THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KERMIT VARGAS CRUZ, Defendant and Appellant, 13 Cal. 4th 764

Opinion GEORGE, C. J. The question before us is whether proof that the defendant suffered a 1992 conviction for first degree burglary adequately proved the truth of a serious felony enhancement allegation as defined by Penal Code

section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18) (section 1192.7(c)(18)).

Section 1192.7(c)(18) defines serious felonies for the purpose of sentence enhancement as including “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building . . . .” The quoted language duplicated the definition of first degree burglary in effect at the time

section 1192.7(c)(18) last was amended in 1986. (Stats. 1986, ch. 489, § 1, p. 1809 [section 1192.7(c)(18)]; Stats. 1982, ch. 1297, § 1, p. 4787 [section 460—differing only in its use of the word “the” before “inhabited portion”].) In 1989, however, the Legislature added the phrase “burglary of. . . [a] vessel. . . which is inhabited and designed for habitation” to the definition of first degree burglary in

section 460. (Stats. 1989, ch. 357, § 3, pp. 1475-1476, eff. Jan. 1, 1990.) The Court of Appeal concluded that proof of a first degree burglary conviction under

section 460, based upon a burglary committed after the effective date of the 1989 amendment, does not prove adequately that a defendant has previously committed a serious felony for the purpose of sentence enhancement under

section 1192.7(c)(18), because of the divergence between the two sections that began with the 1989 amendment. We disagree. As we shall explain, the phrase “inhabited dwelling house” is a broad, inclusive term that includes an inhabited vessel. The circumstance that the Legislature amended the statutory definition of first degree burglary in

section 460, to include explicitly burglary of an inhabited vessel, does not require us to interpret the broad, inclusive term “inhabited dwelling house” in a narrow fashion when the term appears in

section 1192.7(c)(18). We conclude that proof that the defendant was convicted of a 1991 first degree burglary, a crime that may include burglary of an inhabited vessel, adequately proves the truth of a serious felony enhancement based upon a previous conviction for “burglary of an inhabited dwelling.” I In 1993, a jury convicted defendant of two counts of second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, former subd. (b) [now subd. (c)]), and one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)).

The jury also found true the allegations that defendant used a firearm in committing the robberies. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, a second jury found true the allegation that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction in 1992 for a first degree burglary that occurred in 1991. (§§ 667, subd. (a) , 1192.7(c)(18).) In a separate proceeding, another jury convicted defendant of one count of escape (involving custody for a felony; § 4532, subd. (b) ), an escape that occurred after defendant was arraigned on the robbery charges.

In yet another separate proceeding, the court revoked defendant’s probation for the 1992 first degree burglary conviction (§§ 459, 460). He was sentenced on all matters simultaneously, receiving a total term of twelve years and eight months in state prison, which included a five-year enhancement for the 1992 first degree burglary conviction. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal granted his motion for consolidation of the separate proceedings below.

Defendant claimed on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to establish a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1192.7(c)(18), and that the trial court had failed to instruct the jury fully on the elements of this enhancement. He argued the prior conviction could have been for burglary of a vessel under

section 460, a crime he claims would not be a prior serious felony conviction under

section 1192.7(c)(18). He also claimed there was instructional error at trial. The Court of Appeal agreed that proof of the 1992 first degree burglary conviction provided insufficient evidence that the prior conviction involved a burglary as defined by

section 1192.7(c)(18). The court vacated the five-year enhancement imposed under

section 667, subdivision (a), and remanded the matter for resentencing, without reaching defendant’s claim of instructional error. The People petitioned for review, claiming substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding on the sentence enhancement allegation under a proper reading of the relevant statutes. II A.

Section 667 provides for a sentence enhancement for defendants who previously have been convicted of a serious felony.

Section 667, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that “any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately.” Subdivision (a)(4) of

section 667 provides that: “As used in this subdivision, ‘serious felony’ means a serious felony listed in subdivision (

c) of

Section 1192.7.”

Section 1192.7, subdivision (c), provides in pertinent part: “As used in this section, ‘serious felony’ means any of the following: [<fl] . . . (18) burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building.” The crime of burglary is divided into degrees. For some years,

section 460 provided in pertinent part that: “Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or the inhabited portion of any other building committed in the nighttime . . . .’’is burglary of the first degree, and that “[a]ll other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.” (Stats. 1978, ch. 579, § 23, p. 1985.) Indeed, since 1923 our law has provided, with other qualifications including that the crime be committed in the nighttime, that burglary of an “inhabited dwelling house” is a first degree burglary. (Stats. 1923, ch. 362, § 1, p. 747.) In 1982, the Legislature removed the qualification that first degree burglary must occur in the nighttime. (Stats. 1982, ch. 1290, § 1, p. 4774; Stats. 1982, ch. 1297, § 1, p. 4786.) Of particular import to this case, in 1989 the Legislature again amended the section, effective January 1, 1990.

As amended, the

section added a reference to inhabited vessels. Thus, at the time defendant committed the 1991 offense of burglary,

section 460 provided in pertinent part: “1. Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as defined in the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or the inhabited portion of any other building, is burglary of the first degree. [<JD 2. All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 357, § 3, pp. 1475-1476, italics added.) B. The Court of Appeal properly noted that enhancement allegations must be pleaded and proved. (People v.

Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 312 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77]; People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 208 [249 Cal.Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013].) A judgment of conviction establishes the necessarily adjudicated elements of the crime involved in the conviction, for the purpose of enhancement allegations. The trier of fact, however, may look beyond the judgment to the entire record of the prior conviction to determine whether the previous offense involved conduct required to establish the truth of the enhancement allegation. (People v.

Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 354, 355 [243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150].) Applying these rules, the Court of Appeal held that proof of defendant’s conviction for a 1991 violation of

section 460 did not adequately prove a prior serious felony conviction under

section 1192.7(c)(18). The Court of Appeal observed that in 1991, when defendant committed first degree burglary,

section 460 defined the crime as specifically including burglary of an inhabited vessel. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the applicable definition of burglary as a serious felony under

section 1192.7(c)(18) did not state specifically that it included burglary of an inhabited vessel. The statutory definition of first degree burglary under

section 460, the court reasoned, is broader than the definition of the serious felony of burglary under

section 1192.7(c)(18). Accordingly, proof that defendant has suffered a prior first degree burglary conviction may prove the commission of a crime that is not included in the narrower definition of burglary contained in

section 1192.7(c) (18). As such, proof of the burglary conviction does not necessarily demonstrate that defendant committed the offense referred to in

section 1192.7(c)(18). The Court of Appeal also considered the record to determine whether there was other proof that defendant had committed an offense as defined by

section 1192.7(c)(18). It noted that at the trial on the prior felony conviction allegation, the prosecutor offered the clerk’s minutes of the proceedings at which defendant entered his change of plea, reflecting that defendant had pleaded guilty to violating sections 459 and 460, former subdivision 1 (now subdivision (a)), and describing the offense as “(First Degree Burglary— Residential) as set Forth in Count One of the Information.” In addition, a probation order noted that defendant was convicted of “violation of . . .

section 459-460.1 (*First Degree Burglary-Residential).” Another document, entitled “Report—Indeterminate Sentence, or Other Sentence Choice,” noted that defendant had been convicted by guilty plea of first degree burglary. Defendant’s probation officer testified that defendant was the person referred to in the probation order. No preliminary hearing transcript or copy of the information was offered. The Court of Appeal concluded that this evidence did not demonstrate whether the burglary was of an inhabited vessel, or whether, instead, the burglary fit the definition of

section 1192.7(c)(18). The court held that evidence that the previous burglary was “residential” did not adequately narrow the offense to one defined by

section 1192.7(c) (18), that is, a burglary of a residence other than an inhabited vessel, because the term “residential” is a broad term that would include burglary of an inhabited vessel. Therefore, the court found the evidence insufficient to support the finding as to the truth of the enhancement allegation. We granted review to consider whether the Court of Appeal’s conclusion was correct. Ill We examine the language and history of

section 1192.7(c)(18) to determine whether proof of a 1991 violation of

section 460 adequately supports the finding as to the truth of the enhancement allegation. In June 1982, the voters adopted

section 1192.7(c)(18) as part of Proposition 8. That initiative enacted sections 667 and 1192.7 to provide for a sentence enhancement for repeat offenders who commit “serious felonies” as enumerated in

section 1192.7. (People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826, 830 [210 Cal.Rptr. 623, 694 P.2d 736].) Although most of the “serious felonies” listed in

section 1192.7 referred to specific, defined criminal offenses,

section 1192.7(c)(18), as originally enacted by the electorate, did not. Rather, as enacted, it listed as a serious felony “burglary of a residence,” a term we noted “does not correspond precisely to the elements of any then-existing criminal offense.” (People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 832.) We explained that the electorate treated burglary of a residence as seriously as the violent felonies listed in

section 1192.7 on the premise that such burglaries are so inherently dangerous that persons who repeatedly commit this type of offense should be punished as harshly as violent recidivists. (People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 832.) In order to carry out the electorate’s intent to deter such conduct, we construed

section 1192.7(c)(18) “as referring not to specific criminal offenses, but to the criminal conduct described therein.” (37 Cal.3d at p. 832; see also People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1199 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301]; People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 347-348.) The Legislature amended

section 1192.7(c)(18) in 1986. (Stats. 1986, ch. 489, § 1, p. 1809.) Deleting reference to “burglary of a residence,” the Legislature substituted the current language: “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, or trailer coach as defined by the Vehicle Code, or inhabited portion of any other building.” (Ibid.) This language matched the definition of first degree burglary then contained in

section 460 (Stats. 1982, ch. 1297, § 1, p. 4786 [identical except for the nonsubstantive difference of an

article and a comma]), language which, as we have seen, no longer contained the requirement that the burglary occur in the nighttime. The 1986 amendment of

section 1192.7(c) (18) reflects an evident legislative intent to correct the anomaly we identified in People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d 826, that is, that the term “burglary of a residence” did not refer to any specific, identified offense. (People v. Harrell (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1445 [255 Cal.Rptr. 750] [holding that the amendment to

section 1192.7(c)(18) was intended to make it consistent with the definition of first degree burglary].) Legislative history supports the view that the Legislature amended

section 1192.7(c)(18) in order to prevent any misunderstanding, by conforming the language of

section 1192.7(c)(18) to the definition of first degree burglary. Thus, the Assembly Committee on Public Safety’s analysis of the bill stated that differences in wording between

section 1192.7(c)(18) and other provisions of the Penal Code had led to confusion and “in some cases, require special findings in order to apply Proposition 8 enhancements.” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3733 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) Far from departing from the electorate’s original intent, the bill was designed to “ ‘conform Penal Code § 1192.7(

c) to the appropriate Penal Code provisions . . . and delete those acts that do not easily relate to a current specific Penal Code provision. . . . This would end any confusion caused by the differences, while keeping true to the intent of the electorate.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3733 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) The Senate analysis provided to the Senate Committee on Judiciary reflects the same understanding that the bill’s purpose was “to correct drafting deficiencies in the Proposition 8 initiative thereby conforming the serious felony definition of that provision to related Penal Code

definitions.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3733 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 1986, p. 2; see also Sen. Rules Com., Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3733 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 1986, p. 2 [“. . . the proposed amendments are intended to conform Penal Code

Section 1192.7(c)—part of the Proposition 8 package—to the appropriate Penal Code provisions.”].) As is evident, the Legislature amended

section 1192.7(c)(18) for the purpose of making it clear that

section 1192.7(c)(18) would include any first degree burglary encompassed by the then existing language of

section 460. No intent appears to narrow the application of the “burglary of a residence” serious felony enhancement. As the court stated in People v. Harrell, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d 1439, the amendment was intended simply as a clarification of the existing provision. (Id. at p. 1445.) The language of

section 1192.7(c)(18) has not been altered since 1986. It appears, accordingly, that those burglaries that were intended to be treated as serious felonies by virtue of the 1986 amendment of

section 1192.7(c)(18) should continue to constitute serious felonies for the purpose of that provision. Keeping in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting and amending

section 1192.7(c)(18), we consider the meaning of the words the Legislature chose to employ, that is, the phrase “inhabited dwelling house.” The fundamental task of statutory construction is to “ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute.” (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420].) The words of a statute are to be interpreted in the sense in which they would have been understood at the time of the enactment. (Resure, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 156, 164 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 354]; People v. Fair (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 890, 893 [62 Cal.Rptr. 632]; see also Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 52 [276 Cal.Rptr. 114, 801 P.2d 357] [declaration of later Legislature of little weight in determining the relevant intent of the enacting Legislature].) We presume that the legislators were aware of the law of burglary in enacting

section 1192.7(c)(18), and of judicial decisions interpreting the language they chose to employ. (See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1155 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873]; Estate ofMcDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837 [122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].) At the time the Legislature amended

section 1192.7(c)(18) in 1986, no published decision in California specifically had addressed the question whether burglary of an inhabited vessel constituted “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house” for purposes of the then existing provisions of

section 460, so as to render such an offense first degree burglary. Cases interpreting the term “inhabited dwelling house” in

section 460, however, had made it clear that this term should be construed to effectuate the legislative purposes underlying the statute, namely, to protect the peaceful occupation of one’s residence. Thus, the courts had recognized that our burglary law stems from the common law policy of providing heightened protection to the residence. (People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 712-713 [125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365]; People v. Lewis (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 912, 917 [79 Cal.Rptr. 650]; see also People v.

Guthrie (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 832, 847 [193 Cal.Rptr. 54].) The occupied dwelling continued to receive heightened protection under our statutes in order to avoid the increased danger of personal violence attendant upon an entry into a “building currently used as sleeping and living quarters.” (People v.

Lewis, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d 912, 921.) As the court in Lewis explained, “a person is more likely to react violently to burglary of his living quarters than to burglary of other places because in the former case persons close to him are more likely to be present, because the property threatened is more likely to belong to him, and because the home is usually regarded as a particularly private sanctuary, even as an extension of the person.” (Id. at p. 920.) Courts specifically have recognized that the distinction between first and second degree burglary is founded upon the perceived danger of violence and personal injury that is involved when a residence is invaded. (People v.

Parker (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 818, 823 [223 Cal.Rptr. 284]; People v. Lewis, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at pp. 920-921.) This policy extends to inhabited vessels, of course, because the danger of violence inherent in the invasion of an inhabited vessel is the same as that attending any other living quarters. If, as the case law has established, areas such as an attached garage not having an entrance into the house (see People v. Moreno (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 109, 113 [204 Cal.Rptr. 17]), or a house whose owner had been absent for two years (see People v.

Marquez (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 797, 800-802 [192 Cal.Rptr. 193]), are within the above stated policies informing the law of first degree burglary, it seems clear that an inhabited vessel would be, as well. More technically, courts have explained that the term “inhabited dwelling house” means a “structure where people ordinarily live and which is currently being used for dwelling purposes. [Citation.] A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future.” (People v.

Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987-988 [217 Cal.Rptr. 612]; see also People v. Guthrie, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 838; People v. Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 484 [191 Cal.Rptr. 109]; People v. Allard (1929) 99 Cal.App. 591, 592 [279 P. 182].) The term “inhabited dwelling house” for many years has been considered a broad, inclusive definition (People v. Grover (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1187 [223 Cal.Rptr. 444], and cases cited), and has been analyzed in terms of whether the dwelling was being used as a residence. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes

(1963) Crimes Against Property, § 452, p. 415 [“The place—whether dwelling house or building— must be inhabited. This requirement makes relevant some of the common law decisions and distinctions on dwelling house. Thus, it can be any kind of structure if used as a habitation.”]; Comment, Criminal Law—Development of the Law of Burglary in California (1951-1952) 25 So.Cal.L.Rev. 75, 100-101 [declaring that the 1923 amendment to

section 460 defining first degree burglary in part as entry into an inhabited dwelling house, caused California law more closely to resemble common law, with its special protection of the home]; 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law (14th ed. 1980) § 335, pp. 207-208 [“A structure qualifies as a dwelling house even though it is a makeshift home, so long as it is used regularly for the purpose of sleeping.” (Fn. omitted.)].) Nothing in an inhabited vessel’s marine environment distinguishes it from other structures included in the term.

Certainly, a vessel’s character as an inhabited dwelling should entitle its occupants to the same protection from intrusion and violence as is accorded any other residence. Because an inhabited vessel is one occupied by a “person with possessory rights” who “uses the place as sleeping quarters” (People v. Fleetwood, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at pp. 987-988), and because the nature of such a vessel gives rise to the same interest in peaceful occupancy as any other habitation, we believe inhabited vessels were included in the term “inhabited dwelling house.” In addition, since 1977,

section 459 has explained that for the purpose of the entire

chapter (entitled “burglary”) in which the

section is contained, the term “inhabited” means “currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not.” (§ 459.) Such a definition certainly would encompass a vessel designed for habitation. We reject defendant’s argument that because vessels are enumerated in

section 459, but not in

section 460, and because they may be mobile, rather than fixed, an intent to exclude vessels from

section 460 was established before the 1989 amendment. This argument is based upon the Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Moreland (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 11 [146 Cal.Rptr. 118]. In that case, the court considered whether a recreational vehicle came within the definition of “inhabited dwelling house or occupied building” as it appeared in

section 246, a provision that prohibits a person from discharging a firearm into certain types of habitation. After concluding that the history of amendments to this

section strongly suggested the foregoing phrase did not include recreational vehicles, the court rejected the Attorney General’s contention that these terms should be interpreted broadly, as they have been construed in

section 459. The court conceded that the terms “house” and “building” as used in

section 459 have been interpreted very broadly, but opined that

section 460 had not been interpreted so broadly. (81 Cal.App.3d at p. 21.) The court declared that a “reasonable inference” could be drawn that because a recreational vehicle is enumerated in

section 459 (as a “house car”), defining burglary, but not specifically enumerated in

section 460, it is not included in the term “inhabited dwelling house” as contained in

section 460. (81 Cal.App.3d at p. 21.) We do not believe that the Legislature would conclude from People v. Moreland, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d 11, that any structure listed in

section 459—but not specifically enumerated in

section 460—was excluded from the latter section. The Moreland opinion did not purport to establish such a broad rule, nor would such a rule be at all reasonable, since many structures that are enumerated in

section 459 but not mentioned in

section 460, most notably “room,” “tenement,” and “apartment,” long have been understood as included in the term “inhabited dwelling house.” (See People v. Fleetwood, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 988.) As for the claim that People v. Moreland, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d 11, establishes that only a structure fixed to the ground may be considered an “inhabited dwelling house,” and that the Legislature so must have understood

section 460 after the Moreland opinion was decided, we reject that claim and find no support for it in the Moreland opinion itself. That opinion merely observed that cases interpreting

section 459 had interpreted the statute broadly, noting (among other observations) the absence of any requirement that the structure entered be fixed to realty. (81 Cal.App.3d at p. 21.) The court then contrasted the one case it was able to find that suggested a narrower

interpretation of

section 460. (People v. Moreland, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d. at p. 21.) As we have explained, later cases made it clear, however, that the terms used in

section 460, like those used in

section 459, are subject to a broad

interpretation (People v. Grover, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 1187; see also People v. Fleetwood, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 987; People v. Guthrie, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 838; People v. Cardona, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 484.) Nor have we found any case indicating that an inhabited dwelling house must be set on a foundation in order to be subject to the protection provided by the additional punishment set forth under

section 460. (See Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) p. 256 [“A regular place of abode is a ‘dwelling house’ for purposes of burglary, moreover, even if it is on wheels and not restricted to a particular locality.”]; but see Annot. (1961) 78 A.L.R.2d 778, 780 [asserting that a “building” is a structure erected upon land].) Although we have not found any California case (decided either prior to or subsequent to the 1986 amendment) that has discussed the precise issue whether burglary of an inhabited vessel constitutes a burglary of an “inhabited dwelling house,” the reasoning of the prior California cases broadly interpreting the term “inhabited dwelling house” as used in

section 460 fully supported the conclusion that burglary of an inhabited vessel would constitute burglary within the meaning of that statute. Furthermore, although the question of the application of

section 460 to burglary of an inhabited vessel had not yet been presented in California, the Minnesota Supreme Court had held several years earlier that burglary of a houseboat cabin is a burglary of a “building,” where the statute defined “building” as a “ ‘dwelling or other structure suitable for affording shelter for human beings.’ ” (State v. Vredenberg (Minn. 1978) 264 N.W.2d 406, 406-407; see also Shoemaker v.

State (Alaska Ct.App. 1986) 716 P.2d 391, 392 [burglary of fishing vessel is burglary of dwelling, where statute defines dwelling as a building designed for or used as a home, and defines building to include vessels].) We properly may assume that when the electorate enacted the five-year enhancement provided in sections 667 and 1192.7(c)(18) for serious felonies committed by repeat offenders, it was responding to the same concern—that burglary of a residence was likely to escalate into violence— expressed in the above cases interpreting the language of

section 460. And, as we have shown, at the time the Legislature amended

section 1192.7(c)(18) to conform its provisions to the definition of first degree burglary contained in

section 460, it shared the electorate’s intent to deter recidivism involving such a dangerous crime. Accordingly, in light of (1) the prior California cases broadly interpreting the term “dwelling house” for purposes of

section 460, (2) the legislative objective underlying this statutory language (that is, recognition of the increased danger and gravity of a residential burglary), and (3) the out-of-state cases construing similar language to include burglary of an inhabited vessel, we believe the term “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house,” when incorporated into

section 1192.7(c)(18) in 1986, encompassed burglary of an inhabited vessel. Because the language of

section 1192.7(c)(18) has remained unchanged since 1986, it follows that the phrase “burglary of an inhabited dwelling house,” as used in that section, continues to include burglary of an inhabited vessel. Thus, an individual who has suffered a conviction for burglary of an inhabited vessel has sustained a conviction of a “serious felony” that will support a five-year enhancement under

section 667. In arguing against this conclusion, defendant relies upon the amendment to

section 460 enacted in 1989, three years after the enactment of the relevant provisions of

section 1192.7(c)(18). As noted, this amendment to

section 460 expressly included inhabited vessels within the ambit of first degree burglary. Defendant urges that subsequent to (and as a result of) this amendment, the term “inhabited dwelling house” must be given a more restrictive meaning, so as to exclude vessels from the provisions of both

section 460 and

section 1192.7(c)(18). On the face of the statute, no such

interpretation is required. Although the added reference to inhabited vessels makes explicit the inclusion of vessels among the habitations protected by the first degree burglary law, it does not compel the conclusion that the inclusive term “inhabited dwelling house” thereafter must be read more narrowly. It would be anomalous to conclude the Legislature intended thereby to narrow the general definition of first degree burglary, while making it explicit that marine habitations are equally protected under the law from criminal intrusion.

It would be even more anomalous to conclude that the Legislature intended to restrict the scope of serious felony enhancements for first degree burglaries, while making it clear it intended to punish burglary of an inhabited vessel to the same extent as any other first degree burglary. We discern no indication that the Legislature, in amending

section 460 to specify that burglary of an inhabited vessel is first degree burglary, intended to put prosecutors to the task of demonstrating that a prior first degree burglary conviction (perhaps obtained in a distant jurisdiction, many years earlier) did not involve an inhabited vessel (or, as the statute later was amended to provide, a floating home), in order to prove that the defendant had incurred a prior serious felony conviction.

Defendant points to the legislative history of the 1989 amendment, indicating the Legislature was informed that séction 460 did not already punish burglary of an inhabited vessel as a first degree burglary. Indeed, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest and other sources apparently so informed the Legislature. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 162 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.); Assem. 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 162 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) p. 2; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 162 (1989-1990 Reg.

Sess.) as introduced, pp. 1-2, 4.) Obviously, these declarations do not have the force of law, for the

interpretation of law is a judicial function. (City of Sacramento v. Public Employees’ Retirement System (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 786, 795 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 545].) We are not bound, accordingly, by the misinformation delivered to the Legislature, when the amendment itself showed no intent to narrow the definition of “inhabited dwelling house.” To the extent these sources reflect the Legislature’s understanding, or more accurately, misunderstanding, that it was expanding the reach of

section 460 when it amended that statute in 1989 to provide that burglary of an inhabited vessel should be treated as first degree burglary, this circumstance does not afford any justification for restricting or narrowing the scope of the previously enacted provisions of

section 1192.7(c)(18), so as to exclude burglary of an inhabited vessel from the category of burglaries covered by

section 1192.7(c)(l8). It is well established, of course, that when the Legislature declares that an amendment is intended simply to “clarify” the meaning of a preexisting version of a statute, such a declaration is not determinative as to the meaning of the earlier version. (See, e.g., Peralta Community College Dist. v.

Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 52 Cal.3d 40, 52 [such declarations are “of little weight”].) Because the determination of the meaning of statutes is a judicial function, a court, faced with the question of determining the scope of the earlier version, still must ascertain from all the pertinent circumstances and considerations whether the subsequent amendment actually constitutes a modification or instead a clarification of the preexisting provision. (Ibid.; see also Harris v.

Capital Growth Investors XIV, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p.1158, fn. 6 [noting that subsequent legislative declarations are not binding as to the intent of the Legislature that enacted the statute, and observing that the Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute]; Del Costello v. State of California (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 887, 893, fn. 8 [185 Cal.Rptr. 582] [the Legislature has no authority to declare what it meant in an earlier enactment]; but see Eu v.

Chacon (1976) 16 Cal.3d 465, 470 [128 Cal.Rptr. 1, 546 P.2d 289] [such a legislative statement is not binding, but may supply evidence of earlier legislative intent]; California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 213-214 [187 P.2d 702] [same]; City of Sacramento v. Public Employees’ Retirement System, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.) By analogy, when a court is called upon to determine the scope of an earlier version of an existing statute, the Legislature’s assumption that its current amendment represents an expansion of an earlier provision cannot be determinative of the question.

Under such circumstances, a court still must examine all of the relevant considerations in performing its function of deciding the proper

interpretation of the preexisting provision. For the reasons explained above, we conclude the preexisting language of

section 460, as incorporated into

section 1192.7(c)(18) in 1986, properly should be interpreted as having encompassed burglary of an inhabited vessel. This conclusion is consistent with the overall purpose of the 1989 amendment to

section 460. Nothing in the legislative history of that amendment remotely suggests that the Legislature intended to restrict the reach of the then existing provisions of

section 1192.7(c)(18) to exclude burglary of an inhabited vessel from the statute. Indeed, such a restriction would conflict directly with the fundamental legislative purpose of the 1989 amendment of

section 460, by requiring that burglary of an inhabited vessel be treated differently—and punished less severely—than burglary of inhabited land-based premises for purposes of determining whether the burglary constituted a serious felony. The 1989 amendment to

section 460, on the other hand, obviously reflected the Legislature’s intent that burglary of an inhabited vessel be treated equivalently to burglary of a land-based residence. The Court of Appeal recognized in this case that there was authority for giving an expansive reading to the term “inhabited dwelling house” as used in both sections 460 and 1192.7(c)(18), and for concluding the term would include an inhabited vessel. Nonetheless, the court felt constrained to reach a different conclusion in order to avoid violating a rule of statutory construction.

That rule directs courts to avoid interpreting statutory language in a manner that would render some part of the statute surplusage. (See Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 484 [208 Cal.Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272]; City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell (1982) 32 Cal.3d 47, 54 [184 Cal.Rptr. 713, 648 P.2d 935].) The Court of Appeal reasoned that, in the event it were to interpret

section 1192.7(c)(18) and its reference to “inhabited dwelling house” to include the burglary of a vessel, the reference in

section 460 to vessels would be redundant. Defendant also urges that we consider the “established rule of construction that ambiguities in penal statutes are to be construed most favorably to the accused.” (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1011 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].) We have said that in interpreting a statute, “ ‘ “[i]f possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of

an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” ’ ” (DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 388, italics added.) Rules such as those directing courts to avoid interpreting legislative enactments as surplusage are mere guides and will not be used to defeat legislative intent. (See Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 811 [151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R. 324]; see also Bledstein v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 160-161 [208 Cal.Rptr. 428]; People v. Hacker Emporium, Inc. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 474, 477 [93 Cal.Rptr. 132].) As we already have stressed, the fundamental goal of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature. (People v. Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 898; Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) To the extent that uncertainty remains in interpreting statutory language, “consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular

interpretation” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]), and both legislative history and the “wider historical circumstances” of the enactment may be considered. (Ibid.) Further, ambiguities are not interpreted in the defendant’s favor if such an

interpretation would provide an absurd result, or a result inconsistent with apparent legislative intent. (People v. Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 899.) As we have shown, the

interpretation proposed by defendant is quite inconsistent with the Legislature’s evident intent in amending

section 1192.7(c)(18)—an intent to effectuate the desire of the electorate to enhance the sentences imposed on recidivists who have committed a prior residential burglary. Nothing contained in the subsequent amendment to

section 460 was intended to limit the applicability of the

section 1192.7(c)(18) enhancement. The amendment to

section 460 was intended, rather, to ensure that vessels would receive the same protection as other habitations. We would contravene the intent and purpose of the Legislature that amended

section 460 in 1989, if, out of a perceived need to avoid rendering statutory language “surplusage,” we were to construe the Legislature’s addition of language to

section 460 (mandating equivalent first degree treatment for burglary of an inhabited vessel and burglary of a land-based residence) as having exactly the opposite effect with respect to the enhancement provisions of

section 1192.7(c)(18). Sound principles of statutory construction dictate against our arriving at such an unreasonable conclusion. Defendant asks us to examine related amendments to the definition of first degree robbery, and the sentence enhancement for certain prior residential robberies. He argues these amendments demonstrate that the Legislature purposefully omitted parallel amendments to the burglary provision contained in

section 1192.7(c)(18). Defendant points out that, before 1990,

section 212.5, subdivision (a), defined first degree robbery as (among other things) “robbery which is perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house or trailer coach, as defined in the Vehicle Code, or the inhabited portion of any other building.” (Stats. 1986, ch. 1428, § 2, p. 5123; see also former

section 213.5, added by Stats. 1982, ch. 1293, § 2, p. 4783.) The

section was amended effective January 1, 1990, to include robbery of “a vessel, as defined in

Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 361, § 1, p. 1486.) The amendment, defendant points out, was nearly identical to the amendment of

section 460, enacted in the same year. In addition, defendant asks us to consider

section 667.5, subdivision (c)(9), which provides for a sentence enhancement for a prior prison term for certain violent felonies, including robbery of an inhabited dwelling house committed with personal use of a deadly weapon. Defendant points out that prior to its amendment in 1991, this statute encompassed “robbery perpetrated in an inhabited dwelling house or trailer coach, as defined in the Vehicle Code, or in the inhabited portion of any other building.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 611, § 1, p. 1953.) The statute was amended effective January 1, 1992, to include robbery of a “vessel, as defined in

Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 451, § 1.) Defendant would have us infer from the Legislature’s failure to insert parallel amendments into

section 1192.7(c) (18) that it intended that burglary of a vessel not be considered a serious felony for the purpose of the five-year enhancement provided under

section 667. Defendant points out the Legislature did have occasion to amend

section 1192.7(c)(18) in the years after the amendment of

section 460, but did not amend the statute to conform to the amendment of

section 460, as it did with respect to sections 667.5, subdivision (c)(9), and 212.5, subdivision (a). The circumstance that the Legislature did not enact a clarifying amendment to

section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18), as it did with respect to sections 212.5 and 667.5, does not signify that the term “inhabited dwelling house,” as used in

section 1192.7(c)(18), does not include inhabited vessels. There is no indication that the Legislature considered and rejected such an amendment to

section 1192.7(c)(18), and we frequently have expressed reluctance to draw conclusions concerning legislative intent from legislative silence or inaction. (See, e.g., People v. King (1993) 5 Cal.4th 59, 77 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 233, 851 P.2d 27]; Ornelas v. Randolph (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1095,1108 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 847 P.2d 560]; Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV, supra, 52 Cal.3d atp. 1156; Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1349 [241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299].) In light of our foregoing discussion of the legislative history of these various provisions, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument in this regard. In

summary, it is clear that when the electorate originally enacted sections 667 and 1192.7, imposing a five-year sentence enhancement for serious felonies, it intended to enhance recidivist sentences to be imposed when a prior residential burglary is involved, having concluded that residential burglary is as potentially dangerous as other listed serious felonies. (People v. Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 831-832; see also People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 347-348.) The Legislature, in amending

section 1192.7(c)(18) in 1986 to conform the statute to the definition of first degree burglary, simply intended to eliminate any uncertainty caused by the electorate’s reference to conduct not matching a specific definition of a crime. By enacting this amendment, the Legislature attempted to ensure that the intent of the electorate—to treat residential burglary as a serious felony-—would be carried out. Nothing in the 1989 amendment to

section 460 was intended to limit the applicability of the enhancement provided by

section 1192.7(c)(18). The 1989 amendment was intended simply to ensure that vessels would receive the same protection as other habitations; it would be wholly anomalous to conclude that this enactment had the unintended effect of creating a class of first degree residential burglary—“burglary of an inhabited vessel”—that would escape the enhancement otherwise provided by

section 1192.7(c)(18). To avoid any possible misunderstanding, we emphasize that in reaching our decision, we reject any argument that this court must, or should, add to

section 1192.7(c)(18) a reference to inhabited vessels in order to correct a legislative oversight. We have not added words to

section 1192.7(c)(18), nor have we rewritten that provision. Rather, we have attempted to ascertain the most reasonable

interpretation of the Legislature’s intent in enacting

section 1192.7(c)(18), as amended in 1986, in light of the statutory language, the prior California authorities broadly interpreting that language, and out-of-state decisions and secondary authority construing similar language to include burglary of an inhabited vessel. IV The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Kennard, J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Brown, J., concurred. All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

In light of our reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the claim of instructional error should be considered by that court on remand.

Section 460 again was amended, effective January 1, 1992. The amendment added “floating home, as defined in subdivision (

d) of

Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code” to the definition of first degree burglary. (Stats. 1991, ch. 942, § 15.) As the Court of Appeal pointed out, defendant’s conviction reflects the offense as defined at the time he committed the crime, when the “floating home” language was not included in

section 460. Throughout the opinion, we refer to

section 460 as amended in 1989, unless otherwise indicated. (See Stats. 1989, ch. 357, § 3, pp. 1475-1476.) As we have explained, “it is well established that reports of legislative committees and commissions are part of a statute’s legislative history and may be considered when the meaning of a statute is uncertain. (See Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 653, 659 [156 Cal.Rptr. 733, 596 P.2d 1149]; People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [217 P.2d 1]; Southern Pac. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1942) 19 Cal.2d 271, 278-279 [120 P.2d 880]; Planned Protective Services, Inc. v.

Gorton (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1, 15 [245 Cal.Rptr. 790]; People v. Martinez (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 15, 22 [239 Cal.Rptr. 272]; Maben v. Superior Court (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 708, 713 [63 Cal.Rptr. 439].) The United States Supreme Court has long followed a similar practice in using committee reports as an aid in construing federal legislation. (See Commissioner v. Bilder (1962) 369 U.S. 499, 502-505 [8 L.Ed.2d 65, 68-69, 82 S.Ct. 881]; Wright v.

Vinton Branch (1937) 300 U.S. 440, 463, fn. 8 [81 L.Ed. 736, 744, 57 S.Ct. 556, 112 A.L.R. 1455].) The rationale for considering committee reports when interpreting statutes is similar to the rationale for considering voter materials when construing an initiative measure. In both cases it is reasonable to infer that those who actually voted on the proposed measure read and considered the materials presented in explanation of it, and that the materials therefore provide some indication of how the measure was understood at the time by those who voted to enact it.” (Hutnick v.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 465, fn. 7 [253 Cal.Rptr. 236, 763 P.2d 1326].) One case did affirm a second degree burglary conviction for burglary of a cabin cruiser at night, but the case does not discuss whether the crime could have been charged and proved as a first degree burglary. (People v. Holt (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 42 [198 P.2d 58].) Later authorities confirm the view that the term “inhabited dwelling house” is subject to a broad

interpretation, but we do not rely on them as they were not available to the Legislature when

section 1192.7(c)(18) was amended. (See People v. Wilson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1488 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 77] [tent qualifies as inhabited dwelling house]; People v. Wilson (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 611, 615 [256 Cal.Rptr. 422] [holding locked bedroom within boarding house is inhabited dwelling house, and observing that “courts have traditionally analyzed first degree burglary ‘in terms of whether the dwelling was being used as a residence’ ”]; People v.

Deay (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 280, 284 [239 Cal.Rptr. 406] [collecting cases establishing that “courts have consistently analyzed first degree burglary in terms of whether the dwelling was being used as a residence”]; see also 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law (15th ed. 1995) § 325, p. 256 [noting that dwelling house may be a fishing vessel for purpose of burglary law]; Annot. (1989) 68 A.L.R.4th 425, 449, § 16 [noting that a houseboat cabin is a building for the purpose of a burglary statute]; id. at p. 498, § 70 [vessel cabin subject to burglary].)

Section 459 provides in pertinent part: “Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, bam, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, as defined in

Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as defined in subdivision (

d) of

Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container. . . trailer coach . . . house car . . . is guilty of burglary.” Reference to floating homes was added in 1991. (Stats. 1991, ch. 942, § 14.) The People have asked us to take judicial notice of various letters and legislative staff analyses related to this legislation. The request that we take judicial notice of legislative staff analyses in this connection is granted. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459; DuBois v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 393 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 523, 853 P.2d 978]; Southern Cal. Gas Co. v.

Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 653, 659 [156 Cal.Rptr. 733, 596 P.2d 1149].) We do not rely, however, on evidence of the individual views of proponents of legislation. (See Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062, fn. 5 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 907 P.2d 1057].) Accordingly, we deny the request to take judicial notice of a letter received by the legislator who introduced the bill, requesting that such a bill be introduced, and of a letter sent by the proponent of the bill to the Governor, urging that he approve the bill.