J. W. HARROTT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF KINGS et al., Defendants and Respondents, 25 Cal. 4th 1138

Opinion BROWN, J. Mr. Harrott is an attorney. He received a gun collection in payment for legal services rendered to clients who had pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property. The Kings County Sheriff’s Department, which was in possession of the gun collection, did not assert that one of the weapons, a semiautomatic rifle (the rifle), was stolen property, but nevertheless refused to deliver it to Mr. Harrott on the ground it was an assault weapon proscribed by the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 (Stats. 1989, ch. 19, § 3, p. 64; hereafter AWCA). Mr.

Harrott brought this petition for writ of mandate to compel the sheriff’s department to deliver the rifle to him. The trial court denied the writ, holding the rifle to be an assault weapon, and the Court of Appeal reversed. We granted review and held the case pending our decision in Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23 Cal.4th 472 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, 2 P.3d 581] (Kasler).

In Kasler, supra, 23 Cal.4th 472, in the course of upholding the AWCA against various constitutional challenges, we summarized the statutory provisions that govern the question whether a semiautomatic firearm is considered an assault weapon. “Prior to amendment of the AWCA in 1999 (the 1999 amendments) (Stats. 1999, ch. 129, § 7 et seq.), semiautomatic firearms were designated as assault weapons by (1) being listed by type, series, and model in

section 12276 [of the Penal Code], or (2) by being declared an assault weapon under a procedure set forth in

section 12276.5. Under the latter procedure, which is commonly referred to as the add-on provision, certain superior courts, upon petition by the Attorney General, may be called upon to declare a firearm an assault weapon because of its essential similarity to a listed assault weapon. With its 1999 amendments to the AWCA, the Legislature took a third approach to designating assault weapons—defining them in

section 12276.1, subdivision (

a) in terms of generic characteristics, for example, a ‘semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has the capacity to accept a detachable magazine’ and also has a ‘pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon.’ {Id., subd. (a)(1)(A), Stats. 1999, ch. 129, § 7.) It bears repeating that the 1999 amendments were additive in this respect. Neither the list method of designating assault weapons in

section 12276 nor the add-on provision of

section 12276.5 was abandoned or textually modified by the 1999 amendments.” (Kasler, at pp. 477-478.) In order to frame the question before us, we must be clear about what the trial court did not hold. First, because this case was tried prior to the adoption of the 1999 amendments, the trial court did not decide the rifle belonging to Mr. Harrott was an assault weapon under Penal Code

section 12276.1. Second, the trial court did not declare the rifle an assault weapon under the add-on provision of

section 12276.5. The court did not purport to do so, and it would not have had the authority to do so, because the Kings County Superior Court is not one of the superior courts designated in

section 12276.5, subdivision (a) (superior courts “of a county with a population of more than 1,000,000”). Moreover, the Attorney General had not filed the petition called for by that section. Finally, the trial court did not find the rifle to be one of the models specifically Usted in

section 12276. Rather, the trial court declared the rifle to be an assault weapon on the ground it was an “AK series” weapon under

section 12276, subdivisions (a)(1)(

A) and (e). The court found that the differences between Mr. Harrott’s rifle and one of the Chinese-made AK models specifically listed in

section 12276, subdivision (a)(1)(A)—the AK47S—were only “minor,” thus satisfying the test for a “ ‘series’ ” weapon stated in subdivision (

e) of

section 12276. There are two more statutory provisions that are critical to the framing of the issue in this case:

Section 12276.5, subdivision (

g) provides the Attorney General “shall prepare a description for identification purposes, including a picture or diagram, of each assault weapon listed in

Section 12276, and any firearm declared to be an assault weapon pursuant to this section, and shall distribute the description to all law enforcement agencies responsible for enforcement of this chapter.”

Section 12276.5, subdivision (

h) directs the Attorney General to “promulgate a list that specifies all firearms designated as assault weapons in

Section 12276 or declared to be assault weapons pursuant to this section. The Attorney General shall file that list with the Secretary of State for publication in the California Code of Regulations.” The California Department of Justice criminalist called by the County of Kings (County) testified the rifle was not in his opinion an AK series weapon. He reasoned as follows: Pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (g), the Attorney General had prepared an assault weapons identification guide (Cal. Atty. Gen., Assault Weapons Identification Guide (1993); hereafter Identification Guide) setting out each of the assault weapons listed in

section 12276, as well as the firearms declared to be assault weapons pursuant to

section 12276.5. The Identification Guide designated the AK series weapons by their manufacturers’ markings. The markings on this rifle did not match any of the markings in the Identification Guide. Therefore, the rifle was not an assault weapon. The expert called by Mr. Harrott reached the same conclusion on the same grounds. Nevertheless, the trial court held the rifle was an AK series weapon, and thus, an assault weapon. It did so on the theory that the ultimate legal question as to whether the rifle was an AK series weapon was a question for the court, not the Attorney General, to decide. The test to be applied by the decision maker is set out in subdivision (

e) of

section 12276: “The term ‘series’ includes all other models that are only variations, with minor differences, of those models listed in subdivision (a), regardless of the manufacturer.” That test was satisfied here, the trial court found, because the criminalist called by the County conceded that any variations between this rifle and an AK reference weapon (the AK 47S) were only minor. The question presented by this case, therefore, is whether the superior court had the authority to declare Mr. Harrott’s rifle an AK series assault weapon under

section 12276, subdivisions (a)(1)(

A) and (

e) when it had not been identified as such in the Identification Guide published by the Attorney General pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (g), and had not been included in the list of assault weapons promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (h). We conclude the answer to this question is no, for reasons well stated by the Court of Appeal in reversing the judgment of the trial court. “The legislative history of the amendments to the [AWCA] reveals strong concern that law enforcement personnel be clearly advised which firearms are ‘assault weapons’ within the meaning of the [AWCA] so as to prevent erroneous confiscation of legal weapons. The Legislature’s concern that such a list be current and completely inclusive is demonstrated by the requirement that when a firearm has been declared to be an assault weapon pursuant to a

section 12276.5 proceeding, the Attorney General’s list must be amended within 90 days to include the specified firearm. There is no corresponding provision that if a trial court independently declares a firearm to be an assault weapon, it must notify the Attorney General. Since decisions of the trial court are not published, if we were to read the [AWCA] as urged by the county, the Legislature’s purpose in mandating promulgation of a complete and current list would be thwarted.

Without notice to the Attorney General, any trial court could, at any time, declare firearms to be assault weapons, thereby rendering the Attorney General’s list obsolete and frustrating the intent of the Legislature.” Moreover, the Court of Appeal noted, “the Attorney General’s list [must] be complete and accurate .... [because] [s]ection 12280, subdivision (

b) makes it a crime to possess a firearm which has been designated ... an assault weapon unless it has been registered. . . . [W]ere trial courts independently authorized to declare additional firearms to be assault weapons without the participation of or notice to the Attorney General, the likelihood the list would be incomplete is substantially increased. Thus, ordinarily law-abiding citizens could suddenly find themselves in violation of the [AWCA] and subject to prosecution despite having periodically checked the Attorney General’s list and reviewed

section 12276, subdivision (

a) to ensure their firearms had not been declared . . . assault weapons.” The reasoning of the Court of Appeal was validated by our subsequent decision in In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 466, 4 P.3d 297] (Jorge M.).

In Jorge M., we considered the question whether the offense of possession of an unregistered assault weapon (§ 12280, subd. (b)) “can properly be categorized as a public welfare offense, for which the Legislature intended guilt without proof of any scienter.” (Jorge M., at p. 872.) We concluded that in a prosecution for this offense, “the People bear the burden of proving the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the firearm possessed the characteristics bringing it within the AWCA.” (Id. at p. 887, italics & fn. omitted.) In reaching this conclusion, we considered seven factors “courts have commonly taken into account in deciding whether a statute should be construed as a public welfare offense.” (Id. at p. 873.) One of these factors is the difficulty of ascertaining facts. “This interpretive guideline holds with particular strength when the characteristics that bring the defendant’s conduct within the criminal prohibition may not be obvious to the offender.” (Id. at p. 881.) As was mentioned above, prior to its amendment in 1999, the AWCA did not define assault weapons genetically.

In 1989, when the AWCA was originally enacted, the Legislature was sharply divided, and if the proponents of the legislation had insisted upon a generic definition, the bill would apparently have died in the Assembly that session. (Easier, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 487.) Recognizing that the perfect can be the enemy of the good, the Legislature compromised and enacted an admittedly imperfect bill under which “semiautomatic firearms were designated as assault weapons by (1) being listed by type, series, and model in

section 12276, or (2) by being declared an assault weapon under a procedure set forth in

section 12276.5.” (Easier, at pp. 477-478.) As a result, anomalous situations could arise. That is, prior to the amendment of the AWCA in 1999, two semiautomatic firearms made by different manufacturers, or two different models made by the same manufacturer, could be virtually identical in appearance, and yet one might be banned while the other is not. In Jorge M., we recognized it could be difficult to ascertain whether a semiautomatic firearm has the characteristics making it an assault weapon under the AWCA as originally enacted. “The Attorney General maintains the weapons listed in

section 12276 are ‘highly dangerous offensive weapons which are unambiguously hazardous. Assault weapons are typically used by soldiers in a war. . . . The assault weapons listed in

section 12276, like the SKS with detachable magazine, are not “ambiguous substances” such that a person would not be aware of the dangerous character of the weapon after looking at one.’ The minor, in contrast, again stresses that the AWCA restricts only a subset of semiautomatic firearms, leaving the remainder available for lawful uses such as hunting and target shooting, and that even those semiautomatic firearms classified as assault weapons may, if registered, be lawfully possessed and used for these purposes. (See § 12285, subd. (c).) [f] On this point the minor has the better argument. . . . flQ As to whether the possessor of a weapon listed in

section 12276 would, in all or most cases, ‘be aware of the dangerous character of the weapon after looking at one,’ the Attorney General does not demonstrate, or even attempt to demonstrate, that the listed weapons are universally distinguishable by their appearance from firearms not listed in

section 12276. Comparison of the photographs of listed rifles in the [Identification Guide] with photographs of unlisted rifles in a general reference work (Walter, Rifles of the World [(2d ed. 1998)]) fails to bear out the assumption.

While many of the rifles depicted in the Identification Guide are of particularly menacing appearance, with folding or telescoping stocks, forward pistol grips, bullpup configuration or other unusual external features, others, with fixed wooden stocks and a relatively conventional rifle appearance, are not obviously unsuited, to the untrained eye at least, for hunting, ranching and farming uses, or target shooting. (See, e.g., Identification Guide at pp. 6 [Baretta AR-70], 7 [CETME Sporter], 18 [SKS with detachable magazine], 23 [Springfield Armory BM 59], 26 [Valmet M62S], 28 [Valmet M78S].) Conversely, several unlisted semiautomatic rifles have unusual military-type features and appear, again to the untrained eye, unlikely sporting or working guns. (See, e.g., Walter, Rifles of the World, supra, at pp. 384 [PMC Paratrooper], 404 [Ruger Mini-14/5RF], 442 [Universal Paratrooper], 439 [Stoner Model 63A1].)” (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 882-883.) Two points made in our discussion in Jorge M. bear significantly on the question before us now:

(1) In order to determine whether a firearm is an assault weapon under the AWCA, an ordinary citizen will have to rely heavily on the markings listed in the Identification Guide; and (2) even after consulting the Identification Guide, the ordinary citizen may still not be able to determine whether the firearm is considered an assault weapon. “[W]e observe that

section 12276 lists weapons primarily by manufacturer and model. ‘Accordingly, the identification markings are the most important factor in determining if a particular firearm is an “assault weapon” ’ within the meaning of

section 12276. (Identification Guide, supra, Foreword.) Yet the Identification Guide also suggests markings may vary from gun to gun: ‘Department of Justice staff has attempted to locate examples of each of the identified “assault weapons” to identify accurately the markings on them. However, some of the identified “assault weapons” were not physically located and some which were found were not marked as specified in

Section 12276.’ (Identification Guide, supra, Foreword.) Accompanying the Identification Guide’s photograph of a Valmet M78S (listed in § 12276, subd. (a)(16)) is the note, ‘No firearm marked M78S has been located. However, the firearm pictured may be the M78S.’ A similar note accompanies the photograph of a SIG PE-57 (listed in § 12276, subd. (a)(12)). (Identification Guide, supra, at pp. 20, 28.) Consequently, although most firearms listed in

section 12276 are likely to be readily identifiable, some instances in which the possessor of a semiautomatic firearm could reasonably be in doubt as to whether the weapon is subject to regulation under the AWCA are also likely.” (Jorge M., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 884.) This case amply illustrates the difficulty an ordinary citizen might have, when a gun’s markings are not listed in the Identification Guide, in determining whether a semiautomatic firearm should be considered an assault weapon under the AWCA. Perhaps the grossest feature of the rifle belonging to Mr.

Harrott, its stock, was dissimilar to the AK series reference weapon, while features that might be familiar only to a gun buff, such as the “sear,” were interchangeable with those of the reference weapon, and still others, such as the “receiver cover,” were not. Moreover, as the amicus curiae brief filed in support of Mr. Harrott by the National Rifle Association (NRA) points out, the authority claimed by the trial court here—to hold a firearm to be an assault weapon under

section 12276, even though its markings do not appear in the Identification Guide— could lead to the same weapon being treated differently from county to county and even within the same county. “[T]he course taken by the Sheriff and the Kings County Superior Court would substitute chaos for the AWCA’s plan of uniform, statewide determinations of which guns are [assault weapons]. If allowed to stand, the trial court decision in Harrott would subject California’s gun owners, particularly hunters, to whimsical and capricious prosecution.

Kern County might have no problem with a particular firearm, but a single judge in Kings County could turn a truly innocent citizen . . . into a felon. A hunter who left Kern (where a Clayco rifle is completely legal) to hunt in Kings County could be arrested and prosecuted for the minimum four-year sentence felony of transporting an ‘assault weapon’ under

section 12280, subdivision (a).” Trial court decisions are not precedents binding on other courts under the principle of stare decisis. (Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshé (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 754]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 922, p. 960.) Therefore, as the NRA notes, “the trial court decision in Harrott binds only the parties thereto—even in Kings County. If the exact same situation arose again in some other county (or even in Kings), a Clayco owner would be free to bring suit to compel the police to give him his Clayco.

While the superior court in which he brought it could follow the Harrott superior court, it would not have to. It would be free to reach the opposite conclusion—either by examining the merits for itself or by accepting as binding the Attorney General’s list of AK series guns which does not include the Clayco.” (Fn. omitted.) Moreover, the NRA argues, just as the Kings County Superior Court had no authority to pronounce Mr. Harrott’s rifle an AK series assault weapon under

section 12276, subdivision (e), the Attorney General also lacks the authority to identify series weapons under that provision. Such a determination, the NRA contends, could only be made in a

section 12276.5 add-on proceeding brought by the Attorney General in one of the courts designated in that section. The Attorney General, on the other hand, contends we have already upheld his authority under

section 12276, subdivision (e). “The Rosier decision has affirmed the Attorney General’s authority to identify assault weapons with both the add-on provisions of. . .

section 12276.5 and identify the ‘series’ AR and AR-15 assault weapons pursuant to . . .

section 12276[, subdivisions] (

e) and (/).” (Cal. Dept, of Justice, Firearms Div. Information Bull. No. 2000-04-FD (Aug. 22, 2000) p. 1, italics added, at <http://caag.state.ca.us/firearms/infobuls/200004.pdf> [as of June 28, 2001].) Although both the NRA and the Attorney General profess to find support for their positions in Raster, in that opinion we expressly declined to reach the question of the Attorney General’s authority under

section 12276, subdivisions (

e) and (f). “Because we have concluded that plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge must be rejected even if, as plaintiffs contend,

section 12276 covers only the specific makes and models listed in that provision, we need not reach the Attorney General’s argument that the challenge is based on a misreading of the AWCA. ‘[Plaintiffs’] basic premise that various weapons allegedly identical in design produced by different manufacturers were not included by [the] Legislature is defeated by the plain language of the statute,’ the Attorney General contends, because subdivision (

f) of

section 12276 states that the list includes ‘any other models which are only variations of those weapons with minor differences regardless of manufacturer.’ ” (Kasler, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 491, fn. 2.) There is an apparent tension between the authority conferred upon the Attorney General by

section 12276.5, subdivision (a)—the power to initiate a judicial proceeding to add assault weapons to the list of such weapons in

section 12276, and the authority conferred upon the Attorney General by

section 12276, subdivision (e)—the power, in the absence of a judicial proceeding, to identify and promulgate a list of the firearms considered to be series assault weapons. The tension, however, is only apparent, and we uphold the Attorney General’s authority. Our decision today—upholding the Attorney General’s authority to identify series assault weapons pursuant to

section 12276, subdivision (e), but holding that a trial court may not find a semiautomatic firearm a series assault weapon under

section 12276, subdivision (e), unless the firearm has first been included in the list of series assault weapons promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (h)—is compelled by our examination of the legislative history of the AWCA. As the AWCA was originally enacted in 1989,

section 12276 did not contain subdivision (e). (Stats. 1989, ch. 19, § 3, pp. 64-65.) In 1991, the AWCA was amended by, inter alia, adding subdivision (

e) to

section 12276, as well as subdivision (

h) to

section 12276.5. (Stats. 1991, ch. 954, §§ 2-3, pp. 4440-4443.) Subdivision (

e) of

section 12276 provides that series includes “all other models that are only variations, with minor differences, of those models listed in subdivision (a), regardless of the manufacturer.” Subdivision (

h) of

section 12276.5 provides in pertinent part: “The Attorney General shall promulgate a list that specifies all firearms designated as assault weapons in

Section 12276 or declared to be assault weapons pursuant to this section. The Attorney General shall file that list with the Secretary of State for publication in the California Code of Regulations.” When the AWCA was originally enacted, the Legislature clearly intended to reach all series assault weapons. In amending

section 12276 to add subdivision (e), the Legislature articulated the standard under which the Attorney General was to administratively identify the semiautomatic firearms considered to be series assault weapons. And importantly, by also amending

section 12276.5 to add subdivision (h), we agree that the Legislature, in the words of the author of the bill, provided “additional due process protections for public notification purposes.” (Sen. David Roberti, letter to Governor Wilson re: Sen. Bill No. 263 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 19, 1991, p. 2.) The fact these amendments were enacted together supports the conclusion that subdivision (

e) of

section 12276 is not self-executing, but, rather, that the specific make and model of an assault weapon must first appear on the list the Attorney General, pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (h), files with the Secretary of State for publication in the California Code of Regulations. This construction is consistent with one of the Legislature’s primary purposes in amending the AWCA in 1991, which was to promote compliance with the requirement of

section 12285 that assault weapons be registered. In its earlier iterations, Senate Bill No. 263 only (1) established a registration forgiveness period affording owners who did not comply with the original registration requirement another opportunity, and (2) required the Department of Justice to conduct a public education program regarding the registration requirement. (See Sen. Bill No. 263 (1991-1992 Reg.

Sess.) as amended Feb. 11, 1991.) According to a Senate Judiciary Committee report, the Attorney General sought the bill because of very poor compliance with the original January 1, 1991, registration deadline. “[C]onsidering the fact that the great majority of gun owners are law abiding citizens, regardless of their opinion of a particular law, it is unlikely that a 90% rate of noncompliance can [be] explained as a concerted political statement.

Far more likely is the possibility that owners of assault weapons were simply unaware of the deadline, or unaware that their particular weapons were included on the list of proscribed firearms.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 263 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 3, italics added.) “The low rate of compliance evident at the time of the registration deadline led the Attorney General to suggest an extension permitting lawful compliance, on the grounds that no public interest is served by punishing a large class of individuals for failure to perform due to insufficient disclosure of the law.

Certainly, respect for the law is not served by the punishment of individuals lacking an opportunity to know its terms and conditions. Thus, some additional opportunity for compliance, accompanied by a genuine education effort, seems reasonable.” (Id. at p. 4, italics added.) Our construction of the statute, holding that a trial court may not find a semiautomatic firearm to be a series assault weapon under

section 12276, subdivision (e), unless the firearm has first been included in the list of series assault weapons promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (h), best serves the legislative goal we have just described. A contrary

interpretation would be inconsistent with the legislative goal because owners of unlisted weapons would still be unsure whether they had to comply with the registration requirement. Our

interpretation of

section 12276, subdivision (

e) is reinforced by the rule that a statute must be interpreted in a manner, consistent with the statute’s language and purpose, that eliminates doubts as to the statute’s constitutionality. (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 788 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641].) “A law failing to give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited violates due process under both the federal and California Constitutions. (Groyned v. City of Rockford (1972) 408 U.S. 104, 108 [92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222]; People v.

Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 199 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 886 P.2d 1229].)” (Kasler, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 498-499.) Ordinary gun owners of reasonable intelligence, Mr. Harrott contends, cannot be expected to know whether the differences between their semiautomatic firearms and the assault weapons specifically listed in

section 12276, subdivision (

a) are, in the language of

section 12276, subdivision (e), only “minor.” However, our

interpretation of the AWCA avoids this problem. To determine whether the differences between their firearms and the series assault weapons listed in

section 12276 are considered to be only “minor,” gun owners need only consult the California Code of Regulations. Mr. Harrott relies upon Springfield Armory, Inc. v.

City of Columbus (6th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 250 (Springfield Armory), in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found the City of Columbus’s assault weapon ordinance unconstitutionally vague. “The ordinance defines ‘assault weapon’ as any one of thirty-four specific rifles, three specific shotguns and nine specific pistols, or ‘[o]ther models by the same manufacturer with the same action design that have slight modifications or enhancements. . . .’” (Id. at p. 251, italics added.) “How is the ordinary consumer to determine which changes may be considered slight?” the Sixth Circuit asked. “A weapon’s accuracy, magazine capacity, velocity, size and shape and the caliber of ammunition it takes can all be altered.” (Id. at p. 253.) In Easier, the Court of Appeal relied upon Springfield Armory, supra, 29 F.3d 250, in holding

section 12276.5 unconstitutionally vague. “Section 12276.5 violates [the standard that a law should give a person of ordinary intelligence an opportunity to know what is prohibited], the Court of Appeal held, ‘because it defines the weapons which can be added on as those with “slight” modifications and those which have been “redesigned, renamed, or renumbered” from guns on the list. (§ 12276.5, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Reasonable persons can understand renaming and renumbering.

But what is a “slight” modification or a “redesign?” ’ ” (Kasler, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 499.) “The questions raised by the Court of Appeal in Easier,” we pointed out, “are not questions ordinary citizens must answer at their peril. Rather, they are questions the Attorney General must address in deciding whether to petition the superior court for a declaration of temporary suspension (§ 12276.5, subd. (a)), and that the superior court must resolve in determining whether to issue a permanent declaration that a firearm is an assault weapon (§ 12276.5, subd. (f)).

If the superior court issues a permanent declaration that a specified firearm is an assault weapon, then the Attorney General must, within 90 days, promulgate an amended list of the firearms designated as assault weapons in

section 12276, or added to the list pursuant to

section 12276.5, and the amended list must be filed by the Attorney General with the Secretary of State for publication in the California Code of Regulations. (§ 12276.5, subd. (h).) Therefore, concerned citizens need not struggle with the question whether, for example, a particular firearm is identical to one of the listed assault weapons except for slight modifications.

The citizens may simply consult the amended list. (The availability of the amended list distinguishes the cases upon which the Court of Appeal relied in holding the AWCA unconstitutionally vague—Springfield Armory, supra, 29 F.3d 250, and Robertson v. City and County of Denver (Colo. 1994) 874 P.2d 325 [29 A.L.R.5th 837].) Because the standard set forth in

section 12276.5, subdivision (a), is to be applied by the Attorney General and the superior court, we need not and do not reach the question whether it would be unconstitutionally vague if ordinary citizens were required to apply it.” (Kasler, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 499.) Just as the questions raised by the Court of Appeal in Kasler—what is a “slight” modification or a “redesign[]” within the meaning of

section 12276.5, subdivision (a)(1) and (2)?—are not questions ordinary citizens have to answer at their peril, so, too, ordinary citizens are not held responsible for answering the question raised by Mr. Harrott—which differences are only “minor” within the meaning of

section 12276, subdivision (e)? As we have interpreted the statute, to determine whether the differences between the firearms of concern to them and the series assault weapons listed in

section 12276 are considered by the Attorney General to be only “minor” for the purposes of

section 12276, subdivision (e), ordinary citizens need only consult the California Code of Regulations. Moreover, the Attorney General’s Identification Guide is also available to them. On the other hand, we reject the argument that a saving construction is unnecessary because the statute is applicable, not only to ordinary gun owners, but also to gun dealers, and the latter should be able to apply

section 12276, subdivision (e)’s standard regarding “minor” differences with reasonable certainty. This argument is based on a false premise. The premise is that we adopt a saving construction only if a statute would otherwise be unconstitutional on its face, that is, in all its applications.

This premise is simply wrong. “ ‘If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable. [Citations.] The basis of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature intended, not to violate the Constitution, but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its constitutional powers.’ [Citations.]” (People v.

Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628].) It can hardly be argued that this statute does not raise serious and doubtful constitutional questions as applied to ordinary citizens. The language found constitutionally problematic by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Springfield Armory, supra, 29 F.3d 250, and by the Colorado Supreme Court in Robertson v.

City and County of Denver, supra, 874 P.2d 325, was more specific than the language at issue here. (See Springfield Armory, supra, 29 F.3d at p. 252 [“other models by the same manufacturer with the same action design that have slight modifications or enhancements of firearms listed”]; Robertson v.

City and County of Denver, supra, 874 P.2d at p. 334 [“ ‘[a]ll semiautomatic pistols that are modifications of rifles having the same make, caliber and action design but a shorter barrel and no rear stock or modifications of automatic weapons originally designed to accept magazines with a capacity of twenty-one (21) or more rounds’ ”].) Our construction of this statute to preserve its constitutionality is supported by the related rule of lenity.

The latter rule applies even though this is not a criminal prosecution because the statute we are construing imposes criminal penalties. “In determining the meaning of [a] statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy. [Citations.] Moreover, [when] the governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute’s coverage.

To the extent that the language or history of [a statute] is uncertain, this ‘time-honored interpretive guideline’ serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal conduct and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal liability. [Citations.]” (Crandon v. United States (1990) 494 U.S. 152, 158 [110 S.Ct. 997, 1001-1002, 108 L.Ed.2d 132]; see also United States v.

Thompson/Center Arms Co. (1992) 504 U.S. 505, 517-518 [112 S.Ct. 2102, 2109-2110, 119 L.Ed.2d 308] [applying the rule of lenity in a federal firearms case involving a tax, not a criminal penalty].) Finally, our construction of the AWCA—that a trial court may not find a firearm a series assault weapon unless it has been first identified as such in the list published by the Attorney General in the California Code of Regulations—comports with the Attorney General’s own construction of the statute. The Attorney General has never supported the trial court’s assertion of authority to find Mr.

Harrott’s rifle an AK series assault weapon. In the brief amicus curiae filed in this court, the Attorney General insists upon his exclusive authority to determine which firearms are series assault weapons. “Series firearms . . . have to be specified in a list promulgated by the Attorney General, filed with the Secretary of State and published in the California Code of Regulations pursuant to

section 12276.5, subdivision (h).” The testimony of the California Department of Justice criminalist called by the County was consistent with the Attorney General’s position in that the criminalist testified that the rifle was not in his opinion an AK series weapon because its markings did not match any of the markings listed in the Identification Guide. “[B]oth this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized on numerous occasions that ‘[t]he construction of a statute by the officials charged with its administration must be given great weight.’ ” (Highland Ranch v.

Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 848, 859 [176 Cal.Rptr. 753, 633 P.2d 949].) It is particularly appropriate to do so here because of (1) the technical knowledge required to ascertain whether which weapons are knockoffs or clones of listed assault weapons, and (2) the importance, as the Court of Appeal pointed out, of avoiding conflicting rulings by various trial courts. (See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031] [“[T]he binding power of an agency’s

interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of the

interpretation.”].) The limits of our holding today warrant emphasis. Although we hold the Attorney General has the authority to determine that certain semiautomatic firearms are assault weapons by simply identifying them as such in the list published by the Attorney General in the California Code of Regulations, that authority applies only to the two types of firearms defined in

section 12276 by the use of the term series, namely, the AK47 series and the Colt AR-15 series. (See fn. 3, ante.) In order to have any other semiautomatic firearms declared assault weapons within the meaning of

section 12276, the Attorney General must utilize the add-on procedure set forth in

section 12276.5. And, of course, the Attorney General’s identification of a particular firearm as a series assault weapon would, in an appropriate case, be subject to challenge on the ground the firearm in question did not satisfy the standard set forth in

section 12276, subdivision (e), namely that the variations between it and the AK47 series or the Colt AR-15 series were more than “minor.” Our conclusion that the trial court exceeded its authority in declaring Mr. Harrott’s rifle an AK series weapon under

section 12276, subdivisions (a)(1)(

A) and (

e) does not end the matter. As stated in footnote 2, ante, the Attorney General now asserts the rifle is an AK47, one of the assault weapons specifically listed in

section 12276, subdivision (a)(1)(A), and in his petition for writ of mandate, Mr. Harrott did describe the rifle as an “AK-47 2822.” Therefore, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a resolution of this question. Conclusion The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Kennard, J., Baxter, J., and Chin, J., concurred. Unless otherwise indicated, all further

section references are to the Penal Code. Interestingly, in his petition for writ of mandate, Mr. Harrott identified the rifle as an “AK-47 2822,” and the “AK47” is one of the models of assault weapons specifically listed in

section 12276, subdivision (a)(1)(A). However, the hearing below proceeded on the assumption that the rifle was not one of the models specifically listed in

section 12276, subdivision (a). In a final twist, the Attorney General, in an amicus curiae brief filed in this court, asserts for the first time that the rifle is an assault weapon specifically listed in

section 12276, subdivision (a)(1)(A), namely, a “[m]ade in China . . . AK47 . . . .” The term series is used in

section 12276 with respect to only two types of semiautomatic firearms, both of which are rifles: the “AK series” at issue here (§ 12276, subd. (a)(1)) and the “Colt AR-15 series” (§ 12276, subd. (a)(5)).

Section 12276, subdivision (a)(1) provides: “As used in this

chapter [the AWCA], ‘assault weapon’ shall mean the following designated semiautomatic firearms: [1Q (

a) All of the following specified rifles: [f]

(1) All AK series including, but not limited to, the models identified as follows: 0Q (

A) Made in China AK, AKM, AKS, AK47, AK47S, 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S. HQ (

B) Norinco 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S. HQ (

C) Poly Technologies AKS and AK47. HD (

D) MAADI AK47 and ARM.”

Section 12276, subdivision (

e) provides: “The term ‘series’ includes all other models that are only variations, with minor differences, of those models listed in subdivision (a), regardless of the manufacturer.” Not only would ordinary citizens find it difficult, without the benefit of the Identification Guide, to determine whether a semiautomatic firearm should be considered an assault weapon, ordinary law enforcement officers in the field would have similar difficulty. While we do not rely on the individual views of proponents of legislation in interpreting a statute (see, e.g., Quintano v.

Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062, fn. 5 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 906 P.2d 1057]), we note that the author of the legislation that requires the Attorney General to produce the Identification Guide recognized this difficulty. “I am writing to request your signature on SB 2444 which would enable law enforcement personnel in the field the means to be able to recognize what actually is or is not an ‘assault weapon,’ as defined under state law. HD Unfortunately, a great many law enforcement officers who deal directly with the public are not experts in specific firearms identification. . . .

HQ There are numerous makes and models of civilian military-looking semi-automatic firearms which are not listed by California as ‘assault weapons’ but which are very similar in external appearance. This situation sets the stage for honest law-enforcement mistakes resulting in unjustified confiscations of non-assault weapon firearms. Such mistakes, although innocently made, could easily result in unnecessary, time-consuming, and costly legal actions both for law enforcement and for the lawful firearms owners affected.

HD SB 2444 will benefit everyone concerned by assuring that law enforcement officers are assisted in the proper performance of their duties through having at their disposal a reliable means of accurately identifying each listed ‘assault weapon.’ ” (Sen. Don Rogers, letter to Governor Deukmejian re: Sen. Bill No. 2444 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 23, 1990.) A sear is “the catch that holds the hammer of a gunlock at cock or half cock.” (Webster’s 3d New Internal.

Diet. (1965) p. 2048.) A receiver is “the metal frame in which the action of a firearm is fitted and to which the breech end of the barrel is attached.” (Webster’s 3d New Internal. Diet., supra, at p. 1894.) “Clayco” is a brand name used by the Court of Appeal to refer to Mr. Harrott’s rifle. We have avoided using the term because the Attorney General asserts that “Clayco” is the name, not of a manufacturer, but of an importer of semiautomatic firearms made by Norinco, a Chinese manufacturer of AK series assault weapons. Under

section 12276.5, certain superior courts, upon a request by the Attorney General, may declare a firearm an assault weapon “(a) . . . because the firearm is either of the following: HQ

(1) Another model by the same manufacturer or a copy by another manufacturer of an assault weapon listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (

c) of

Section 12276 which is identical to one of the assault weapons listed in those subdivisions except for slight modifications or enhancements including, but not limited to: a folding or retractable stock;Vdjustable sight; case deflector for left-handed shooters; shorter barrel; wooden, plastic or, metal stock; larger magazine size; different caliber provided that the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire; or bayonet mount. The court shall strictly construe this paragraph so that a firearm which is merely similar in appearance but not a prototype or copy cannot be found to be within the meaning of this paragraph. HQ

(2) A firearm first manufactured or sold to the general public in California after June 1, 1989, which has been redesigned, renamed, or renumbered from one of the firearms listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (

c) of

Section 12276, or which is manufactured or sold by another company under a licensing agreement to manufacture or sell one of the firearms listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (

c) of

Section 12276, regardless of the company of production or distribution, or the country of origin.” As amended in 1991,

section 12276 now provides that the term assault weapon means all of the rifles specified in subdivision (a), .as well as all of the pistols and shotguns specified in subdivisions (

b) and (c), respectively. Subdivision (

a) of

section 12276 lists the specified rifles in 21 numbered subdivisions, beginning with “

(1) All AK series including, but not limited to, the models identified as follows: fl[] (

A) Made in China AK, AKM, AKS, AK47, AK47S, 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S. (

B) Norinco 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S. (

C) Poly Technologies AKS and AK47. [T (

D) MAADI AK47 and ARM.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 954, § 2, p. 4440.)