MARY H. BRILL et al., Appellants, v. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (a Body Politic) et al., Defendants; CITY OF LOS ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent; EUGENE W. BRITT, Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (a Body Politic) et al., Defendants; CITY OF LOS ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent; DANIEL M. HUNSAKER, Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (a Body Politic) et al., Defendants; CITY OF LOS ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent; MARY H. BRILL, Appellant, v. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (a Body Politic) et al., Defendants; CITY OF LOS ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent; ROSE H. STEEHLER, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (a Body Politic) et al., Defendants; CITY OF LOS ANGELES (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent, 16 Cal. 2d 726

CARTER, J. These several causes for the recovery of taxes based on alleged excessive assessments for the year 1932 have been consolidated and are before us on appeals from judgments on the pleadings in favor of the defendant city. In each cause the tax sought to be recovered had been assessed and collected by the defendant county for and on behalf of the defendant city. So far as pertinent here,

section 6 of

article XI of the Constitution provides that “Cities and towns . . . may, by charter provision or amendment, provide for the performance by county officers of certain of their municipal functions.” Accordingly, the charter of the defendant city, adopted in 1925, provided in

section 2 thereof that the city “shall have the right and power, subject to the restrictions in this charter contained ... to transfer or consolidate functions of the city government to or with appropriate functions of the state or county government . . . ” The transfer by the city to the county of the taxing function was contained in

section 342 of the charter which, in part, declared that “Until otherwise provided by ordinance, the city shall continue to use, for purposes of municipal taxation, the county system of assessment and tax collection ...” The city has never “otherwise provided by ordinance” but, on the contrary, and in furtherance of its transfer of the taxing function to the county, has provided by ordinance that “Any taxes, together with any penalties thereon heretofore or hereafter paid for the use of or on behalf of the City of Los Angeles may be refunded by the County Auditor in all cases where a refund of county taxes and penalties thereon is provided for under the provisions of

Part III, Title IX of the Political Code of the State of California.” (Ordinance 40302, adopted May 13, 1920, as amended by Ordinance 45027, approved November 14, 1922). Sections 3804 and 3819 of the Political Code, which prescribe distinct and under certain circumstances cumulative methods or remedies for the refund and recovery of taxes (Stewart Law & Collect. Co. v. County of Alameda, 142 Cal. 660 [76 Pac. 481]), are found in the title and part of the Political Code designated in the ordinance.

In view of the above-mentioned transfer or consolidation of the taxing function, the respective plaintiffs in the several causes now before us, paid the city taxes here sought to be recovered to the county tax collector. Conformably with the provisions of

section 3819, supra, the payments were made under written protest and these consolidated actions to recover the same were respectively commenced within six months thereafter. In order to preclude any uncertainty in the matter, it is well to here state that inasmuch as the alleged illegality in the taxes sought to be recovered arose out of asserted excessive assessments, the several taxpayers prior to suit unsuccessfully had taken the required preliminary precaution of challenging the same before the board of supervisors sitting as a board of equalization. As stated, these several actions were commenced under

section 3819, supra. No claim or demand for payment (other than the objection before the board of equalization and the written protest at the time of payment) was filed by any of the plaintiffs prior to suit, undoubtedly, because

section 3819, which authorizes an action to recover a tax based on an excessive assessment, contains no requirement for the filing of a claim prior to suit. After answer filed, the defendant city moved for and procured judgment on the pleadings in each cause on the ground that

section 376 of its charter required the filing and rejection of a demand for payment as a prerequisite to suit “on any claim for money or damages.” These consolidated appeals followed. While the several causes are at issue as to the defendant county, the trials thereof are awaiting disposition of these appeals in order to avoid the possibility of duplicate trials. In support of the judgments in its favor, the city urges, among other things, that while the provisions of

section 342 of the charter and the above-mentioned ordinance have generally adopted and committed it to the system of county taxation and refund, nevertheless, under the provisions of

section 2 of the charter, supra, its “right and power ... to transfer or consolidate functions of the city government to or with appropriate functions of the . . . county government” was at all times “subject to the restrictions in this charter contained. ’ ’ Hence, it is argued that the transfer or consolidation of the taxing function, which necessarily includes the refund procedure (Hellman v. City of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 653, 655 [82 Pac. 313] ; Keyes v. San Francisco, 177 Cal. 313, 323 [173 Pac. 475]), was limited by and subject to the restriction contained in

section 376 of the charter as to the necessity of filing a claim with the city prior to suit for refund. This argument entirely disregards the further and definitely more pertinent provision of

section 2 of the charter to the effect that “in case of any such transfer or consolidation, the provisions of this charter providing for the function of the city government so transferred or consolidated shall be deemed suspended during the continuation of such transfer or consolidation, to the extent that such suspension is made necessary or convenient by said transfer or consolidation and is set forth in the ordinance establishing such transfer or consolidation ...” The only practical construction of this provision appropriate to our inquiry is the one that suggests the conclusion that any requirement such as is contained in

section 376 of the charter for the filing of a claim with the city prior to suit, which might have application were the city itself assessing, collecting and refunding its taxes, is “suspended” during the continuation of the transfer or consolidation of these functions to the extent that such “suspension” is necessary or convenient and is set forth by ordinance. Here, as already shown, the city by ordinance, supra, had authorized refunds of city taxes where refunds of county taxes would be appropriate under the provisions of

Part III, Title IX of' the Political Code wherein, as stated above, are found sections 3804 and 3819, the latter of which contained no requirement for the filing of a claim prior to suit and whose provisions as to written protest and commencement of action within six months after payment of the challenged tax were strictly followed by the plaintiffs herein. In our opinion, as to tax refunds the foregoing definitely indicates a suspension by the city of the claim provision of

section 376 of the charter during the continuation of the transfer and consolidation of the taxing and incidental refund function, even if we assume, a point not necessary to here decide, that such general claim provision would be applicable to tax refunds if the city itself were directly exercising such function. Moreover,

section 376 appears in that part of the charter entitled “Disbursements and Liabilities" and containing sections 360-376, inclusive. Examination of those several charter sections discloses that they contain many requirements obviously bearing no relation to the refund of taxes assessed and collected by the county for the city, again assuming that they would otherwise apply. In this connection see Birch v.

County of Orange, 186 Cal. 736, 742 [200 Pac. 647], wherein it was held that the general claims provisions of sections 4075 et seq. of the Political Code (analogous to sections 360-376 of the charter) contained and prescribed requirements peculiar to the handling of general claims against a county and were therefore inapplicable to the refund of county taxes. We shall have more to say about the Birch case at a later point in this opinion. In support of its contention that the filing of a claim with it prior to suit was indispensable, the city places great reliance on the case of Farmers etc. Bank v.

City of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 655 [91 Pac. 795]. That case is factually distinguishable from the present one and does not require a conclusion herein that the filing of a claim with the city was an indispensable prerequisite to the commencement of these actions. There, as distinguished from the present case, the city itself had directly provided a complete scheme for the assessment and collection (which, as shown, includes refund) of taxes by city officers though, pursuant to charter provision, such scheme was to be “substantially" the same “as the mode and manner" for the collection of state and county taxes.

Though patterned after the county plan, the city had there set up its own complete taxing system and four of the Justices thereupon concluded that under such circumstances the refunding procedure of such city system was subject to and controlled by the charter provision as to the necessity for filing a claim prior to suit to recover money. In so concluding, the majority opinion declared that under the circumstances there prevailing it was “doubtful whether

section 3819 of the Political Code, relating to the recovery by suit of taxes paid under protest, is applicable to the city of Los Angeles ’ ’. True, the decision went on to assume applicability of the

section and stated that if applicable it would have to be construed “subject to the provisions of the charter as to claims and demands against the city". This latter holding was unnecessary to the determination of the case then before the court and was dissented to by three of the Justices. The cited case has been frequently distinguished. (Keyes v. San Francisco, 177 Cal. 313, 318, 322 [173 Pac. 475]; Birch v.

County of Orange, 186 Cal. 736, 743 [200 Pac. 647].) Moreover, it was decided prior to the adoption of the present city charter and before the city contracted with the county for the latter to collect its taxes. Here, as already stated, we have not a situation where, as in the cited case, the city itself has directly established its taxing system, though patterned after another, but, rather, a situation where it has adopted such other system and has transferred or consolidated its function to or with the county function.

Under such circumstances, and by reason of the charter (secs. 2 and 342) and ordinance provisions, supra, it must be held to have adopted the refund procedure of the county taxing system unimpaired by the general claim provision of its charter. Additional support for this conclusion is found in the established principle of statutory construction to the effect that a special statute dealing expressly with a particular subject controls and takes priority over a general statute.

Where a statute provides a special remedy for use in specified cases, a party seeking the remedy is entitled to look to the special statute for a definition of his rights, and a condition not named in the statute need not be satisfied.

Section 3819, under which these actions were brought, deals expressly and specifically with the refund and recovery of taxes paid under an asserted excessive assessment. The remedy there afforded is conditioned solely and only upon payment of the tax under written protest and commencement of action within six months thereafter.

No requirement is therein contained for the filing of a claim prior to suit and the city having adopted the provisions of this special statute should not, under all the circumstances here present, be permitted to alter or enlarge them by interpolating therein the requirement of its charter provision having to do with "claims generally. If a taxpayer, after paying his taxes, must prepare and file a claim and wait for it to be considered and rejected before he can sue, obviously he is not accorded the full right given by

section 3819 of bringing suit at any time within six months after payment. The principle now under discussion was given application in Birch v. County of Orange, supra, where, as already indicated, in an action brought under

section 3819 to recover county taxes based on an alleged excessive assessment. and paid under written protest, without prior claim, it was held that

section 4075 of the same code, providing generally for the presentation of claims and demands to boards of supervisors, was without application.

Among other things, it was there declared that “Section 3819, providing for the recovery of taxes paid under protest, under which this action is brought, makes no reference, directly or indirectly, to any demand upon the board of supervisors, but provides that after the disputed taxes have become payable, and are paid under written protest, the protesting taxpayer may at any time within six months after such payment bring his action against the county. “If he must first present his claim to the board of supervisors, it is plain that he is precluded from bringing suit at ‘any time’ after payment, and that he could not have the full six months after such payment in which to commence his action. “It was held in Clear Lake W.

W. Co. v. Lake Co., 45 Cal. 90, under a special statute for recovering damages from a county for property destroyed by a mob, that the limitation of the time to bring action to six months negatived any presumption that the legislature meant to require the claim to be presented to the board of supervisors before suit was begun. . . . “In Western Ranches v. Custer County, 89 Fed. 577, it was held, under an enactment in Montana similar to

section 3819 of our code, that the statute provided a special remedy as to taxes paid under protest and that a condition to bringing suit, not named in the statute, was not required, and that, therefore, the claim did not require presentment before suit. ’ ’ In supplemental briefs filed pursuant to this court’s suggestion, it is urged that as a result of an amendment to

section 4075 in 1931 the county procedure now contemplates in all instances that a claim be filed as a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit against a county, including suits under

section 3819 for the refund of taxes whether collected for the county or on behalf of a municipality. In other words, it is contended that by reason of such amendment of

section 4075 (the general claims provision applicable to counties) the earlier decision in the Birch case has lost much- of its virility. Without attempting to here state the many and divergent arguments advanced upon this proposition, we are satisfied after a thorough consideration of the problem that the 1931 amendment of

section 4075 may not be given the effect contended therefor. Examination of the cases decided prior to 1931 discloses that everything contained in the 1931 amendment, so far as is here pertinent, was the law at the time the Birch case was decided and that, in effect, the 1931 amendment merely served to place in the statute expressly what had theretofore existed by reason of judicial

interpretation. Thus, long before 1931 it was held quite uniformly that under

section 4075 as it then read, and under other similar statutes, the filing of a claim was a condition precedent to bringing suit on all claims, unless by virtue of some special statute, such as

section 3819, the general

section did not apply. (McCann v. Sierra County, 7 Cal. 121; People v. Supervisors, 28 Cal. 429, 430; Alden v. County of Alameda, 43 Cal. 270; Rhoda v. Alameda County, 52 Cal. 350; Arbios v. County of San Bernardino, 110 Cal. 553 [42 Pac. 1080] ; City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County, 9 Cal. (2d) 624, 628 [72 Pac. (2d) 138, 113 A. L. R. 370] (sec. 4075, supra, before the 1931 amendment). We cannot, therefore, accede to the proposition that the 1931 amendment of

section 4075 abrogated the rule of the Birch case. As matter of fact, as we shall presently show, the reasons which led to the decision in the Birch case are equally compelling since the 1931 amendment of

section 4075. As stated earlier in this opinion, the legislature (prior to a 1939 amendment hereinafter discussed) had provided two distinct and cumulative methods or remedies for the refund and recovery of taxes. One of these (sec. 3804, Pol. Code) has been frequently referred to as an administrative remedy by which, after the filing of a verified claim, the appropriate authorities may, without court sanction, direct and pay a refund of taxes. The second distinct and cumulative remedy was that provided by

section 3819 of the same code (under which these actions were brought) and may be referred to as the judicial or court remedy. Under the latter remedy it was only necessary to pay the tax under protest and sue within six months to recover the same. No claim was required to be filed and under the established principles mentioned earlier in this opinion this special statute must be held to prevail over a general claims statute such as

section 4075. Particularly, when it is noted that the tax collection and refund provisions appeared in

Part III, Title IX of the Political Code entitled “Revenue” which presented a complete scheme of property tax administration, covering every detail of assessment, equalization, levy, collection and remedies both of the taxpayer and the taxing body—while

section 4075 appears in

Part 4, Title 2, having to do with claims generally against a county and makes no express mention of tax claims elsewhere completely covered. Moreover, much of the language of sections 4074-4076, inclusive, is inappropriate and inapplicable to tax claims. Recurring to our statement that the reasons underlying the Birch decision are as potent since the 1931 amendment of

section 4075, we need only briefly set them forth as follows:

(1) The taxation procedure (collection and refund) set out elsewhere than in

section 4075 completely and adequately covered the subject, including the filing of a claim when appropriate (see. 3804); (2) the provisions of

section 4075 as to itemization, etc., of claims are not particulars which would seem to relate to tax claims; (3) if the taxpayer, proceeding under

section 3819 (which required no claim), must file a claim under

section 4075 and await action thereon, he is denied the full right given him by

section 3819 of suing at any time within six months after payment; (4) the filing of a claim is an idle act when the assessment already has been challenged before the board of supervisors sitting as a board of equalization and the tax has been paid under protest—these steps adequately serving the only purpose of a claim, viz., to notify the governmental entity of the challenge to the tax; and (5) the fact that the remedy provided by

section 3804 expressly required a prior claim, while

section 3819 contained no such requirement, is indicative of a legislative intent to afford a distinct and cumulative remedy for the recovery of a tax without filing a prior claim therefor—the only essentials being payment under protest and suit within six months thereafter. As stated, these five reasons or grounds advanced in the Birch decision in 1921 are equally persuasive today and together with the fact that

section 3819 is special in character ahd should therefore under settled principles govern a general statute such as

section 4075, point indisputably to the conclusion that the latter

section is without application to these several causes. This conclusion finds further support in the fact that

section 3819 was amended in 1937, subsequent to both the Birch decision and the amendment of

section 4075, but no attempt was then made to bring it into line with or to subordinate it to the latter section. Moreover, in 1939 the legislature repealed the two special statutes (secs. 3804 and 3819) having to do with the recovery of taxes and included their counterparts in the new Revenue and Taxation Code (Stats. 1939, p. 1274, sees. 5096-5102 and 5136-5140) again without any requirement for a claim prior to suit in the counterpart of the former

section 3819. This is strongly indicative of a legislative intention that in cases of this character the special remedy for the recovery of taxes is to be free of any requirement contained in

section 4075 for the prior filing of a claim. Any other conclusion would deprive the taxpayer of his right to rely exclusively on the provisions of the statute affording him his remedy and would necessitate a search of all other statutes and codes for possible pitfalls with respect to such remedy. In our disposition of these causes we have examined the many briefs of the parties and those of amici curiae. While we may not have specifically referred herein to all of the arguments advanced, we have carefully considered them and are satisfied that what we have said adequately disposes of the causes.

The judgments are and each of them is reversed with directions to the trial court to proceed with the trials of the several causes. Edmonds, J., Peters, J., pro tem., and Pullen, J., pro tem., concurred.