HOTEL EMPLOYEES AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, Petitioner, v. GRAY DAVIS, as Governor, etc., et al., Respondents; FRANK LAWRENCE, Real Party in Interest; ERIC CORTEZ et al., Petitioners, v. GRAY DAVIS, as Governor, etc., Respondent; FRANK LAWRENCE et al., Real Parties in Interest, 21 Cal. 4th 585

Opinion WERDEGAR, J. In 1984, the people of California amended our Constitution to state a fundamental public policy against the legalization in California of casino gambling of the sort then associated with Las Vegas and Atlantic City: “The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (e), added by initiative, Gen.

Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984).) In 1998, at the November 3 General Election, the people approved a proposed initiative statute designated on the ballot as Proposition 5—“The Tribal Government Gaming and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998”— concerning gaming on Indian lands in the State of California. The principal provisions of this statutory initiative purport to authorize various forms of gaming in tribal casinos. As we will explain, to authorize such gaming facilities, however, would be to authorize casinos of the type expressly prohibited by

article IV,

section 19, subdivision (

e) of the California Constitution (hereafter

section 19(e)). Because Proposition 5, a purely statutory measure, did not amend

section 19(

e) or any other part of the Constitution, and because in a conflict between statutory and constitutional law the Constitution must prevail, we conclude Proposition 5’s authorization of casino gambling is invalid and inoperative. We further conclude that only one provision of Proposition 5, the state’s consent to suit contained in the final sentence of Government Code

section 98005, is separable from the measure’s invalid provisions. With the exception of that single provision, therefore, we will issue the writ sought by petitioners, prohibiting the Governor and the Secretary of State from implementing Proposition 5. Procedural Background On November 4, 1998, Proposition 5 became effective by operation of law. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a).) Between November 4 and 12, the Governor received a request from each of 39 Indian tribes for the state to enter into a standard “Tribal-State Gaming Compact” as set forth in the measure to cover gaming on Indian lands.

Under the measure, the Governor was obligated to execute an individual compact within 30 days after receipt of a request and would be deemed to have done so if he should fail. Under the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) (Pub.L.

No. 100-497 (Oct. 17, 1988) 102 Stat. 2467, as amended, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. and 18 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.), before any such compact could go into effect, the Secretary of the Interior had to publish notice in the Federal Register that he had given his approval within a prescribed review period of 45 days. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B), (d)(8)(C) & (d)(8)(D).) On November 20, 1998, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (hereafter the Union) filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, with a request for a stay pendente lite.

In its petition, the Union sought to compel Pete Wilson, in his official capacity as Governor, now succeeded by Gray Davis who takes his place by substitution, and Bill Jones, in his official capacity as Secretary of State, not to implement Proposition 5, claiming the measure was invalid under the law of both California and the United States. The Union named Frank Lawrence, the measure’s proponent, as real party in interest.

On that same day, Eric Cortez and others (hereafter collectively Cortez) filed a separate, similar petition for writ of mandate in this court, also with a request for a stay pendente lite, and also seeking to compel the Governor not to implement the measure, on the grounds it is invalid under state and federal law. Cortez named Californians for Indian Self-Reliance, as well as Frank Lawrence (hereafter collectively Real Parties) as real parties in interest. On December 2, we acted in response to the petitions.

We did so in recognition that a writ of mandate is available, in the absence of a “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086), against the implementation of an invalid statute (Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Van de Kamp (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 245, 264 [226 Cal.Rptr. 361]). We determined to decide the matter ourselves, instead of allowing lower courts, in accordance with our custom, to address it in the first instance (see, e.g., Legislature v.

Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 500 [286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309]), because we concluded the underlying questions were of “great public importance and must be resolved promptly” (County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845 [59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593]; accord, Legislature v. Eu, supra, at p. 500). We therefore ordered the Governor, the Secretary of State, and Real Parties to show cause in this court why the relief the Union and Cortez sought against Proposition 5 should not be granted, and stayed implementation of the measure pendente lite.

Pursuant to our orders, Real Parties, and the Governor and the Secretary of State filed returns to the petitions, and the Union and Cortez each filed a traverse. In his initial returns, Governor Wilson supported the Union’s and Cortez’s claims against Proposition 5 and their prayers for relief. With our leave, Governor Davis later withdrew the returns of Governor Wilson and filed substitute returns of his own, in which he expressed neutrality on the claims against Proposition 5 and the prayers for relief.

On January 13, 1999, we ordered the Union’s cause and that of Cortez consolidated for purposes of oral argument and decision. On or about January 22, 1999, the Secretary of the Interior disapproved the tribal-state gaming compacts requested by Indian tribes under Proposition 5, reasoning that, because this court had stayed the operation of the measure, the compacts, which had not actually been executed by the Governor, could not be deemed executed pursuant to the measure’s 30-day provision. Discussion I.

Legal Background Proposition 5 was enacted against an extensive legal background of California and federal law regarding gaming and other gambling. We briefly review the most pertinent parts of these bodies of law. A. California Gambling Law Since 1849, the California Constitution has generally prohibited all lotteries and the sale of all lottery tickets. In the original document of 1849, the Constitution prohibited all lotteries and the sale of all lottery tickets, doing so in

article IV,

section 27. In the current document of 1879, it continues the prohibition, formerly in

article IV,

section 26, and presently in

article IV,

section 19, subdivision (a), which declares: “The Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries and shall prohibit the sale of lottery tickets in the State.” Since 1872,

section 319 et seq. of the Penal Code also has prohibited all lotteries and the sale of all lottery tickets. But since 1984, through the addition of

article IV,

section 19, subdivision (d), the California Constitution has provided: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), there is authorized the establishment of a California State Lottery.” As we explained in Western Telcon, Inc. v. California State Lottery (1996) 13 Cal.4th 475, 484 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 812, 917 P.2d 651] (Western Telcon), a lottery is defined by three elements, namely, a prize, distribution by chance, and consideration. “Consideration” is the fee (in the form of money' or anything else of value) that a participant pays the operator for entrance. (See Cal. Gas. Retailers v.

Regal Petroleum Corp. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 844, 853-854, 857-862 [330 P.2d 778].) “Chance” means that winning and losing depend on luck and fortune rather than, or at least more than, judgment and skill. (Finster v. Keller (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 836, 844-845 [96 Cal.Rptr. 241]; People v.

Hecht (1931) 119 Cal.App.Supp. 778, 784-787 [3 P.2d 399].) “Prize” encompasses property that the operator offers to distribute to one or more winning participants and not to keep for himself. (Western Telcon, supra, at pp. 485-488.) The property offered may exist apart from the fees the participants pay the operator or it may arise from the fees themselves, as when, in the commonly used parimutuel system, the property consists of the fees in the form of a pool that remains after the operator has taken out some amount for himself. (Id. at p. 488 & fn. 4.) The prize or prizes, however, must be “either fixed in advance” of the play or “determined by the total amount” of fees paid. (Id. at p. 489.) Commencing in 1872, the year of the Penal Code’s enactment,

section 330 of that code has proscribed a number of games by name; since 1885 (Stats. 1885, ch. 145, § 1, p. 135), the list has included the game “twenty-one.” Also commencing in 1872,

section 330 of the Penal Code has prohibited all “banking” games, that is, those games in which there is a person or entity that participates in the action as “the one against the many” (People v. Ambrose (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d Supp. 966, 970 [265 P.2d 191]), “taking on all comers, paying all winners, and collecting from all losers” (Sullivan v. Fox (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 673, 678 [235 Cal.Rptr. 5]), doing so through a fund generally called the bank (Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 487).

As we expressly held in Western Telcon, a banking game is not a lottery, and a lottery is not a banking game, for the two are “mutually exclusive.” (13 Cal.4th at p. 494.) In a lottery, the “operator distributes the prize or prizes to the winner or winners . . . .” (Id. at p. 485.) The operator is not a participant and, hence, does not compete with the participants.

He has “no interest in the outcome of’ the lottery, “because neither the fact the prize will be disposed of, nor the value of the prize to be distributed, depends upon which, or how many,” of the participants “might win it.” (Id. at p. 488.) Insofar as the operator is concerned, the result is invariable: he will give over the prize to one or more of the participants. (See id. at pp. 485-486.) In a banking game, by contrast, the banker “pays off all winning wagers and keeps all losing wagers.” (Id. at p. 485.) He is in fact a participant and, hence, “compete[s] with the other participants: ‘he is the one against the many.’ ” (Id. at p. 488.) He has an “interest in the outcome of the game, because the amount of money” he “will have, to pay out,” or be able to take in, “depends upon whether each of the individual bets is won or lost.” (Ibid.) The result is variable: the banker may either win or lose as to either some or all of the other participants. (See id. at pp. 485, 487, 489, 494.) Commencing in 1885,

section 330 of the Penal Code has similarly prohibited all “percentage” games, that is, those games in which the operator does not participate in the action but “collects a percentage . . . computed from the amount of bets made, winnings collected, or . . . money changing hands.” (Sullivan v. Fox, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 679.) Since at least 1872, all nonprohibited card games, primarily “round” games such as various forms of poker, have been permitted. (See, e.g., Monterey Club v. Superior Court (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 131, 148-149 [119 P.2d 349].) Nevertheless, as reflected in

section 19800 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code, such games are subject to regulation by the state and, in the absence of state regulation, to regulation and even prohibition by localities. (See Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 482, fn. 2 [stating that gambling games that are not prohibited “are generally subject to local control, with some state regulation”].) Since 1911,

section 330a of the Penal Code has prohibited all slot machines;

section 330b of the same code, enacted in 1950, has redoubled the prohibition. The Penal Code’s broad

definitions of slot machines include virtually every kind of stand-alone gaming device.

Section 330a impliedly defines slot machines as “any . . . machine, contrivance, appliance or mechanical device, upon the result of action of which money or other valuable thing is staked or hazarded, and which is operated, or played, by placing or depositing therein any coins, checks, slugs, balls, or other articles or device, or in any other manner and by means whereof, or as a result of the operation of which any merchandise, money, representative or articles of value, checks, or tokens, redeemable in, or exchangeable for money or any other thing of value, is won or lost, or taken from or obtained from such machine, when the result of action or operation of such machine, contrivance, appliance, or mechanical device is dependent upon hazard or chance . . . .” (Pen.

Code, § 330a, as added by Stats. 1911, ch. 483, § 1, p. 951.)

Section 330b expressly defines slot machines, in similar terms, as encompassing “[a]ny machine, apparatus or device . . . that is adapted, or may readily be converted into one that is adapted, for use in such a way that, as a result of the insertion of any piece of money or coin or other object, or by any other means, such machine or device is caused to operate or may be operated, and by reason of any element of hazard or chance or of other outcome of such operation unpredictable by him, the user may receive or become entitled to receive any piece of money, credit, allowance or thing of value or additional chance or right to use such slot machine or device, or any check, slug, token or memorandum, whether of value or otherwise, which may be exchanged for any money, credit, allowance or thing of value, or which may be given in trade, irrespective of whether it may, apart from any element of hazard or chance or unpredictable outcome of such operation, also sell, deliver or present some merchandise, indication of weight, entertainment or other thing of value.” (Pen.

Code, § 330b, subd. (2), as added by Stats. 1950, First Ex. Sess. 1950, ch. 17, § 1, pp. 452-453; see also Pen. Code, § 330.1 [containing similar definition].) Beginning in 1933, the California Constitution has authorized the Legislature to allow horse races and horse race wagering. (See now Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (b), former art. IV, § 25a.) As reflected in

section 19400 et seq. of the Business and Professions Code, the Legislature has done so, permitting licensed wagering in accordance with the parimutuel system. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 19590, 19593.) Beginning in 1976, in

article IV,

section 19, subdivision (c), the California Constitution has authorized the Legislature to permit bingo: “Notwithstanding subdivision (a),” which proscribes lotteries, “the Legislature by statute may authorize cities and counties to provide for bingo games, but only for charitable purposes.” As reflected in

section 326.5 of the Penal Code, the Legislature has done so. Lastly, since 1984, through the addition of

section 19(e), the California Constitution has declared: “The Legislature has no power to authorize, and shall prohibit casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” B. Federal Indian Gaming Law We now briefly review the federal law concerning gaming on Indian lands. In 1987, the United States Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians (1987) 480 U.S. 202 [107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244] (Cabazon), interpreting Public Law No. 280 (Aug. 15, 1953) 67 Statutes at Large 588.

In Public Law No. 280, Congress granted certain states, including California, broad criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country (including “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government” (18 U.S.C. § 1151)) within their respective borders.

Pursuant to this grant, the Cabazon court held, the laws of these states generally applied to activities in Indian country to the extent the law was “prohibitory,” but did not generally apply to the extent it was “regulatory,” the shorthand test being whether the conduct at issue violates the state’s public policy. (Cabazon, supra, at pp. 207-210 [107 S.Ct. at pp. 1087-1089].) On the particular question at issue, whether California could apply to certain Indian tribes on their reservations its law governing the operation of bingo (Pen.

Code, § 326.5), the high court gave a negative answer: “In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.” (Cabazon, supra, at p. 211 [107 S.Ct. at p. 1089], fn. omitted.) In 1988, in the wake of Cabazon, Congress enacted IGRA (Pub.L.

No. 100-497 (Oct. 17, 1988) 102 Stat. 2467, as amended, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. and 18 U.S.C. § 1166 et seq.), with the declared purpose to “provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments” (25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)), while at the same time providing a basis for regulation of Indian gaming so as to shield it from organized crime and corruption, prevent exploitation for non-Indian profit, and ensure fair and honest gaming. (IGRA, § 3; 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1), (2).)

Section 4 of IGRA divides gaming into three categories—“class I,” “class II,” and “class III.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(6), (7), (8).) Class I gaming is “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).) Class II gaming is defined to include: “(

i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo” and “(ii) card games” that “are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State” or “are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any location in the State,” “but only if such card games are played in conformity with those laws and regulations (if any) of the State regarding hours or periods of operation of such card games or limitations on wagers or pot sizes in such card games.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A).) The act excludes from its definition of class II gaming: “(

i) any banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack (21)” and “(ii) electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines of any kind.” (Id., § 2703(7)(B).) Class El gaming is defined as “all forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).)

Section 11 of IGRA provides for the regulation of each of the three categories of gaming—from the lightest regulation for. class I, by tribal action alone without federal or state participation; to heavier regulation for class II, by joint federal and tribal participation; to the heaviest regulation for class HI, by state and tribal participation through tribal-state compacts plus federal oversight. (25 U.S.C. § 2710.) Specifically as to class HI gaming,

section 11(d)(1) of IGRA states that class HI gaming activities are “lawful. . . only if such activities are”: “(

A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution” that, among other things, is adopted by an Indian tribe and approved by the Chairman of the National Indian Gaming Commission; “(

B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity”; and “(

C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . that is in effect.” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).)

Section 11(d)(3)(

A) of IGRA describes the process whereby the Indian tribe and the state may commence negotiations toward a tribal-state compact: the tribe must “request” that the state “enter into negotiations,” and, on receiving such request, the state must proceed to “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith . . . .” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).) A compact takes effect only when approved by the Secretary of the Interior. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).) C.

Legal Conflicts Leading up to Proposition 5 Despite IGRA’s negotiation and compact framework, several unresolved conflicts have developed between the State of California and Indian tribes surrounding class HI gaming and, especially, gaming devices in casinos. Class HI gaming, comprising all gaming outside class I and class II, including parimutuel horse race wagering, lotteries, banked table games and gaming devices, is, unquestionably, the “most lucrative kind.” (U.S. v.

Spokane Tribe of Indians (9th Cir. 1998) 139 F.3d 1297, 1299.) The most notable conflict is that underlying Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Ind. v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1994) 64 F.3d 1250. Pursuant to IGRA, several Indian tribes requested the State of California to negotiate compacts permitting “stand-alone electronic gaming devices” and “live banking and percentage card games.” (Id. at p. 1255, fns. omitted.) The state refused, asserting that its criminal law prohibited the games and devices in question.

The state and certain tribes agreed to seek judicial determination through a test case whether the state was obligated to enter into negotiations concerning such games and devices; pursuant to that stipulation, the tribes initiated an action in federal district court for declaratory relief against the state. (Ibid.) The district court gave

summary judgment to the plaintiff tribes, concluding that, except for games using traditional casino game themes, the state was indeed obliged to negotiate over the games and devices in question. (Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Ind. v.

Wilson, supra, 64 F.3d at p. 1255.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in large part, concluding that, because California prohibited anyone in the state to engage in banked or percentage card games or operation of slot machines (“[wjith the possible exception of slot machines in the form of video lottery terminals” (id. at p. 1260)), IGRA did not require the state to negotiate a compact allowing those activities to be conducted in tribal gaming facilities. (Id. at pp. 1256-1258.) On remand, the district court determined California law did not permit slot machines in the form of California State Lottery terminals or otherwise, and ordered judgment for the defendants. (Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Ind. v.

Wilson (E.D.Cal. 1998) 39 F.Supp.2d 1227.) While the above proceedings and those leading to this court’s 1996 decision in Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th 475, were pending, a number of the tribes commenced and continued class III gaming activities without tribal-state compacts; in response, Governor Wilson refused to negotiate further until they ceased such gaming activities. (See Note, Western Telcon v.

California State Lottery; Will Native Americans Lose Again? (1997) 19 Thomas Jefferson L.Rev. 361, 374-376.) Governor Wilson instead negotiated a compact with the Pala Band of Mission Indians, a tribe previously without gaming facilities, which he intended to serve as a statewide model.

In part because of objections to the negotiation procedures and in part because of restrictions the Pala compact placed on the type and number of gaming devices, most of the tribes with existing casinos rejected the Pala compact. (See Comment, The Effect of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act on California Native American’s Independence (1998) 35 San Diego L.Rev. 179, 198-201). It was to resolve such conflicts between the State of California and Indian tribes relative to class III gaming on Indian lands that Proposition 5 was drafted and circulated by petition. (See Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (b) [measure intended to end “uncertainties” regarding class III gaming by tribes].) That the initiative measure might not meet its purpose was known before the election: after the measure qualified for the ballot, but prior to the election, the Legislative Counsel issued an opinion concluding, inter alia, that the measure would be invalid under

section 19(

e) because it would authorize “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” (Ops. Cal. Legis. Counsel, No. 21947 (Oct. 8, 1998) Tribal Gaming: Proposition 5, pp. 8-14, 17-18.) At the election the people nevertheless approved the measure. II. Proposition 5 Having reviewed Proposition 5’s legal background and context, we turn to the measure itself. Proposition 5 adds a single title to the Government Code, viz., title 16, “State-Tribal Agreements Governing Indian Gaming,” which contains a single chapter, viz.,

chapter 1, “The Tribal Government Gaming and Economic Self-Sufficiency Act of 1998,” which comprises sections 98000 through

Section 98001 of the Government Code contains three findings made by the people as electors. The first finding opens as follows: “[Historically, Indian tribes within the state have long suffered from high rates of unemployment and inadequate educational, housing, elderly care, and health care opportunities, while typically being located on lands that are not conducive to economic development in order to meet those needs. . . .” (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (a).) It notes that federal law (i.e., IGRA) “provides a statutory basis” for gaming on Indian lands “as a means of strengthening tribal self-sufficiency through the creation of jobs and tribal economic development.” (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (a).) It also notes that federal law provides for class III gaming pursuant to tribal-state compacts. (Ibid.) The second finding states that “uncertainties have developed over various issues concerning class III gaming and the development of Tribal-State compacts between the state and tribes, and . . . those uncertainties have led to delays and considerable expense.” (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) It proceeds to declare that the terms of the model tribal-state compact set forth in Proposition 5 “are intended to resolve those uncertainties in an efficient and cost-effective way, while meeting the basic and mutual needs of the state and the tribes without undue delay.

The resolution of uncertainty regarding class III gaming in California, the generation of employment and tribal economic development that will result therefrom, and the limitations on the growth of gaming in California that are inherent therein, are in the best and immediate interest of all citizens of the state. . . .” (Ibid.) The third finding declares as follows: “[C]asinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey are materially different from the tribal gaming facilities authorized under” Proposition 5, including its model tribal-state compact, “in that the casinos in those states (1) commonly offer their patrons a broad spectrum of house-banked games, including but not limited to house-banked card games, roulette, dice games, and slot machines that dispense coins or currency, none of which games are authorized under this chapter; and (2) are owned by private companies, individuals, or others that are not restricted on how their profits may be expended, whereas tribal governments must be the primary beneficiaries of the gaming facilities” hereunder, and “are limited to using their gaming revenues for various tribal purposes, including tribal government services and programs such as those that address reservation housing, elderly care, education, economic development, health care, and other tribal programs and needs, in conformity with federal law.” (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (c).)

Section 98002 of the Government Code, among other things, authorizes and obligates the Governor to execute the model tribal-state compact on behalf of the State of California “as a ministerial act, without preconditions, within 30 days after receiving a request from” an Indian tribe “to enter into such a compact.” (Gov. Code, § 98002, subd. (a).)

Section 98004 of the Government Code sets forth Proposition 5’s model tribal-state compact. On behalf of the State of California, it “offers” such compact to any federally recognized Indian tribe that may choose to request and accept the compact. (Gov. Code, § 98004.) While the model compact contains numerous provisions detailing the manner in which tribal gaming facilities are to be licensed, staffed and operated, for present purposes we need review only those provisions pertinent to the scope of gaming permitted.

Section 3.0 of the model tribal-state compact “authorize[s] and permit[s]” the Indian tribe to engage in the class III gaming activities expressly referred to in

section 4 of the compact.

Section 4.0 of the model tribal-state compact sets out the scope of class III gaming activities. It authorizes and permits the Indian tribe to engage in the following four “forms or types of class HI gaming” (Gov. Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.1): First, the “operation of Tribal gaming terminals,” provided, inter alia, that the Indian tribe “shall pay prizes solely in accordance with a players’ pool prize system.” (Gov.

Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.1(a).) “Tribal gaming terminal” is defined as a “gaming device” of any kind “that does not dispense coins or currency and is not activated by a handle.” (Id., model compact § 2.21.) Second, the “operation of any [class III] card games that were actually operated in any tribal gaming facility in California on or before January 1, 1998,” provided that the Indian tribe “shall pay prizes solely in accordance with a players’ pool prize system.” (Gov.

Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.1(b).) Third, the “operation of any lottery game, including, but not limited to, drawings, raffles, match games, and instant lottery ticket games.” (Gov. Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.1(c).) Fourth, the operation of off-track parimutuel horse race wagering under specified terms and conditions, including consistency with an existing tribal-state compact covering the same subject. (Gov. Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.1(d).)

Section 4.0 of the model compact also authorizes the Indian tribe to “establish and operate gaming facilities” and generally to “combine and operate” therein “any forms and kinds of gaming permitted under law.” (Gov. Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.2.)

Section 98005 of the Government Code provides, among other things, that if the Governor does not execute a model tribal-state compact requested by an Indian tribe within 30 days after receiving its request, he will be ' “deemed” to have done so “to the extent permitted by law.” (Gov. Code, § 98005.) This

section also contains a waiver on the state’s part of immunity to suit in federal court for certain compact-related disputes. (Ibid.)

Section 98006 of the Government Code states that the gaming authorized pursuant to Proposition 5, including, but not limited to, the gaming authorized pursuant to its model tribal-state compact, “is not subject to any prohibition in state law now or hereafter enacted.

Without limiting the foregoing, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the following forms of gaming specifically are permitted and authorized to be conducted on Indian lands by a tribe that has entered into” a tribal-state compact: First, any class III card games “that were operated on any Indian reservation in California on or before January 1, 1998,” including, evidently, twenty-one or blackjack, subject to specified terms and conditions, including that the Indian tribe must pay prizes solely in accordance with a so-called “players’ pool prize system.” (Gov.

Code, § 98006, subd. (a).) Second, “[a]ny gaming or gambling device,” also subject to specified terms and conditions, including that such devices may not “dispense coins or currency and are not activated by handles,” and that the Indian tribe must pay prizes solely in accordance with a players’ pool prize system. (Gov. Code, § 98006, subd. (b).) Third, the “operation of any lottery game, including, but not limited to, drawings, raffles, match games, and instant lottery ticket games.” (Gov.

Code, § 98006, subd. (c).) A “players’ pool prize system” is defined as “one or more segregated pools of funds that have been collected from player wagers, [that] are irrevocably dedicated to the prospective award of prizes in [authorized gaming activities,] and in which the house neither has acquired nor can acquire any interest. The tribe may set and collect a fee from players on a per play, per amount wagered, or time-period basis, and may seed the pools in the form of loans or promotional expenses, provided that the seeding is not used to pay prizes previously won.” (Gov.

Code, § 98006, subd. (a); accord, id., § 98004, model compact § 2.16].)

Section 98009 of the Government Code declares that the provisions of Proposition 5’s model tribal-state compact “are hereby incorporated into state law, and all gaming activities, including but not limited to gaming devices, authorized therein are expressly declared to be permitted as a matter of state law to any Indian tribe entering into” such a compact. (Gov. Code, § 98009.) III. Proposition 5 and California Constitution,

Article IV,

Section 19(

e) We turn to the claims by the Union and Cortez that Proposition 5 is invalid under the California Constitution, specifically

section 19(e)’s declaration that “[t]he Legislature has no power to authorize . . . casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” We consider and decide the causes before us on the pleadings, without recourse to evidentiary proceedings, for none of the papers raise any question as to a matter of fact essential to determination of the petition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1090.) A statute inconsistent with the California Constitution is, of course, void. (Nougues v. Douglass (1857) 7 Cal. 65, 70.) In order to decide whether Proposition 5 is inconsistent with

section 19(e), we begin by examining and interpreting each part of

section 19(e). “The Legislature has no power . . . .” The “power” referred to is, of course, the legislative power, which is the subject of

article IV of the California Constitution as a whole. The legislative power may be exercised by either of two legislative bodies, inasmuch as

article IV,

section 1 declares that it is “vested” in the Legislature and also “reserve[dj” to the people acting through initiative, specifically, initiative statute.

Section 19(

e) could, therefore, be taken, relatively narrowly, to deny legislative power to the Legislature alone of the two legislative bodies, or, relatively broadly, to deny legislative power to the legislative body as such and, hence, to both legislative bodies. For two reasons, we conclude the broader

interpretation is the correct one. First, as we held in Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 674 [194 Cal.Rptr. 781, 669 P.2d 17], “[a] statutory initiative is subject to the same state and federal constitutional limitations as are the Legislature and the statutes which it enacts.” In that case, we interpreted a provision of the state Constitution requiring that “[i]n the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of’ various electoral districts. (Cal. Const., art.

XXI, § 1.) Having previously held that this provision, and its predecessor, limited the Legislature to one reapportionment every ten years (see Legislature v. Deukmejian, supra, at pp. 668-671), we considered and rejected the “novel theory” that this implied limitation applied only to the Legislature and not to the people’s reserved initiative power. (Id. at p. 673.) We found this theory “puzzling inasmuch as the reserved power to enact statutes by initiative is a legislative power, one that would otherwise reside in the Legislature.

It has heretofore been considered to be no greater with respect to the nature and attributes of the statutes that may be enacted than that of the Legislature.” (Ibid.) In the passing years, we have adhered to that broad holding without deviation. (See Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 696, fn. 2 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, 889 P.2d 557]; Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 540 [277 Cal.Rptr. 1, 802 P.2d 317]; Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 821 [226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68]; but see Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.

State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 252 [279 Cal.Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360] [rule does not apply to “procedural requirements addressed to the Legislature’s deliberations” unless evidence shows such application was intended].) We see no reason either to depart from or further narrow Legislature v. Deukmejian today. Second,

section 19(e), the anticasino provision, parallels in language, and was presumably based upon, the preexisting antilottery provision of California Constitution,

article IV,

section 19, subdivision (a) (hereafter

section 19(a)), which declares, “[t]he Legislature has no power to authorize lotteries . . . .”

Section 19(

a) dates back to 1879 and to the very establishment of the current California Constitution in that year. At that time, prior to the 1911 constitutional amendment that provided for the initiative (see Stats. 1911, Ex. Sess., pp. xvi-xviii), the Legislature was the sole legislative body. At that time, therefore, to deny legislative power to the Legislature was necessarily to deny legislative power to the legislative body as such. In 1911, when the people took the legislative power for themselves, they took it on these terms; they did not exempt themselves from existing substantive limits on the legislative power. After 1911 and to the present day, then,

section 19(

a) barred either legislative body, the people or the Legislature, from authorizing lotteries (subject, of course, to the exceptions in

article IV,

section 19, subdivisions (

c) and (

d) for charitable bingo and the California State Lottery). As “[t]he Legislature” in

section 19(

a) thus denotes the legislative body as such, meaning both the Legislature itself and the people acting through initiative statute, and as

section 19(

e) was apparently modeled upon

section 19(

a) and deals with a closely related subject, we should similarly interpret

section 19(

e) as restricting the legislative power in both its forms of exercise. We recognize that in 1879, to which the substance of the antilottery provision dates, “[t]he Legislature” could not have been used to exclude the people as a legislative body, inasmuch as the people were not yet such, while in 1984, to which the anticasino provision dates, the phrase could have been so used. There is no indication, however, that it was. From all that appears,

section 19(

e) was designed to proscribe casinos—specifically, “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey”—by constitutional force, preventing any future legislative authorization of such casinos without constitutional amendment. (See Ballot Pamp., Analysis by Legis. Analyst of Prop. 37, as presented to the voters, Gen.

Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984) p. 46 [in addition to establishing state lottery, Proposition 37 “would amend the Constitution to prohibit in California gambling casinos of the type that exist in Nevada and New Jersey. (Casino gambling currently is prohibited within the state by a statute, but not by the Constitution.)”].) It was not designed to proscribe the specified casinos only if they were authorized by the Legislature. “Casinos." In common usage around the time that

section 19(

e) was added to the California Constitution in 1984, a “casino” was defined simply as “a building or room for gambling.” (Webster’s New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 347; accord, e.g., Rose, Gambling and the Law (1986) at p. 4.) In the anticasino provision itself, it does not appear to demand any different signification. “Of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” “Currently” is potentially ambiguous, in that it could refer to 1984, the time of its use in

section 19(e), or to the time at which prohibited casinos are purportedly authorized. We adopt the former view. To declare, “The Legislature has no power to authorize . . . casinos of the type . . . operating in Nevada and New Jersey” in 1984, addresses an evil that was knowable and, in fact, known at the time the anticasino provision was added, that is, the kind of casino then existing in those states.

By contrast, to declare, “The Legislature has no power to authorize . . . casinos of the type . . . operating in Nevada and New Jersey” from time to time, addresses an evil, if evil it be, that is altogether unknown and unknowable. That the amendment drafters or the voters intended only such an attenuated effect is unlikely. The sense of the other words in this phrase within

section 19(

e) requires more effort to discern. What was meant by “the type” of casino “operating in Nevada and New Jersey” in 1984?

Section 19(

e) contains no definition of this phrase. Logic and reference to legislative history, however, allow us to see with reasonable clarity what the drafters and voters intended to prohibit in 1984. The 1984 constitutional amenders must have had in mind a type of gambling house unique to or particularly associated with Nevada and New Jersey, since they chose to define the prohibited institution by reference to those states.

On this logic, the “type” of casino referred to must be an establishment that offers gaming activities including banked table games and gaming devices, i.e., slot machines, for in 1984 that “type” of casino was legal only in Nevada and New Jersey and, hence, was particularly associated with those states. (See Rose, Gambling and the Law, supra, at p. 4 [of the states, only Nevada and New Jersey allow “[c]asinos offering the full range of gambling games”]; id. at pp. 6-7 [detailing gaming operations of the “average Atlantic City casino” in 1984]; Com. on the Review of the Nat.

Policy Toward Gambling, Final Rep., Gambling in America (1976) pp. 88-89 [detailing gaming operations of Nevada casinos].) Similarly, “the type” of casino “operating in Nevada and New Jersey” presumably refers to a gambling facility that did not legally operate in California; something other, that is, than “the type” of casino “operating” in California. The type of casino then operating in California is what has commonly been called a “card room” (see, e.g., Bristow v. Morelli (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 894, 897 [76 Cal.Rptr. 203]) or “card club” (see, e.g., Wynn v.

Monterey Club (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 789, 793 [168 Cal.Rptr. 878]), a type that did not offer gaming activities including banking games and gaming devices. (See Rose, Gambling and the Law, supra, at pp. 3-4.) A California card room or card club was not permitted to offer gaming activities in the form of: (1) lotteries; (2) banking games, whether or not played with cards; (3) percentage games, whether or not played with cards; (4) slot machines; or (5) games proscribed by name, including twenty-one— all of which were prohibited at least by statute. (See pt.

I.A., ante.) Thus, a casino of “the type . . . operating in Nevada and New Jersey” may be understood, with reasonable specificity, as one or more buildings, rooms, or facilities, whether separate or connected, that offer gambling activities including those statutorily prohibited in California, especially banked table games and slot machines. Real Parties object to this approach as rendering

section 19(

e) merely an elevation of statutory prohibitions on certain activities to the constitutional level. But the available legislative history suggests

section 19(

e) was designed, precisely, to elevate statutory prohibitions on a set of gambling activities to a constitutional level. (See Ballot Pamp., Analysis by Legis. Analyst of Prop. 37 as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984) p. 46 [in addition to establishing state lottery, Proposition 37 “would amend the Constitution to prohibit in California gambling casinos of the type that exist in Nevada and New Jersey. (Casino gambling currently is prohibited within the state by a statute, but not by the Constitution.)”]; Ballot Pamp., argument in favor of Prop. 37 as presented to the voters, Gen.

Elec. (Nov. 6, 1984) p. 48 [Proposition 37 “adds a new Constitutional Prohibition Against Casino Gambling”].) Voters on the 1984 initiative would thus have understood the constitutional provision they added,

section 19(e), as focusing on a set of statutorily prohibited activities, i.e. “casino gambling,” and as endowing the existing statutory bars on that set of activities with a new, constitutional status. From the

interpretation of

section 19(e), we turn to determining the effect of Proposition 5. As stated, Proposition 5, including its model tribal-state compact, authorizes tribal gaming facilities and authorizes in such facilities the operation of tribal gaming terminals, grandfathered class III card games, lotteries, and off-track parimutuel horse race wagering under specified terms and conditions. As shown below, Proposition 5, including its model tribal-state compact, authorizes what would amount to prohibited casinos.

With their tribal gaming terminals and grandfathered class HI card games, tribal gaming facilities authorized under the measure would constitute facilities that offer gambling activities including those statutorily prohibited to card clubs in California in 1984, especially banked table games and slot machines. According to Real Parties, who rely on the “players’ pool prize system” of Proposition 5, the grandfathered class III card games, specifically including blackjack, are lotteries. According to the Union and Cortez, they are banking games.

We conclude the card games in question are not lotteries, but banking games. Here, unlike in lotteries, the Indian tribe does not “distribute” to a “winner or winners” (Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 485), with “no interest in the outcome” of the play (id. at p. 488), a “prize or prizes” (id. at p. 485) that are invariable because they are “either fixed in advance or determined by the total amount” of fees paid (id. at p. 489).

Rather, as in other banking games, the tribe, through the prize pool, simply “pays off all winning wagers and keeps all losing wagers” (id. at p. 485), which are variable “because the amount of money” it “will have to pay out,” or be able to take in, “depends upon whether each of the individual bets is won or lost” (id. at p. 488). That the tribe must “pay[] all winners, and collect[] from all losers” (Sullivan v. Fox, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 678) through a fund that is styled a “players’ pool” is immaterial: the players’ pool is a bank in nature if not in name.

It is a “ ‘ “fund against which everybody has a right to bet, the bank . . . taking all that is won, and paying out all that is lost.” ’ ” (Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 487.) Theoretically, an extraordinary run of good luck by one or more gamblers in a short period could exhaust the players’ pool, thus breaking the bank, a course of events that cannot occur even theoretically in a lottery. (Id. at p. 488.) True, the players’ pool is limited in what it pays—but not in what it collects—in that the tribe is prohibited from lending the pool money “to pay prizes previously won” (Gov.

Code, § 98004, model compact § 2.16; accord, id., § 98006, subd. (a)). But, as we explained in Western Telcon, the fact that payouts on wagers must be made from a limited fund of money does not transform a banking game into a lottery. (Western Telcon, supra, at pp. 493-494.) Such a banker simply finds itself “in the enviable position of a gambler who has, by law, an upper limit to his losses.” (Id. at p. 494.) That Proposition 5 does not limit tribal casinos to card games operated as lotteries is especially clear if one focuses on the manner in which payouts are calculated under the “players’ pool” system.

Although this fund is the only permitted source of payouts, nothing in Proposition 5 or its model compact requires that payouts be calculated as shares of the “pool.” (See Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 492 [California State Lottery’s Keno a banking game rather than a lottery because payouts are fixed rather than “calculated as shares of a ‘prize pool.’ ”].) Of course, a lottery may use fixed prizes rather than a parimutuel system. “In a fixed-prize lottery, however, the total prize amount must be fixed in advance of the draw.

If fixed prizes are offered, in other words, the number of such prizes must also be determined in advance of the draw.” (Id. at p. 490, italics in original.) Again, nothing in Proposition 5 or its model compact requires that the number of fixed payouts for a given game be determined in advance of the game. Real Parties argue the games allowed under Proposition 5 are not house banked because the casino’s tribal owner-operator cannot profit from surpluses in the “players’ pool,” which is dedicated to payment of prizes.

Even if true, this limitation would not make the games lotteries rather than banking games, since a banking game, within the meaning of Penal Code

section 330’s prohibition, may be banked by someone other than the owner of the gambling facility. (Oliver v. County of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1407-1409 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 641].) In any event, that the tribal operator does not profit from the prize pool’s winnings is not strictly true. The tribe retains an “interest in the outcome” of play (Western Telcon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 488) even if it “neither has nor can acquire any interest” in the players’ pool itself, which is “irrevocably dedicated to the prospective award of prizes in authorized gaming activities” (Gov.

Code, § 98004, model compact § 2.16; accord, id., § 98006, subd. (a)). The more the players’ pool collects from losers and the less it pays to winners, the lower the tribal operator’s costs—the less likely it will be compelled to lend seed money to the players’ pool in the future, the more likely it will be able to obtain repayment of seed money lent to the pool in the past. Conversely, the less the pool collects and the more it pays, the higher the operator’s costs.

Of necessity, moreover, the operator of a casino authorized under Proposition 5 must be concerned with maintaining ample funds in the players’ pool or pools, since depletion of those funds will require lower payouts, hence worse odds on players’ bets, hence less action to generate fee revenue for the operator. Even under Proposition 5’s players’ pool prize system, therefore, the “house” retains an interest in the outcome of play. As to the “Tribal gaming terminals” (Gov.

Code, § 98004, model compact §§ 2.21, 4.1(a)) or “gaming or gambling device[s]” (id., § 98006, subd. (b)) authorized by Proposition 5, Real Parties contend they differ from the slot machines found in Nevada and New Jersey casinos in two respects: first, they are not house banked, but rather operate as lotteries, because they must be conducted according to the players’ pool prize system, and second, they “do not dispense coins or currency and are not activated by handles” (Gov. Code, § 98006, subd. (b); accord, id., § 98004, model compact § 2.21). The first assertion, as we have just seen, is incorrect.

The player’s pool prize system does not convert a game or device into a lottery; tribal gaming devices are not lottery terminals, rather than slot machines, merely because a player’s winnings must come from, and his or her losses go into, a particular fund. The second assertion, while true, is immaterial. A slot machine is no less a slot machine under California law because it dispenses a “credit, allowance or thing of value,” rather than money (Pen. Code, § 330b, subd. (2)), or because it is “caused to operate” by one “means” rather than another (ibid.).

Nor would the voters on the 1984 constitutional amendment likely have understood

section 19(

e) to permit casinos so long as the slot machines therein were activated by buttons rather than levers, and dispensed chips or electronic credits rather than coins.

Real Parties point to several other respects in which tribal casinos authorized by Proposition 5 will presumably differ from the archetypical 1984 Nevada or New Jersey casino: tribal casinos will not be clustered together in an urban “strip”; tribal casinos, assertedly, may not serve free alcohol; tribal casinos will not be able to offer banked noncard games such as craps and roulette; and tribal casinos will be owned by tribes and the revenues used for tribal purposes. These asserted characteristics, however, fail meaningfully to distinguish casinos authorized under Proposition 5 from those prohibited by

section 19(e). We think it highly unlikely that the 1984 constitutional amenders, who were told the measure before them would constitutionalize California’s statutory prohibitions on “casino gambling,” were concerned with such secondary nongambling features of casinos as their mutual proximity or service of free alcohol. As to banked noncard games, we cannot agree that a casino offering activities including banked card games and slot machines differs in fundamental type from one offering, in addition, roulette and craps.

Finally, because private ownership and for-profit operation were not unique to Nevada and New Jersey gambling facilities in 1984, and, indeed, characterized permitted California facilities such as card clubs and horse racing tracks, private ownership and for-profit operation could not logically have been the characteristics to which the constitutional amenders intended to refer in prohibiting “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey.” In concluding as we do, we do not overlook the finding made in Proposition 5 that “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey are materially different from . . . tribal gaming facilities ... in that the casinos in those states (1) commonly offer their patrons a broad spectrum of house-banked games, including but not limited to house-banked card games, roulette, dice games, and slot machines that dispense coins or currency, none of which games are authorized” under the measure, including its model tribal-state compact; and “(2) are owned by private companies, individuals, or others that are not restricted on how their profits may be expended, whereas tribal governments must be the primary beneficiaries of the gaming facilities . . . , and are limited to using their gaming revenues for various tribal purposes, including tribal government services and programs such as those that address reservation housing, elderly care, education, economic development, health care, and other tribal programs and needs, in conformity with federal law.” (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (c).) “As a general rule, ‘[i]t is not the judiciary’s function ... to reweigh the [findings of] “legislative facts” underlying a legislative enactment.’ ” (American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 348 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 210, 940 P.2d 797] (plur. opn. of George, C. J.).) To the extent the quoted findings actually state legislative facts, we follow the general rule of deference here.

Thus we may take it as given, for example, that the tribal facilities authorized by Proposition 5 would use their net revenues for tribal purposes, and that in this respect they differ from privately owned Nevada and New Jersey casinos.

As just discussed, however, private ownership and for-profit operation did not distinguish Nevada and New Jersey casinos from California card clubs in 1984 and, therefore, these were almost certainly not the characteristics to which the drafters and voters intended to refer when barring authorization of casinos “of the type currently operated in Nevada and New Jersey.” To the extent the quoted findings do not consist of legislative fact, but of statutory or constitutional

interpretation—interpretation of

section 19(

e) or of California statutory law regarding lotteries and banking games— the general rule of deference is not implicated. The “finding” to the effect that the games and devices authorized under Proposition 5 are not banked card games and slot machines, for example, is a pure statement of law that we must independently evaluate (and, having done so, have found incorrect). Most importantly, the general statement that “casinos of the type currently operating in Nevada and New Jersey are materially different from the tribal gaming facilities authorized under this chapter” (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (c)) is not a “finding” of “legislative fact” or indeed of any other kind of “fact.” Rather, it is a construction of the anticasino provision of

section 19(e). As such, it commands no deference on our part, because we construe the provisions of the California Constitution independently. (Nougues v. Douglass, supra, 7 Cal. at p. 70 [“It would be idle to make the Constitution the supreme law, and then require the judges to take the oath to support it, and after all that, require the Courts to take the legislative construction as correct”]; see also Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 354 [276 Cal.Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077].) Against the conclusion that Proposition 5 is invalid as inconsistent with the anticasino provision of

section 19(e), Real Parties argue that IGRA preempts the anticasino provision itself. More particularly, they argue that under IGRA states may not regulate the manner in which permitted class III games are played or, indeed, impose any regulation except to prohibit specific games, by any means other than a tribal-state compact. Because

section 19(

e) is not a prohibition on particular gaming activities, but on conducting them in a Nevada- or New Jersey-style casino, Real Parties argue, IGRA preempts its application to tribal gaming. Real Parties’ preemption argument fails because neither of the premises upon which it rests is true. First, contrary to their representation, IGRA does not exempt gambling on Indian lands from state regulatory laws. Indeed,

section 23 of IGRA provides that “for purposes of Federal law, all State laws pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling . . . shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.” (18 U.S.C. § 1166(a).) Subsection (

c) of the same

section recognizes an exception to that rule for class III gaming conducted under a tribal/state compact but, as we further explain below, such a compact may not go into effect unless it is validly entered into under state law, which the model compact in Proposition 5 could not be, because its approval would violate

section 19(e). In the absence of a valid tribal-state compact, therefore, California law regulating class III gaming activities does apply to such gaming on Indian lands, although the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute violations of that law criminally. (18 U.S.C. § 1166(d); see U.S. v. E.C. Investments, Inc. (9th Cir. 1996) 77 F.3d 327, 330-331 [in absence of compact, prohibition of slot machines in Penal Code

section 330b applies to operation of such devices on Indian reservation, although only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute a violation].) Second, the argument incorrectly characterizes

section 19(e): that provision does, in substantial part, prohibit specific gambling activities, including slot machines, banked card games and other banking games, when conducted in a casino setting. More generally, Real Parties’ reliance on IGRA is misplaced because IGRA legalizes only gaming conducted pursuant to a compact validly entered into by both the state and the tribe. In

section 11(d)(1), IGRA declares that “[c]lass III gaming activities” are “lawful. . . only if such activities are . . . conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State . . . that is in effect.” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1).) To be “entered into” by the state and the tribe means to be “entered into” validly in accordance with state (and tribal) law. (See Pueblo of Santa Ana v.

Kelly (10th Cir. 1997) 104 F.3d 1546, 1555 [concluding “the ‘entered into’ language imposes an independent requirement and the compact must be validly entered into by a state before it can go into effect, via Secretarial approval, under IGRA” (fn. omitted)]; id. at pp. 1550-1551, 1557-1559 [agreeing with New Mexico Supreme Court that compact was invalid under the law of that state because the Governor did not have authority, without legislative enactment, to bind state to compact authorizing casino gambling otherwise prohibited by state law]; Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v.

Babbitt (D.D.C. 1993) 827 F.Supp. 37, 44-46, reversed on other grounds sub nom. Kickapoo Tribe of Indians in Kansas v. Babbitt (D.C. Cir. 1995) 43 F.3d 1491 [same as to compact invalidly signed by Governor of Kansas]; see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 47 [116 S.Ct. 1114, 1119, 134 L.Ed.2d 252] [observing that IGRA “provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only in conformance with a valid compact between the tribe and the State” (italics added)].) With respect to a tribal-state compact, IGRA balances the interests of the state and the tribe.

Its balancing is predicated on a recognition that the state and the tribe are sovereigns, albeit sovereigns subordinate to the federal union. That fact is implied in its provisions and is express in its legislative history, which presents the “use of compacts between tribes and states” as the “best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met. . . .” (Sen.Rep. No. 100-446, 2d Sess., p. 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News, at p. 3083.) To recognize that the state and the tribe are sovereigns entails an acknowledgment that the law of each operates in its proper sphere and, therefore, that the law of each governs the validity of its own entry into a compact. IGRA would not make lawful particular gaming activities included in a compact if the compact itself were not validly entered into under the law of both the state and the Indian tribe in question.

Such is the case here for the model tribal-state compact set forth in Proposition 5: entry into such a compact is beyond the legislative power under the law of California, conflicting as it would with the anticasino provision of

section 19(e). IV. Severability of Valid and Invalid Provisions We therefore conclude Proposition 5 is inconsistent with the anticasino provision of

section 19(e), insofar as it authorizes what would amount to proscribed casinos. Of course, a statute that is invalid as inconsistent with the California Constitution is not ineffective and inoperative to the extent that its invalid parts can be severed from any valid ones. (See, e.g., Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian (1989) 48 Cal.3d 805, 821-822 [258 Cal.Rptr. 161, 771 P.2d 1247].) An invalid

part can be severed if, and only if, it is “grammatically, functionally and volitionally separable.” (Id. at p. 821.) It is “grammatically” separable if it is “distinct” and “separate” and, hence, “can be removed as a whole without affecting the wording of any” of the measure’s “other provisions.” (Id. at p. 822.) It is “functionally” separable if it is not necessary to the measure’s operation and purpose. (See id. at pp. 821, 822.) And it is “volitionally” separable if it was not of critical importance to the measure’s enactment. (Id. at p. 822.) Although Proposition 5 and its model tribal-state compact both contain severability clauses (Gov.

Code, § 98004, model compact § 14.0; id., § 98007), and although Proposition 5’s invalid parts authorizing what would amount to proscribed casinos are grammatically separable, the invalid provisions are not functionally or volitionally separable from the remainder of the model compact or from Proposition 5 as a whole. First, the model compact as a whole is inseparable, both functionally and volitionally, from the compact’s authorization of casino gambling.

Without the provisions authorizing the operation of tribal gaming terminals and grandfathered class III card games, tribal gaming facilities would remain authorized—but without resolution of the chief conflicts over class III Indian gaming that prompted the measure’s circulation and passage.

By the measure’s own declaration, its authorization of gaming, including that authorized in the model tribal-state compact, was intended to be comprehensive, that is, to resolve the “uncertainties” regarding class III gaming, including tribal gaming terminals and class III card games, “in an efficient and cost-effective way.” (Gov. Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) It would not be such if it should prove to resolve nothing about these gaming activities. Nor can the compact as a whole be considered volitionally separate from its authorization of casino gambling.

The scope of authorized gambling was of “critical” importance to the “enactment” of the measure, including its offer of a model compact (Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 822), because the scope of gambling was of critical importance to the measure itself. Even apart from Government Code

section 98004, which sets forth the model compact, and Government Code

section 98006, which separately but in parallel fashion authorizes tribes to operate casinos prohibited by

section 19(e), almost all of the measure’s remaining provisions are functionally dependent on the existence of a model compact and the authorization of casino gambling. Setting aside the title (Gov. Code, § 98000), findings (id., § 98001), severability clause (id., § 98007), grant of gubernatorial signing authority (id., § 98008), guide to construction (id., § 98010) and amendability clause (id., § 98012), none of which could function separate from the measure as a whole, all the remaining sections of the measure except

section 98005 concern the model compact or the gambling authorized under the compact and Government Code

section 98006. (Id., §§ 98002, 98003, 98004, 98006, 98009, 98011.) The first sentence of Government Code

section 98005, as well, concerns the model compact. The second, and final, sentence of

section 98005, however, deals with a functionally separate subject—the state’s waiver of immunity from suit in disputes arising out of negotiations for new or amended tribal-state compacts other than the measure’s model compact.

It provides as follows; “Without limiting the foregoing, the State of California also submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any action brought against the state by any federally recognized California Indian tribe asserting any cause of action arising from the state’s refusal to enter into negotiations with that tribe for the purpose of entering into a different Tribal-State compact pursuant to IGRA or to conduct those negotiations in good faith, the state’s refusal to enter into negotiations concerning the amendment of a Tribal-State compact to which the state is a party, or to negotiate in good faith concerning that amendment, or the state’s violation of the terms of any Tribal-State compact to which the state is or may become a party.” (Gov.

Code, § 98005.) The consent to suit contained in the final sentence of Government Code

section 98005 is functionally separable from the measure’s authorization of casino gambling and its model compact. It concerns neither the scope of gambling permitted to tribes nor the implementation of the model compact but, rather, the resolution of future disputes concerning the negotiation, amendment and performance of compacts “different” from Proposition 5’s model compact. In significant part, it would affect the resolution of any dispute arising out of the course of future negotiations for compacts that tribes may seek in lieu of the compact invalidly offered in Proposition 5. The final sentence of Government Code

section 98005 is also volitionally separable from Proposition 5’s authorization of casino gambling and its model compact. The enactors of Proposition 5 sought, among other things, to expedite and remove obstacles from the process of reaching tribal/state agreements on class III gaming. (Gov.

Code, § 98001, subd. (b).) They sought to do so within the framework of IGRA. (Id., subd. (a).) As part of its framework for negotiating class III gaming compacts, IGRA provides for a tribal action in United States District Court against a state that has refused to negotiate for a compact or has failed to do so in good faith. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).) The tribal remedy provided by Congress lost its effectiveness, however, with the United States Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.

Florida, supra, 517 U.S. 44, to the effect that state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits in federal district court by Indian tribes against states to enforce legislation enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause and, hence, that, in the absence of a state’s consent to suit, the Eleventh Amendment renders invalid IGRA’s purported grant to such court of jurisdiction. The final sentence of Government Code

section 98005, in providing the state’s consent to such a suit, is obviously intended to restore to California tribes the remedy provided in IGRA. Because doing so will tend to effectuate and expedite IGRA’s process for achieving class III Indian gaming compacts, one of the express goals of Proposition 5, we are confident the enactors of Proposition 5 would have approved this portion of the measure even if they had known the remainder could not constitutionally be given effect. The final sentence of Government Code

section 98005 also survives the other challenges petitioners make to Proposition 5’s validity: it is not beyond the people’s initiative power as failing to enact a statute; subject to constitutional limitations, a statute may define the scope of the government’s immunity to suit. (See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 [federal Tort Claims Act]; Gov. Code, §§ 810-997.6 [California Tort Claims Act].) It does not impermissibly infringe on the Governor’s executive power, as waiver of immunity is not an exclusively executive function. (See ibid.) It is not preempted by IGRA, as it is consistent with and furthers the purposes of IGRA. (Because all other provisions of Proposition 5 are invalid under

section 19(

e) or are inseparable from such invalid provisions, we need not address petitioners’ remaining challenges as they concern Proposition 5 in general.) Conclusion and Disposition For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Proposition 5, except for the final sentence of Government Code

section 98005, is invalid because it is inconsistent with the anticasino provision of

article IV,

section 19, subdivision (

e) of the California Constitution. We therefore discharge the orders to show cause and direct issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the Governor and the Secretary of State not to implement Proposition 5, with the exception of the final sentence of Government Code

section 98005. George, C. J., Chin, J., Brown, J., Gilbert, J., and Gant, J., concurred. The record does not contain an exhaustive list of the card games played at tribal casinos on or before January 1, 1998, but there is no dispute they included one or more forms of blackjack or twenty-one. (See Ballot Pamp., Analysis by Legis. Analyst of Prop. 5, as presented to the voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1998) p. 20 [“Currently, . . . Indian gambling operations in California . . . offer a variety of gambling activities . . . including] bingo, card games (including a type of blackjack), and electronic (video) gambling devices.”].) Unlike the parties, Justice Kennard focuses on the word “authorize” in

section 19(e), arguing that because “it is federal law, not state law, that authorizes Indian gambling ... the model compact of Proposition 5 does not authorize Indian gambling and thus does not violate

section 19(e).” (Dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 616.) By their terms, however, both the tribal-state compact (Gov. Code, § 98004, model compact § 4.1) and Government Code

section 98006 would “authorize[]” various forms of gaming in tribal gaming facilities. Moreover, as federal legal authority for class HI gaming is, under IGRA, dependent in two ways on state authorization (see 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710(d)(1)(B) [requiring such gaming be permitted under state law], 2710(d)(1)(C) [requiring existence of compact entered into by state and tribe]), Justice Kennard’s attempt to draw a bright line between federal and state authority in this area is unavailing.

Justice Kennard compares the players’ prize pool system to the “rollover” feature sometimes used in lotteries. (Dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 624.) There is little comparison between such an isolated feature of a lottery and the pervasive pooling of revenue—not only from round to round, but over indefinite time periods and between games as well—characterizing the players’ prize pool system.

In any event, prizes in even a rolled-over lottery are calculated as shares of the ticket sales; payouts in the games authorized by Proposition 5 would neither be calculated as shares of revenue for the game nor as a prespecified number of fixed prizes. For. the same reason, Justice Kennard’s argument that games operated according to the players’ prize pool system are lotteries, rather than banking games, because the tribal operator assertedly has no interest in the outcome (dis. opn. of Kennard, J„ post, at p. 624), would fail even if its factual premise were true.

The pool itself functions as a bank, collecting from all losers and paying all winners. Apart from their identity as banking games rather than lotteries, the card games and devices in question are within the prohibition of Penal Code

section 330—which

section 19(

e) was intended, in part, to constitutionalize—to the extent that the Indian tribe may, under Proposition 5, collect fees from players on a per-amount-wagered basis: to that extent, they may be played as percentage games. And the grandfathered card games are also within

section 330 to the extent that they include twenty-one, or blackjack: to that extent, they are proscribed by name. Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

article VI,

section 6 of the California Constitution. Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to

article VI,

section 6 of the California Constitution.