DACUS WADE ALLEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SULLY-MILLER CONTRACTING COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent, 28 Cal. 4th 222

Opinion BAXTER, J. Civil Code

section 3333.4 (section 3333.4) was enacted through passage of Proposition 213 in the November 5, 1996 General Election. Known as The Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, Proposition 213 sought to restrict the ability of uninsured motorists, convicted drunk drivers, and convicted felons to recover for losses suffered in accidents. In this case, an uninsured motorcyclist was injured in a single-vehicle accident while turning across an unmarked elevated “bus pad” on a public roadway. We shall address whether

section 3333.4 bars the motorcyclist from recovering noneconomic losses in his premises liability action against the private construction company that maintained control over the roadway at the time of the accident We conclude that it does. Factual and Procedural Background The City of Los Angeles (the City) hired Sully-Miller Contracting Company (Sully-Miller) as the prime contractor for certain road construction work, including street widening and the installation of concrete bus pads on the road at bus stop locations. Sully-Miller, in turn, subcontracted with Daniel J.

Lopez Concrete Construction (Lopez Construction) to construct the bus pads. Sully-Miller retained responsibility for providing traffic control at the construction sites, which entailed the installation and maintenance of road barriers and delineators to warn motorists and others of ditches and uneven road surfaces. One of the bus pads constructed by Lopez Construction was not level with the asphalt surface of the street; it rose three inches above the street surface in some places.

On the night of August 13, 1996, there were no barricades or delineators marking the differentiated height of the pad when Dacus Wade Allen (Allen), who was driving his motorcycle, attempted to make a right-hand turn across the pad. Allen’s tire caught on the elevated lip of the pad and his motorcycle fell, causing injuries to his knee. Allen brought a negligence and premises liability action against the City, Sully-Miller, and Lopez Construction.

On the day scheduled for trial, defendants moved to preclude the introduction of evidence of Allen’s noneconomic damages based on Allen’s admission that he did not have liability insurance for his motorcycle at the time of the accident. The trial court granted the motion, finding the action subject to the restrictions of

section 3333.4. At the close of Allen’s case, the trial court granted a nonsuit in favor of Lopez Construction. Subsequently, the jury found, by special verdict, that the public property in question was in a dangerous condition at the time of Allen’s accident. Although the jury found that the City was not liable because it had no actual or constructive notice of the condition, it evidently accepted Allen’s theory that Sully-Miller was negligent in failing to install barriers or delineators to warn of the elevated nature of the bus pad. Allen was not assessed with any comparative negligence.

The jury awarded Allen $24,080 in economic damages for his medical expenses and lost earnings. The trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict and denied Allen’s motion for a new trial. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial. Relying on Hodges v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 109 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 884, 980 P.2d 433] (Hodges), the appellate court concluded that

section 3333.4 does not apply in an action for premises liability against a private entity. We granted review and held the matter pending our decision in Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196] (Day), which involved the question whether

section 3333.4 applied in an action against two local public entities for nuisance and dangerous condition of property. After we decided Day, we ordered briefing limited to the issue whether

section 3333.4 bars recovery of noneconomic losses in this premises liability action against a private construction company. Discussion

Section 3333.4 provides in pertinent part: “(a) . . . [I]n any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle, a person shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages if any of the following applies: [TO • • • [TO

(2) The injured person was the owner of a vehicle involved in the accident and the vehicle was not insured as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state. [TO

(3) The injured person was the operator of a vehicle involved in the accident and the operator can not establish his or her financial responsibility as required by the financial responsibility laws of this state.” In this case, the question is whether an action to recover damages arising out of a motor vehicle accident caused by a private construction company’s negligent creation or maintenance of a dangerous road condition is an “action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” within the meaning of

section 3333.4, subdivision (a). Where, as here, the issue presented is one of statutory construction, our fundamental task is “to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272; see People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 240 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283].) We begin by examining the statutory language because it generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (People v.

Trevino, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 241.) We give the language its usual and ordinary meaning, and “[i]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.” (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.) If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, “we may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history.” (Ibid.) Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute. (Ibid.; Torres v.

Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57].) Any

interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences is to be avoided. (Ibid.) Applying these rules of statutory construction, we conclude that Allen’s action falls squarely within the terms of

section 3333.4. First, Allen did not have liability insurance on his motorcycle at the time of the accident. Second, his action seeks to recover for damages that occurred when the tire of the uninsured motorcycle he was operating caught on an uneven street surface, causing his motorcycle to fall.

The factual circumstances here raise no ambiguity or uncertainty as to the application of the statute, which precludes recovery of noneconomic damages “in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (§ 3333.4, subd. (a)), if the injured person was not insured as the owner or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident (id., subd. (a)(2), (3)).

Accordingly, Allen “shall not recover non-economic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages.” (Id., subd. (a).) We compare the instant action with the one at issue in Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th 268, which involved an uninsured motorcyclist who was struck by a car in an intersection. In that case, the jury determined that overgrown vegetation on public property surrounding the intersection had obstructed the motorists’ views and contributed to the accident.

Since such facts demonstrated “a necessary and causal relationship between the plaintiffs operation of his motorcycle and the accident for which he claimed the public entities were responsible,” Day concluded that the plaintiffs action sought to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of that motor vehicle within the contemplation of

section 3333.4. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 274.) As in Day, the facts here establish “a necessary and causal relationship” between Allen’s operation of his uninsured motorcycle and the accident for which he claims Sully-Miller was responsible by virtue of its negligence in creating or maintaining a dangerous road condition. Just as in Day, then, Allen may recover for his economic losses, but he is statutorily barred from seeking noneconomic recovery. Contrary to the assertions of Allen and the dissenting justices, neither Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th 109, nor Horwich v.

Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927], compels a different construction. In both cases, we found the language of

section 3333.4, subdivision (

a) ambiguous with respect to the particular factual circumstances before us. (Hodges, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 113; Horwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 277.) In Hodges, which involved an uninsured plaintiffs action against the manufacturer of a defective vehicle, there was no necessary connection between the plaintiffs “operation or use” of a vehicle and the injuries he suffered. In Horwich v. Superior Court, recovery of noneconomic damages was sought by “a person” who was not the uninsured owner or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident.

Since the facts in those cases raised uncertainty as to the statute’s application, we consulted the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 213 to determine whether

section 3333.4 was intended to restrict the subject actions. (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 273.) Review of such materials led us to conclude the statute was inapplicable on the facts presented. As explained in Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th 268, actions seeking damages for vehicular accidents caused by dangerous road conditions are an entirely different matter. In such actions, a necessary and causal relationship generally exists between the uninsured motorist’s use or operation of a vehicle and the accident that occurs. (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 274.) Not only do actions of this sort fall squarely within a fair and objective reading of

section 3333.4’s terms, but allowing such actions advances, rather than defeats, the legislation’s declared purpose to “ ‘change the system that rewards individuals who fail to take essential personal responsibility’ and to ‘restore balance to our justice system.’ ” (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 276.) And as Day emphasized, nothing in Hodges implied the contrary. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 279-282.) Thus, while Hodges observed that a primary aim of Proposition 213 was to limit automobile insurance claims by uninsured motorists against insured motorists, that decision did not suggest it was the initiative’s exclusive aim. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 280.) Allen points out that in Day, we observed in a footnote that some of the plaintiffs arguments in the case had assumed that

section 3333.4 did not apply to premises liability actions against owners of private property. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 282, fn. 8.) But because Day did not involve the liability of a private property owner, we declined to address “such arguments or the possibility that other concerns may justify a different result” in the case of private owners. (Ibid.) Seizing on that footnote, Allen contends there are several distinctions between his property-related action against Sully-Miller and the property-related action in Day.

First, he argues, the fact that Sully-Miller’s negligence in maintaining the construction site was the sole legal cause of his accident distinguishes his action from the one in Day, wherein liability for the plaintiffs damages was apportioned between a second motorist (52 percent) and the two public entities responsible for the nuisance and dangerous condition (48 percent, cumulatively). (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.) Second, the legislative history of

section 3333.4, he claims, offers no basis for concluding that the statute encompasses actions involving injury caused by the ownership, occupation, or maintenance of private, as opposed to public, property. Upon careful review of Day and the statutory language and history, we perceive no legitimate basis for distinguishing Allen’s action from the action in Day in assessing

section 3333.4’s application. Day’s holding did not turn upon the factual circumstance that a second motorist was partly at fault. Rather, its analysis focused on the particular action against the public entity defendants and determined that the action, which sought recovery under the theories of nuisance and dangerous condition of public property, was reasonably viewed as having arisen out of the plaintiffs operation or use of his uninsured motorcycle. (Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 273-274, 280.) More importantly, we find no evidence of legislative intent supporting Allen’s proposal to carve out a private entity or private property exception to

section 3333.4’s application. The statutory language makes no distinction between public entity and private entity defendants in precluding recovery for noneconomic losses. To the contrary,

section 3333.4 explicitly bars recovery of such losses “in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (id., subd. (a), italics added), where the injured person was the owner of an uninsured vehicle involved in the accident or was the vehicle operator and cannot properly establish his or her financial responsibility (id., subd. (a)(2), (3)).

Likewise, nothing in the legislative history of the provision, as reflected in the ballot materials accompanying Proposition 213, suggests an intent to differentiate between public defendants and private defendants, or between dangerous conditions on public property and private property. Although Allen correctly notes that the ballot materials contained a specific reference to the initiative’s impact upon public entities (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) Legis. Analyst’s analysis of Prop. 213, p. 49), the broad statutory language (“in any action”) leaves no doubt that

section 3333.4 applies in all actions where the statutory prerequisites are met, including those actions brought against private persons and entities. (§ 3333.4, subd. (a).) Conversely, the implication of Allen’s alternative construction is that the phrase “in any action to recover damages arising out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle” (ibid.) would have one meaning for the public entity that owned the uneven roadway and a different meaning for the private contractor that exercised control over it. Such an illogical and inconsistent reading of the statute cannot be what the voters intended.

In the final analysis, Allen stands in the same position as the plaintiff in Day. He drove his motorcycle in violation of the state financial responsibility law and got into an accident because of a roadway condition. He seeks to hold another financially responsible for his economic and noneconomic damages, even though he himself, as an uninsured motorist, could have avoided financial responsibility for any damages had he caused an accident while on the road. Even if Sully-Miller did not own the property where the elevated bus pad was situated, but merely occupied it, construing

section 3333.4 to apply in circumstances such as these substantially advances, rather than defeats, the statute’s general purpose to restore balance to the justice system with respect to violators of the financial responsibility law. (See Day, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 276.) Disposition We conclude that

section 3333.4 bars Allen from recovering noneconomic damages in his action against Sully-Miller. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein. George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Brown, J., concurred.

Section 3333.4 additionally bars recovery of noneconomic losses if the injured person was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the accident and was convicted of that offense. (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The statute provides one exception to its bar on recovery of noneconomic losses whereby an owner of an uninsured vehicle may recover such losses if he or she was injured by a motorist who was driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol and was convicted of that offense. (Id., subd. (c).) Strictly speaking, the action here does not involve private property. Rather, it involves a private party that occupied public property while making improvements to the property.