THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDWIN GILMORE GARCIA, Defendant and Appellant, 21 Cal. 4th 1

Opinion WERDEGAR, J. This case presents the question of statutory

interpretation we left “for another day” in People v. Davis (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1096, 1103 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 879, 938 P.2d 938]: Under the provisions of the “Three Strikes” law allowing certain prior juvenile adjudications to be counted for sentencing purposes as prior felony convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(3), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3)), does a prior juvenile adjudication for an offense that would qualify as a prior felony conviction (a strike) if it were the subject of an adult conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), (2), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1), (2)) qualify as a strike if the offense is not also listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707, subdivision (b)? We conclude such a prior adjudication does qualify as a strike if, in the prior juvenile proceeding, “[t]he juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court . . . because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (§§667, subd. (d)(3)(D), 1170.12, subd. (b)(3)(D).) Factual and Procedural Background Defendant was charged with and convicted in a jury trial of one count each of residential burglary (§§ 459, 460) and possession of burglar’s tools (§ 466). Four prior juvenile adjudications for residential burglary, alleged pursuant to

section 667, subdivisions (

b) through (i), were tried to the court in a bifurcated proceeding. The trial court found all four allegations true. In addition, the court, rejecting defendant’s argument that juvenile adjudications could not be used for Three Strikes purposes because residential burglary is not an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707, subdivision (b) (hereafter Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b)), found the priors valid as strikes. On the prosecutor’s motion, the court dismissed three of the four prior adjudication allegations. The court then sentenced defendant to the middle term of four years for the current burglary, doubled to eight years under the Three Strikes law’s second strike provision (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)). The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting, as had the trial court, defendant’s contention his prior juvenile adjudication did not qualify as a strike under

section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(D), because residential burglary is not an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b). The Court of Appeal, following People v. Griggs (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 557 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 174], held that the Legislature’s failure to include a reference to “serious and violent” offenses in

section 667, subdivision (d)(3)(

D) was a “drafting oversight” that should be judicially corrected. We granted review on defendant’s petition. Discussion

Section 667, subdivision (d)(3) provides as follows: “A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior felony conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement if: “(

A) The juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense. “(

B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or described in paragraph (1) [subdivision (d)(1) of

section 667] or (2) [subdivision (d)(2) of

section 667] as a felony. “(

C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. “(

D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of

Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” For convenience, we will refer below to the four paragraphs of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) simply as paragraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D). Paragraph (

B) disjunctively cross-references three statutory lists of offenses: the list in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b), which establishes a rebuttable presumption of unfitness for treatment under the juvenile court law for juveniles charged with such offenses (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (c)); the list of “serious” offenses in

section 1192.7, subdivision (c); and the list of “violent” offenses in

section 667.5, subdivision (c). The latter two lists delineate, through cross-referencing in subdivision (d)(1) and (2) of

section 667, the set of offenses that qualify as strikes when they are the subject of a prior adult conviction. Paragraph (D), by contrast, refers only to a single statutory list: that contained in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b). Because the two sets of offenses referenced in paragraph (B) (Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offenses, and “serious” or “violent” offenses) are not identical,

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) would contain an internal conflict if the lists in paragraphs (

B) and (

D) were both understood as defining the set of juvenile offenses qualifying as strikes. Under paragraph (

B) a given juvenile offense would qualify if it were listed in

section 707(

b) or if it were serious or violent; under paragraph (D), however, an offense would qualify only if it were listed in

section 707(b). Because burglary of an inhabited dwelling is listed as “serious” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)), but is not listed in

section 707(b), defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication for residential burglary would qualify under paragraph (B), but not under paragraph (D). The parties’ briefs, lower court opinions and our own research have disclosed a number of possible resolutions of this postulated internal conflict, all based on the premise that the distinction between paragraphs (

B) and (

D) of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) is a result of “drafting error.” As we demonstrate later, however, each such resolution would require the court to disregard one of the two assertedly conflicting paragraphs or to rewrite some of their provisions. Although we may properly decide upon such a construction or reformation when compelled by necessity and supported by firm evidence of the drafters’ true intent (see, e.g., People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 775 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752]), we should not do so when the statute is reasonably susceptible to an

interpretation that harmonizes all its parts without disregarding or altering any of them. “It is fundamental that legislation should be construed so as to harmonize its various elements without doing violence to its language or spirit.” (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788 [176 Cal.Rptr. 104, 632 P.2d 217].) Rather than rewrite the statute in any way, therefore, we adopt an

interpretation that harmonizes paragraphs (

B) and (D), without doing violence to the language or spirit of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3). In brief, we interpret paragraph (

B) as setting out the list of prior juvenile offenses that will qualify as strikes and paragraph (

D) as requiring, in addition, that in the prior juvenile proceeding giving rise to the qualifying adjudication the juvenile have been adjudged a ward of the court because of a Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offense, whether or not that offense is the same as the offense currently alleged as a strike. Our

interpretation depends upon a close reading of the statutory language exactly as written. As indicated in its introductory clause,

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) delineates the circumstances under which a “prior juvenile adjudication” qualifies as “a prior felony conviction” for Three Strikes purposes. Each paragraph sets forth a necessary circumstance. Paragraph (

A) requires that the juvenile was 16 years old or older “at the time he or she committed the prior offense.” (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(A).) Paragraph (A)’s reference to “the prior offense,” in context, can only mean the offense that was the subject of a “prior juvenile adjudication” currently alleged as a “prior felony conviction,” i.e., the prior offense currently alleged as a strike. Paragraph (B), like paragraph (A), sets out a circumstance relating to “[t]he prior offense,” requiring such offense to be listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) or to be a “serious” or “violent” felony. (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(B).) Again, “[t]he prior offense” must, in context, be understood to mean the prior offense currently alleged as a strike. Paragraph (C), unlike paragraphs (

A) and (B), does not set forth a circumstance relating to “the prior offense.” Instead, it requires that the juvenile “was found” to be fit for juvenile court proceedings. (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(C).) In context, paragraph (

C) requires that the fitness finding, although not necessarily limited to any particular prior offense, must have occurred in the proceeding that led to the prior juvenile adjudication currently alleged as a strike. In this context, had the Legislature intended that the fitness finding could have occurred at any time, and not necessarily in the proceeding that led to the prior juvenile adjudication currently alleged as a strike, it would have used language so indicating. Paragraph (D), like paragraph (

C) and unlike paragraphs (

A) and (B), does not set forth a circumstance relating to “the prior offense.” Instead, it requires that the juvenile “was adjudged” a ward under Welfare and Institutions Code

section 602 because of a Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offense. (§ 667, subd. (d)(3)(D).) As in paragraph (C), such adjudication is not necessarily limited to any particular offense alleged in the prior juvenile petition; also as in paragraph (C), however, such adjudication is limited, by context, to the proceeding that led to the prior juvenile adjudication currently alleged as a strike. Here, as with paragraph (C), had the Legislature intended that the adjudication of wardship could have occurred at any time, and not necessarily in the proceeding that led to the prior juvenile adjudication currently alleged as a strike, it would have used language so indicating. Our

interpretation of paragraph (

D) does violence neither to the language nor to the purpose and spirit of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3). Linguistically, our

interpretation flows from, and is consistent with, the Legislature’s use of significantly different language in paragraphs (

C) and (

D) than in paragraphs (

A) and (B). While paragraphs (

A) and (

B) expressly state circumstances relating to “the prior offense,” i.e., the prior offense currently alleged as a strike, paragraphs (

C) and (

D) state circumstances unlimited, by their terms, to any particular prior offense: that the juvenile “was,” respectively, found fit for juvenile court and adjudged a ward because of at least one Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offense. Our

interpretation is, furthermore, consistent with the general purpose of the Three Strikes statute: “to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses.” (§ 667, subd. (b).) Under our

interpretation, only paragraph (

B) limits the set of offenses that may qualify as strikes when the subject of a juvenile adjudication; consistent with the law’s general purpose, all “serious” and “violent” offenses may so qualify. Paragraphs (A), (C), and (D), under our

interpretation, do not restrict possible qualifying juvenile offenses to a set narrower than the set of serious or violent adult offenses that may qualify as strikes, but merely set forth additional conditions to the use of a qualifying juvenile offense as a strike. Nor is our

interpretation inconsistent with the legislative history relating more specifically to

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) and the parallel provision of the Three Strikes initiative,

section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(3). A legislative committee analysis of the Three Strikes bill after its amendment to conform to the then-circulating initiative (see People v. Superior Court Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 505 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628]) noted a juvenile offense would qualify as a strike if “the offense committed was from the list of offenses enumerated in Welfare & Institutions Code

Section 707(

b) or if it was a serious or violent offense.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 971 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Jan. 26, 1994, p. 8.) Voters on the initiative were later told that under the initiative version of the law, as under the legislative version, “specified” juvenile offenses would qualify as strikes, and that these specified crimes would “generally include the same crimes defined as serious and violent felonies.” (Ballot Pamp., Legis. Analyst’s Analysis of Prop. 184 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 33.) Both of these explanations describe paragraph (

B) in a manner consistent with our

interpretation, under which the set of possible qualifying juvenile offenses includes both Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offenses and serious or violent offenses. Neither quoted explanation purports to describe the additional requirement for juvenile strikes set forth in paragraph (D). By their terms, then, paragraph (

B) sets out the list of qualifying priors, and paragraph (

D) provides that those priors may be counted as strikes so long as the record of the prior juvenile proceeding shows that the adjudication of wardship was premised at least in part upon an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b). This

interpretation harmonizes all parts of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) without altering or adding language to any part or rendering any part superfluous or a nullity. If, contrary to the

interpretation adopted above, paragraphs (

B) and (

D) of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) are viewed as both setting forth the set of offenses qualifying as juvenile strikes, the paragraphs are in conflict, for some offenses would qualify under one paragraph but not under the other. As we will now see, all resolutions of this postulated conflict proposed by the parties, embraced in lower court decisions or discovered in our research, would require this court to disregard or rewrite some significant part of the statute. To resolve the conflict, we could:

(1) Disregard paragraph (B), on the theory that its inclusion was inadvertent drafter’s error. All juvenile adjudications for Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offenses would, under paragraph (D), qualify as prior felony convictions, assuming, of course, that the requirements of paragraphs (

A) and (

C) were also met. This was, in essence, the resolution urged by the dissenting justice below.

(2) Disregard paragraph (D), on the theory that its inclusion was inadvertent drafter’s error. All juvenile adjudications for Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offenses, “serious” felonies and “violent” felonies would, under paragraph (B), qualify as prior felony convictions, assuming, again, that the requirements of paragraphs (

A) and (

C) were also met.

(3) Add references to serious and violent felonies to paragraph (D), on the theory the omission of such language was inadvertent drafter’s error. Paragraph (D)’s list of offenses would then duplicate paragraph (B)’s, rendering one of them superfluous. All juvenile adjudications for Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offenses, “serious” offenses and “violent” offenses would, under both paragraphs, qualify as prior felony convictions. This is the resolution urged by the People here and adopted in People v. Griggs, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at page 561, and by the Court of Appeal majority in this case, which followed Griggs, and is endorsed in theory by Justice Baxter.

(4) Change the first “or” in paragraph (

B) to “and,” on the theory that the use of the disjunctive was inadvertent drafter’s error. Only those offenses listed both in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) and as “serious” or “violent” would qualify. The reference to

section 707(

b) offenses in paragraph (

D) would be rendered superfluous. This is the resolution urged by defendant and by Justice Brown.

(5) A fifth possible construction, unlike the first four, does not proceed from the premise that paragraphs (

B) and (

D) both set forth the set of offenses qualifying as juvenile strikes, and thus avoids the purported conflict. Under this construction, paragraph (

B) would be rewritten to refer to the allegations contained in the prior juvenile petition rather than to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, on the theory that omission of such a reference to the allegations was inadvertent drafter’s error. This theory rests on legislative history: As introduced, the Three Strikes bill provided that a prior juvenile adjudication would qualify as a strike if “the juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, the offense alleged to have been committed was an offense listed in [Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b)], the juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, and the juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court . . . because the person committed an offense listed in [Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b)].” (Assem. Bill No. 971 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.), italics added.) When the bill was amended to conform to the circulating initiative, which itself had been “loosely based” on the original bill (People v.

Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 505), these four conditions were lettered (A), (B), (C), and (D), references to “serious” and “violent” felonies were added to paragraph (B), and paragraph (B)’s reference to “the offense alleged to have been committed” was replaced with the enacted statutory phrase, “[t]he prior offense.” Pursuant to the fifth possible construction, the last change could be regarded as an inadvertent drafter’s error, and the statute could be rewritten to reinstate the original language, eliminating any conflict between paragraphs (

B) and (D). As is evident, all of the above resolutions share a critical, disqualifying feature as

interpretations of the Three Strikes law: all would require the court to disregard or rewrite some portion of the statute, violating the fundamental principle that a court should interpret a statute or initiative so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions if such an

interpretation is consistent with the language and purpose of the act. (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc., supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 788; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) Defendant, arguing for resolution (4) above, relies primarily on the “rule of lenity” for

interpretation of ambiguous penal statutes. Under that rule (or, more properly, interpretive policy or guideline), we generally “construe a penal statute as favorably to the defendant as its language and the circumstances of its application may reasonably permit . . . .” (Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal.Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420].) The lenity policy is of little help here, however, because the language of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) does not reasonably permit us to interpret the first “or” in paragraph (

B) as meaning “and.” Such a construction can only be reached by rewriting the statute’s language. The rule of lenity provides guidance when the language of a penal statute is “susceptible” of two or more

interpretations. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) But the word “or,” at least in the context of paragraph (B), is not susceptible to being understood as “and,” any more than paragraph (D)’s reference to “an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code” is susceptible to being understood as referring, as well, to offenses that are not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) but are classified as “serious” or “violent.” If, perhaps, the court were forced to choose between two possible ways of rewriting a penal statute to avoid an internal conflict or absurdity, we might apply a variation on the rule of lenity and choose the rewriting more favorable to the defendant. As demonstrated earlier, however, we are not faced with that problem here, because we are able to harmonize paragraphs (

B) and (

D) without rewriting or disregarding the language of either. Defendant also argues that the first “or” in paragraph (

B) should be read as “and” because an “equal protection problem” arises if paragraph (

B) is read, according to its terms, as providing a broader set of qualifying offenses for juvenile strikes (offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) or classified as serious or violent) than for adult strikes (only serious or violent felonies). Defendant contends there is “no rational basis for punishing persons who commit the same crime more harshly if they were adjudicated a ward of the court at age 16 . . . rather than [convicted] at age 20.” As we are not faced here with any assertedly unconstitutional application of the statute, however, we have no occasion to address defendant’s constitutional argument on the merits. Under our

interpretation of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3), defendant is not treated more harshly because his prior offenses were committed as a juvenile. To the contrary, as shall be seen below, he benefits from that fact; because the alleged prior conviction at issue does not meet the requirement of paragraph (D), applicable only to juvenile adjudications, it does not count as a strike, though it would have had it been the subject of an adult conviction, in that residential burglary is a serious felony qualifying as a strike under

section 667, subdivision (d)(1). Defendant, in short, lacks standing to assert the equal protection claims of hypothetical felons who may be treated more harshly because their prior offenses were committed as juveniles. (See, e.g., Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 103 [154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595]; Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 77-78 [95 Cal.Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785].) The question whether

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) can be constitutionally applied to a felon whose alleged prior conviction is for an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b), but not categorized as a serious or violent felony, must await a case in which it is actually presented. The Attorney General, emphasizing the express legislative intent to increase punishment for felons who “have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses” (§ 667, subd. (b)), urges us to interpret paragraph (

B) to include as strikes juvenile adjudications for all such serious or violent offenses, regardless of whether the offense is also listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b). We agree the language of paragraph (B), as well as the stated legislative intent, calls for such an

interpretation of that paragraph. Neither the language of paragraph (B), however, nor the intent expressed in

section 667, subdivision (b), requires us to disregard or rewrite the language of paragraph (D), which requires, separately and without conflict, that the defendant was, in the prior juvenile proceeding, adjudged a ward of the juvenile court because of a

section 707(

b) offense. The apparent premise of the Attorney General’s argument is that, in order to implement the intent expressed in

section 667, subdivision (

b) to ensure greater punishment and longer prison terms for recidivists who have been previously convicted of a serious or violent felony, all prior adjudications for serious or violent felonies must be counted as strikes. That was patently not the Legislature’s intent, however, as it included three additional requirements (paragraphs (A), (

C) and (D)) limiting the juvenile adjudications that so qualify. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528 [“But to say the intent of a law was to restrict judicial discretion begs the question of how judicial discretion was to be restricted. The answer to that question can be found only by examining the language of the act.” (Italics in original.)].) In an argument similar to the Attorney General’s, Justice Baxter, who nonetheless joins in our

interpretation of paragraph (D), complains it will “partially gut” paragraph (B)’s list of qualifying offenses. (Conc. opn. of Baxter, J., post, at p. 17.) We disagree. Paragraphs (A), (B), (C), and (

D) all state independent necessary requirements for use of a prior juvenile adjudication. That a given prior adjudication may meet one of these independent requirements but not another, and therefore be unusable as a strike, does not “gut” any part of the former requirement. For example, there are presumably a number of cases in which juveniles under the age of 16 have suffered adjudications for offenses listed in paragraph (B). That these adjudications do not meet the age requirement of paragraph (A), and therefore could not be used as prior felony convictions, does not render any part of paragraph (

B) nugatory. The same is true for adjudications that satisfy paragraph (

B) but not paragraph (D). Justice Baxter also argues that paragraph (D)’s language can be explained only by drafting error. (Conc. opn. of Baxter, J., post, at pp. 18-19.) The presence or absence in the prior proceeding of an adjudication for an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) is, in his view, a “mere fortuity” that cannot rationally affect the usability of an otherwise qualifying prior adjudication. (Conc. opn. of Baxter, J., post, at p. 21.) Again, we disagree. Since the Legislature, the initiative drafters and the voters have enacted a scheme that includes an explicit requirement, for juvenile adjudications, that the juvenile was at the same time adjudged a ward because of a Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offense, we must presume the Legislature, the drafters and the voters did not regard that circumstance as a “fortuity.” Had they thought the requirement of a Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) offense unimportant or anomalous to the purposes of the Three Strikes law, they would presumably have omitted any reference at all to that section. As written, the requirement of paragraph (

D) may be seen as serving the purpose of ensuring that the crimes adjudicated in the prior proceeding included at least one offense “so serious as to raise a presumption of unfitness for treatment in the juvenile court system.” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 24.) To summarize, we interpret

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) according to its terms, without adopting any of the rewritings proposed by the parties and lower courts. Under paragraph (B), a prior juvenile adjudication qualifies as a prior felony conviction for Three Strikes purposes only if the prior offense is listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) or is classified as “serious” or “violent.” Paragraph (

D) does not modify or conflict with paragraph (B), but states a separate, additional requirement: the prior adjudication qualifies as a prior felony conviction only if the defendant, in the prior juvenile proceeding, was adjudged a ward because of at least one offense listed in

section 707(b). People v. Griggs, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 557, which adopted a construction of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3) inconsistent with ours, is disapproved. Our conclusion does not rest on the premise that all, or any particular, legislators or voters who enacted the Three Strikes law in either its legislative or initiative forms subjectively contemplated this

interpretation of paragraph (D). The lack of parallelism between the cross-referenced lists of offenses in paragraphs (

B) and (

D) may well be the result of an oversight by the drafters of the Three Strikes initiative and by the legislators who subsequently enacted the text of the initiative as a statute, rather than a product of careful legislative craftsmanship. For purposes of interpreting these statutes, however, it matters not whether the drafters, voters or legislators consciously considered all the effects and interrelationships of the provisions they wrote and enacted. We must take the language of

section 667, subdivision (d)(3), and

section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(3), as it was passed into law, and must, if possible without doing violence to the language and spirit of the law, interpret it so as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions. In this respect, the Attorney General’s proposal to rewrite paragraph (

D) by adding cross-references to the statutory lists of serious and violent felonies ignores necessary limitations on our proper role in statutory

interpretation. Consistent with the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3), we have previously limited ourselves to relatively minor rewriting of statutes and, even then, only resorted to that drastic tool of construction when it has been obvious that a word or number had been erroneously used or omitted. (See, e.g., People v.

Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 775 [court found it “clear” that the word “and” was “erroneously used” in place of “or”]; In re Thierry S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 727, 741, fn. 13 [139 Cal.Rptr. 708, 566 P.2d 610] [“obvious mistake” in statute’s cross-reference to “Section 625” was corrected to read “Section 2,” so as to reflect the Legislature’s “clear intent”]; People v. Troutman (1921) 187 Cal. 313, 316-317 [201 P. 928] [“evident” drafting error—statute’s reference to “Part Two”—corrected to read “Part One” in order to reflect Legislature’s intent]; Washburn v.

Lyons (1893) 97 Cal. 314, 315 [32 P. 310] [“very clear” drafting error—use of “and” instead of “or”—was reformed to reflect Legislature’s intent].) In the present case, by contrast, that any of the several possible rewritings outlined earlier would effectuate the subjective intent of the drafters and enactors of the Three Strikes laws (much less which one would best do so) is anything but obvious, and the rewriting involved in most of them would be far from minor.

The Attorney General was unable to cite, nor has our research disclosed, any case in which this court has cured an asserted drafting error by grafting an entire substantive clause onto a statute. As the divergent views of Justices Baxter and Brown illustrate, reasonable people can differ as to how this statute would best be “corrected” if we undertook to rewrite it. In these circumstances, we must limit ourselves to interpreting the law as written and leave for the People and the Legislature the task of revising it as they deem wise.

In the proceeding leading to the prior juvenile adjudication alleged and imposed against defendant as a prior felony conviction, the only felony offense for which defendant was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court was burglary of an inhabited dwelling, which is not an offense listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(b). Although that offense is classified as serious and would, therefore, qualify as a strike under paragraph (B), the separate requirement of paragraph (D), that the juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court because of a

section 707(

b) offense, was not satisfied. The trial court therefore erred in sentencing defendant under

section 667, subdivision (e)(1). Disposition The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed. The matter is remanded to the Court of Appeal with directions to remand to the trial court for new proceedings on sentence. George, C. J., Mosk, J., Kennard, J., and Chin, J., concurred. A11 further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. The facts of the offenses are not material to the issue on review. Subdivision (b)(3) of

section 1170.12 is virtually identical. Our discussion applies tó it as well. Offenses classified as “serious” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)) or “violent” (§ 667.5, subd. (c)) but not listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) include voluntary manslaughter (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(1), 667.5, subd. (c)(1)); rape committed by means other than force, violence or threat of great bodily harm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(3)); simple kidnapping committed other than in the course of a carjacking and without infliction of bodily harm (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(20)); a felony in which the defendant was alleged and found to have inflicted great bodily injury (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8)); and residential burglary (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)). Offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) but not classified as “serious” or “violent” include discharge of a firearm into an inhabited building (§ 707(b)(15)), dissuading a witness or suborning perjury (§ 707(b)(19)), and manufacturing controlled substances (§ 707(b)(20)). This formulation appears to have been drawn from

section 12021, subdivision (e), the only statute we have been able to locate using the same language. At the time Assembly Bill No. 971 was introduced,

section 12021, subdivision (

e) provided in relevant part: “Any person who (1) is alleged to have committed an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, (2) is found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, and (3) is subsequently adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of

Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code shall not own, or have in his or her possession or under his or her custody or control, any firearm until the age of 30 years.” (§ 12021, as amended by Stats. 1991, ch. 955, § 3, p. 4453; see 51C West’s Ann. Pen. Code (1992 ed.) § 12021, p. 206, italics added.) The Three Strikes bill, when originally introduced on March 1, 1993, provided that a prior juvenile adjudication would qualify as a strike if “the juvenile was 16 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, the offense alleged to have been committed was an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law, and the juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court within the meaning of

Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (

b) of

Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (Assem. Bill No. 971 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.).) The bill’s original cross-references—both of them to Welfare and Institutions Code

section 707(

b) alone—were parallel. While the bill was pending in the Legislature, however, the petition to place the initiative version of the law—which contained the nonparallel cross-references with which we are here concerned'—began circulating. (People v.

Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 505.) By amendments of January 3 and January 13, 1994, the Assembly then substituted nearly verbatim the provisions of the circulating initiative relating, inter alia, to prior juvenile adjudications, thus introducing into the legislative bill the same lack of parallelism originally created by the initiative drafters. (Compare Ballot Pamp., text of Prop. 184, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) p. 65, with Assem. Amend, to Assem. Bill No. 971 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 13, 1994.) Justice Brown reads the above discussion as an acknowledgement that “in all probability” our

interpretation was not subjectively contemplated by the Legislature and electorate; on that basis she argues our

interpretation violates the principle that we should interpret statutes so as to effectuate legislative intent. (Cone. & dis. opn. of Brown, J., post, at p. 23.) With respect, she misreads this opinion. We do not say anything regarding the “probability” any or all legislators or voters subjectively contemplated a given meaning; we simply do not know. Nor, of course, do we dispute that determining legislative intent is the goal of statutory

interpretation; we simply apply the principle that, in general, a statute’s words are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (See, e.g., People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 621 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713].) We speak here only of rewriting to correct drafting or clerical errors. A different set of considerations and limitations governs the reformation of statutes to preserve their constitutionality. (See Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 607 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 108, 905 P.2d 1248].)