RICHARD GREEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RALEE ENGINEERING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent, 19 Cal. 4th 66

Opinion CHIN, J. May administrative regulations be a source of fundamental public policy that limits an employer’s right to discharge an otherwise at-will employee? Although our Legislature has determined that an emplovment contract is generally terminable at either-party’s will (Lab. Code, § 2922), we have created a narrow exception to this ..rule, by-recognizing that an employer’s right to discharge an at-will employee is subject to limits that fundamental public policy imposes. (Tameny v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172 [164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, 9 A.L.R.4th 314] (Tameny).) In Tameny, we drew from Petermann v.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 184 [344 P.2d 25] (Petermann) to hold that at-will employees may recover tort damages from their employers if they can show they were discharged in contravention of fundamental public policy. (Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 177.) Both Tameny and Petermann relied on substantial public policy concerns to limit the employer’s discharge right, and subsequent cases have recognized similarly narrow public policy violations for discriminatory or retaliatory termination. (Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 172; Petermann, supra, 174 Cal.App.2d at p. 188 [perjury]; Stevenson v.

Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 894 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157] (Stevenson) [age discrimination]; Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 90-91 [276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373] [sex discrimination].) Following Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, this court explained that employees who assert Tameny claims must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v.

Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680] (Gantt).) Here, we address a related, albeit narrow issue. We must decide whether particular administrative regulations implementing the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1301 et seq., now § 40101 et seq.), a public safety statute that created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), should be included as a source of fundamental public policy that limits an employer’s right to discharge an at-will employee. Like the Court of Appeal, we conclude they should.

We continue to believe that, aside from constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to declare the public policy of the state. (See AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 818, 824, fn. 10 [274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253]; see also Hentzel v.

Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 297 [188 Cal.Rptr. 159, 35 A.L.R.4th 1015] [Courts must not “mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law.”].) Recognizing this important distinction, however, does not allow us to ignore the fact that statutorily authorized regulations that effectuate the Legislature’s purpose to ensure commercial airline safety are “tethered to” statutory provisions.

We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment in favor of Richard Green (plaintiff) and against Ralee Engineering Company (defendant), and we remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this judgment. Discussion A.

Summary Judgment Rules Because the case arises out of a

summary judgment motion that the trial court originally granted, we initially note that under the 1992 and 1993 amendments to Code of Civil Procedure

section 437c, a defendant moving for

summary judgment “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the [plaintiff’s] cause of. action . . . cannot be established . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) Once the defendant satisfies this obligation, the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).) Both the trial courts and the appellate courts apply these principles in resolving

summary judgment motions. “On appeal, however, the appellate court conducts an independent review of the trial court’s resolution of questions of law. [Citations.]” (Davis v. Consolidated Freightways (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 354, 360 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 438].) Keeping these rules in mind, we turn our attention to defendant’s appeal. B. Facts The principal facts alleged are these: Defendant manufactures fuselage and wing components for military and civilian aircraft. It supplies those parts to major airline assembly companies such as Boeing and to major war plane assembly companies such as Northrop.

In 1968, defendant hired plaintiff as a quality control inspector. Plaintiff was an at-will employee, and, as such, could be discharged at any time, and for any reason not otherwise prohibited by law. (§ 2922.) By the early 1990’s, plaintiff was in his 50’s and working the night shift as part of a 4-member team inspecting aircraft parts before defendant shipped them to Boeing, Northrop, and other aviation companies. Beginning in 1990, plaintiff allegedly noticed defendant was shipping some airplane parts even though, according to plaintiff, they failed the inspections his team performed.

On several occasions over the next two years, plaintiff objected to defendant’s practice to supervisory and management personnel and to the company president. Plaintiff made all of his complaints internally, and at no time did he complain to outside government sources. According to plaintiff, his complaints met with varying results. Defendant corrected its practices to conform to Northrop’s contractual requirements. Nonetheless, defendant continued to ship allegedly defective parts to Boeing.

In an effort to provide proof of the ongoing practice, plaintiff began photocopying the inspection reports, including some reports concerning parts destined for Boeing. In March 1991, defendant shut down its night shift, citing a downturn in orders for the parts it produced. Defendant then discharged plaintiff along with other night shift employees. At the same time, defendant retained several other night shift inspectors, some with less experience than plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a timely wrongful termination action against defendant.

He alleged defendant terminated him in retaliation for his complaints about its inspection practices. Plaintiff also claimed his complaints served a broad public policy favoring aviation safety, entitling him to tort damages even though he was an at-will employee. Defendant sought

summary judgment against plaintiff. Defendant observed it was entitled to discharge plaintiff, an at-will employee, even if it was motivated by his objections to its inspection and shipping practices, because no statute or constitutional provision specifically prohibited these practices. Defendant claimed that plaintiff could not establish his cause of action for wrongful termination as a matter of law (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2)) because “[p]laintiff’s termination was not in violation of any fundamental public policy embedded in either a statute or constitutional provision.” Defendant noted that plaintiff cited to the entire Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1301 et seq., now § 40101 et seq.) to support his Tameny claim; he cited no specific statute or constitutional provision to support the claim. The trial court granted

summary judgment in defendant’s favor. It stated that plaintiff was an at-will employee whom defendant could discharge without cause. (§ 2922.) Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. After engaging in independent research, the court identified several key federal regulations involving airline safety on which plaintiff now relies and requested supplemental briefing on whether those regulations could form the basis for plaintiff’s public policy claim. The court considered defendant’s contention that during the pretrial discovery phase plaintiff failed to produce the appropriate statutes to support his assertion at the

summary judgment stage, but concluded that plaintiff had adequately identified several relevant FAA regulations as part of his opposition to

summary judgment. Finding airline safety so closely tied to the statutory and regulatory purpose, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff had established a sufficient connection between the public policy favoring safe manufacture of passenger aircraft and federal law to satisfy our rule that the public policy be based on either a statute or constitutional provision. Defendant argues principally that, even if we assume it did everything plaintiff claimed, its conduct violated no public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision.

Consequently, defendant argues, plaintiff’s discharge fails to qualify as a wrongful discharge justifying a Tameny claim. As we explain, we agree with the Court of Appeal in concluding that the federal safety regulations promulgated to address important public safety concerns may serve as a source of fundamental public policy. The regulations satisfy our requirement that the action be tethered to fundamental policies delineated in a statutory or constitutional provision. (Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 894.) C.

An Overview of Wrongful Termination Cases This case requires us to restate and reaffirm our recent cases explaining what sources may be used to support a Tameny action as an exception to our statutory employment-at-will principle (§ 2922). In Foley v.

Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 669 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373] (Foley), we underscored the term “public” in Tameny’s public policy exception by observing that the employee’s actions must further a policy affecting the public interest, which must be fundamental or substantial when the company discharges the employee. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 670, fn. 11.) In rejecting a tort claim based on an employee’s discharge after he reported to management his supervisor’s history of embezzlement, we held that alleged violations of internal practices that affect only the employer’s or employee’s interest, and not the general public’s interest, will not give rise to tort damages. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 669-671.) In other words, courts must focus not on compensation to employees, but rather on the “general social policies being advanced.” (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 668.) Even then, not all statutes (or constitutional provisions) will support a Tameny claim. “[M]any statutes simply regulate conduct between private individuals, or impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental public policy concerns.” (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 669.) In discussing whether an employee’s Tameny claim could state a discharge that actually implicated public policy, we held that “[t]he absence of a distinctly ‘public’ interest in this case is apparent when we consider that if an employer and employee were expressly to agree that the employee has no obligation to, and should not, inform the employer of any adverse information the employee learns about a fellow employee’s background, nothing in the state’s public policy would render such an agreement void.

By contrast, in the previous cases asserting a discharge in violation of public policy, the public interest at stake was invariably one which could not properly be circumvented by agreement of the parties. For example, in Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, a contract provision purporting to obligate the employee to comply with an order of thp employer directing the employee to violate the antitrust laws would clearly have been void as against public policy. . . .

Because here the employer and employee could have agreed that the employee had no duty to disclose such information, it cannot be said that an employer, in discharging an employee on this basis, violates a fundamental duty imposed on all employers for the protection of the public interest.” (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 670-671, fn. 12.) In Gantt, we discussed further the requirements for a wrongful discharge claim alleging a public policy violation.

Gantt considered whether an employee stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge against public policy after his employer terminated him in retaliation for supporting a coworker’s sexual harassment claim. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1087-1089.) The court recognized that public policy cases fall into one of four categories: the employee (1) refused to violate a statute; (2) performed á statutory obligation; (3) exercised a constitutional or statutory right or privilege; or (4) reported a statutory violation for the public’s benefit. (Id. at pp. 1090-1091.) After observing that all four categories involved statutory provisions, Gantt allowed the plaintiff’s claim, but specifically limited Tameny’s application to those cases in which a plaintiff’s public policy source is “tethered to” either a specific constitutional or statutory provision. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Gantt also observed that, in order to provide an exception to

section 2922’s at-will mandate, the policy must be “public” in that it “affects society at large” rather than the individual, must have been articulated at the time of discharge, and must be “ ‘fundamental’ ” and “ ‘substantial.’ ” (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1090; see also Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Gantt’s limitation on public policy sources (that they must be supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions) grew from our belief that “ ‘public policy’ as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and that courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care and due deference to the judgment of the legislative branch” in order to avoid judicial policymaking. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Although Gantt did not address whether its rule includes governmental regulations adopted to implement particular constitutional or statutory provisions, the court did observe the considerable disparity existing between those states adopting broad views of the public policy exception and those applying a stricter limitation on how they define public policy. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1092-1093.) Recognizing that “ ‘[t]he term “public policy” is inherently not subject to precise definition,’ ” we interpreted the term to mean “ ‘ “that principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good. . . .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1094, quoting Safeway Stores v.

Retail Clerks etc. Assn. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 567, 575 [261 P.2d 721].) In 1984, our Legislature provided “whistle-blower” protection in

section 1102.5, subdivision (b), stating that an employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing a violation of state or federal regulation to a governmental or law enforcement agency. This provision reflects the broad public policy interest in encouraging workplace whistle-blowers to report unlawful acts without fearing retaliation.

Section 1102.5, subdivision (b), concerns employees who report to public agencies. It does not protect plaintiff, who reported his suspicions directly to his employer. Nonetheless, it does show the Legislature’s interest in encouraging employees to report workplace activity that may violate important public policies that the Legislature has stated. The state’s whistle-blower statute includes administrative regulations as a policy source for reporting an employer’s wrongful acts and grants employees protection against retaliatory termination.

Thus, our Legislature believes that fundamental public policies embodied in regulations are sufficiently important to justify encouraging employees to challenge employers who ignore those policies. Like California, most sister states recognize a public policy exception to at-will employment. Plaintiff relies on cases from other jurisdictions to support his contention that a public policy claim involving commercial airline safety may be grounded in administrative regulations that serve the statutory policy. (See Pratt v. Brown Mach.

Co. (6th Cir. 1988) 855 F.2d 1225, 1237 [at-will employee not required to prove statutory violation for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, observing that statutes are “the legislative foundation upon which a cause of action of this nature could be implied”]; accord, Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co. (Tex.Ct.App. 1989) 776 S.W.2d 768, 772; McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc. (1984) 69 Or.App. 107 [684 P.2d 21, 24].) Other cases are even more to the point. In Anderson v. Evergreen Intern.

Airlines, Inc. (1994) 131 Or.App. 726 [886 P.2d 1068] (Anderson), an airline employer fired the plaintiff, a maintenance worker, when he refused to install a defective airline part.

The plaintiff alleged the employer fired him for refusing to violate FAA safety regulations and for refusing to participate in the employer’s attempt to cover up those violations. (Id. at pp. 1072-1073.) Noting that “ ‘[A]ir safety ranks somewhere in pecking order between motherhood and the American flag,’ ” the court concluded the plaintiff’s discharge for refusing to violate FAA regulations fell within the public policy exception to at-will employment. (Id. at p. 1073, fn. 8, quoting F.A.A. v. Landy (2d Cir. 1983) 705 F.2d 624, 637; see also Adolphsen v.

Hallmark Cards, Inc. (Mo.Ct.App. 1995) 907 S.W.2d 333, 338-339 [regulations may support public policy claim if regulation involves clear public policy mandate]; Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., supra, 417 A.2d at p. 512 [allowing at-will employee to base public policy claim on administrative rules and regulations]; but see Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub.

Co. (Tex. 1990) 795 S.W.2d 723, 723-724 [restricting public policy exceptions to cases involving employee’s refusal to perform illegal acts or employer’s deliberate attempt to avoid pension fund contribution].) After Gantt, we decided several wrongful termination cases that refined and explained its reasoning, including Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1256-1257 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022] (Turner).

In Turner, the plaintiff had alleged, in part, that he was forced to resign from the company (i.e., he was constructively discharged) after complaining to management about violations of internal operating practices and the company’s collective bargaining agreements. (Id. at pp. 1256-1257.) Without pointing to a statute or constitutional provision that applied directly to the defendant, the plaintiff made vague allegations that the defendant had violated the federal “ ‘Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms laws.’ ” (Id. at p. 1257.) Although Turner was a constructive discharge case, it did reaffirm our view of what it takes to establish a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of fundamental public policy. (Id. at p. 1256.) Indeed, we held: “Assuming, as we must in a

summary judgment posture, that [the plaintiff] could prove these claims at trial, none of them implicates a fundamental public policy embodied in a statute or constitutional provision. The tort of wrongful discharge is not a vehicle for enforcement of an employer’s internal policies or the provisions of its agreements with others. [The plaintiff’s] failure to identify a statutory or constitutional policy that would be thwarted by his alleged discharge dooms his cause of action.” (Id. at p. 1257.) In General Dynamics Corp. v.

Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 876 P.2d 487] (General Dynamics), we held that, under most circumstances, an in-house attorney could maintain “a retaliatory discharge claim against his or her employer ... [if] the attorney was discharged for following a mandatory ethical obligation prescribed by professional rule or statute.” (Id. at p. 1188.) Our reference to “professional rule” was specifically to the Rules of Professional Conduct, a code of conduct adopted pursuant to statute by the California State Bar with the approval of this court and binding on all attorneys in the state. (See Bus. & Prof.

Code, §§ 6076, 6077.) Although General Dynamics did not specifically address how to reconcile its holding with our earlier pronouncements in Gantt, the court implicitly recognized that Gantt’s analysis would not exclude all Tameny claims rooted in statutorily based administrative regulations. (General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) In Jennings v.

Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 876 P.2d 1074] (Jennings), and Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 892-894, we again narrowly defined what sources will provide fundamental public policy that limits an employer’s ability to discharge an at-will employee. Jennings held that the Fair Employment and Housing Act’s (FEHA) ban on age discrimination, which defines an employer as a person “regularly employing five or more persons,” does not apply to an employer with fewer than five employees. (Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 135-136; Gov.

Code, § 12926, subd. (d).) We rejected the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that, notwithstanding the exemption for small employers, the public policy expressed in the statute reflected a “fundamental” policy that would support a common law cause of action in violation of public policy under Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 1095. (Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 133.) We observed that “the inclusion of age in the policy statement of the FEHA alone is not sufficient to establish a ‘fundamental’ public policy for the violation of which an employer may be held liable in a common law tort action.

The Legislature’s decision to exclude small employers from the FEHA and the omission of any other legislation barring discrimination on the basis of age precludes finding a fundamental policy that extends to age discrimination by small employers.” (Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 135.) In Stevenson, we concluded that the FEHA policy prohibiting age discrimination against older workers supported the plaintiff’s Tameny claim after she was discharged by an employer who employed more than four persons. (Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 885.) In allowing the claim, we expressly stated the reason courts must be careful not to extend a Tameny cause of action beyond policy based in either a constitutional or statutory provision: “In the context of a tort claim for wrongful discharge, tethering public policy to specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves not only to avoid judicial interference with the legislative domain, but also to ensure that employers have adequate notice of the conduct that will subject them to tort liability to the employees they discharge . . . .” (Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Our review of the above cases makes clear that wrongful termination cases involving a Tameny cause of action are limited to those claims finding support in an important public policy based on a statutory or constitutional provision. (Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 888-890.) This limitation recognizes an employer’s general discretion to discharge an at-will employee without cause under

section 2922, and best serves the Legislature’s'goal to give law-abiding employers broad discretion in making managerial decisions. It also acknowledges the fact that fundamental public policy may be enunciated in administrative regulations that serve the statutory objective. To acknowledge statutorily authorized regulations as evidence of public policy in retaliatory discharge actions is wholly consistent with the rationale for limiting these tort actions set forth in Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 1095.

As noted above, one of the primary reasons for requiring the public policy that gives rise to a wrongful termination action to have “a basis in either constitutional or statutory provisions,” is to limit “judicial policymaking” “ Test [courts] mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law.’ ” (Ibid.) Contrary to the dissenting opinions, when courts discover public policy in regulations enacted under statutory authority, they are not “mistaking] their own predilections for public policy,” but rather are recognizing a public policy that the Legislature has formulated and the executive branch has implemented.

The question we now address is whether important public safety regulations governing commercial airline safety may provide a basis for declaring a public policy in the context of a retaliatory discharge action. D. FAA Regulations Federal regulations promoting the proper manufacture and inspection of component airline parts advance the important public policy objectives we have discussed in the cases following Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167.

In the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1301 et seq., now § 40101 et seq.), Congress declared the public interest in commercial air safety in 49 United States Code

section 44701: “(a) . . .

The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing— [¶] (1) minimum standards required in the interest of safety for . . . the design, material, construction, quality of work, and performance of aircraft . . . .” In other provisions, Congress authorized the federal government to supervise closely the design and manufacture of aircraft or component aircraft parts. (49 U.S.C. § 44704(a), (b) [establishing a system of certificates manufacturers must obtain from the FAA to produce aircraft or aircraft components].) The FAA, in turn, used the congressional grant of authority to establish an intricate regulatory scheme in order to ensure that aircraft design meets safety standards and aircraft manufacture conforms to the design.

Regulations require prime manufacturers (such as Boeing) to establish quality control inspection systems for components they produce and ensure their subcontractors (such as defendant) do the same, “(

a) Each [prime manufacturer] must submit, for approval, data describing the inspection and test procedures necessary to ensure that each

article produced conforms to the type design and is in a condition for safe operation, including as applicable . . .[¶] ... [¶]

(2) A description of inspection procedures for . . . parts and assemblies produced by manufacturers’ suppliers [such as defendant] including methods used to ensure acceptable quality of parts and assemblies that cannot be completely inspected for conformity and quality when delivered to the prime manufacturer’s plant; [¶] ... [¶] (

b) Each prime manufacturer shall make available to the Administrator information regarding all delegation of authority to suppliers [such as defendant] to make major inspections of parts or assemblies for which the prime manufacturer is responsible.” (14 C.F.R. § 21.143 (1998).) In United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797 [104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660] (Varig), the high court recognized the importance of this regulatory scheme. It approved congressional delegation to the FAA of authority to promulgate regulations and the concomitant FAA regulatory prerogative.

In Varig, a commercial aircraft owner sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act seeking damages for a destroyed aircraft.

The court held the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act precluded tort actions based on the FAA’s alleged negligence in failing to check certain items in the course of certifying commercial airplanes. (Varig, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 819-820 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2767-2768].) The court also stated that “the Secretary of Transportation has the duty to promote safety in air transportation by promulgating reasonable rules and regulations governing the inspection, servicing, and overhaul of civil aircraft.” (Id. at p. 816 [104 S.Ct. at pp. 2765-2766].) More importantly, Varig held that “[i]n the exercise of this discretion, the FAA, as the Secretary’s designee, has devised a system of compliance review that involves certification of aircraft design and manufacture at several stages of production. [Citation.] The FAA certification process is founded upon a relatively simple notion: the duty to ensure that an aircraft conforms to FAA safety regulations lies with the manufacturer and operator, while the FAA retains the responsibility for policing compliance.

Thus, the manufacturer is required to develop the plans and specifications and perform the inspections and tests' necessary to establish that an aircraft design comports with the applicable regulations . . . .” (Varig, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 816-817 [104 S.Ct. at p. 2766], fn. omitted.) That Congress delegated to the FAA regulatory power in the commercial aircraft safety context is not unusual or surprising. A substantial body of law, advancing significant public policy objectives, is found in administrative regulations that promulgate important legislative objectives.

This is especially true of laws pertaining to the protection of public health and safety. (See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300g et seq. [delegating to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency the authority to issue safe drinking water regulations]; Health & Saf. Code, § 1275, subd. (a) [authorizing Department of Health Services to promulgate regulations for health facilities]; Health & Saf.

Code, § 25150, subd. (a) [authorizing the Department of Toxic Substances Control to promulgate regulations regarding hazardous waste disposal].) The United States Supreme Court has stated that the development of its jurisprudence regarding congressional delegation of rule-making authority to administrative and executive agencies “has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” (Mistretta v.

United States (1989) 488 U.S. 361, 372 [109 S.Ct. 647, 654-655, 102 L.Ed.2d 714].) In California, administrative agencies routinely adopt quasi-legislative regulations under express statutory authority. For such regulations to be valid in this state, they must be consistent “with the terms or intent of the authorizing statute.” (California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 11 [270 Cal.Rptr. 796, 793 P.2d 2].) A valid regulation must also be “reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose” of its authorizing legislation. (Ibid.) Federal law is similar. (See Chevron U.S.A. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 842-845 [104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-2783, 81 L.Ed.2d 694].) It therefore follows that if a statute that seeks to further a public policy objective delegates the authority to adopt administrative regulations to an administrative agency in order to fulfill that objective, and that agency adopts regulations that are within the scope of its statutory authority and effectuate the statutory policy, then those regulations may be manifestations of important public policy.

Plaintiff performed the FAA-required inspections on the parts intended for use in Boeing aircraft to further a fundamental public policy: “to ensure that each

article produced conforms to the type design and is in a condition for safe operation.” (14 C.F.R. § 21.143(a) (1998).) Therefore, this regulation-based fundamental public policy may serve as the foundation for plaintiff’s Tameny claim.

It furthers important safety policies affecting the public at large and does not merely serve either the employee’s or employer’s personal or proprietary interest. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 669-671.) As we have noted, “ ' “[t]here is no public policy more important or more fundamental than the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens.” ’ ” (General Dynamics, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1183.) E. Defendant’s Claims 1.

Alleged procedural deficiencies As defendant observes, in wrongful termination cases we have rejected public policy claims that were “largely unaccompanied by citations to specific statutory or constitutional provisions.” (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1257.) We observed that the omission “puts [the defendant] and the court in the position of having to guess at the nature of the public policies involved, if any.

This kind of showing is plainly insufficient to create an issue of material fact justifying a trial on the merits of [the plaintiff’s] claims.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) Defendant contends that under Turner, the Court of Appeal erred in reversing its

summary judgment motion because plaintiff failed to identify a specific statute supporting his wrongful termination claim until he filed his opposition to defendant’s motion. Even then, defendant asserts, plaintiff did not identify the statutes on which he relied, instead citing to the entire Federal Aviation Act and the Code of Federal Regulations without explaining their application to his case. Defendant contends that the Court of Appeal should have required plaintiff to specify his claim’s statutory basis in his original complaint, or, at the very least, in his responses to discovery.

Defendant claims that, without a specific statute or constitutional provision upon which to base his claim, plaintiff’s case was deficient as a matter of law and warranted

summary judgment. (See Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 653],) After engaging in independent research, the Court of Appeal identified the regulations on which plaintiff now relies and requested supplemental briefing on whether those regulations could form the basis for plaintiff’s public policy claim. Defendant did not argue in the Court of Appeal that plaintiff should have specified the statutory basis for his claim in his complaint, and the court did not address that issue. The court considered defendant’s claim that plaintiff failed to produce the appropriate statutes or regulations to support his action at the

summary judgment stage, but concluded that plaintiff had adequately identified several relevant FAA regulations as part of his opposition to

summary judgment. Thus, the Court of Appeal properly held that plaintiff had met his burden to provide the specific statutes and regulations on which he based his claim. 2. Balancing public policy and legislative province Defendant contends that including regulations as a potential public policy source does not strike the proper balance between employer and employee that our cases require. (See, e.g., Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 889.) Defendant claims that it is improper to assume employers are aware of the fine details of administrative regulations. (See, e.g., Sequoia Ins. Co. v.

Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1480 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 888] [refusing to allow wrongful discharge action where there was no expression of the policy anywhere in the codes under which employer operated its business].) As plaintiff correctly observes, however, no reasonable parts manufacturer could read the applicable federal regulations and believe it was free to supply defective parts to airline companies.

Moreover, by allowing employees to rely on regulations that are supported by the important policies of the Federal Aviation Act, we satisfy our goal to balance the competing interests by (1) providing the employer with proper warning it is violating fundamental public policies, (2) ensuring employees are protected against employer actions that contravene fundamental policy, and (3) guaranteeing to the public that employers’ interests will not be protected at the expense of society’s most important policies. (See Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1090-1091; Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 669-671.) 3.

The FAA regulations’ effect on the public at large Defendant also contends that the particular administrative regulations here affect only the personal or proprietary interests of employers who apply for certification and do not inure to the public’s benefit.

Thus, defendant claims, no public interest exists to justify plaintiff’s claim. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 670-671, fn. 12.) Defendant asserts the provisions are not “firmly established,” “fundamental,” and “substantial” as Tameny requires (Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 172, 176-177), but are merely procedural because the regulations apparently involve the “ ‘procedural requirements for the issue of type certificates.’ ” We disagree.

The critical distinction between the facts here and those at issue in Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pages 670-671, footnote 12, is that there the violations of internal practices affected only the employer’s interest, while here defendant’s alleged misconduct potentially jeopardized airline passenger safety. Protecting airline passengers, therefore, is the relevant fundamental public policy at issue. Promoting airline safety—the subject of the federal regulations—constitutes a policy of sufficient public importance.

As plaintiff points out, travel by any common carrier inevitably concerns the public, because a common carrier’s mistake or a manufacturer’s defective

part can cause multiple casualties. Thus, the public policy that is the foundation for plaintiff’s case not only satisfies Foley’s requirement for a “public” interest, but also Tameny’s requirement for a “fundamental” policy interest. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 670; Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 176.) 4.

Notice of federal law violations Defendant claims that even if we allow a public policy claim based on specific regulatory violations, plaintiff’s case fails because his complaints focused on defendant’s internal practices and procedures, and because he did not give defendant proper notice that it violated any federal law. We cannot agree.

By informing defendant that he believed it was shipping defective parts for use in passenger aircraft, plaintiff gave defendant adequate notice that his concern involved potentially significant public policy matters because the FAA requires manufacturers to establish quality control procedures for the component parts they produce. (14 C.F.R. § 21.143 (1998).) Thus, unlike some cases in which an employer’s violation of its own internal procedures does not implicate public policy (see, e.g., Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1257), the internal quality control procedures at issue in this case are part of a statutory and regulatory scheme established by Congress and the FAA, designed to ensure the manufacture of safe aircraft. 5.

Violation of FAA regulations Defendant next attempts to refute plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove defendant actually violated any law, including the FAA regulations, or that defendant’s alleged inadequate inspection practices were, in fact, hazardous.

Defendant specifically relies on Jennings, in which we held that the FEHA statutory ban on age discrimination was “inseparable from ... the legislative statement of policy” (Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 125), and that “[i]t would be unreasonable to expect employers who are expressly exempted from the FEHA ban on age discrimination to nonetheless realize that they must comply with the law from which they are exempted under pain of possible tort liability.” (Id. at pp. 135-136.) In Jennings, however, we observed that “[t]he absence of an FEHA remedy would not negate the existence of a common law tort remedy if another law created the right on which this action is predicated.” (Id. at p. 130.) Here, plaintiff predicated his action on the important public policy Congress declared when it enacted the Federal Aviation Act. (49 U.S.C. § 44101; In re Air Crash Disaster Near Silver Plume, Colo. (D.Kan. 1977) 445 F.Supp. 384, 400 [Congress’s intent in enacting the act was to improve air safety and to prevent or reduce tragic aviation accidents.].) The significant safety regulations that the FAA promulgated to implement the act, which require prime manufacturers to establish detailed inspection systems for components they producé and to ensure that their subcontractors or suppliers do the same, are potentially implicated here. (14 C.F.R. § 21.143 (1998).) Whether or not plaintiff can prove his allegations at trial is not for us to determine.

To the extent defendant also claims that the FAA regulations do not even apply to its operations because it apparently never applied for certification under the FAA provisions, its argument also fails at the

summary judgment stage of proceedings. If plaintiff’s allegations are true, then defendant arguably misrepresented the safety of the parts shipped to prime manufacturers such as Boeing, on which information these manufacturers would foresee-ably rely for their own certification program, causing these manufacturers to submit to the FAA information that would have misrepresented the safety and soundness of some airplane parts.

Therefore, whether or not defendant itself was applying for certification, there can be no question that any representations it made that caused the certification of an airplane with defective parts was a breach of a fundamental public policy as evidenced in a federal regulation. (See United States v. Steiner Plastics Mfg.

Co. (2d Cir. 1956) 231 F.2d 149, 151-152 [airplane subcontractor that delivered a number of cockpits to the aircraft assembly company with false approval certificates attached, thereby implying they had passed inspection, violated statutory government fraud provisions (18 U.S.C. § 1001) even without proof the cockpits were in any way defective].) Accordingly, as the Court of Appeal stated: “The fact [the inspections] were performed by [defendant] as a ‘manufacturer’s supplier’ rather than by Boeing as a ‘prime’ manufacturer does not mean they were any less important to the public policy favoring safe manufacture of passenger aircraft.

Nor does it mean the honest performance of those inspections was not ‘tethered to’ the statutes establishing that policy and authorizing the FA A to promulgate regulations furthering that policy.

No reasonable component manufacturer could read those regulations and believe it was free to supply parts which failed inspection or could perform inspections that failed to meet the standards established by ‘prime manufacturers,’ e.g., aircraft assembly companies such as Boeing.” Moreover, as the Court of Appeal has held, an employee need not prove an actual violation of law; it suffices if the employer fired him for reporting his “reasonably based suspicions” of illegal activity. (See Collier v.

Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117, 1125 [279 Cal.Rptr. 453] {Collier) [“An agreement prohibiting an employee from informing anyone in the employer’s organization about reasonably based suspicions of ongoing criminal conduct . . . would be a disservice ... to the interests of the public and would therefore present serious public policy concerns not present in Foley.” (Fn. omitted.)].) Thus, though it may be unclear whether defendant, as a subcontractor or supplier, legally violated the FAA regulations, its alleged conduct in shipping nonconforming parts to an aircraft manufacturer violated the public policies embodied in the regulations.

In other words, defendant’s alleged conduct may have contravened the fundamental well-established policy “delineated in” the act and its regulations. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) That the FAA’s regulations place the burden on prime manufactures to establish quality control inspections systems, and not on subcontractors, does not imply that subcontractors may undermine or ignore the regulations by shipping allegedly defective parts to prime manufacturers.

Therefore, plaintiff’s suspicion that defendant’s conduct may have violated the act and its regulations was certainly “reasonably based.” (Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1125.) 6. Nature of plaintiff’’s claim Defendant next insists that, because the regulations and statute on which plaintiff relies are wholly federal in nature, we should not “extend the common law public policy tort doctrine” to defendant’s alleged federal law violations.

Defendant also asserts that we should bar plaintiff’s claim because neither the Federal Aviation Act nor the implementing regulations contain a provision prohibiting an employee’s retaliatory termination, nor do they provide for private civil damages. Defendant’s arguments are without merit. As plaintiff notes, Gantt holds employers responsible for knowing “the fundamental public policies of the state and nation.” (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095, italics added.) In Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 170, federal antitrust laws formed, in part, the basis for the wrongful termination claim.

The Court of Appeals of Oregon rejected a similar preemption argument in Anderson, supra, 886 P.2d at pages 1070-1072. Anderson observed that the Federal Aviation Act specifically states, “ ‘Nothing contained in this

chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this

chapter are in addition to such remedies.’ ” (Anderson, supra, 886 P.2d at p. 1070, quoting 49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1506.) When Congress amended the act in 1978, it retained the saving clause. (49 U.S.C. former appen. § 1305(a)(1).) Anderson also observed that the Federal Aviation Act provides no remedy for wrongful discharge, and it concluded that plaintiffs would have no remedy for a wrongful termination if the preemption doctrine barred them from bringing a state-law-based wrongful discharge claim. (Anderson, supra, 886 P.2d at pp. 1071-1072.) 7.

Federal law and wrongful termination Defendant relies on several federal decisions that decline to recognize an “implied right of action” directly or impliedly based on the breach of a duty stated in a federal statute, particularly where the statute already provides a remedy. (See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg (1991) 501 U.S. 1083, 1087 [111 S.Ct. 2749, 2755, 115 L.Ed.2d 929] [false statements in proxy solicitation]; Thompson v. Thompson (1988) 484 U.S. 174, 178-179 [108 S.Ct. 513, 515-516, 98 L.Ed.2d 512] [Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act]; Pavolini v.

Bard-Air Corp. (2d Cir. 1981) 645 F.2d 144, 145-146 [Federal Aviation Act provides no implied federal cause of action or remedy for wrongful discharge of private party].) As plaintiff observes, however, these cases are inapposite; they do not address the common law public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 8.

California’s public policy doctrine and plaintiff’s claim Defendant observes that California’s public policy doctrine is designed to advance “general social policies,” and not to compensate employees for specific violations. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 668.) Defendant contends that California’s interest in providing a private cause of action is to enforce the statute, not to regulate the employment relationship.

Thus, defendant asserts, the policies underlying federal statutes, and the Federal Aviation Act in particular, are neither “substantial” nor “fundamental” enough to support plaintiff’s wrongful termination action. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 668, 670.) Plaintiff notes that the cases on which defendant relies ignore the strong congruence between state and federal public policy involving air safety. (See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. (9th Cir. 1984) 740 F.2d 1468 (Olguin); Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc. (S.D.W.Va. 1989) 751 F.Supp. 585 (Tritle); Rachford v. Evergreen Intern.

Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Ill. 1984) 596 F.Supp. 384 (Rachford).) As plaintiff observes, Olguin turns primarily on federal preemption and only incidentally discusses the public policy exception, while Tritle and Rachford merely follow Olguin, with no independent analysis. (See Olguin, supra, 740 F.2d at p. 1475; Tritle, supra, 751 F.Supp. at p. 585; Rachford, supra, 596 F.Supp. at p. 385.) Moreover, numerous cases support plaintiff’s claim that a wrongful termination claim involving airline safety may stem from federal law. (See, e.g., Air Lines Pilots Association, International v.

Quesada (2d Cir. 1960) 276 F.2d 892, 894 [Federal Aviation Act’s purpose was to centralize, in a single authority, rulemaking power regarding safe and efficient airspace use]; Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. (1992) 74 Hawaii 235 [842 P.2d 634, 646], affd. on other issues in Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris (1994) 512 U.S. 246 [114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203] [airline employee discharged for reporting to the FAA discrepancies in his employer’s aircraft maintenance activities was protected against retaliatory discharge because of the state’s significant interest in avoiding harm to the flying public].) 9.

Separation of powers doctrine Defendant next contends that the separation of powers doctrine prevents the court from creating a public policy exception here because the California Legislature alone is responsible for creating new public policy. Although defendant concedes that we may recognize a public policy exists in the absence of a legislative declaration (Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks etc. Assn., supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 574), it nevertheless asserts that the Legislature spoke on the subject when it addressed at-will employment in

section 2922. In other words, defendant seems to assert that extending Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, to include “federal” public policy regarding aviation safety would effectively abrogate

section 2922. We disagree. When employers are charged with violating a fundamental public policy grounded in federal law, our cases do not require the state Legislature to have enacted an identical statute prohibiting the precise conduct alleged. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) We emphasize that not all administrative regulations can support such claims, but only those that implicate substantial public policies.

As Foley demonstrated, it is insufficient for employees to allege that they were discharged for refusing to violate a statute or follow a statutory duty; they must also allege that the statute in question was designed to protect the public or advance some substantial public policy goal. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 670.) Employees must do the same when alleging a discharge for refusing to follow administrative regulations that implement an important statutory objective.

In the case of both statutes and regulations based on statutes, courts must distinguish between those that promote a “clearly mandated public policy” and those that do not. (See Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 670, fn. 11.) Contrary to the dissents, we are confident courts will continue to be able to make that distinction.

Conclusion We conclude that the public policy behind federal regulations concerning airline safety has a basis in statutory provisions, consistent with our rule that the public policy giving rise to a wrongful termination action have a basis in a constitutional or statutory provision. (Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) Congress has specifically directed the FAA to “assign[], maintain[], and enhancfe] safety and security as the highest priorities in air commerce” and to regulate air commerce “in a way that best promotes safety.” (49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(1), (2).) Our judicial decisions favor protecting employees who vindicate important public policy interests. (See Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th 880; Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167.) Allowing defendant to discharge plaintiff with impunity after he sought to halt or eliminate its alleged inspection practices would only undermine the important and fundamental public policy favoring safe air travel.

By including significant administrative safety regulations promulgated to serve important FAA mandates as a source of fundamental public policy limiting an employer’s right to discharge an otherwise at-will employee, we effectively guarantee that employers do not exercise their right to terminate their employees at will in a way that undermines more important public safety objectives. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeal judgment and remand the matter for proceedings consistent with this decision. George, C. J., Mosk, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.

All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated. Subdivision (o)(2) was added to Code of Civil Procedure

section 437c in 1992 as subdivision (n)(2). (Stats. 1992, ch. 1348, § 1, pp. 6702-6703.) It was amended and renumbered in 1993. (Stats. 1993, ch. 276, § 1.) In the alternative, defendant asserted it was entitled to discharge plaintiff for photocopying company inspection reports without its authorization. Although defendant did not learn of the photocopying until it engaged in pretrial discovery, it reasoned that, under the after-acquired evidence doctrine, it would have been allowed to discharge plaintiff immediately had it learned of his activities at the time they occurred. (See Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 632 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 329] [affirming

summary judgment for employer based on after-acquired evidence that employees falsified employment applications].) The court did not rule on defendant’s alternative ground, and defendant did not argue that ground in the Court of Appeal as an independent basis for affirming the

summary judgment. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court favored broadly defining public policy exceptions: “The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy.” (Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1980) 84 N.J. 58 [417 A.2d 505, 512, 12 A.L.R.4th 520].) By contrast, the Michigan Supreme Court held that wrongful discharge tort actions must be based in public policies found in statutes or constitutional provisions. (Suchodolski v.

Michigan Consol. Gas Co. (1982) 412 Mich. 692 [316 N.W.2d 710, 712].) Several states do not recognize a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. (See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Products Corp. (1983) 58 N.Y.2d 293 [461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89] [refusing to recognize wrongful termination exception to at-will doctrine outside legislative declaration]; see also Salter v. Alfa Ins. Co., Inc. (Ala. 1990) 561 So.2d 1050, 1051-1053 [no exceptions to at-will rule]; Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Miss. 1987) 508 So.2d 1086, 1089-1090 [same]; Evans v.

Bibb Co. (1986) 178 Ga.App. 139 [342 S.E.2d 484, 485-486] [same]; Smith v. Piezo Technology & Prof. Adm'rs (Fla. 1983) 427 So.2d 182, 184 [same].) To the extent one can read Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 1095, to conclude that important administrative regulations implementing fundamental public policies as reflected in their enabling statutes are not “tethered to” legislative enactments, we overrule it. We emphasize, however, that our holding does not include any other potential sources of policy not discussed here or in any of our cases following Gantt.

Defendant observes that Turner suggests plaintiffs should specify the statutory provisions on which they rely no later than at the

summary judgment stage. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1257.) As noted, the Court of Appeal did find that plaintiff adequately identified the statutes and regulations supporting his public policy claim in his opposition to defendant’s

summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we need not decide here the precise time at which a plaintiff must identify the particular statutes forming the basis of a Tameny claim. Clearly, a claim that does not identify the basis of its wrongful termination allegations will not prevail on

summary judgment. Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s opposition to the

summary judgment motion failed to conform to Code of Civil Procedure

section 437c because plaintiff filed it six days late and did not file a responsive separate statement of undisputed facts. Defendant raised these issues in the trial court, but the Court of Appeal did not address them, apparently concluding they did not represent material procedural defects in plaintiff’s opposition to the motion. Because defendant did not call the issues to the court’s attention in a petition for rehearing, we do not consider them here. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(2).)