connection with the sale of his cattle and that he should be compensated in damages as a result. Given this reality, I fail to see why the Court should be drawn into side trips such as those involving the validity of the search warrant obtained by APO Greke and those dealing with whether Mr. Mandziak’s Charter rights were violated. That is especially so when, as the Court has been advised, charges have been laid against Mr. Mandziak under the Act and the proceedings related to them are being held in abeyance pending the outcome of this appeal.

It would be unwise to make unnecessary rulings with respect to matters that will presumably be live issues in the prosecution. [ 50 ] The fact here is that the Chambers judge has already found that Mr. Mandziak’s entitlement to procedural fairness was breached when his cattle were sold. Mr. Mandziak needs no more than that determination to advance his argument for damages. I therefore respectfully decline to travel down the various legal side streets into which Mr. Mandziak invites the Court. [ 51 ] That point made, let me say that Mr. Mandziak’s appeal faces two fundamental problems.

These relate to the scope and nature of his right of appeal under the Act to the Court of King’s Bench and to this Court, and the unavailability of damages in the context of the present proceedings. Let me explain. 1. The right of appeal [ 52 ] As noted above, the Act expressly provides only for a limited right of appeal. More specifically, s. 21(1) says that a person directly affected by an order made by an animal protection officer pursuant to clause 13(3)(

d) may appeal the order to a judge of the Court of King’s Bench. The only orders of this sort that were made with respect to Mr. Mandziak were the June 23 Order and the June 26 Order. The June 26 Order was cancelled by APO Greke on July 8, 2020, and, therefore, it is not in play. This appears to have been originally appreciated by Mr. Mandziak because, in his originating application dated June 30, 2020, he sought to appeal only “the June 23, 2020 Corrective Action Order” and made no reference to the June 26 Order. I note that Mr.

Mandziak also purported to appeal the Seizure Order, but it clearly falls outside the scope of the right of appeal prescribed by s. 21(1) . [ 53 ] The Act grants only a narrow right of appeal to this Court from a King’s Bench Chambers decision made pursuant to s. 21 .

Section 22 says that such an appeal may be taken: (

a) only with leave of a judge of this Court; (

b) only on a question of law; and (

c) only if the application for leave is made within 20 business days of the order in issue, or unless otherwise provided in the Act . I note that there is no other provision applicable here. [ 54 ] All of this serves to create an insurmountable difficulty for Mr. Mandziak. To begin, of course, the Act affords a right of appeal only insofar as the decision of a Chambers judge concerns “an order of an animal protection officer made pursuant to clause 13(3)(d)”. Thus, as noted, there is a right of appeal only in relation to the June 23 Order, something that is not directly connected to Mr.

Mandziak’s objective of obtaining compensation for the fact that, as he sees it, his cattle were sold at a discounted price. Given her approach, the Chambers judge obviously understood this point. [ 55 ] Further, and more importantly, Mr. Mandziak has not sought or obtained leave to appeal as required by s. 22. On this front, he asks the Court to grant leave nunc pro tunc . However, this cannot be done.

Section 22 specifically prescribes that leave must be sought within 20 days after the date of the Queen’s Bench order which must be understood to be a reference to the date on which the Queen’s Bench decision was released, not the date on which the formal order was taken out. Those 20 days have long since passed. This is not a situation where, as with some other statutes, and under s. 9(6) of The Court of Appeal Act, 2000 , SS 2000, c C-42.1 , an appeal must be launched within some specified period or by such later date as the Court may allow.

The 20 days provided by the Act is a fixed requirement that the Court is not entitled to ignore, extend, or work around. As Herauf J.A. (in Chambers) explained in Geml v Cope , 2013 SKCA 39 , 414 Sask R 43, “where there is no provision in an enactment for an enlargement of time to appeal or to apply for leave to appeal, the right to do so ends if it is not brought within the appeal or leave to appeal period” (at para 5).

This point has been made by this Court on numerous occasions when considering statutorily prescribed time limits similar to the one found in s. 22 of the Act , see, for example: Houston v Saskatchewan Teachers’ Federation , 2009 SKCA 70 at paras 5–7 , 331 Sask R 157; The Board of Chiropractors’ Association of Saskatchewan v Pankiw , 2011 SKCA 142 at para 12 , 377 Sask R 237; and Schnell v Schnell , 2001 SKCA 123 at paras 6–7 , 213 Sask R 174. See also: The Honourable Stuart J.

Cameron, Civil Appeals in Saskatchewan: The Court of Appeal Act and Rules Annotated , 1st ed (Regina: Law Society of Saskatchewan Library, 2015) at 61–62. Accordingly, Mr. Mandziak meets a dead-end insofar as he attempts to base his case in this Court on alleged defects in the June 23 Order and a related right of appeal from the Court of Queen’s Bench. [ 56 ] Nonetheless, of course, Mr. Mandziak is entitled to pursue an appeal in this Court with respect to what might be called the “judicial review” aspect of what was decided by the Chambers judge. 2.

The claim for damages [ 57 ] As indicated, the bottom-line relief sought by Mr. Mandziak is compensation for the loss that he claims to have suffered because his cattle were sold at less than their value. His position in this regard is problematic for two very basic reasons. [ 58 ] The first reason is that Mr. Mandziak did not seek damages in the Court of Queen’s Bench. His June 30, 2020, “originating application” said nothing about the remedy he was seeking. His “originating application (appeal by motion)” filed on August 14, 2020, asked simply that the June 23 Order be quashed.

His August 25, 2020, “amended originating application”, prolix as it was, asked only that certain orders be quashed and that various declarations of invalidity and unlawfulness be made. Mr. Mandziak did not seek damages tied to how the sale of his cattle had been managed or, for that matter, for any other reason. All of his pleadings were completely silent on this issue. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Chambers judge simply found, as requested, that Mr. Mandziak’s entitlement to procedural fairness had been violated and did no more. The problem faced by Mr.

Mandziak, therefore, is readily apparent. He cannot say

that the Chambers judge erred by failing to award him damages when the fact is that he did not seek damages. [59] The second fundamental problem that Mr. Mandziak faces on the judicial review side of this appeal is that damages are not aremedy available in the context of a judicial review application. I note here, parenthetically, that Mr.

Mandziak’s counsel in the Court ofQueen’s Bench presumably understood that point and that this explains his decision not to seek damages. [60] The simple bottom line is that judicial review applications are concerned with the legality of the actions of public authorities.They are not aimed at providing compensation for civil wrongs.

This was explained as follows by the Supreme Court of Canada in Finneyv Barreau du Québec, 2004 SCC 36 at para 31, [2004] 2 SCR 17 [Finney]: [31] Although the result of this method is also recognition of the Barreau’s liability, it is preferable to take an approach different fromthe one taken by the Quebec Court of Appeal. That court declined to apply s. 193 [of the Professional Code, RSQ, c C-26], because in itsopinion the appellant had failed to exercise its powers for the purposes set out in the Act, that is, the protection of the public.

That methodhas the disadvantage of confusing review of the legality of a public body’s decisions with the rules that determine that body’s civilliability. Undoubtedly those questions will overlap on occasion, and acts that are illegal and that may be set aside under the rules thatgovern review for legality may found an action in civil liability. However, this does not often happen, and illegality is not necessarilysynonymous with civil fault, or a source of delictual liability (Morier v. Rivard, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 716, at p. 745, perChouinard J.; Québec (Procureur général) v.

Deniso Lebel Inc., (QC CA), [1996] R.J.Q. 1821, at pp. 1836-37, leave toappeal refused, [1997] 1 S.C.R. vi; R. Dussault and L. Borgeat, Administrative Law: A Treatise (2nd ed. 1990), vol. 5, at p. 190). See also: Enterprises Sibeca Inc. v Frelighsburg (Municipality), 2004 SCC 61 at para 15, [2004] 3 SCR 304. As noted in Donald J.M.Brown & John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, loose-leaf (Rel 2, June 2023), vol 1 (Toronto: ThomsonReuters, 2023) at §5:39, “[g]enerally speaking, apart from

section 24 of the Charter or a statutory provision to the contrary, damagescannot be obtained in an application for a prerogative order or on a statutory application for judicial review”. [61] I note here that, relying on Cohnstaedt v University of Regina (1986), (SK CA), 45 Sask R 197 (CA)[Cohnstaedt], Mr. Mandziak attempts to argue that damages can, in fact, be awarded in a judicial review application grounded inprocedural fairness concerns. Mr. Cohnstaedt was a professor whose employment was terminated by the University of Regina.

He suedthe University, arguing both breach of contract and that the procedure followed by it in dealing with him had not comported with theprinciples of procedural fairness. In this Court, Tallis J.A. (writing for himself and Cameron J.A.) found that Mr. Cohnstaedt’s right toprocedural fairness had been denied.

He found as well that “if we had not been persuaded that the appellant was entitled to relief becauseof the failure to comply with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, we would, in the circumstances of this case, havefound for the appellant on the alternative basis of breach of contract” (at para 91).

Then, turning to the question of remedy, Tallis J.A. saidthis: [92] On the question of entitlement to salary and other benefits arising from the invalid termination of the appellant’s tenuredemployment, or the alternative claim for damages for breach of contract, we observe that the learned trial judge made no assessment.However, either path would lead to the same calculation of quantum. … [62] This decision was successfully appealed to the Supreme Court but it did not address the question at issue in this appeal.

See:Cohnstaedt v University of Regina, (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 1011. [63] I am not prepared to read Cohnstaedt as opening the door to a world where, in the context of a judicial review application,damages can be awarded as a remedy for a breach of procedural fairness. First, Tallis J.A. did not advert to this issue. It appears that bothcounsel and the Court simply assumed that damages could be awarded for a breach of procedural fairness in the context they were dealingwith. In other words, there was no considered treatment of the point now in issue.

Second, as indicated above, Tallis J.A. was operating ina situation where the same damages were also available by way of a breach of contract analysis. That is not the situation here. Third, andmost importantly, Mr. Mandziak’s reading of Cohnstaedt simply cannot be squared with what the Supreme Court has said about this pointin cases like Finney. [64] I find, therefore, that Mr. Mandziak’s appeal must be dismissed. The Chambers judge made no reviewable error in failing toaward damages in Mr. Mandziak’s favour. [65] As a last point on the damages issue, I note Mr.

Mandziak’s submission that, if the Court declines to award damages to him asrequested, it should remit this matter to the Court of King’s Bench so that damages can be determined. This, obviously, would not beappropriate. The issue standing in Mr. Mandziak’s way is not an inability to calculate or ascertain damages, it is the absence of anentitlement to damages in the context of the present proceedings. B. Animal Protection’s cross-appeal [66] As will be recalled, the Chambers judge found that Mr.

Mandziak reasonably expected that Animal Protection would return hiscattle if he paid the seizure costs and that he had not been given an opportunity to respond to its concerns about density or to demonstratethat he could properly sustain his herd if the seized animals were returned. [67] Animal Protection says the Chambers judge erred in coming to this conclusion because she overlooked or failed to understandimportant parts of the factual record and failed to appreciate that the situation with respect to the return of the cattle changed when, on July8, 2020, it learned that Mr.

Mandziak had more cattle than had previously been thought. In making this submission, Animal Protectioncharacterizes the key dealings between it and Mr. Mandziak as follows: (

a) On June 23, 2020, Mr. Mandziak took APO Greke to inspect animals on four quarters of land. Animal Protection says Mr.Mandziak was clear this was all the cattle that he owned and all the land to which he had access. (

b) On June 26, 2020, APO Greke attended at Mr. Mandziak’s ranch again. She seized 135 animals and placed the rest under theJune 26 Order. Animal Protection says that, at this time, Mr. Mandziak did not advise APO Greke that he owned cattle in addition to the

ones inspected on that date. (

c) On July 8, 2020, APO Greke conducted the follow-up inspection at Mr. Mandziak’s ranch whereat, according to Animal Protection, Mr. Mandziak “revealed” that he had 100 more cattle than he had previously disclosed. (

d) On July 8, 2020, Animal Protection’s counsel received a cheque from Mr. Mandziak for seizure-related expenses. The cheque was then sent to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel with a letter stating, according to Animal Protection, that counsel would follow up in relation to the inspection being carried out that day. (

e) On July 10, 2020, Animal Protection’s counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel stating that the 135 seized animals would not be returned because Animal Protection had concerns that doing so would create a density issue that would result in those animals being in distress. [ 68 ] Animal Protection submits it was clear from all of this that, as a result of the July 8, 2020, inspection, it came upon new information that changed its position with respect to the return of the seized animals. In this regard, it points to paragraphs 84–87 of Dr.

Changar’s affidavit where he explains that he had originally estimated Mr. Mandziak’s herd at appropriately 300 head but that, on July 8, 2020, he had discovered that it was closer to 400 head. Dr. Changar also says in his affidavit that he was concerned that returning the 135 seized cattle would create a situation where the total number of animals in the herd would outstrip the available food sources and create a density issue. [ 69 ] Animal Protection submits that the Chambers judge erred by failing to consider what it calls this change in circumstances.

It contends that it was not possible for it to have known about the additional 100 cattle prior to July 8, 2020, and that, once the existence of these animals became apparent, the ground shifted. Animal Protection says that, because of this new information, it was not bound by its earlier representations that the cattle would be returned upon the payment of the seizure expenses. It also submits that, in any event, the July 8 and 10, 2020, letters from its counsel to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel gave Mr.

Mandziak sufficient time to respond, by way of a court application, before the cattle were sold. [ 70 ] I am not persuaded by this line of argument. In my respectful view, Animal Protection’s submission is faulty in several respects. To begin, it is not clear how the fact that Mr. Mandziak had 400 head of cattle can be seen as having become apparent to Animal Protection only on July 8, 2020. There is no suggestion in the affidavits that APO Greke ever directly asked Mr. Mandziak or anyone else how many animals were in Mr. Mandziak’s herd.

More significantly, at paragraph 26 of her August 7, 2020, affidavit, APO Greke averred that “[o]n June 26, 2020 myself and my colleagues observed approximately 400 head of cattle”. Similarly, in her report to the Justice of the Peace, following the execution of the warrant on June 26, 2020, APO Greke wrote “approximately 400 head viewed”. It appears that Dr. Changar may have believed that he had seen only 300 head of cattle on June 26, 2020, but he does not directly contradict the evidence of APO Greke – the responsible official who made the decisions in issue – that she had seen 400 cattle on that day.

Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Mr. Mandziak somehow “revealed” on July 8, 2020, that he had 400 cattle. It appears that he never made an express representation, at any point, about the size of his herd. [ 71 ] In addition, I am also skeptical about Animal Protection’s claim that it was surprised to learn, on July 8, 2020, that Mr. Mandziak had more than four quarters of land. I say this because, in her affidavit of August 7, 2020, at paragraph 17, APO Greke averred that Mr.

Mandziak told her on June 23, 2020, that he had “access to four sections of land and had cattle on several of these quarters” (emphasis added). Further, in the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant sworn on June 25, 2022, APO Greke identified 14 quarters of land owned by Mr. Mandziak. Accordingly, I doubt the factual premise of Animal Protection’s argument. [ 72 ] In any event, and much more importantly, it must be remembered that the Chambers judge’s point was not that there was no basis for Animal Protection’s concerns about density. It was that Mr.

Mandziak had been given no notice of those concerns and had not been provided an opportunity to respond to them. This assessment was sound. The July 3, 2020, letter from Animal Protection’s counsel to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel stated that, if Mr. Mandziak did not pay the seizure expenses, the seized cattle would become the property of Animal Protection and would be sold. The reasonable understanding of that communication, an understanding consistent with the Regulations and the Notice of Seizure, was that, if Mr. Mandziak paid those costs, the cattle would be returned to him. Mr.

Mandziak then sent in a certified cheque to cover the seizure costs. [ 73 ] Animal Protection’s counsel returned the cheque to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel, by letter dated July 8, 2020, but, contrary to Animal Protection’s submissions, it said only “further to our conversation of yesterday’s date, please be advised that the position of [Animal Protection] is that the cattle will not be returned”. The record offers no explanation as to what was, or was not, canvassed in the referenced “conversation” and the letter itself says nothing about the reason why the cattle were not going to be returned.

The July 10, 2020, letter from Animal Protection’s counsel to Mr. Mandziak’s counsel was little more than the declaration of a decision already made by Animal Protection. It said that the seized cattle “will not be returned to Mr. Mandziak but will be sold at auction on July 14, 2020”. It revealed no awareness of the fact that Mr. Mandziak had already trimmed his herd by selling 80 cattle. Unlike what happened with respect to the June 23 Order and the June 26 Order, Mr. Mandziak was given no opportunity to respond to Animal Protection’s concerns. The fact that Mr.

Mandziak might have been able to get into court in time to attempt to enjoin the sale is beside the point. That would not have cured the breach of procedural fairness. [ 74 ] In my view, there is no reviewable error in the Chambers judge’s consideration of these matters. I am unable to see a basis on which it can be concluded that she improperly found that Mr. Mandziak’s entitlement to procedural fairness was offended by Animal Protection. VII. CONCLUSION [ 75 ] As explained above, I conclude that both Mr. Mandziak’s appeal and Animal Protection’s cross-appeal must be dismissed.

As a result, I would make no order with respect to costs. “Richards C.J.S.”

Richards C.J.S. I concur. “Jackson J.A.” Jackson J.A. I concur. “Drennan J.A.” Drennan J.A.