FREDERICK HOFF et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. VACAVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent, 19 Cal. 4th 925

Opinion CHIN, J. Plaintiff Frederick Hoff (Hoff) suffered serious injuries when a student exiting a high school parking lot jumped the curb with his car and struck Hoff, who was on the sidewalk across the street. We granted review to consider whether Hoff can pursue a negligence claim against the school district based on the breach of a duty to supervise the student. On the facts of this case, we conclude that neither the school district nor any of its employees owed a duty to Hoff, a nonstudent who was not on school property at the time of the accident.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held to the contrary. Factual and Procedural Background The trial court entered judgment for the Vacaville Unified School District (District) upon granting a motion for nonsuit after opening statement. Accordingly, on review, we accept as true all facts Hoff asserted in his opening statement and indulge every legitimate inference those facts support. (Willis v. Gordon (1978) 20 Cal.3d 629, 633 [143 Cal.Rptr. 723, 574 P.2d 794]; Abeyta v.

Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1041 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 680].) At the end of the last day of the 1991-1992 school year, Jason Lozano, a 16-year-old student at Vacaville High School, lost control of his car as he exited the school’s overflow parking lot and struck Hoff. In exiting the lot, Lozano had “floor[ed]” the accelerator, “peeled out” with the wheels “screeching,” “fishtailed,” and jumped the curb and hit Hoff, who was walking on the sidewalk across the street. Lozano had been driving for six months, had no history of misbehavior, and obeyed his school supervisors.

Hoff sustained severe injuries in the accident. Both the overflow parking lot and the school’s main parking lot exited onto West Monte Vista Avenue, a “very busy street.” Since the 1980’s, school authorities, who knew that young drivers “would bum rubber,” “hang out of windows,” and “ride on top of cars,” had assigned trained employees to direct traffic exiting the main parking lot at the end of the school day. These traffic supervisors could stop traffic on the street to allow students to exit the lot and could suspend students who drove recklessly or revoke their campus parking permits.

However, the overflow lot “was never supervised,” even though the school had the money and personnel to do so. Hoff filed suit seeking recovery for his injuries, naming the District as one of the defendants. In a negligence claim against the District, Hoff alleged that the District: (1) “had statutory duties, pursuant to California Education!] Code

section 44807, to supervise [its] students on the premises of the Vacaville High School, including in the overflow lot and at the exit of the overflow parking lot at the end of the school day”; (2) “had undertaken the duty and responsibility to supervise [its] student drivers on the public street, and had assumed joint control of the public street for that purpose, as they exited the main parking lot at Vacaville High School onto said public street”; (3) “owed a duty of due care to [Hoff] to fulfill [its] statutory duty to supervise [its] students on the campus and [its] assumed duty to supervise students with reasonable care on the public street as they leave the high school premises”; and (4) was “negligent in the performance of [its] statutory duties and in the duties [it] assumed by [its] conduct, pursuant to California Education Code

section 44807 and 44808 so as to cause the injuries to” Hoff. Trial against the District began in September 1996. After Hoff’s opening statement, the District moved for nonsuit, arguing that it owed Hoff no duty of care. Although the trial court had previously rejected the same argument in denying a

summary judgment motion, it granted the motion for nonsuit, finding that the District owed Hoff no duty of care. The trial court later entered judgment for the District. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding that the District owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising its students for the protection of both students and nonstudents. Wé then granted the District’s petition for review. Discussion Under the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), “a public entity is not liable for injury arising from

an act or omission except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); [citation].)” (Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 630-631 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 957 P.2d 1323].) Thus, in California, “all government tort liability must be based on statute [citation].” (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785, fn. 2 [221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 710 P.2d 907].) “ ‘In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute ... is found declaring them to be liable.’ ” (County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 479, 481 [105 Cal.Rptr. 374, 503 P.2d 1382].)

Section 815.2, subdivision (a), is one such statute. It provides: “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by

an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee . . . .” Through this section, the California Tort Claims Act expressly makes the doctrine of respondeat superior applicable to public employers. (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 209 [285 Cal.Rptr. 99, 814 P.2d 1341].) “A public entity, as the employer, is generally liable for the torts of an employee committed within the scope of employment if the employee is liable. [Citations.]” (Thomas v.

City of Richmond (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1154, 1157 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 442, 892 P.2d 1185].) Under

section 820, subdivision (a), “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . . , a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.” Thus, “the general rule is that an employee of a public entity is liable for his torts to the same extent as a private person (§ 820, subd. (a)) and the public entity is vicariously liable for any injury which its employee causes (§ 815.2, subd. (a)) to the same extent as a private employer (§ 815, subd. (b)).” (Societa per Azioni de Navigazione Italia v.

City of Los Angeles (1982) 31 Cal.3d 446, 463 [183 Cal.Rptr. 51, 645 P.2d 102], fn. omitted.) Through these statutes, “the Legislature incorporated ‘general standards of tort liability as the primary basis for respondeat superior liability of public entities. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 209-210.) Under them, “a school district is vicariously liable for injuries proximately caused by [the] negligence” of school personnel “responsible for student supervision.” (Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified Sch.

Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 741, 747 [87 Cal.Rptr. 376, 470 P.2d 360] (Dailey); see also Castro v. Los Angeles Bd. of Education (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 232, 235 [126 Cal.Rptr. 537] [under § 815.2, “school districts are liable for the negligence of their employees”].) Thus, the District’s liability under

section 815.2 depends on whether school personnel, by failing to supervise Lozano as he exited the overflow parking lot, breached a duty owed Hoff. I. No Common Law Duty Runs to Hoff To say that someone owes another a duty of care “ ‘is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself. . . . “[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ [Citation.]” (Dillon v.

Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316].) “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166] (Tarasoff).) “As a general rule one has no duty to control the conduct of another, and no duty to warn those who may be endangered by such conduct. [Citations.] A duty may arise, however, where ‘(

a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (

b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 315; [citations].)” (Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 806 [205 Cal.Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193] (Peterson).) “This rule derives from the common law’s distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its reluctance to impose liability for the latter. [Citation.]” (Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 435, fn. 5.) In this case, Hoff does not argue that a special relationship exists between himself and school personnel.

Rather, emphasizing that “a ‘special relationship’ need not exist between the defendant (here District) and victim (Mr. Hoff),” and quoting Tarasoff, supra, 17 Cal.3d at page 435, Hoff argues that “the special relationship between the School District and its student Jason [Lozano] imposes upon the School District a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the student to ‘. . . protect all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his (Jason’

s) conduct.’ ” As we have explained, “in some instances the relationship of [school personnel] to . . . students gives rise to a duty of care. . . . ‘While school districts and their employees have never been considered insurers of the physical safety of students, California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to “supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.]” [Citations.] [Citations.] The standard of care imposed upon school personnel in carrying out this duty to supervise is identical to that required in the performance of their other duties.

This uniform standard to which they are held is that degree of care “which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with [comparable] duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.” [Citations.] Either a total lack of supervision [citation] or ineffective supervision [citation] may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Peterson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 806-807, fn. 3.) In a number of cases, California courts have recognized that a student may recover for injuries proximately caused by a breach of this duty of supervision. (E.g., Hoyem v.

Manhattan Beach City Sch.

Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 523 [150 Cal.Rptr. 1, 585 P.2d 851]; Dailey, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 747-751.) However, before the Court of Appeal issued its opinion in this case, no reported California decision had considered whether the duty of student supervision that arises out of the relationship between school personnel and students may support recovery by nonstudents, like Hoff, who are injured off In considering this novel question, it is instructive to consider the limits of the common law duty that parents owe third parties to supervise and control the conduct of their children. “[A] parent may become liable for an injury caused by the child where the parent’s negligence made it possible for the child to cause the injury complained of, and probable that [the child] would do so. [Citations.]” (Buelke v.

Levenstadt (1923) 190 Cal. 684, 689 [214 P. 42].) “California follows the Restatement rule (Rest.2d Torts, § 316), which finds a ‘special relationship’ between parent and child, and accordingly places upon the parent ‘a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his minor child as to prevent [the child] from intentionally harming others or from so [behaving] . . . as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the parent (

a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his child, and (

b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.’ [Citations.]” (Robertson v. Wentz (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1281, 1288-1289 [232 Cal.Rptr. 634].) Thus, “[knowledge of dangerous habits and ability to control the child are prerequisites to imposition of liability. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1290.) “[O]nly the manifestation of specific dangerous tendencies . . . triggers a parental duty to exercise reasonable care to control the minor child in order to prevent . . . harm to third persons. [Citation.]” (Robertson v. Wentz, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1290; see also Weisbart v.

Flohr (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 281, 291 [67 Cal.Rptr. 114] [parents liable only if they “became aware of habits or tendencies of the infant which made it likely that the child would misbehave so that they should have restrained him”].) In Perry v. Simeone (1925) 197 Cal. 132 [239 P. 1056], we applied these principles to facts analogous to those now before us. There, defendants’ 15-year-old daughter negligently operated an automobile, causing a fatal collision.

On appeal, we reversed a judgment against defendants because the evidence showed they “had no knowledge of the fact . . . that the[ir] daughter was or ever had been careless in the operation of the automobile,” and that “their only knowledge and observation of the daughter’s habits in that regard were that [she] drove the car in a prudent and careful manner.” (Id. at p. 137.) In reaching this conclusion, we refused to “take judicial notice of the fact that a girl of fifteen years of age cannot possibly be competent to operate an automobile.” (Id. at p. 134.) Instead, we reasoned in part that the Vehicle Code, which then established 14 as the minimum age limit for obtaining a driver’s license, “must be regarded as a declaration that persons of the age of fifteen years may be competent to operate motor vehicles.” (Id. at p. 135.) We find it appropriate to look to these limits on the common law parental duty of supervision in determining whether, on the facts of this case, any duty of District employees to supervise students ran to Hoff.

The relationship between school personnel and students is analogous in many ways to the relationship between parents and their children.

At common law, “[s]chool officials are said to stand in loco parentis, in the place of parents, to their students, with similar powers and responsibilities. [Citation.]” (In re Christopher W. (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 777, 780-781 [105 Cal.Rptr. 775], disapproved on another ground in In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 566 [221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 709 P.2d 1287].) Moreover, by statute, we measure school personnel’s criminal liability for exercising physical control over students by the standard applicable to parents. (Ed.

Code, § 44807.) Given these similarities, any duty that school employees owe off-campus nonstudents should at least be no greater in scope than the duty that parents owe third persons. (Cf. Costello v. Hart (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 898, 900-901 [100 Cal.Rptr. 554] [looking to parental duty in considering liability of grandparents for acts of grandchild over whom they exercised control]; Poncher v.

Brackett (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 769, 773 [55 Cal.Rptr. 59] [same].) Accordingly, school personnel who neither know nor reasonably should know that a particular student has a tendency to drive recklessly owe no duty to off-campus nonstudents. This conclusion is consistent with that which courts from other jurisdictions have reached in considering claims like Hoff’s. In Thompson v. Ange (1981) 83 A.D.2d 193 [443 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919-920] (Ange), plaintiffs sustained injury when a student driving from a high school to a vocational school caused an accident on a public highway.

Plaintiffs sued school authorities in negligence, alleging they had negligently supervised the student and failed to enforce a school rule requiring students to ride a bus to the vocational school. (Ibid.) Looking to the limits of a parent’s common law duty to supervise children, the court affirmed

summary judgment for the school authorities. (Id. at p. 921.) It explained: “The uncontroverted proof was that [the student] was a licensed driver. The schools’ awareness of reckless driving by some students and their concern for student safety is not sufficient to show that [the student] was anything but the average 17-year old whom the Legislature has determined may be licensed to drive[]. There is no claim that the schools had notice that [the student] was an incompetent driver.

The risk that [the student] would be involved in an automobile accident was no greater than the risk incurred by the operation of an automobile by any average 17-year old driver.” (Ibid.; see also Wickey v. Sparks (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) 642 N.E.2d 262, 267 [premising lack of duty in part on lack of evidence student participated in horseplay or was otherwise an unsafe driver, despite school’s knowledge that some students engaged in horseplay].) Our conclusion is also consistent with Thompson v.

County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741 [167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 12 A.L.R.4th 701], There, we held that public entities have no affirmative duty to warn of the release of an inmate with a violent history unless the inmate makes a specific threat against a specific, identifiable victim or group of victims. (Id. at p. 758.) In reaching this conclusion, we noted that “whenever a potentially dangerous offender is released and thereafter commits a crime, the possibility of the commission of that crime is statistically foreseeable.

Yet the Legislature has concluded that the benefits to society from rehabilitative release programs mandate their continuance.” (Ibid.) Similarly, given the immaturity of teenage drivers, accidents caused by their reckless driving are statistically foreseeable. Yet the Legislature has concluded that the benefits to society from issuing them licenses outweigh the risks. Therefore, school personnel who lack specific knowledge about the dangerous propensities of a particular student driver have no duty to off-campus nonstudents.

As the New York court explained in Ange, “[i]t would be extending the legal consequences of wrongs beyond a controllable degree to hold that the use of an automobile by a licensed operator under these circumstances constitutes an unreasonable risk to others for which . . . schools may be liable.” (Ange, supra, 443 N.Y.S.2d at p. 921.) Under this rule, any common law duty of District employees to supervise students did not run to Hoff. According to Hoff’s opening statement, the accident occurred “off-campus,” on the sidewalk across the street from the school’s overflow parking lot.

School personnel considered Lozano a “[g]ood kid” who was “Responsible” and “never disobeyed them.” Thus, they neither knew nor had reason to know that Lozano had a propensity to operate his car recklessly (if, in fact, he did). Accordingly, they owed Hoff no duty, and the District may not be held liable for any breach of duty by its employees. II. No Statutory Duty Runs to Hoff Hoff contends his negligence claim may proceed under Education Code

section 44807, which provides in relevant part: “Every teacher in the public schools shall hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess.” According to Hoff, this statute establishes a duty of student supervision that extends to him because “[virtually all high school teachers and all parents of teenage drivers know that automobile driving is, by far, the most dangerous daily activity which teenage students are routinely permitted to do on school grounds.” “Therefore,” Hoff asks rhetorically, “if student driving on school grounds does not fall with in [>zc] the ambit of activities to be supervised under Education Code

section 44807, then what activity does?” “A duty of care, and the attendant standard of conduct required of a reasonable [person], may of course be found in a legislative enactment which does not provide for civil liability. [Citations.] In this state a presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm which the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation of the statute. [Citations.] The Legislature has . . . codified this presumption with the adoption of Evidence Code

section 669: ‘The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:

(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;

(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property;

(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and

(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.’ (Subd. (a).)” (Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164-165 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151].) “Whether the injury involved resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute was designed to prevent and whether the plaintiff was one of the persons for whose protection the statute was enacted are questions of law. [Citations.]” (Fredette v. City of Long Beach (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 122, 135 [231 Cal.Rptr. 598].) In this case, Hoff cannot invoke Education Code

section 44807 to support a negligence claim against District teachers—or, therefore, vicariously against the District under Government Code

section 815.2—because his injury did not “result[] from an occurrence of the nature which the statute . . . was designed to prevent” (Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(3)) and he is not “one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” (Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(4).) As we observed in Dailey regarding the predecessor sections of Education Code

section 44807, “ ‘the purpose of the law . . . requiring supervision of pupils ... is to regulate their conduct so as to prevent disorderly and dangerous practices which are likely to result in physical injury to immature scholars under their custody.’ [Citation.]” (Dailey, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 748, fn. 4, second italics added.) In Dailey, we also cited Education Code

section 44807’s predecessor in stating that “California law has long imposed on school authorities a duty to ‘supervise at all times the conduct of the children on the school grounds and to enforce those rules and regulations necessary to their protection. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Dailey, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 747, italics added.) Consistent with these pronouncements, Hoff concedes in his brief that, “[a]lmost unquestionably, Education Code

section 44807 and its forerunners were designed primarily to safeguard students . . . Because the Legislature most certainly did not design Education Code

section 44807 to protect against the risk of injury to members of the general public who, like Hoff, are not on school property, Hoff may not state a negligence claim based on the duty of teachers under Education Code

section 44807 to “hold pupils to a strict account of their conduct . . . .” (See Figone v. Guisti (1919) 43 Cal.App. 606, 608-610 [185 P. 694] [plaintiffs may not base negligence claim on violation of employment statute enacted for protection and well-being of minor who killed plaintiffs’ son].) Nor can Hoff rely on Education Code

section 44807 to state a claim directly against the District under Government Code

section 815.6, which provides: “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” By its terms, Education Code

section 44807 requires only “teacher[s]” to hold pupils to a strict account for their conduct; it does not purport to impose a mandatory duty more broadly on any public entity. Moreover, like Evidence Code

section 669, Government Code

section 815.6 applies only if the plaintiff’s injury is “one of the consequences which the Legislature sought to prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty.” (Zolin v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 871].) As we have already explained, Hoff’s injury does not fall within “the risk of a particular kind of injury” against which the Legislature “designed” Education Code

section 44807 to protect. (§ 815.6.) Therefore, Hoff cannot base a direct claim against the District under

section 815.6 on any duty that Education Code

section 44807 imposes. (See Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 626 [200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846] [no claim under

section 815.6 where “primary purpose” of statute was not to protect decedent from type of injury he sustained, and statute conferred only “incidental” benefit on him].) Finally, Hoff contends Education Code

section 44808 “constitutes a second, statutory basis of school district liability where a school specifically assumes a responsibility and then fails to exercise it reasonably.” That

section states in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district... or any officer or employee of such district. .. . shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district ... or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Ed.

Code, § 44808.) According to Hoff, “the District undertook the responsibility of supervising driving in one [parking] lot; thus, it is for the jury to determine whether that undertaking constituted a[n] [Education Code section] 44808 ‘specific assumption’ and, if so, whether the District’s subsequent failure to supervise the subject lot was negligent.” Hoff’s claim under Education Code

section 44808 fails. The part of Education Code

section 44808 on which Hoff relies applies only where a school district has “specifically assumed” responsibility or liability “for the conduct or safety of any pupil ... at any time when such pupil is not on school property . . . .” In this case, the decision to supervise the school’s main parking lot does not appear to constitute specific assumption of responsibility or liability for a student’s off-campus conduct.

In any event, according to Hoff’s opening statement at trial, the evidence would “show that [the overflow] parking lot was never supervised at the end of the school day.” Contrary to Hoff’s argument, this record unequivocally establishes that the District did not specifically assume any responsibility to supervise student driving in the overflow lot. Hoff cannot expand the decision to supervise the main parking lot into assumption of a general duty to supervise all student driving at the school. Thus, he cannot establish a claim under Education Code

section 44808. Disposition For the reasons stated above, we find that the trial court properly granted the District’s motion for nonsuit and entered judgment for the District. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Brown, J., concurred. Eleanor Hoff, Frederick’s wife, also sued for loss of consortium. Because her claim depends on Frederick’s right to sue the District, we do not discuss it separately. (See Hendy v.

Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 728, fn. 3 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 819 P.2d 1].) Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Government Code. Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 544 [2 Cal.Rptr. 279, 348 P.2d 887] is not to the contrary.

Although Lehmuth referred to the school district’s “duty to properly supervise the members of the student body, in order to guard the members of the public” (id. at p. 552), the injured parties in Lehmuth “were students of the college.” (Id. at p. 550.) Moreover, the school district’s liability was “a primary one created by statute.” (Ibid.) The relevant statutes were Education Code former

section 16142, which provided for organization of student body associations “ ‘subject to the control and regulation of the governing board of the school district,’ ” and Vehicle Code former

section 400, which expressly imposed on the school district “liability for . . . the negligent operation of [a] motor vehicle by an officer, agent or employee.” (Lehmuth, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 551, italics omitted.) Neither of these statutes is relevant in this case. In addition to negligence liability based on their own breach of duty, parents, by statute, have limited vicarious liability for the acts of their children. (Civ. Code, § 1714.1, subd. (a); Veh. Code, §§ 17708, 17709.) Education Code

section 44807 provides in relevant part: “A teacher, vice principal, principal, or any other certificated employee of a school district, shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or criminal penalties for the exercise, during the performance of his duties, of the same degree of physical control over a pupil that a parent would be legally privileged to exercise but which in no event shall exceed the amount of physical control reasonably necessary to maintain order, protect property, or protect the health and safety of pupils, or to maintain proper and appropriate conditions conducive to learning.” Given the facts of this case, and contrary to the assertion of the concurring opinion (conc. opn. of Mosk, J., post, at p. 951), we proffer no opinion (either express or implied) as to the existence or scope of a duty where school personnel have knowledge of a particular student’s dangerous propensity.

The similarity between Government Code

section 815.6 and Evidence Code

section 669 is not accidental. As the Law Revision Commission comment to

section 815.6 explains, “[t]his

section declares the familiar rule . . . that failure to comply with applicable statutory or regulatory standards is negligence unless reasonable diligence has been exercised ... to comply with those standards. [Citations.]” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1995 ed.) § 815.6, p. 210; see also Ramos v.

County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 695 [94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93].) “ ‘In its practical application, [the] standard for determining whether a mandatory duty exists is virtually identical to the test for an implied statutory duty of care.’ . . . [Although] there is a semantic distinction in the labels attached to each cause of action, there is no legal difference in the analytic process to determine the existence of a duty of care.” (Tirpak v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 639, 646 [232 Cal.Rptr. 61].)