In re JEANICE D., a Minor, on Habeas Corpus, 28 Cal. 3d 210

Opinion TOBRINER, J. In this proceeding, petitioner Jeanice D., a minor, seeks a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the superior court exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing her to state prison without first remanding her to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for evaluation pursuant to

section 707.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. In defense of the trial court’s action, the Attorney General argues that because of her conviction of first degree murder without special circumstances, Jeanice is statutorily ineligible for commitment to the CYA under

section 1731.5. The Attorney General maintains that in view of such alleged ineligibility, the trial court was under no obligation to remand her for an evaluation report under

section 707.2. For the reasons discussed below, we have concluded that Jeanice is entitled to the relief she seeks. Contrary to the main premise of the Attorney General’s argument, we find that Jeanice’s conviction does not render her automatically ineligible for CYA commitment. As we shall explain, pursuant to the current provisions of Penal Code

section 190, Jeanice’s conviction of first degree murder without special circumstances carries a “25 years to life” sentence; moreover, for more than 35 years, we have followed this court’s decision in People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d 575 [150 P.2d 401] that a minor facing such an indeterminate sentence is not ineligible for CYA commitment under

section 1731.5. The Attorney General attempts to avoid the force of the Ralph decision by arguing that the 25 years to life sentence of Penal Code

section 190 should not be read as establishing an indeterminate sentence but should instead be construed as a determinate life sentence with a minimum parole eligibility date of 25 years. As we shall explain, however, the Attorney General’s construction conflicts with the explicit language of the statute and finds no support in any relevant legislative history. Accordingly, we conclude that the requested writ should issue. 1.

Procedural background In May 1979, Jeanice, who was then 17 years of age, was tried as an adult in Merced County Superior Court and was convicted of (1) first degree murder without special circumstances and (2) use of a firearm in the commission of the murder. Prior to sentencing, defense counsel requested that the trial court remand Jeanice to CYA for a diagnostic evaluation and report pursuant to

section 707.2. The trial court, although indicating that in its view the 25 years to life sentence of Penal Code

section 190 represented “an indeterminate sentence, not one of the determinate sentences that was enacted by the Legislature in 1977,” nevertheless denied defense counsel’s request, stating that “[m]y version of the law as it exists is I am not permitted nor do I care to commit you to the Youth Authority for their observation and diagnostic workup.” Thereafter, the court directly committed Jeanice to state prison for 25 years to life, with a consecutive term of two years for use of a firearm.

In addition to appealing from the judgment of conviction, Jeanice filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal, asserting that the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing her to state prison without first obtaining a diagnostic report from the CYA and that her remedy by appeal did not afford an adequate, prompt remedy. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, and, after briefing and oral argument, ruled in favor of Jeanice. Thereafter, in light of the general importance of the question of statutory

interpretation presented, we granted the Attorney General’s petition for hearing. In challenging the trial court’s action, Jeanice contends (1) that the trial court was in error in considering her ineligible for CYA commitment, and (2) that, even if she is ineligible for such commitment, the court was nonetheless obligated under

section 707.2 to remand her for a diagnostic evaluation and report. As we shall explain, we have concluded that Jeanice’s conviction does not render her ineligible for CYA commitment and that for this reason alone the trial court’s action cannot be sustained. In light of this conclusion, we have no occasion in the instant case to determine whether

section 707.2 additionally requires a trial court to remand for a diagnostic evaluation those minors who come within

section 707.2’s literal terms but who are statutorily ineligible for CYA commitment. (See People v. Eaker (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1015-1016 [161 Cal.Rptr. 417]; People v. Grisso (1980) 104 Cal.App. 3d 380, 385-386 [163 Cal.Rptr. 547].) 2. Because petitioner was convicted of an offense carrying an indeterminate sentence, she is eligible for CYA commitment pursuant to

section 1731.5

Section 1731.5 currently provides, as it has since 1941, that a person under 21 years of age who is convicted of a crime is generally eligible for commitment and treatment in the CYA unless, inter alia, he or she has been sentenced to “imprisonment for life.” Shortly after the enactment of

section 1731.5, this court unanimously concluded in People v. Ralph, supra, 24 Cal.2d 575, that a youth who is convicted of an offense carrying an indeterminate sentence with a possible life imprisonment maximum (e.g., a sentence of “five years to life”) does not fall within the “imprisonment for life” exclusion embodied in the statute, and thus, if amenable to treatment as a juvenile offender, may be committed to the CYA. In the more than 35 years since the decision in Ralph, the Legislature has amended

section 1731.5 on many occasions but has never questioned the validity of the

interpretation of the statute in Ralph. In the present case, Jeanice has been convicted of first degree murder without special circumstances. Under Penal Code

section 190, as amended by the voters of this state in November 1978, her offense carries a sentence of “25 years to life.” Noting that the statutory language prescribing this sentence cannot be distinguished from the statutory terminology that has uniformly been utilized in this state to signify an indeterminate sentence with a minimum possible term of 25 years and a maximum potential term of life imprisonment (see, e.g., In re Lee (1918) 177 Cal. 690 [171 P. 958]), Jeanice argues that under People v. Ralph, supra, 24 Cal.2d 575, the trial court erred in finding her. ineligible for CYA commitment pursuant to

section 1731.5. Although the trial court, in concluding that Jeanice was ineligible for CYA commitment, apparently was under the impression that the nature of Jeanice’s offense (i.e., first degree murder) was itself controlling, the Attorney General properly recognizes that under

section 1731.5 it is the nature of the sentence, rather than the offense, which governs a juvenile’s eligibility for commitment to CYA. In light of the applicable statutory framework, the Attorney General implicitly acknowledges that if, as the trial court thought, the current provisions of Penal Code

section 190 provide for an indeterminate 25 years to life sentence, it necessarily follows under the Ralph decision that Jeanice is eligible for CYA commitment. In seeking to forestall that result, however, the Attorney General argues that contrary to the trial court’s reading, the “25 years to life” sentence currently provided by Penal Code

section 190 should not be interpreted as establishing an indeterminate sentence in which the actual term of an individual’s sentence may be set between 25 years and life, but rather should be read as prescribing a determinate life sentence in every case with a minimum parole release date of 25 years. A careful review of the explicit language of Penal Code

section 190 (quoted in full at fn. 5, ante), however, demonstrates the fallacy of the Attorney General’s proposed construction. To begin with, the initial, and most obvious, indication of the nature of the sentence established by the statute flows from the “25 years to life” language utilized in the provision. As already noted, this statutory terminology is precisely the language that has been commonly and uniformly utilized in this state to denote an indeterminate sentence.

As this court observed nearly a half-century ago; “It is a well-recognized rule of construction that after the courts have construed the meaning of any particular word, or expression, and the legislature subsequently undertakes to use these exact words in the same connection, the presumption is almost irresistible that it used them in the precise and technical sense which had been placed upon them by the courts.” (City of Long Beach v.

Payne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 184, 191 [44 P.2d 305].) This prime principle, moreover, applies equally to subsequent legislation adopted through the initiative process as to enactments passed by the Legislature itself. (See, e.g., Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 93 [207 P.2d 47].) If the drafters of the current version of Penal Code

section 190 had intended to establish a determinate life sentence, with some minimum parole fixing date, they surely would not have specifically utilized language that unequivocably connotes an indeterminate sentence. Furthermore, even if the “25 years to life” language left any question as to the nature of the sentence established by the section, any such doubt dissolves in the concluding sentence of Penal Code

section 190. That sentence provides in relevant part: “The provisions of

Article 2.5 (commencing with

section 2930) of

Chapter 7 of Title 1 of

Part 3 of the Penal Code [relating to credit, i.e., reduction in time of confinement, for good behavior and participation in designated programs] shall apply to reduce any minimum term of 25. . .years in a state prison imposed pursuant to this section, but such person shall not otherwise be released on parole prior to such time.” (Italics added.) In referring to a “minimum term of 25.. . years. . . imposed pursuant to this section,” the current statute unambiguously demonstrates that the provision contemplates that an individual sentenced under the statute will not automatically receive a determinate term of life imprisonment.

Instead, the statute recognizes that, as with traditional indeterminate sentences, the term actually imposed upon an individual offender may range from 25 years to life. The Attorney General’s proposed

interpretation of the statute as requiring an automatic imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment in every case completely conflicts with this language and for that reason alone must be rejected. Finally, even if—despite the clarity of the statutory terminology—we were somehow able to discern a remaining ambiguity in the statute, the Attorney General’s suggested

interpretation of the provision still could not be sustained. It is, of course, an established principle that ambiguities in penal statutes must be construed in favor of the offender, not the prosecution. “‘When language which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law, ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted.’ [Citation.] The defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt as to the true

interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.” (People v. Smith (1955) 44 Cal.2d 77, 79 [279 P.2d 33]; see, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Douglass) (1979) 24 Cal.3d 428, 435 [155 Cal.Rptr. 704, 595 P.2d 139].) The Attorney General’s

interpretation would turn this principle on its head. In attempting to defend his proposed

interpretation of Penal Code

section 190, the Attorney General points out that prior to the November 1978 amendment of the statute minors convicted of first degree murder without special circumstances were not eligible for CYA commitment. (See, e.g., People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 724-725 [135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976].) The Attorney General argues that because there is no indication that the drafters of the amendment specifically intended to render such minors eligible for CYA commitment, the

section should not be given such effect. The pri- or ineligibility for CYA of minors convicted of first degree murder, however, flowed simply from the fact that before 1978, Penal Code

section 190 prescribed a “straight” life imprisonment sentence for the offense. As we have explained, under

section 1731.5, the alteration of this sentence in November 1978 carried with it an alteration in a minor offender’s CYA eligibility. Although there may be no affirmative indication that the drafters of the provision specifically had this consequence in mind, by the same token there is similarly no indication that the drafters intended to preclude the normal application of

section 1731.5. Moreover, if, as the Attorney General urges, we were to interpret Penal Code

section 190’s “25 years to life” sentence for first degree murder as establishing a determinate life sentence, rendering a minor ineligible for CYA commitment, it would follow that a separate provision of Penal Code

section 190, prescribing a “15 years to life” sentence for second degree murder (see fn. 5, ante) would likewise necessarily be construed as creating a determinate life sentence, thereby rendering all minors convicted of second degree murder similarly ineligible for CYA commitment. From the enactment of

section 1731.5 in 1941, however, juveniles convicted of second degree murder have at all times been eligible for CYA commitment. We do not have the slightest indication that the 1978 amendment sought to curtail that eligibility. Consequently, contrary to the Attorney General’s suggestion, the present case cannot be resolved by resorting to the treatment of juveniles under earlier versions of Penal Code

section 190. Rather, the present provisions of Penal Code

section 190, analyzed above, must control. The Attorney General further argues that our reading of the “25 years to life” provision of

section 190 as establishing an indeterminate, rather than determinate, sentence conflicts with one of the purposes of the 1978 amendment expressed in the election pamphlet argument, namely, the objective of increasing the penalties for first (and second) degree murder. Contrary to the Attorney General’s assertions, however, our

interpretation of the statute does not impede this purpose, because the adoption of indeterminate sentences with respective minimum terms of 25 years and 15 years and a potential maximum of life imprisonment itself represents a significant increase over the prior penalties for both first and second degree murder. Prior to the 1978 amendment, a person convicted of first degree murder without special circumstances and sentenced to a straight life term, was eligible for parole in seven years. (See Pen. Code, § 3046.) Under the indeterminate 25 years to life sentence of current Penal Code

section 190, by contrast, the earliest that such an offender may be released from prison on parole, even if his term is set at the minimum 25-year period, would be 16 years and 8 months, an obvious increase in confinement over the prior 7-year period. Similarly, the 1978 amendment of Penal Code

section 190 altered the punishment for second degree murder from “5, 6 or 7 years” to an indeterminate term of “15 years to life,” a clear increase in penalty. Consequently, in interpreting the new provisions of Penal Code

section 190 as creating indeterminate 15 and 25 years to life sentences, we do not contravene the initiative’s purpose of increasing the punishment for first and second degree murder.

Finally, although the 1978 election brochure arguments and analysis do disclose an intent to increase the punishment for first and second degree murder, neither the arguments nor analysis support the Attorney General’s further suggestion that either the drafters of the measure or the electors who voted the proposition into law intended, notwithstanding the clear language utilized by the section, to establish determinate rather than indeterminate sentences.

The 1978 initiative, of course, was not drafted as part of the general DSL, but on the contrary, explicitly replaced the determinate sentence (five, six, or seven years) established by the DSL for second degree murder with a “15 years to life” sentence. (See fn. 7, ante.) Under these circumstances, we find no justification for interpreting the statute as establishing determinate sentences. In sum, we conclude that Jeanice’s sentence under Penal Code

section 190 constitutes an indeterminate 25 years to life sentence. Therefore, under People v. Ralph, supra, 24 Cal.2d 575, she is eligible for CYA commitment pursuant to

section 1731.5. Accordingly, the trial court erred in refusing to remand the matter to the CYA for a diagnostic evaluation and report prior to sentencing, as provided by

section 707.2. To avoid any misunderstanding, we note in conclusion that our holding in the present case in no sense mandates or guarantees that Jeanice will ultimately be committed to the CYA rather than to state prison. Instead, our decision simply recognizes that the existing statutes adopted by the Legislature and the voters of this state preserve to the sentencing court an option of such commitment and treatment in the event that the court finds such commitment appropriate in light of the minor’s individual circumstances. In this respect, the Attorney General’s proposed

interpretation of the statute in question would not only fly in the face of the provision’s clear language, but would also run counter to “[t]he basic predicate of the Juvenile Court Law.. .that each juvenile be treated as an individual.” (In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 31 [89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737].) Any contrary

interpretation of the statute would strip the court of its opportunity to judge and determine the treatment of this individual juvenile. Moreover, the Attorney General’s

interpretation would disregard the legislative directive that provisions of the juvenile law are to be “liberally construed” to promote the goal of “substituting for retributive punishment methods of training and treatment directed toward the correction and rehabilitation of young persons found guilty of public offenses.” (§ 1700.) Let the writ of habeas corpus issue. The trial court is directed to recall petitioner from state prison, to refer her to the CYA for evaluation and report, and thereafter to determine the appropriate disposition of the case pursuant to the provisions of

section 707.2. Bird, C. J., Mosk, J., and Newman, J., concurred. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

Section 707.2 provides: “Prior to sentence, the court of criminal jurisdiction may remand the minor to the custody of the California Youth Authority for not to exceed 90 days for the purpose of evaluation and report concerning his amenability to training and treatment offered by the Youth Authority. No minor who wai under the age of 18 years when he committed any criminal offense and who has been found not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law shall be sentenced to the State prison unless he has first been remanded to the custody of the California Youth Authority for evaluation and report pursuant to this

section and the court finds after having read and considered the report submitted by the Youth Authority that the minor is not a suitable subject for commitment to the Youth Authority.” (Italics added.) In this proceeding, the Attorney General has not contested petitioner’s right to raise the present issue through a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See, e.g., Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 16-17 [9 Cal.Rptr. 607, 357 P.2d 839]; In re Duran (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 632, 635 [113 Cal.Rptr. 442].)

Section 1731.5 presently provides in relevant part: “After certification to the Governor as provided in this

article a court may commit to the [California Youth] [Authority any person convicted of a public offense who comes within subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), or subdivisions (a), (b), and (d), below: “(

a) Is found to be less than 21 years of age at the time of apprehension. “(

b) Is not sentenced to death [or] imprisonment for life.... “(

c) Is not granted probation. “(

d) Was granted probation and probation is revoked and terminated. “The Youth Authority shall accept a person committed to it pursuant to this

article if it believes that the person can be materially benefited by its reformatory and educational discipline, and if it has adequate facilities to provide such care.” Penal Code

section 190 currently provides in full: “Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole, or confinement in the state prison for a term of 25 years to life. The penalty to be applied shall be determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5. “Every person guilty of murder in the second degree shall suffer confinement in the state prison for a term of 15 years to life. “The provisions of

Article 2.5 (commencing with

Section 2930) of

Chapter 7 of Title 1 of

Part 3 of the Penal Code shall apply to reduce any minimum term of 25 or 15 years in a state prison imposed pursuant to this section, but such person shall not otherwise be released on parole prior to such time.” (Italics added.) Prior to amendment in the November 1978 election, Penal Code

section 190 provided in part: “Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole, or confinement in state prison for life." (Italics added.) The italicized language reflected the sentence for first degree murder without special circumstances. Prior to 1976, persons convicted of second degree murder under Penal Code

section 190 faced a “five years to life” sentence (see Stats. 1927, ch. 889, § 1, p. 1952; Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 1, p. 3509; Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 1, pp. 1297-1298), and at that time juveniles convicted of second degree murder were uniformly considered eligible for CYA commitment under Ralph. With the enactment of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 (DSL), the sentence for second degree murder was revised to “five, six or seven years” (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 133, p. 5098), but juveniles found guilty of the offense remained eligible for CYA commitment under

section 1731.5. Although the November 1978 amendment of Penal Code

section 190 increased the minimum term for second degree murder from five to fifteen years, the current statute explicitly prescribes a sentence precisely analogous to the “five years to life” term for second degree murder which existed for many years prior to the DSL under which juveniles were clearly eligible for the CYA. Thus, a draftsman who intended to establish a 15 years to life indeterminate term for second degree murder, under which juveniles would remain eligible for CYA pursuant to

section 1731.5, would have written the amendment of Penal Code

section 190 in precisely the language in which the

section now appears. Penal Code

section 3046 provides in relevant part: “No prisoner imprisoned under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at least seven calendar years.” It might be argued that the replacement of the former straight life sentence for first degree murder with an indeterminate 25 years to life sentence would represent a reduction in penalty because under an indeterminate scheme an offender’s actual sentence may in some cases be set at less than life imprisonment.

In light of the actual operation of the pre-1978 provisions, however, this aspect of the “25 years to life” indeterminate sentence does not in reality represent any reduction from the actual sentence prescribed by the prior law. Under the prior statutory scheme, although Penal Code

section 190 prescribed a straight life term, the Board of Prison Terms could effectively establish an ultimate sentence for life prisoners at less than 25 years. As already noted, under Penal Code

section 3046 the board was authorized to release a life prisoner on parole after seven years; Penal Code

section 3000, subdivisions (

b) and (d), in turn, provided that such life prisoners would be completely discharged from custody upon their successful completion of a five-year period of parole. As a consequence of these statutory provisions, a life prisoner’s ultimate sentence under the pre-1978 law could be considerably shorter than is possible under the present 25 years to life indeterminate sentence. The analysis of the initiative measure prepared by the Legislative Analyst contains no discussion of whether the “25 years to life” and “15 years to life” sentences embodied in the measure constitute indeterminate or determinate sentences.

The one paragraph of the analysis that does describe these statutory sentences is totally ambiguous on the point. That paragraph reads in full: “The measure provides that individuals convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment shall serve a minimum of 25 years, less whatever credit for good behavior they have earned, before they can be eligible for parole. Accordingly, anyone sentenced to life imprisonment would be required to serve at least 16 years and 8 months. The penalty for secorid degree murder would be increased to 15 years to life imprisonment.

A person sentenced to 15 years would be compelled to serve at least 10 years before becoming eligible for parole.” (Ballot Pamp., Analysis by Legislative Analyst of Prop. 7, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) p. 32.) While the initial portion of the paragraph dealing with the “25 years to life” sentence could in isolation be read to support the Attorney General’s

interpretation, the latter segment of the paragraph clearly indicates that the “15 years to life” sentence is not a determinate life sentence; if it were, of course, a person could not be “sentenced to 15 years” under the statute. The confusion of this paragraph simply indicates that the Legislative Analyst did not specifically address himself to the question of the nature of the sentences prescribed by the section. In enacting the DSL, the Legislature did not provide determinate sentences for all penal provisions in this state.

Thus, for example, a variety of penal statutes currently provide for punishment “by imprisonment.. .in a state prison not exceeding one year and one day....” (Italics added.) (See Pen. Code, §§ 270 (failure to provide family support); 502.7 (telephone fraud); 594 (vandalism); 597.5 (fighting dogs); 653h (transfer of recorded sounds for unlawful use); 4532 (nonforcible escape from county jail).)