In re RICHARD PRICE et al., on Habeas Corpus, 25 Cal. 3d 448

Opinion MOSK,J. Petitioners sought permission from the administration of Soledad Prison to hold meetings of the Prisoners Union, at which not only inmates but outside members and guests would be present. Their request for approval of the organization as an “inmate activity group” was rejected, and a subsequent appeal to the Director of Corrections was denied. The petitioners then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Monterey County. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition. We issued an order to show cause.

The trial judge stated the issue: “the rights claimed by Petitioners are such that, in the abstract, cannot be denied. The question therefore is whether the reasonable security of this institution . . . justified their denial.” The relationship of the claimed rights to reasonable security is invoked by reference to the provisions of Penal Code

section 2600: “A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may, during any such period of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public.” In a well-reasoned written opinion, the trial judge reviewed the evidence and the conflicting theories of the parties. The following facts and contentions emerge from the trial court’s findings: Approximately 3,000 state prisoners in California are members of the Prisoners Union.

Some 300, of whom 40 are dues paying members, are in the Soledad facility. The organization has a formal corporate structure, and membership outside the institution which includes former inmates. Its president is a former inmate.

The Prisoners Union has proclaimed the following goals: (1) to collectively bargain with the correctional department, support convict-initiated prison change, and seek redress for convict grievances; (2) to end economic exploitation by gaining the right to a prevailing wage for all work done in prison; (3) to establish a uniform sentencing structure and the abolition of indeterminate sentencing; (4) to restore civil and human rights to convicts and ex-convicts.

Petitioners prefer to define the goal of collective bargaining as the right to meet and confer or to negotiate grievances through peaceful and rational persuasion with prohibition of the traditional strike as a bargaining weapon. Respondent Director of Corrections on the other hand urges that, regard less of the label attached to the process, the strike and the withdrawal of good behavior are the only realistic consequences of group representation on issues such as conditions of confinement.

The Prisoners Union acknowledges that picketing of prison facilities by outside sympathizers might be employed in connection with the negotiation of disputes. Respondents further contend that recognition of the organization as an activity group would result in the exertion of pressure on inmates to join and to vote on union policy, the infiltration by illegal inmate gangs, the increase of factionalism by inmates, the decline of discipline, increased potential for violence, and upsetting of the delicate balance essential to proper operation of a prison facility.

Respondents further claim that the veiy nature of the Soledad facility, being one of tight security, housing relatively young offenders, renders the existence of a union therein even more dangerous.

Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that no exertion of pressure on inmates to join would occur, that voting would be through secret ballot and thus not subject to coercion, that inmate gangs would not attempt to infiltrate because of the Union’s openness and lawful methods, that communication between prisoners and staff would be improved, that prisoner frustrations would be alleviated through the mutual aid and support supplied by the association and that overall potential for violence would be diminished.

The Prisoners Union appears to be the product of an informed segment of our society with sentiments at odds with much of the traditional system of prison operation and administration. It seeks to eliminate all injustice in prisoner treatment, discipline, labor, and general conditions, through the vehicles of individual and group representation, negotiation and a representative grievance procedure. The Union also aspires to effect legislative change in these areas and in the areas of wages for prison labor and sentencing laws.

In their petition to this court, petitioners insist that “being able to participate in Prisoners Union meetings is a fundamental right.” The nature of this claimed fundamental right is not delineated. If the right asserted is that of association, then it is undeniably illusory. Manifestly, one of the basic rights enjoyed by all free citizens, and necessarily denied to prisoners, is the right of association. By the very nature of imprisonment prisoners are separated from their families, their friends, and their business or social associates.

Even in confinement their ability to effect associations among others equally confined is circumscribed by assignment of quarters and work duties. No legislative intent indicates, and no case law holds, that such restrictions on the right of association are invalid. If other constitutional rights are asserted, then we need be detained only momentarily. That the restriction on the union offends no constitutional right was unequivocally determined by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union (1977) 433 U.S. 119 [53 L.Ed.2d 629, 97 S.Ct. 2532].

Therefore we turn for guidance to the statute involved: Penal Code

section 2600 which limits a prisoner’s deprivation to only such rights “as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he is confined. . . .” In that context, then, we must determine whether the instant regulation is reasonable (In re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575 [116 Cal.Rptr. 371, 526 P.2d 523]; In re Harrell (1970) 2 Cal.3d 675 [87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470, P.2d 640]) or, conversely, whether the prison administration is unreasonable in its concern that prisoners’ union meetings and activities are a potential threat to the security of penal institutions.

The law is clear that maintenance of security in prisons is a legitimate interest of the state and its officials. (Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 561 [41 L.Ed.2d 935, 94 S.Ct. 2963].) In his presentation to this court the prison director has emphasized several potential security apprehensions inherent in prisoners’ union activities. These may be categorized roughly as follows: 1.

Petitioning for redress of grievances, an avowed union purpose, has a peaceful ring, but if the petition is rejected and since thereafter normal union economic pressures are unavailable, strikes and disruption are the only available courses of action for prisoner members. 2. Unions, to be effective, must be expansive in membership. Recruiting activities, in a prison environment, will inevitably lead to threats and coercion. This is particularly so in such a setting, where there are inherent conflicts between short-term and long-term prisoners. 3.

Membership solicitation activities lend themselves to infiltration of the union organization, and possible seizure, by existing prison gangs which have exhibited a propensity for violence and other antisocial behavior. 4. The present proceedings involve the prison at Soledad. Even if ultimate experimentation might prove a tolerable risk elsewhere, Soledad has had a history of violent disruption by inmates. Confined at Soledad is a volatile group of younger inmates many of whom have committed crimes of violence. 5.

Ability of outside union representatives and members—nonrelatives and nonattorneys—to have regular contact with inmates poses a problem because the conduct and influence of noninmates are not subject to monitoring by prison officials. By any objective appraisal, the foregoing apprehensions are not inconsequential, and therefore they do not result in the imposition of unreasonable restrictions upon prisoners’ rights enumerated in Penal Code

section 2600. (For a discussion of the “limits of correctional reform” see Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice (1978) pp. 371-423.) Prisons differ substantially from a free society. The melancholy fact is that they are populated by an inordinate number of persons who have previously resorted to violence. Any form of concerted activity among that populace, particularly when directed to grievances and complaints and encouraged by outside persons, appears calculated to create potentially explosive situations.

We reach our conclusion despite the laudable premises implied in the petition that peaceful redress of grievances is always preferable to violent confrontation, that a sharpening of wits in meetings of peers and administrators is more desirable than a sharpening of knives in preparation for assaults on peers or administrators, and that prison inmates are more likely to respond rationally when treated with dignity and civility than with abasement and humiliation.

From those premises, however, we find it a giant leap to an unwarranted conclusion that the prison administration has abused its discretion in satisfying legitimate safety concerns. We recognize that circumstances may change in the future: the goals and membership of the Prisoners Union may undergo revision, the security of penal institutions may become more effective and less restrictive of necessity, penal administrative officials may find methods of achieving an accommodation with those purposes and activities of the prisoners’ organization that are meritorious.

Thus our conclusion is not carved in stone and should not be interpreted as a permanent prohibition against reasonable prisoner activities proposed by the union. We decide merely that as a court we cannot second-guess the present determination of the prison administration that Prisoners Union meetings pose a potential threat to the reasonable security of penal institutions. Under separation of powers this is, as recently described by the United States Supreme Court, a judgment call “confided to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.” (Bell v.

Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 562 [60 L.Ed.2d 447, 484, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886].) The order to show cause is discharged. The petition is denied. Clark, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred. CLARK, J. Finding the majority’s analysis of the dangers inherent in union activity among prison inmates entirely persuasive, I concur in the judgment and opinion of the court.

I would merely add that the same considerations leading the court to uphold rules regulating such activity in this case led me to conclude that related rules should have been upheld in In re Reynolds, ante, p. 131 [157 Cal.Rptr. 892, 599 P.2d 83] (right of inmates to wear prisoners union lapel button) and In re Brandt, ante, p. 136 [157 Cal.Rptr. 894, 599 P.2d 86] (right of parolees to carry on official prisoners union correspondence with inmates). There are existing, well-defined grievance procedures for individual convicts. This goal is now moot; indeterminate sentencing has been abolished in California.

Rights of association are not totally denied. Membership in the union is permitted, as are individual visitation and correspondence with outside union representatives. The Attorney General of California, appearing for the Department of Corrections, is supported by an amici curiae brief signed by the attorneys general of 20 states.