JOHANA GOMEZ, as Administrator, etc., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY et al., Real Parties in Interest, 35 Cal. 4th 1125

Opinion MORENO, J. The estate of a passenger who died as a result of injuries allegedly sustained while riding on the Indiana Jones attraction at Disneyland brought causes of action based upon Civil Code

section 2100, which requires a “carrier of persons for reward” to “use the utmost care and diligence” for the safety of its passengers, and Civil Code

section 2101, which imposes a duty upon such a carrier to provide “vehicles” that are “safe and fit for the purposes to which they are put.” The superior court sustained a demurrer to these causes of action, reasoning that the operator of an amusement park ride cannot be a carrier of persons, but the Court of Appeal reversed. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Court of Appeal and conclude that the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride can be a carrier of persons for reward within the meaning of Civil Code sections 2100 and 2101.

Facts and Procedural History On September 3, 2002, the estate of Cristina Moreno and her heirs filed a second amended complaint for wrongful death and damages against The Walt Disney Company and related defendants (hereafter Disney) alleging that Moreno suffered a brain injury and eventually died after riding on the Indiana Jones amusement ride at Disneyland in Anaheim, California.

Plaintiffs alleged that on June 25, 2000, Moreno was 23 years old and had traveled from her home in Spain with her new husband on their honeymoon and rode on the Indiana Jones amusement ride, during which Moreno “suffered serious injuries due to the violent shaking and stresses imposed by the ride.” Plaintiffs alleged that “[a]s a proximate cause of this incident, [Moreno] sustained injuries including a subarachnoid hemorrhage and hydrocephalus which required extensive hospitalization and multiple brain surgeries.

The charges alone for the initial hospitalization and air ambulance to Spain are in excess of $1,365,000.00.” Moreno died on September 1, 2000. Plaintiffs alleged that the Indiana Jones attraction has been in operation from at least 1995 and utilizes “jeep-style ride vehicles” that are “computer controlled with 160,000 different combinations. The ride is fast, turbulent, combining the ups and downs of a roller coaster with jarring jumps, drops, and unpredictable movements.

The $100 million Indiana Jones Attraction at Disneyland shakes and whipsaws riders with such fury that many passengers are forced to seek first aid and in some instances hospitalization.” They alleged that the ride’s sudden changes in direction could cause, and did cause, bleeding in the brain “similar to what happens in ‘shaken-baby syndrome.’ ” In addition to causes of action for premises liability, “product negligence,” strict products liability, and unfair business practices, plaintiffs brought a cause of action under Civil Code

section 2100 for “common carrier liability,” alleging that Disney owed Moreno a “duty of utmost care and diligence” because the Indiana Jones attraction consists of a “vehicle” that was “used to transport passengers while, at the same time, providing them with entertainment and thrills.” Plaintiffs also brought a cause of action under Civil Code

section 2101 for “strict liability,” alleging that Disney failed to “provide a vehicle safe and fit for transportation and are not excused for default in this regard by any degree of care.” Disney filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint challenging the causes of action based upon Civil Code sections 2100 and 2101. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the grounds “that amusement rides such as roller coasters are not common carriers. . . .

Here, the primary purpose of the ride is entertainment, thrills, and the incidental consequence is that people are transported in the process.” The Court of Appeal granted plaintiffs’ petition for writ of mandate and directed the superior court to overrule the demurrer on the ground that Disney acted as a common carrier in operating the Indiana Jones attraction because Disney “offers to the public to carry persons.” We granted Disney’s petition for review.

Discussion Carriers of persons for reward have long been subject to a heightened duty of care. (3 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986) The Nature of Negligence, § 16.14, p. 506.) This heightened duty imposed upon carriers of persons for reward stems from the English common law rule that common carriers of goods were absolutely responsible for the loss of, or damage to, such goods. (Beale, The History of the Carrier’s Liability in Selected Essays in Anglo-American Legal History (Assn. of Am.

Law Schools, edit., 1909) p. 148.) Carriers of goods are bailees and, at “early law goods bailed were absolutely at the risk of the bailee.” (Ibid.) Thus, carriers of goods for reward were “ ‘responsible absolutely for the goods delivered, even when lost by theft, and regardless of negligence.’ ” (Id. at p. 149, fn. 4.) This rale was applied in California in Agnew v.

Steamer Contra Costa (1865) 27 Cal. 425, 429, which held that a common carrier of goods (in that case a horse), “was an insurer against all injury not resulting from the act of God or the public enemies, or from the conduct of the animal.” The precursor to recognizing a heightened duty of care for carriers of persons came in 1680, when an English court applied the rule regarding carriers of goods to personal property that a passenger on a stagecoach had delivered to the driver, but which the driver failed to return at the end of the journey. (Lovett v. Hobbs (1680) 89 Eng.

Rep. 836.) The court rejected the argument that the driver of a stagecoach could not be a common carrier regarding property brought by a passenger, stating: “[I]f a coachman commonly carry goods, and take money for so doing, he will be in the same case with a common carrier, and is a carrier for that purpose, whether the goods are a passenger’s or a stranger’s . . . .” (Id. at p. 837.) The extension of applying the heightened duty of care for carriers of goods to carriers of persons for reward “is probably of American origin, finding its earliest expression in 1839 in Stokes v.

Saltonstall [(1839) 38 U.S. 181 [10 L.Ed. 115]].” (3 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, supra, The Nature of Negligence, § 16.14, p. 507.) In Stokes, a passenger in a stagecoach was injured when the coach was upset.

The court noted that a carrier of goods was absolutely liable for the loss of or damage to such goods regardless of the cause “except the act of God, and the public enemy,” but recognized that “a contract to carry passengers differs from a contract to carry goods.” (Stokes, supra, 38 U.S. at p. 191.) “But although he does not warrant the safety of the passengers, at all events, yet his undertaking and liability as to them, go to this extent: that he . . . shall possess competent skill; and that as far as human care and foresight can go, he will transport them safely.” (Ibid.) Restating this standard, the court required the driver to act “with reasonable skill, and with the utmost prudence and caution.” (Id. at p. 193.) The rule that carriers of persons for reward must exercise great care for the safety of their passengers was adopted in California in 1859 in Fairchild v.

The California Stage Company (1859) 13 Cal. 599, in which a passenger was injured when the stagecoach in which she was riding overturned.

The court rejected the proposition that a carrier of persons for reward warrants the safety of its passengers, but held the carrier to a high duty of care; “While it is true that the proprietors of a stage-coach do not warrant the safety of passengers in the same sense that they warrant the safe carriage of goods, yet they do warrant that safety so far as to covenant for the exercise of extraordinary diligence and care to insure it; and they do this as common carriers.” (Id. at p. 605.) The California Legislature soon adopted a comprehensive scheme governing carriage. Civil Code

section 2085, which was enacted in 1872 and remains unchanged today, defines a “contract of carriage” in extremely broad terms as “a contract for the conveyance of property, persons, or messages, from one place to another.” Similarly,

section 2168 defines a “common carrier” in expansive terms: “Every one who offers to the public to carry persons, property, or messages, excepting only telegraphic messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to carry.” Carriers of persons are treated differently under the statutory scheme depending upon whether they act gratuitously or are paid. A carrier of persons “without reward” is subject only to a duty to “use ordinary care and diligence for their safe carriage.” (§ 2096.) But a carrier of persons for reward, as was true at common law, is subject to a heightened duty.

Section 2100, upon which plaintiffs rely in the present case, states: “A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.” “Common carriers are not, however, insurers of their passengers’ safety. Rather, the degree of care and diligence which they must exercise is only such as can reasonably be exercised consistent with the character and mode of conveyance adopted and the practical operation of the business of the carrier. [Citations.]” (Lopez v.

Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785 [221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 710 P.2d 907],)

Section 2101, upon which plaintiffs also rely, further imposes a duty to provide safe vehicles: “A carrier of persons for reward is bound to provide vehicles safe and fit for the purpose to which they are put, and is not excused for default in this respect by any degree of care.” While the rules governing carriage of persons for hire found their first expression in California in cases involving passengers in stagecoaches (Boyce v. California Stage Co. (1864) 25 Cal. 460, 468; Fairchild v.

The California Stage Company, supra, 13 Cal. 599, 605), it soon became apparent that the term “carrier of persons” would be given an expansive definition. In Treadwell v. Whittier (1889) 80 Cal. 574, 576 [22 P. 266], a hydraulic elevator in the defendants’ store fell and injured the plaintiff. The court had no difficulty concluding that the operators of the elevator qualified as carriers of persons for reward: “The defendants used their elevator in lifting persons vertically to the height of forty feet. That they were carriers of passengers, and should be treated as such, we have no doubt.

The same responsibilities as to care and diligence rested on them as on the carriers of passengers by stage-coach or railway.” (Id. at p. 585.) As the court in Treadwell elaborated: “Persons who are lifted by elevators are subjected to great risks to life and limb. They are hoisted vertically, and are unable, in case of the breaking of the machinery, to help themselves. The person running such elevator must be held to undertake to raise such persons safely, as far as human care and foresight will go.

The law holds him to the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons, and responsible for the slightest neglect, [f] Such responsibility attaches to all persons engaged in employments where human beings submit their bodies to their control by which their lives or limbs are put at hazard, or where such employment is attended with danger to life or limb. The utmost care and diligence must be used by persons engaged in such employments to avoid injury to those they carry.” (Treadwell v.

Whittier, supra, 80 Cal. 574, 591.) It now is well established that commercial operators of elevators and escalators are carriers of persons for reward. (Vandagriff v. J.C. Penney Co. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 579, 582 [39 Cal.Rptr. 671]; 6 Witkin,

Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 768, p. 107.) The expansive definition of carriers of persons for reward was continued in Smith v. O’Donnell (1932) 215 Cal. 714 [12 P.2d 933], which held that an airplane pilot who offered sightseeing flights to the ocean and back was a carrier of passengers for reward despite the circumstance that the flights took off and landed at the same airport.

The court noted that the pilot “ ‘was not engaged in carrying passengers from one terminal, i.e., from the Long Beach Municipal Airport to another fixed landing field, but rather of carrying “Two passengers for five dollars. ...

Up and down the road toward the ocean.” In other words, he was engaged “in the aviation business” for the purpose of taking those who might apply on a flight from the municipal field toward the ocean and back again, landing on the field whence he started.’ ” (Id. at p. 716.) The court in O’Donnell acknowledged the broad scope that had been given to the term carriers of persons for reward, noting that “ ‘any of the following may be common carriers, viz., stage coaches, busses, automobiles, hackney coaches, cabs, drays, carts, wagons, sleds, elevators and in fact almost every vehicle which can be employed for the purpose.’ ” (Smith v.

O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 714, 719.) This court cited with approval the “ ‘interesting and instructive’ ” decision in O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co. (1909) 242 Ill. 336 [89 N.E. 1005], which held that a “scenic railway” was a common carrier, stating; “ ‘ “Why is not this rule (the rule of liability applying to common carriers) applicable to those operating cars upon a scenic railway such as the one here in question? The passengers carried therein are subject to great risk to life and limb. The steep inclines, sharp curves, and great speed necessarily are sources of peril.” ’ ” (Smith v.

O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 719.) We noted that the court in O’Callaghan rejected the argument that the purpose for which the passenger purchases the ride should make a difference: “ ‘Should the motive which causes a person to take passage make any difference as to the degree of responsibility with which the carrier is charged? Passenger elevators are frequently operated in buildings in order to convey persons to some vantage point where they can overlook a great city, or some other object of interest, and trips on electric cars are often made solely for pleasure. . . .

We think not only by fair analogy, but, on reason and sound public policy, appellant should be held to the same degree of responsibility in the management of the railway in question as a common carrier.’ ” (Ibid.) There is an unbroken line of authority in California classifying recreational rides as common carriers, including McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 489 [23 Cal.Rptr. 339], which held that the operator of a mule train that took passengers from Palm Springs to Tahquitz Falls and back was a common carrier.

The Court of Appeal concluded: “The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that a person who paid a roundtrip fare for the purpose of being conducted by mule over the designated route between fixed termini, purchased a ride; that the defendant offered to carry such a person by mule along that route between these termini; and that the transaction between them constituted an agreement of carriage.” (Id. at p. 492; see Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v.

Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897] [ski resort chair lift facility is a common carrier].) The first California case to address whether the operator of a roller coaster was a carrier of persons for reward was Barr v.

Venice Giant Dipper Co., Ltd. (1934) 138 Cal.App. 563, 563-564 [32 P.2d 980], which described the ride upon which the plaintiff was injured as a “roller coaster” that was “in the nature of a miniature scenic railway consisting of a train of small cars constructed to carry two passengers each.” The Court of Appeal held that the operator of the ride was a common carrier and, therefore, the trial court properly had instructed the jury under

section 2100. The appellate court relied upon “the general and accepted rule which is thus stated in 10 C. J. 609: ‘The owner and operator of a scenic railway in an amusement park is subject, where he has accepted passengers on such railway for hire, to the liabilities of a carrier of passengers generally.’ ” (Barr v. Venice Giant Dipper Co., Ltd., supra, 138 Cal.App. at p. 564.) In Kohl v. Disneyland, Inc. (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 780 [20 Cal.Rptr. 367], the Court of Appeal held that the operators of a stagecoach ride at Disneyland were common carriers.

The plaintiffs were riding on The Surrey with the Fringe on Top ride, which was a horse-drawn stagecoach, when the horses became frightened and ran, causing the coach to tip over. The Court of Appeal held that “because of the passenger-carrier relationship between the parties, the duty imposed upon the defendant was to exercise the utmost care and diligence . . . .” (Id. at p. 784.) A federal district court in California echoed the result in Kohl, holding that the operators of the Pirates of the Caribbean amusement ride at Disneyland were common carriers. (Neubauer v.

Disneyland, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 1995) 875 F.Supp. 672.) The plaintiffs in Neubauer were injured when the boat in which they were riding was struck from behind by another boat. The federal district court held: “Under plaintiffs’ allegations, Disneyland’s amusement park boat ride falls within California’s broad statutory definition of a common carrier. At the ‘Pirates of the Caribbean,’ defendant offered to the public to carry patrons.

Under these allegations, the duty of utmost care and diligence would apply to Disneyland.” (Id. at p. 674.) Although California law has consistently defined broadly the term “carrier of persons for reward” (§§ 2100, 2101), and included within that definition amusement park rides like roller coasters, and other recreational forms of carriage, the same has not always been true in other jurisdictions. Many of the decisions from other jurisdictions that hold that operators of amusement park rides are not common carriers follow the reasoning in Harlan v.

Six Flags Over Georgia, Inc. (1982) 250 Ga. 352 [297 S.E.2d 468]. Harlan involved an amusement park ride called The Wheelie that consisted of cars mounted on the sprockets of a wheel that rotated its passengers at increasing speed, eventually suspending them upside down by the power of centrifugal force.

Harlan relied upon a Georgia statute that imposed a duty to exercise extraordinary care to protect passengers “who travel in some public conveyance.” (Id. at p. 469.) The court held that the ride was not a “public conveyance” within the meaning of the statute because passengers board rides and modes of transportation such as elevators with “dissimilar expectations”: “Persons using ordinary transportation devices, such as elevators and buses, normally expect to be carried safely, securely, and without incident to their destination.

Amusement ride passengers intend to be conveyed thrillingly to a place at, or near to, the point they originally boarded, so that carriage is incidental.” (Ibid.) Several cases have adopted the reasoning in Harlan. Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp. (Utah 1993) 869 P.2d 926 held that a children’s roller coaster is not a common carrier. The court noted that common carriers are held to a high standard of care because “[pjassengers entrust common carriers with their personal safety, have little if any opportunity to protect themselves from harm caused by a common carrier, and pay the carrier for safe transportation.

In addition, the public has an important stake in having the public transportation of persons be as safe as possible.” (Id. at p. 930.) The court acknowledged that operators of amusement park rides similarly “are entrusted with passengers who depend on the operators for their safety,” but relied nonetheless on the reasoning in Harlan and concluded that “[a]musement rides are not designed to provide comfortable, uneventful transportation, even when the equipment operates without incident and as intended.” (Id. at p. 931; see Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Elmer (Tex. 2003) 124 S.W.3d 210, 213 [47 Tex. Sup. Ct.

J. 182] [speedboat offering “thrill” rides in the Gulf of Mexico not a common carrier because “its primary purpose is to entertain, not to transport from place to place”].) Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 627 [120 A. 300, 303-304], held that an amusement park ride called an “aeroplane swing,” which consisted of cars made to resemble airplanes that were suspended by steel cables from a rotating tower, was not a carrier.

The court recognized that there was justification for applying the rules applicable to common carriers because “the revolving cars or boats are quite similar to the moving trains upon a railroad in the motive power employed and in the considerable hazard of operation of each . . . .” (Id. at p. 303.) Nevertheless, the court concluded the rules governing common carriers did not apply because the patron of an amusement park ride is seeking entertainment, not transportation: “One traveling upon his lawful occasions must perforce use the ordinary means of transportation, and is practically compelled to place himself in the care of carriers of passengers, and so the rule applied to carriers holds them to the highest degree of care and diligence.

On the other hand, one desiring for his delectation to make use of pleasure-giving devices similar to the one in question is under no impulsion of business or personal necessity. He is seeking entertainment, and when invited by a manager to avail himself of the equipment provided by certain forms of amusement, he can properly ask only that he be not exposed by the carelessness of those in charge of any given instrumentality to harm preventable by care appropriate to the operation of such instrumentality.” (Id. at pp. 303-304; see Sergermeister v.

Recreation Corp. of America (Fla. 1975) 314 So.2d 626, 632.) In Bregel v. Busch Entertainment Corp. (1994) 248 Va. 175 [444 S.E.2d 718], the Virginia Supreme Court concluded without citation to authority that the Skyride—a monocable system that transported patrons in gondolas to three different locations within the Busch Gardens amusement park—was not a common carrier because the ride “is for entertainment purposes, and the transportation function is incidental to the entertainment function.” (Id. at p. 719.) Similarly, Wright v.

Midwest Old Settlers and Threshers Assoc. (Iowa 1996) 556 N.W.2d 808, held that a nonprofit association that ran a five-day public event was not a common carrier by virtue of operating a “train” consisting of two cars pulled by a tractor that sold rides around the grounds. The court reasoned: “[T]he association’s event is limited in scope and duration to only a few days each year. . . . The purpose of this train is not only to provide transportation around the grounds, but also to entertain the public.” (Id. at p. 811; see Gunther v.

Smith (1989) 78 Md.App. 508 [553 A.2d 1314, 1316] [operator of a horse-drawn hayride at a private company picnic was not a common carrier].) As noted above, in 1932 this court rejected the view later espoused in Harlan and its progeny that whether a form of transportation constitutes carriage of persons for reward depends upon the purpose of the transportation. We held instead in Smith v. O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 714, that the operator of a sightseeing airplane was a carrier of persons for reward. We found persuasive the contrary reasoning in O’Callaghan v.

Dellwood Park Co., supra, 242 Ill. 336, that a passenger’s motive for seeking transportation was irrelevant in determining the carrier’s liability and that the carrier owed the same high duty of care whether the passenger rode for pleasure or business. We continue to adhere to the view we adopted in Smith v. O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 714.

As the cases cited above make clear, our conclusion that the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride can be a carrier of persons for reward is consistent with the authority holding that operators of ski lifts are common carriers, despite the fact that the skiers who ride such lifts are engaged in recreation. (Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v.

Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 1499.) A passenger’s purpose in purchasing transportation, whether it be to get from one place to another or to travel simply for pleasure or sightseeing, does not determine whether the provider of the transportation is a carrier for reward. The passenger’s purpose does not affect the duty of the carrier to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of the passenger. Certainly there is no justification for imposing a lesser duty of care on the operators of roller coasters simply because the primary purpose of the transportation provided is entertainment.

As one federal court noted, “amusement rides have inherent dangers owing to speed or mechanical complexities. They are operated for profit and are held out to the public to be safe. They are operated in the expectation that thousands of patrons, many of them children, will occupy their seats.” (U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Brian (5th Cir. 1964) 337 F.2d 881, 883.) Riders of roller coasters and other “thrill” rides seek the illusion of danger while being assured of their actual safety. The rider expects to be surprised and perhaps even frightened, but not hurt.

The rule that carriers of passengers are held to the highest degree of care is based on the recognition that “ ‘[t]o his diligence and fidelity are intrusted the lives and safety of large numbers of human beings.’ ” (Treadwell v. Whittier, supra, 80 Cal. 574, 591.) This applies equally to the rider of a roller coaster as it does to the rider of a bus, airplane, or train. Other jurisdictions agree with the rule adopted in California. The Alabama Supreme Court in Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins (1915) 192 Ala. 534 [68 So. 417, 418], followed the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in O’Callaghan v.

Dellwood Park Co., supra, 89 N.E. 1005, and held that a “scenic railway” in an amusement park “ ‘should be held to the same degree of responsibility in the management of the railway in question as a common carrier.’ ” (See Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp. (1928) 173 Minn. 331 [217 N. W. 374, 376]; Tennessee State Fair Assn. v. Hartman (1915) 134 Tenn. 159 [183 S. W. 735, 736]; Lyons v. Wagers (1966) 55 Tenn.App. 667 [404 S.W.2d 270, 274].) The Missouri Supreme Court stated without explanation in Pointer v. Mountain Ry. Const.

Co. (1916) 269 Mo. 104 [189 S.W. 805] that “scenic railways ... are not common carriers of passengers in any sense of the word,” but subsequent decisions in Missouri have departed from that stance. (See Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co. (1931) 225 Mo.App. 1180 [34 S.W.2d 149, 152] [operator of roller coaster held to the degree of care required of common carriers]; Cooper v. Winnwood Amusement Co. (1932) 227 Mo.App. 608 [55 S.W.2d 737, 742] [same].) The Colorado Supreme Court held in Lewis v.

Buckskin Joe’s, Inc. (1964) 156 Colo. 46 [396 P.2d 933], that a stagecoach ride that traveled over a fixed course as a tourist attraction in a replica of a ghost mining town should be held to the highest degree of care regardless of the passenger’s purpose in entering the ride: “It is not important whether defendants were serving as a carrier or engaged in activities for amusement. The important facts are, the plaintiffs had surrendered themselves to the care and custody of the defendants; they had given up their freedom of movement and actions; there was noting they could do to cause or prevent the accident.

Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants had exclusive possession and control of the facilities used in the conduct of their business and they should be held to the highest degree of care . . . .” (Id. at p. 939.) The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Sand Springs Park v.

Schrader (1921) 82 Okla. 244 [1921 OK 207, 198 P. 983, 987-988] that the operators of “a scenic railway or roller-coaster” was “bound to use the highest degree of care and caution for the safety of his patrons,” observing: “We are unable to see the force of the contention that one who rides a scenic railway should be held to assume any other or further risks than would a passenger riding a passenger train.

The fact that the passenger on a scenic railway might be seeking pleasure and recklessly accepts the risks, it may be stated, would [be no more different than would] a passenger riding a passenger train on a pleasure trip.” Disney points to the fact that

section 2085, which defines a contract of carriage for purposes of sections 2100 and 2101, states that a contract of carriage is a “contract for the conveyance of property, persons, or messages, from one place to another.” Disney argues that the amusement ride at issue is not included within this definition because it is “confined in a single building” and thus does not transport persons “from one place to another.” But the same can be said about elevators and escalators, which long have been held to constitute carriage of persons from one place to another although they are confined in a single building. (Treadwell v. Whittier, supra, 80 Cal. 574; 6 Witkin,

Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 768, p. 107.) Further, we long ago rejected such a limited

interpretation of “from one place to another” by including within the definition of carriage of persons for reward a sightseeing airplane ride that took off and landed at the same airport. (Smith v. O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 714, 717.) The circumstance that a passenger begins and ends a journey in the same place does not mean he or she has not been transported. A tourist in San Francisco who takes a round-trip ride on a cable car solely for entertainment has been transported and is no less entitled to a safe ride than another passenger on the same cable car who disembarks earlier to visit a store or restaurant.

The dissent disagrees, asserting that “it is clear that the Legislature understood the phrase ‘carrier of persons for reward’ in sections 2100 and 2101 to refer to those who provide transportation services to passengers traveling from one point to another. [][] The Indiana Jones ride does not provide such transportation and serves no transportation function.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1144.) The precise contours of the dissent’s analysis are difficult to discern.

The dissent reaches the surprising conclusion that “a roller coaster is not designed to provide transportation at all.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1155, fn. 5.) The dissent reasons that the phrase “carrier of persons for reward” in sections 2100 and 2101 only “refer[s] to those who provide transportation services to passengers traveling from one point to another.” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1146.) But we know that the distance between these two points (assuming any distance at all is required) need not be great.

It is well established that an elevator may be a carrier of persons even though the passenger is transported only from one floor of a building to another. Thus, accepting the dissent’s reasoning would mean that a roller coaster that began on an elevated platform and ended one floor below on ground level would be a carrier of persons, but a roller coaster that began and ended in the same place would not be. The dissent does not explain why the Legislature would want to create such a meaningless distinction.

The essence of the dissent’s analysis, therefore, appears to be that a roller coaster “serves no transportation function,” because “its function is solely to thrill” its passengers and “[t]he movement along the track is purely incidental to the ride’s purpose.” (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 1144-1145.) As noted above, the view that roller coasters are not carriers of persons because “passengers intend to be conveyed thrillingly ... so that carriage is incidental” has been accepted as the rule in some other jurisdictions. (Harlan v.

Six Flags Over Georgia, Inc., supra, 297 S.E.2d 468, 469.) But California considered and rejected this approach more than 70 years ago, holding instead that a passenger’s purpose in purchasing transportation does not determine whether the provider of the transportation is a carrier of persons. (Smith v.

O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 714, 719.) In a novel twist, the dissent denies relying upon the passenger’s purpose, noting in a footnote that its “analysis does not depend on ... ‘ “the motive which causes a person to take passage.” ’ [Citation.]” (Dis. opn., post, at p. 1155, fn. 5.) Rather, the dissent argues that a device is a carrier of persons “if the device at issue is fundamentally a means of transportation.” (Ibid.) But the dissent does not explain how the fundamental nature of a transportation device should be determined.

Fundamentally, a roller coaster is intended to transport people along a fixed route in an exciting and fun manner. It is not clear, therefore, why a roller coaster is not fundamentally a means of transportation for the same reason that a helicopter sightseeing ride that begins and ends at the same place is a means of transportation, despite the fact that its primary purpose is to thrill and amuse its passengers. Our decision in Golden Gate Scenic Steamship Lines, Inc. v.

Public Utilities Commission (1962) 57 Cal.2d 373 [19 Cal.Rptr. 657, 369 P.2d 257] (Golden Gate), does not affect our analysis, because that case addressed the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission rather than the meaning of Civil Code sections 2100 and 2101. Public Utilities Code

section 1007 required entities providing “transportation of persons or property, for compensation, between points in this state” to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Utilities Commission. We held in Golden Gate that a boat that carried paying passengers on a sight-seeing tour of San Francisco Bay need not obtain such a certificate because the boats “do not operate between points,” noting that the trips began and ended on the same wharf. (Golden Gate, supra, at p. 376.) We based our decision on the language of Public Utilities Code

section 1007, explaining that the word “points” as used in that statute means “termini” and it thus follows that “there must be two or more ends-of-the-line, stations, towns, or places between which the vessel operates.” (Golden Gate, supra, at p. 380.) We added that “[t]he word ‘between’ in ordinary usage connotes two different points bounding or defining some line or area.” (Ibid.) Public Utilities Code

section 1007 is part of a regulatory regime for transportation, the purpose of which is distinct from the liability standard for carriers of persons for reward, which is set forth in the Civil Code. (See Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1513 [operators of ski lifts are common carriers under Civil Code

section 2186 despite Public Utilities Code

section 212, which exempts ski lifts from the definition of “common carrier” for purposes of regulation by the Public Utilities Commission].) Because the present case does not involve Public Utilities Code

section 1007, our decision in Golden Gate, supra, 57 Cal.2d 373, does not apply. The Court of Appeal in City of St. Helena v. Public Utilities Commission (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 793 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 713] gave an overly expansive reading to our decision in Golden Gate, supra, 57 Cal.2d 373, concluding that our “definition of ‘transportation’ was not confined to

section 1007; rather it was in accord with the word’s ordinary meaning.” (City of St. Helena v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 802.) City of St. Helena held that the Wine Train, which provided a round trip excursion through the wine country in Napa Valley, was not subject to regulation as a public utility because it “does not qualify as a common carrier providing transportation.” (Id. at p. 796.) In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal did not discuss or attempt to distinguish our decision in Smith v.

O’Donnell, supra, 215 Cal. 714, or the Court of Appeal’s decision in McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d 489. We express no view on whether the Court of Appeal was correct that the Wine Train is not subject to regulation as a public utility, but we disapprove the decision in City of St. Helena v. Public Utilities Commission, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 793, to the extent it suggests that, in general, a provider to the public of roundtrip sight-seeing excursions is not a carrier of persons for reward.

Disney observes that, effective July 12, 2003, the state Office of Administrative Law approved a series of regulations governing the operation of “Permanent Amusement Rides” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, div. 1, ch. 3.2, § 344.5 et seq.) and cites our decision in Ramirez v. Plough (1993) 6 Cal.4th 539 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 97, 863 P.2d 167], to support the argument that we should defer to those regulations. We held in Ramirez that a drug manufacturer’s compliance with applicable statutes and regulations that required providing warnings to consumers in English only satisfied its duty to warn.

The present case arises from an order sustaining a demurrer. The only issue before us, therefore, is whether plaintiffs can state causes of action under sections 2100 and 2101 governing the liability of carriers of persons for reward. We are not called upon to determine in the present proceedings whether compliance by Disney with the cited regulations, which were approved after the incident at issue here, would satisfy its duty of care. The issue before us is only whether plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action under sections 2100 and 2101.

The administrative regulations cited by Disney do not affect that issue. Disney argues that the term “carrier of persons for reward” as used in sections 2100 and 2101 must be interpreted to exclude operators of amusement park rides because “[t]reating amusement rides as common carriers . . . renders part of the common carrier statutory scheme utterly irrelevant.” Disney points to

section 2104, which provides that “[a] carrier of persons for reward must travel at a reasonable rate of speed, and without any unreasonable delay, or deviation from his proper route,”

section 2172, which requires that a common carrier “must start at such time and place as he announces to the public ... in order to connect with carriers on other lines of travel,” and

section 2184, which provides that “[a] common carrier of persons must provide a sufficient number of vehicles to accommodate all the passengers who can be reasonably expected to require carriage at any one time.” It is of course true that not all the statutes pertaining to carriers of persons for reward apply to every form of transportation. But it does not follow that any form of transportation to which these statutes do not apply cannot be a common carrier and carrier of persons.

It is well established that commercial operators of elevators are carriers of persons for reward, although it would make little sense to require that they travel at a reasonable rate, or not deviate from their proper route, or start at an announced time in order to connect with other forms of travel. The same can be said of operators of ski lifts or those offering sight-seeing rides on airplanes or helicopters. We conclude, therefore, that the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride can be a carrier of persons for reward under sections 2100 and 2101.

Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the superior court should have overruled Disney’s demurrer to those counts of the amended complaint raising causes of action under sections 2100 and 2101. Disposition The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Kennard, Acting C. J., Werdegar, J., and Vogel, J., concurred. The liability of a common carrier of property currently is governed by Civil Code

section 2194, which provides that “an inland common carrier of property is liable ... for the loss or injury thereof from any cause whatever, except: [f] 1. An inherent defect, vice, or weakness, or a spontaneous action, of the property itself; [f| 2. The act of a public enemy of the United States, or of this State; [f] 3. The act of the law; or, [j[] 4. Any irresistible superhuman cause.” Civil Code

section 2195 provides further that “[a] common carrier is liable, even in the cases excepted by the last section, if his want of ordinary care exposes the property to the cause of the loss.” Further statutory references are to the Civil Code, unless otherwise indicated. Webster v. Ebright (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 784 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 714] held that

section 2100 applies only to common carriers, and not to private carriers for reward. We stated in Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., supra, 40 Cal.3d 780, 785, that “[t]he duty imposed by

section 2100 applies to public carriers as well as private carriers . . . .” We need not resolve the point in the present case, because the parties do not dispute that Disney, if it is a carrier of persons for reward at all, is a common carrier rather than a private carrier. (§ 2168 [“Every one who offers to the public to carry persons ... is a common carrier . . . .”].) Some cases that hold that operators of amusement park rides are not common carriers rely upon statutory provisions that differ from those in California. In Eliason v.

United Amusement Co. (Or. 1972) 264 Ore. 114 [504 P.2d 94, 96], the court relied on an Oregon statute that provided that the operator of an amusement park ride, including a roller coaster, “shall be deemed not a common carrier; however, such owner or operator shall exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of persons using the devices compatible with the practical operation of the devices being used.” We hold only that the operator of a roller coaster or similar amusement park ride can be a carrier of persons for reward under sections 2100 and 2101.

We do not address, and express no opinion regarding, whether other, dissimilar, amusement rides or attractions can be carriers of persons for reward. The dissent and amici curiae in support of Disney assert incorrectly that our decision in McCordic v. Crawford (1943) 23 Cal.2d 1 [142 P.2d 7] is controlling. The defendant in McCordic leased the Venice Pier and contracted with various concessionaires to operate carnival attractions, including a ride called the Loopa on which the plaintiff was injured.

We held that the defendant could be found liable under principles of premises liability if he failed to reasonably supervise the concessionaire who operated the ride, stating: “ ‘[A] proprietor, or one who operates a place of amusement, owes a legal duty to exercise due care to protect from injury individuals who come upon his premises by his express or implied invitation. He must see that such premises are in a reasonably safe condition. It constitutes a breach of this duty for him to fail to exercise reasonably careful supervision of the appliances or methods of operating concessions under his management.

The proprietor or operator of such a place of amusement is liable to an invited member of the public for injuries received as the result of negligence on the part of an independent contractor or concessionaire when it is shown that the failure to exercise such supervision proximately results in injuries to a patron.’ ” (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Our decision did not address the duty of care of the operator of an amusement park ride or whether the operator of such a ride was a carrier of persons for reward and thus does not apply in the present case.

Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Acting Chief Justice pursuant to

article VI,

section 6, of the California Constitution.