DAVID B. SWOAP, as Director, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; BIEUKY DYKSTRA et al., Real Parties in Interest, 10 Cal. 3d 490

Opinion SULLIVAN, J. We are again called upon to determine whether an adult child of a recipient of aid to the aged under the Old Age Security Law (Welf. & Inst. Code, div. 9, pt, 3, ch. 3, § 12000 et seq.) may constitutionally be required to reimburse the state. We addressed ourselves to this question in County of San Mateo v. Boss (1971) 3 Cal.3d 962 [92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654]. We there held that under the particular facts of that case, the adult son of that recipient could not constitutionally be compelled to make reimbursement according to the relatives’ responsibility statutes. (§§ 12100, 12101.) As we explain in detail infra, we left open the question whether

section 206 of the Civil Code provided a rational basis for upholding relatives’ responsibility against the challenge that such statutes examined in the light of certain decisions of this court arbitrarily charged welfare costs to one class in society and thereby denied equal protection of the laws. We now undertake to answer that question.

Two recipients of aid to the aged, Ila Huntley and Bieuky Dykstra, and their adult children, Howard Huntley and Julius Dykstra, brought a class action seeking to enjoin state officials from requiring adult children to reimburse the state, pursuant to sections 12100 and 12101, for aid to the aged extended to their parents. Plaintiff Howard Huntley is the 60-year-old son of 88-year-old widow Ila Huntley, who is the recipient of aid to the aged.

Huntley alleges in the complaint that he and his 67-year-old wife had a net monthly income of $656.25; that they are trying to save money for their imminent retirement; that the San Joaquin County Welfare Department ordered him, effective October 1, 1971, to pay the department $70 per month for the support of his mother; and that he could not provide.for his own family and at the same time pay such a large sum. Plaintiff Julius Dykstra is the son of 78-year-old widow, Bieuky Dykstra, who is the recipient of aid to the aged.

Dykstra alleges that the same welfare department demanded that he pay $75 per month for the support of his mother; that he works as a truck driver and does not have $75 per month left after paying his own family bills, including $180 a month for child support and $145 a month for rent.

On October 14, 1971 the Superior Court of Sacramento County issued a statewide temporary restraining order, enjoining defendants from “[ejnforcing against plaintiffs Julius Dykstra and Howard Huntley, and the class of persons similarly situated, and plaintiffs Bieuky Dykstra and Ila Huntley, and the class of persons similarly situated, the provisions of W & I Code, §§ 12100 and 12101, as amended, and Civil Code, § 206, as amended.” Defendants seek a writ of prohibition to prevent the Sacramento Superior Court from enforcing its restraining order on the ground that, since sections 12100 and 12101, and Civil Code

section 206 are valid, the court had no jurisdiction to enjoin defendants from administering these statutes. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526.) Under the Old Age Security Law public assistance is extended to aged needy persons. Pursuant to

section 12101 the adult children of such recipients are required to contribute to the recipient’s support according to a fixed schedule. As a result of the enactment of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 (Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 33), the relatives’ contribution scale was revised sharply upwards.

Section 12100 provides that the county granting aid to the aged may proceed against an adult child of a recipient to collect the amount due under

section 12101. In County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d 962, we were of the opinion that the constitutionality of the relatives’ responsibility statutes (§§ 12100, 12101) should be determined in the light of the principles annotmced by us in Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716 [36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, 20 A.L.R.3d 353]. In Kirchner we held that liability could not be imposed (pursuant to former § 6650, now § 7275) on an adult child for the care, support and maintenance of her mentally ill parent in a state institution.

We rested our opinion in Kirchner largely upon Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 247 [28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 379 P.2d 22], where we had declared former

section 6650 unconstitutional insofar as it purported to impose liability upon a father for the cost of the care, maintenance and support in a mental institution of his insane son charged with murder.

We reasoned in Hawley as follows: “The enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration and treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions —subject of course, to the constitutional guaranties—who would endanger themselves or others if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the expense of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should (subject to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate) be borne by the state.” (Id. at pp. 255-256.) Confronted in Kirchner with an attack on the constitutionality of the same statute (former § 6650) challenged in Hawley, this court then declared: “Whether the commitment is. incidental to an alleged violation of a penal statute, as in Hawley, or is essentially a civil commitment as in the instant case, the purposes of confinement and treatment or care in either case encompass the protection of society from the confined person, and his own protection and possible reclamation as a productive member of the body politic.

Hence the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision of adequate care for its inmates, cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society; such assessment violates the equal protection clause.” (Id. at p. 720; italics added.) Two years after Kirchner in In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401 [48 Cal.Rptr. 790], the Court of Appeal was faced with the contention that former

section 5260 (now § 6715), insofar as it purported to make a parent financially responsible for the care, maintenance and support received by his or her mentally retarded child in a state institution, was unconstitutional for the same reasons for which former

section 6650 was declared unconstitutional in Kirchner.

The court framed the issue before it as follows: “If Kirchner stands for the proposition that when the state, in the exercise of its promotion of the general welfare, commits a person either for the protection of society or for his protection or rehabilitation, or any combination thereof, it cannot thereafter seek reimbursement except from such person or his estate, that case then is determinative of the matter in issue. [Fn. omitted.] On the other hand, if Kirchner is limited to its facts and does not preclude the state from seeking reimbursement from those otherwise legally responsible for the care, support and maintenance of the person treated, [fn. omitted] inquiry must be directed to a determination of whether or not respondent is responsible for the support of her adult daughter; and, if so, whether the state has properly provided for the enforcement of any obligation arising from that responsibility.” (Id. at p. 407.) The Dudley court concluded that Kirchner “does not expressly . . . restrict the right to recoupment to the inmate, or his estate, but states that the cost may not arbitrarily be charged to one class of persons.

Such an arbitrary charge results when liability is imposed on a daughter because of blood relationship alone without regard for the means of the parent patient ... [or on] a relative who except for the arbitrary statute was in no other manner liable for support of the patient.” (Italics, added.) (Id. at pp. 411-412.) The court observed that in Kirchner the inmate mother had adequate funds to pay for her own care and maintenance, that therefore the daughter was not legally responsible for the care and maintenance furnished the mother by the state, since the mother was not a “poor person,” and that therein lay the arbitrariness found by the Kirchner court.

The Court of Appeal concluded that where the relative, prior to the commitment, was otherwise legally responsible for the care, maintenance and support of the patient, it was not arbitrary to select that class of persons to pay a reasonable contribution to the state for the cost of the state supporting and caring for the patient. Rejecting the contention that the principle of

section 206 of the Civil Code could not be relied upon to support the constitutionality of the relatives’ responsibility statute (former § 5260) then under review, the Dudley court relied on our opinion in County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394 [296 P.2d 329], an action against the adult daughter of a poor person to recover a portion of the amount paid as aid to the needy aged under the Old Age Security Law. (Now § 12000 et seq.) Adverting to our holding in Simmons that recovery by public agencies from responsible relatives was completely covered by the Welfare and Institutions Code and was not derived from

section 206 of the Civil Code, the Dudley court declared: “The problem herein, however, is not in determining whether or not appellant can recover in an action brought solely under the provisions of

section 206 of the Civil Code, but whether the existence of the liability thereby created demonstrates that it is not a denial of equal protection of the law to require a person subject to that liability to reimburse the county for the care, which in the absence of that furnished by the state and charged to the county ... he would otherwise be required to furnish personally.” (In re Dudley, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d at p. 410.) In short, Dudley came to the conclusion that Kirchner was not controlling. We denied a hearing in this court.

The Dudley analysis of Kirchner was followed by the Court of Appeal in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 154 [55 Cal.Rptr. 437] which held that the “requirement of

section 6650 that the husband support his incompetent wife in a state mental institution is not a denial of equal protection” (id. at p. 165); the “classification is reasonably supported by a rational basis” since “the husband is otherwise liable for the support of his incompetent wife.” (Id. at p. 165.) We denied a hearing in this court. Four years later it was unanimously adopted by this court in In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513 [86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204], which upheld, against an equal protection challenge grounded on Hawley and Kirchner, the provisions of

section 903.1 imposing upon a parent liability for the cost to the county of legal services rendered by the public defender or a court-appointed attorney in juvenile court proceedings.

We there held that the imposition of such liability was not arbitrary since “section 903.1 is merely declarative of the parents’ preexisting obligation to provide reasonable and necessary support to their minor children . . . .” (Id. at p. 521.) It was against the background of these and similar precedents developed over the seven-year period since our decision in Kirchner that we were presented with the constitutional question raised in County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d 962 as to the responsible relatives’ provisions of the Old Age Security Law.

There again it was asserted by the responsible relative that the principles of Kirchner rendered the imposition of such liability constitutionally impermissible as a denial of equal protection. We referred in Boss to the

interpretation placed in Kirchner by the various cases in which it was raised and generally agreed that they amounted to this: Kirchner does not stand for the proposition that recovery by public agencies under responsible relatives statutes is in all instances violative of equal protection of the laws; on the contrary, recovery may be constitutionally required from persons “otherwise legally responsible” or having a “preexisting duty to support” the recipient of public aid or assistance. In the context of this

interpretation we considered the argument made by the county in response to the constitutional attack. In essence it was that Boss, the adult son, had a preexisting duty under Civil Code

section 206 .to support his mother and that this duty provided a rational basis for the imposition of relatives’ responsibility under sections 12100 and 12101. We chose not to reach the latter question in Boss, stating that “We express no opinion as to whether the duty of support created by Civil Code

section 206 provides a sufficient basis for rational classification of those who are required to pay a larger portion of the expense of providing welfare assistance.” (3 Cal.3d at p. 971, fn. 8.) Rather we concluded that under the particular facts of that case Boss, the adult son, had no duty under Civil Code

section 206 to support his mother since although “in need” and therefore qualified for aid to the aged, she was not a “poor person” within that section. Because he owed his mother no “preexisting duty of support,” we found no rational basis for charging him with a portion of the cost of aid to the needy aged and concluded that the relatives’ responsibility statutes (§§ 12100, 12101) as applied to him denied him equal protection of the laws. Apparently in response to our decision in Boss, the Legislature, as part of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971, enacted

section 3 (Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 3) which amended

section 206 of the Civil Code to read as follows: “It is the duty of . . . the children of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. ... A person who is receiving aid to the aged shall be deemed to be a person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work.” (Amended portions italicized.) By virtue of this amendment, all adult children of persons receiving aid to the aged have a duty of support under Civil Code

section 206. We are therefore called upon to answer the question which we left open in Boss, namely whether liability under Civil Code

section 206, as amended, provides a rational basis for imposing liability under the relatives’ responsibility statutes so as to preclude denial of equal protection of the laws. Real parties in interest (hereafter plaintiffs) contend that

section 206 does not constitute a “preexisting duty of support” within the meaning of Boss for three reasons: (1) that the court in Kirchner found Civil Code

section 206 not to create a preexisting duty and that this determination is binding precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis; (2) that since Civil Code

section 206 as amended did not preexist sections 12100 and 12101 in time, it could not create a preexisting duty; and (3) that Civil Code

section 206 is not independent of sections 12100 and 12101 and therefore not preexisting in that sense. Plaintiffs argue that

section 206 of the Civil Code was unquestionably applicable to the facts in Kirchner and that, therefore, the court necessarily concluded, albeit implicitly, that

section 206 did not constitute a preexisting duty. However, since the facts as stated in Kirchner specify that the parent’s guardianship estate included some $11,000 in cash, it appears that such a parent would not be a “poor person” within the meaning of Civil Code

section 206. (See County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d 962, 970-971.) Indeed in our unanimous opinion in Kirchner, we neither mention

section 206 nor indicate that it was urged upon us as creating a “preexisting duty.” Moreover, as discussed, supra, Dudley specifically held Civil Code

section 206 did provide a rational basis for holding parents responsible for the cost of maintaining their mentally retarded children in state institutions and stated that Kirchner specifically involved a case where there was no such other basis for legal responsibility. Relying on dictionary

definitions of “preexisting” (as meaning “to exist beforehand,” “to exist prior to”), plaintiffs urge that a “preexisting duty of support” is necessarily one that existed prior in time. Their argument runs as follows: Since Civil Code

section 206 was amended in 1971 to impose liability on adult children of “needy parents,” whereas the relatives’ responsibility sections, found in the Welfare and Institutions Code, were enacted in 1937, it is obvious that any duty under Civil Code

section 206 did not preexist under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 12100 and 12101. Furthermore, even if “preexisting” is deemed to mean “independent of and separate from,”

section 206 would not be “preexisting” because its amendment in 1971 was part and parcel of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 and clearly aimed at overcoming the crucial difference in standards found determinative in Boss. We need not involve ourselves in the metaphysics of “preexistence” or assess the significance, if any, of the seemingly casual use.of “preexisting duty” or “preexisting obligation” in opinions dealing with relatives’ responsibility. (See, for example, County of San Mateo v.

Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d 962, 968; In re Ricky H., supra, 2 Cal.3d 513, 520; cf. “otherwise liable” in In re Dudley, supra, 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 411.) We are satisfied that plaintiffs’ arguments may be properly and fully disposed of by a resolution of the broad question posed at the start of this opinion: Does the general duty of children to support their needy parents created by Civil Code

section 206 provide a rational basis for the classification of those who are required by law to reimburse the state for aid granted to their aged parents and are thereby compelled to pay a larger portion of the cost of welfare assistance? We conclude that it does. We refer to County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394 [296 P.2d 329], an action brought against an adult daughter to recover, pursuant to former

section 2224 from which present

section 12100 (see fn. 2, ante) is derived, a portion of the aid to the aged paid by the county to her father. We there held that the authority conferred on counties by the Welfare and Institutions Code to obtain reimbursement from responsible relatives of the recipients of such aid was entirely independent of, and not subrogated from, former (see fn. 4, ante) Civil Code

section 206. We said in pertinent part: “There is nothing in

section 206 which suggests an intention to create a liability of the child of poor parents to public agencies which support the parents in accord with their law-imposed duty to pay aid to such parents; the only liability to third persons is in the case of the promise of an adult child expressly referred to in the last sentence of the section.[] On the other hand, the Welfare and Institutions Code . . . not only purports to state the circumstances in which the named responsible relatives are liable to the county when it has supported or paid aid to indigents, aged, blind, etc., but also states a procedure by which in proper cases the county can recover from the responsible relatives.

It seems apparent, therefore, that the Legislature intended, by the Welfare and Institutions Code to cover completely the subject of recovery by public agencies from responsible relatives, and that it did not intend to create, and that there is no proper basis for the courts to innovate, a right of recoupment derived from

section 206 of the Civil Code. [Fn. omitted.] “On this subject it is said in County of Contra Costa v. Lasky (1954), supra, 43 Cal.2d 506, 509 [275 P.2d 452], ‘There is a conflict in the cases as to whether the basic liability of responsible relatives is

section 206 of the Civil Code or the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It has been held that the latter code provisions are complete in themselves and the liability of responsible relatives to the county is thereby established. (County of Lake v. Forbes (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 744 . . .; County of Los Angeles v. Lane (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 476 . . .; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870 . . . .) Seemingly to the contrary are Garcia v. Superior Court (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 31 . . . and Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare (1947) 82 Cal.App. 2d 627 ....

Although it is not important in this case, we believe the matter is adequately covered by the Welfare and Institutions Code and it is the measure of the extent of the responsible relative’s liability to the county.

It is to it we must look to ascertain whether the relative is required, in a particular case, to reimburse the county.’ We reiterate the declaration of the last quoted sentence as a holding, and any inconsistent implications in the Garcia and the Kelley cases are disapproved.” (Id. at pp. 398-399; fn. omitted.) We therefore reaffirm as to the sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code now in effect imposing liability upon responsible relatives (§§ 12100, 12101, see fns. 2 and 3, ante) what we held in Simmons as to their statutory predecessors.

Accordingly we hold that sections 12100 and 12101 are entirely independent of Civil Code

section 206, and that the right of the county granting aid to the aged “to recover that portion of the aid granted as it is determined that the child is liable to pay” (§ 12100, 1st par.) is created solely by the pertinent sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code and does not devolve upon the county by subrogation of any right which the parent may have against the child under Civil Code

section 206. It is manifest, then, that the liability of the child now being subjected to constitutional scrutiny is that imposed by sections 12100 and 12101 in themselves. It is equally clear that the ratiónality of the basis for such liability does not and should not depend upon the exact subrogation of an individual duty, factually established, under Civil Code

section 206. Therefore, the real question which Kirchner raises in the instant case is whether the class of adult children in general are otherwise under a duty to support needy or poor parents which duty provides a rational basis for upholding the relatives’ responsibility created by sections 12100 and 12101 against the challenge that such statutes are impermissibly discriminating. We answer this question in the affirmative. It is abundantly clear that children have generally been subject to a duty to support poor parents for a very long time, indeed.

It is true, as stated in Kirchner and Boss, that there was no such duty at common law. Nevertheless, the duty is deep rooted and of venerable ancestry; it can be traced back over almost four centuries to the year 1601, when it emerged as part and parcel of the Elizabethan Poor Law. (43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2, § vi (1601).) Professor tenBroek has clearly demonstrated that “legal liability of relatives [imposed by the Elizabethan Poor Law] was designed to indemnify the public and to minimize its costs in relieving the poor.” (tenBroek, supra, 16 Stan.L.Rev. 257, 283.) This duty, codified in California in 1872 as

section 206 of the Civil Code in language remarkably similar to the Elizabethan Poor Law, has existed unchanged until the recent 1971 amendment. (See fn. 4, ante.) The purpose of such legislation is identical to that underlying the Elizabethan Poor Law: “It has been stated that the ‘main purpose of the statutes seems to be to protect the public from the burden of supporting people who have children able to support them.’ (Duffy v. Yordi, supra, 149 Cal. at p. 142 [citation].” (Gluckman v.

Gaines (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 52, 54 [71 Cal.Rptr. 795].) In 1930 the state undertook to support needy aged by inaugurating the present state-county old age assistance program. (Stats. 1929, ch. 530.) Aged persons, however, who had children able to support them and responsible under the law for their support were specifically excluded from the system. (Stats. 1929, ch. 530, § 2(g).) Apparently the Legislature determined that aged persons who had children were adequately protected by the existing provision in Civil Code

section 206. In 1937 the Legislature slightly modified the statutory scheme. Only aged persons who were actually receiving support from responsible relatives, including children, were disqualified from receiving aid. (Stats. 1937, ch. 405, § 2(f).) Aged persons not receiving such support but having responsible relatives, including children, who were able and legally responsible to provide support, were unconditionally entitled to receive aid.

However, the county granting aid was allowed to recover from “a spouse or adult child pecuniarily able to support” a person receiving aid “such portion of the aid granted as said relative is able to pay.” (Stats. 1937, ch. 405, § 5.) This statutory scheme continues today in substantially the same form. It is thus abundantly clear that a long tradition of law, not to mention a measureless history of societal customs, has singled out adult children to bear the burden of supporting their poor parents. This duty existed prior to, and independent of, any duties arising out of the state assistance to the aged.

Subsequent statutes imposing liability upon the adult children of persons receiving aid to the aged merely selected a class of relatives who were otherwise legally responsible for the support of their parents. The fact that the Legislature in 1971 changed the standard from “poor persons unable to maintain themselves by work” to “needy persons unable to maintain themselves by work” in no way affects or changes this conclusion.

Plaintiffs argue that although adult children may be otherwise legally responsible to support their poor or needy parents and the rule announced in Kirchner is thus satisfied, the imposition on such class of both the basic duty to support under Civil Code

section 206 and the statutory liability to reimburse the county under sections 12100 and 12101 remains arbitrary and violative of the equal protection of the laws. While pressing their attack against both the Civil Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code sections, plaintiffs at this point are in reality concentrating on the objective of undermining

section 206. In essence, they claim that all three sections must succumb to the “strict scrutiny” delineated by us in Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 597 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241]. Plaintiffs, apparently recognizing that these sections do not touch on or affect a “fundamental interest,” argue that the statute creates a suspect classification on two separate theories: (1) by distinguishing between people on the basis of wealth; and (2) by distinguishing between people on the basis of ancestry. While it is indisputable that “ ‘careful examination on our

part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth (Serrano v. Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584, 597), it is equally clear that these sections do not draw lines on the basis of wealth. They apply to all adult children of parents in need. They draw no distinction between such children and do not single out either wealthy children or poor children for special treatment, except to provide that parent and children shall bear the duty of support “to the extent of their ability.” (Civ.

Code, § 206.) Plaintiffs claim, however, that these sections discriminate between adult children on the basis of their parents’ wealth, since only adult children of “parents in need” are required to support their parents. While this argument has a surface plausibility and appears to establish that these sections create a suspect classification based on wealth, a closer examination exposes the argument as pure sophistry. The class “parents in need” is the only class in which the state has an interest or to which it owes a duty.

As we observed in Boss, “We also note that in his excellent discussion of the development of the California family law, Professor tenBroek establishes that Civil Code

section 206 as well as the various provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code which impose liability on relatives are derived from the Elizabethan Poor Law (43 Eliz. 1, ch. 2 (1601)) and that all of these provisions were developed to relieve the public treasury of part of the burden cast upon it by the public assumption of responsibility to maintain the destitute. [Citations.]” (3 Cal.3d 962, 971, fn. 8.) The state interest advanced, namely to offset the cost of public assistance to the needy comes into play only when the needy are involved and therefore focuses only on a class of needy people.

However, insofar as the state acts toward this class of needy people, it is conferring a benefit upon them either by directly granting aid under the Old Age Security Law or by providing them with the remedy to secure support from their adult children under Civil Code

section 206. Plaintiffs do not contend that the state acts improperly in conferring such a benefit only upon “parents in need.” Insofar as the state imposes a correlative liability upon the adult children of “parents in need,”'it does so without discriminating between such children on the basis of wealth. The state selects the children to bear the burden not on the basis of wealth, but on the basis of parentage. Since these sections do not discriminate on the basis of wealth, it creates no suspect classification based on wealth.

Plaintiffs urge that ancestry is a suspect classification calling for application of the “strict scrutiny” test. They cite no cases directly so holding but call our attention to the following language in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, 100 [87 L.Ed. 1774, 1786, 63 S.Ct. 1375]: “Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.” However, it is abundantly clear that the court used ancestry to denote racial classification and not in the general sense of parentage.

The court continued in the following sentence: “For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.” In Oyama v. California (1948) 332 U.S. 633, 646 [92 L.Ed. 249, 259, 68 S.Ct. 269], the court referred to Hirabayashi as abrogating “discrimination between citizens on the basis of their racial descent.” Moreover, if classifications based on the general fact of descent, as opposed to racial classification, were viewed as suspect, established areas of the law, as for example the statutes of succession, would be undermined.

Since these sections do not touch upon a fundamental interest and do not create any suspect classifications, their constitutionality is to be determined by the normal “rational relationship” test, namely by “ ‘requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivably legitimate state purpose.’ ” (Serrano v.

Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 597.) As indicated earlier, we recognized in Boss that the state purpose of the relatives’ responsibility statutes is to “relieve the public treasury of part of the burden cast upon it by the public assumption of responsibility to maintain the destitute.” It is uncontested that this is a legitimate state purpose. (Bullock v.

Carter (1972) 405 U.S. 134, 147 [31 L.Ed.2d 92, 102, 92 S.Ct. 849].) The sole question therefore is whether placing the burden for this support upon the adult children bears some rational relationship to the accomplishment of the state purpose of relieving the public treasury. It seems eminently clear that the selection of the adult children is rational on the ground that the parents, who are now in need, supported and cared for their children during their minority and that such children should in return now support their parents to the extent to which they are capable.

Since these children received special benefits from the class of “parents in need,” it is entirely rational that the children bear a special burden with respect to that class. Plaintiffs argue, however, that the only support obligations which are rational are those arising out of a relationship voluntarily entered into, as for example marriage and parental relationship, because there the prospective husband or parent knows of the obligations attendant upon entering the relationship and voluntarily consents thereto.

On the contrary, so the argument runs, since children do not themselves voluntarily enter into the relationship with their parents, it is arbitrary to force upon them the obligations of such relationship. Assuming that normally a child has no choice in the creation of a relationship with- his parents, this fact does not per se establish that the classification is arbitrary as to children. Indeed, as we have, explained, the existence of special benefits for the class arising out of the relationship provides an adequate basis for imposing upon it a duty to support parents.

In short we find nothing arbitrary in the delineation of the classes upon which responsibility is imposed by Civil Code

section 206 or by sections 12100 and 12101. We therefore arrive at these final conclusions. The provisions of the Old Age Security Law (§§ 12100 and 12101) requiring adult children to contribute to the support of their parents do not thereby arbitrarily charge to one class in society the cost of public assistance to the aged who are poor or in need. A rational basis for such classification is found in, and provided by, Civil Code

section 206, which itself rests soundly on our Anglo-American legal tradition. Accordingly the liability imposed by the Old Age Security Law on responsible relatives does not deny them the equal protection of the laws. Since these provisions pass constitutional muster, they are entitled to enforcement and respondent court acts in excess of its jurisdiction in restraining and enjoining petitioner from enforcing them against real parties in interest and the class or classes of persons they purport to represent.

We are not unmindful that these provisions may involve harsh results in certain instances and we are indeed sympathetic with the plight of such persons. However, the amelioration of any harsh results must rest in the hands of the administering authorities, since these provisions are constitutional. Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed for. Wright, C. J., McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred. Appendix The Relatives’ Contribution Scale of the Welfare and Institutions Code

Section 12101, Until October 1,1971, Provided: Relatives’ Contribution Scale B. Number of persons dependent upon income . Net 1 2 3 4 5 6 or monthly income C.

Maximum required monthly contributions more $ 400 or under .. . $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 401-$ 450 ____ . 5 0 0 0 0 0 451- 500 ____ . 10 0 0 0 0 0 501- 550 ____ . 15 0 0 0 0 0 551- 600 .... . 20 0 0 0 0 0 601- 650 ____ . 25 5 0 0 0 0 651- 700 .... . 30 10 0 O' 0 0 701- 750 ____ . 35 15 0 0 0 0 751- 800 ____ . 40 20 0 0 0 0 801- 850 .... . 45 25 5 0 0 0 851- 900 ____ . 50 30 10 0 0 0 901- 950 ____ . 55 35 15 0 0 0 951-1,000 .... . 60 40 20 0 0 0 1,001- ____ . 65 45 25 5 0 0 1,026- 1,050 ____ . 70 50 30 10 0 0 1,051-1,075 ____ . 75 55 35 15 0 0 1,076- 1,100 .... . 80 60 40 20 0 0 1,101-1,125 .... . 85 65 . 45 25 5 0 1,126-1,150 .... . 90 70 50 30 10 0 Appendix The Relatives’ Contribution Scale of the Welfare and Institutions Code

Section 12101, Effective October 1, 1971, Provided: Relatives’ Contribution Scale B. Number of persons dependent upon income A. Net 1 2 3 4 5 6 or monthly more income C.

Maximum required monthly contributions $ 350 or under .. .. $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 351-$ 375 .... ,. 20 0 0 0 0 0 376-400 .... .. 25 0 0 0 0 0 401-425 .... .. 30 20 0 0 0 0 426-450 ..... .. 35 25 0 0 0 0 451-475 .... ,. 40 30 20 0 0 0 476-500 .... .. 45 35 25 0 0 0 501-525 .... .. 50 40 30 20 0 0 526-550 .... .. 55 45 35 25 0 0 551-575 .... .. 60 50 40 30 20 0 576-600 .... .. 65 55 45 35 ■ 25 0 601-625 .... .. 70 60 50 40 30 20 626-650 .... .. 75 65 55 45 35 25 651-675 .... .. 80 70 60 50 40 30 676-700 .... .. 85 75 65 55 45 35 701-725 .... .. 90 80 70 60 50 40 726-750 .... .. 95 85 75 65 55 45 751-775 .... .. 100 90 80 70 60 50 776-800 .... .. 105 95 85 75 65 55 801-825 .... .. 110 100 90 80 70 60 826-850 .... .. 115 105 95 85 75 65 851-875 .... .. 120 110 100 90 80 70 876-900 .... .. 125 115 105 95 85 75 901-925 .... .. 130 120 110 100 90 80 926-950 .... .. 135 125 115 105 95 85 951-975 .... .. 140 130 120 110 100 90 976-1,000 .... .. 145 135 125 115 105 95 1,001-1,025 .... .. 150 140 130 120 110 100 1,026-1,050 .... .. 155 145 135 125 115 105 1,051-1,075 .... .. 160 150 140 130 120 110 1,076-1,100 .... .. 165 155 145 135 125 115 1,101-1,125 .... .. 170 160 150 140 130 120 1,126-1,150 .... .. 175 165 155 145 135 125 Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, all

section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Section 12100 provides: “If an adult child living within this state fails to contribute to the support of his parent as required by

Section 12101, the county granting aid under this

chapter may proceed against such child. Upon request to do so, the district attorney or other civil legal officer of the county may maintain an action in the superior court of the county granting such aid, to recover that portion of the aid granted as it is determined that the child is liable to pay, and to secure an order requiring payment of any sums which may become due in the future. “The granting of or continued receipt of aid shall not be held to be contingent upon any court action or order or the child’s compliance with provisions of

Section 12101. “Any adult child held to be liable to make a contribution for the full or partial support of his parent pursuant to the provisions of

Section 12101 of this code may appeal to the department for modification of the required contributions. Such appeal shall be handled in the same manner as specified in

Chapter 7 (commencing with

Section 10950) of

Part 2 of this division for appeals filed by an applicant or recipient. “In the event the amount of earnings, as reported by the relative, is disputed, and it is found necessary to contact the relative’s employer, the county shall give prior notice of its intention to do so to the relative.”

Section 12101, as amended, provides in relevant part: “The ability of an adult child to contribute to the support of a parent shall be determined in accordance with this section. “The director may establish a relatives’ contribution scale setting forth the amount an adult child shall be required to contribute toward the support of a parent in receipt of aid under this

chapter provided that the

schedule established shall not exceed the amounts in the

schedule specified in this section.

Regulations of the department shall prescribe the criteria, methods of investigation and test check procedures relating to the determination of the maximum amount any adult child may be held liable to contribute toward the support of a parent to the end that the required contribution does not impose an undue hardship upon the adult child and administrative time and effort are not expended on non-productive investigative activities. “For purposes of this chapter, income of an adult child is defined as the sum of the income constituting the separate property of the adult child, the income (excluding earnings) which is community property subject to the direction and control of the adult child, and the earnings of the adult child but not of his or her spouse. “In computing net income, a flat 25-percent allowance shall be permitted for the cost of personal income taxes, disability insurance taxes and social security taxes, expenses necessary to produce the income, including the cost of transportation to and from work, meals eaten at work, and union dues, and the cost of tools, equipment and uniforms. “A responsible relative who is self-employed shall also be allowed to deduct the expenses necessary for obtaining the income. “The department, in establishing criteria and regulations for the administration of this section, shall provide for consideration of contributions made in kind. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code to the contrary, the provisions of this

section and the regulations of the department adopted pursuant thereto shall be the basis for determining the extent of liability of an adult child to contribute to the support of, or defray the cost of any medical care or hospital care and other services rendered to a recipient pursuant to any provision of this code if he is a recipient of aid under this

chapter at the time such medical care or hospital care or other services are rendered.” In 1971, the Legislature enacted

section 3 of the Welfare Reform Act of 1971 (Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 3) which amended

section 206 of the Civil Code to read in pertinent part: “It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. ... A person who is receiving aid to the aged shall be deemed to be a person in need who is unable to maintain himself by work.” (Italics added.)

Section 206 prior to its 1971 amendment read in pertinent part as follows: “It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. . . .” (Italics added.) The relatives’ contribution scale is set out in the attached appendix. Certiorari granted (1964) 379 U.S. 811 [13 L.Ed.2d 26, 85 S.Ct. 39], remanded for further proceedings (1965) 380 U.S. 194 [13 L.Ed.2d 753, 85 S.Ct. 871], and reiterated solely on state grounds (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586 [43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321, 20 A.L.R.3d 361]. Until its revision in 1971,

section 206 of the Civil Code provided for a reciprocal duty to support poor parents or children; after the revision, the

section referred to needy parents or children. (See fn. 4, ante.)

Section 2224 (as amended Stats. 1945, ch. 1319, § 2, p. 2474) provided in pertinent part: “If the person receiving aid has within the State, a spouse or adult child found by the board of supervisors pecuniarily able to support said person, the board of supervisors shall request the district attorney . . . to proceed against such kindred . . . [T]he district attorney . . . shall, on behalf of said county, maintain an action, in the superior court of the county granting such aid, against said relative ... to recover for said county such portion of the aid granted as said relative is able to pay . . . .” The 1971 revision of Civil Code

section 206 retained in identical language the provision of former

section 206 that “The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.” As stated earlier, we declined to reach this question in Boss (see 3 Cal.3d at p. 971, fn. 8) but chose rather to resolve the liability of the adult child in that case on an individual basis. To the extent that County of San Mateo v. Boss, supra, 3 Cal.3d 962 is inconsistent with our views and holding herein, it is overruled.

We emphasize that since we now conclude that sections 12100 and 12101 constitutionally impose liability on all persons within the class of children of those receiving aid to the aged, Boss should no longer be followed in determining the liability of such children on an individual basis.

We now hold that the liability is constitutionally imposed on all chldren. “[The parents, grandparents, and the children of] everie poore olde blind lame and impotente person, or other poore person not able to worke, beinge of a sufficient abilitie, shall at their owne Chardges releive and maintain everie suche poore person, in that manner and accordinge to that rate, as by the Justices of the Peace of that Countie where suche sufficient persons dwell, or the greater number of them, at their generall Quarter-Sessions shalbe assessed; upon paine that everie one of them shall forfeite twenty shillings for everie monthe which they shall faile therein.” (Fn. omitted.) (tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status,

Part I (1964) 16 Stan.L.Rev. 257, 283.) Plaintiffs’ argument is directed against the state’s right to select adult children as a class to bear the burden of supporting their needy parents both under

section 206 of the Civil Code and sections 12100 and 12101 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It is clear that the state has adopted as a matter of basic policy the position that needy aged people who have adult children should be supported by these children if and to the extent that these children are able to bear the burden. The county provides no support to those aged whose children have voluntarily met this obligation. But it does grant aid to those needy aged with children who are unwilling to meet their obligation voluntarily.

In such a case, however, the county is given the right to collect reimbursement from those children already legally responsible to support these recipients. “ ‘In the area of economic regulation, the high court has exercised restraint, investing legislation with a presumption of constitutionality and requiring merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose. [Citations.] [Par.] On the other hand, in cases involving “suspect classifications” or touching on “fundamental interests” [fns. omitted] the court has adopted an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the classification to strict scrutiny. [Citations.] Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.’ [Citations.]” Sections 12100 and 12101; Civil Code

section 206. (See fns. 2, 3 and 4, ante.) In apparent recognition of this rationale,

section 12104 provides that adult children who were abandoned for two years during their minority are exempt from the reimbursement duty. We find no merit in real parties’ contention that the provisions constitute an “under-inclusive” classification since similar liability is not imposed on relatives of recipients of aid to the blind and aid to the totally disabled. In the area of economic regulation, the Legislature may, generally speaking, proceed in piecemeal fashion.

Nor do we find any merit in real parties’ claim, unsupported by.any direct authority, that the above provisions offend constitutional principles because they, strike at the “sanctity and privacy” of the family relationship. We deem neither claim worthy of extended discussion.