THOMAS K. BUTT et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Appellants, 4 Cal. 4th 668

Opinion BAXTER. J. In late April 1991, after a period of mounting deficits, the Richmond Unified School District (District) announced it lacked funds to complete the final six weeks of its 1990-1991 school term. The District proposed to close its doors on May 1, 1991. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County issued a preliminary injunction directing the State of California (State), its Controller, and its Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI) to ensure that the District’s students would receive a full school term or its equivalent.

The court approved the SPI’s plan for an emergency State loan, and for appointment by the SPI of an administrator to take temporary charge of the District’s operation. We declined to stay implementation of the plan pending the State’s appeal. However, we transferred the appeal here in order to decide an important issue of first impression: Whether the State has a constitutional duty, aside from the equal allocation of educational funds, to prevent the budgetary problems of a particular school district from depriving its students of “basic” educational equality.

We affirm the trial court’s determination that such a duty exists under the California Constitution. Further, the court did not err in concluding, on the basis of the plaintiffs’ preliminary showing, that the particular circumstances of this case demanded immediate State intervention. However, the court exceeded its judicial powers by approving the diversion of emergency loan funds from appropriations clearly intended by the Legislature for other purposes. Facts and Procedural History On April 17, 1991, Thomas K.

Butt and other named District parents filed a class action for temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the State and the District’s board of education (Board). The complaint alleged as follows: The State is responsible for educating all California children, and the Board is the State’s agent for carrying out this responsibility in the District. The scheduled final day of the District’s 1990-1991 school term was June 14, 1991, but the District had announced that its 44 elementary, secondary, and adult schools would close on May 1,1991.

The resulting loss of six weeks of instruction would cause serious, irreparable harm to the District’s 31,500 students and would deny them their “fundamental right to an effective public education” under the California Constitution. Moreover, as an unjustified discrimination against District students compared to those elsewhere in California, the closure would violate equal protection guarantees of the California and United States Constitutions. Therefore, defendants should be enjoined from closing the District’s schools before the scheduled end of the scholastic term.

On April 22, 1991, plaintiffs noticed a motion for preliminary injunction. In an attached declaration, Frank R. Calton, a member of the Board, stated that the District projected a revenue shortfall of $23 million for the 1990-1991 academic year and only had sufficient funds to pay its employees through April 1991. Gallon declared the District would have to close at the end of April unless new funds were obtained or employees agreed to work for registered warrants in lieu of paychecks.

He indicated that the District’s efforts to obtain an emergency loan from the State had not yet succeeded, and the District was preparing to file for bankruptcy. Plaintiffs’ motion papers also included declarations by District teachers, academicians in the field of education, and members of the Contra Costa County board of education. These statements detailed the serious disruptive effect the proposed closure would have upon the educational process in the District and upon the quality of education afforded its students. The motion was heard on April 29, 1991.

The Attorney General represented the State in opposition. Counsel for the District represented that the Board’s appearance was precluded by an automatic bankruptcy stay. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for amendment of the complaint to include the SPI and the Controller as defendants. Pending applications for intervention and amicus curiae status were not formally granted, but as stipulated by the parties, the court heard argument from the applicants and agreed to consider their briefs.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled orally that under the California Constitution, the State itself is responsible for the “fundamental” educational rights of California students and must remedy a local district’s inability to provide its students an education “basically equivalent” to that provided elsewhere in the State.

Concluding that the threatened closure would deny the District’s students a “constitutionally [equal] education,” the court ordered the State and the SPI to act as “they deem appropriate” to ensure that District schools remained open until June 14, 1991, or to provide District students a “substantially equivalent educational opportunity” within the statutory school year ending June 30, 1991. This oral decision was followed by two written orders filed May 2. One of these, drafted by plaintiffs’ counsel, purported to formalize the April 29 ruling.

It made findings that closure of District schools by May 1 would cause District students irreparable harm, that the balance of harm favored a preliminary injunction, that education is a “fundamental right” in California, that no “compelling interest” justified denying District students six weeks of instruction available to “every other child in the State,” and that plaintiffs’ ultimate success on the merits was reasonably probable.

The State and its agents again were directed to act “as . . . appropriate” to ensure District students, within the school year ending June 30, 1991, an education “equivalent basically” to that provided elsewhere in California for a full school term. The Controller was added as a State official expressly bound by the court’s commands. On the same day, May 2, the SPI and the Controller submitted their plan for compliance with the preliminary injunction.

With counsel for all interested parties present, the court took evidence indicating that uncommitted funds exceeding the estimated $19 million necessary to complete the District’s school year were available from existing State appropriations to the Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) program and for emergency assistance to the OUSD. Counsel for the OUSD stipulated that his client had “no objection” to use of the $10 million OUSD appropriation for purposes of an emergency loan to the District. Accordingly, the court executed an order, drafted by counsel for the SPI, approving in principle the submitted plan.

The order authorized the Controller to disburse an emergency loan to the District from unspent portions of the GAIN and OUSD appropriations. (See Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00; Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, § 1 et seq.) Meanwhile, the SPI, by virtue of the State’s “ultimate responsibility” for equal education and his own statutory obligation to “superintend the schools of this state” (Ed.

Code, § 33112, subd. (a)), would have authority to “relieve the . . . [Bjoard of its legal duties and powers, appoint a trustee, develop a recovery plan and, subject to the approval of the Controller, [develop] a repayment plan on the [District’s behalf as necessary” to ensure completion of the school term, the District’s financial recovery, and the protection of the loaned funds. The Attorney General timely noticed appeals from the April 29 and May 2 orders on behalf of the State. Defendants SPI and Controller did not appeal.

The State immediately requested transfer of the appeal from the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, to this court (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 20) and also asked that we stay enforcement of the trial court’s orders pending appeal. The SPI and the Controller opposed a stay but supported transfer of the appeal to this court. We granted the transfer request but denied a stay. Discussion 1. Standard of review.

In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two “interrelated” factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-442 [261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610].) Appellate review is limited to whether the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. (Cohen v.

Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 [219 Cal.Rptr. 467, 707 P.2d 840].) The trial court’s determination must be guided by a “mix” of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff’s showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction. (King v.

Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227-1228 [240 Cal.Rptr. 829, 743 P.2d 889].) Of course, “[t]he scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.” (Common Cause, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 442.) A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. (Id., at pp. 442-443.) Unless potential merit is conceded, an appellate court must therefore address that issue when reviewing an order granting a preliminary injunction.

Here, the trial court found that plaintiffs’ constitutional demand for State intervention had potential merit, and that the balance of interim harm justified the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the State. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that each of these determinations was within the court’s discretion. 2. Merits of plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court expressly found “[t]here is a reasonable probability that plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their case.” The court agreed with plaintiffs’ claim that the equal protection guaranties of the California Constitution (art.

I, § 7, subds. (a), (b); art. IV, § 16, subd. (a)) require State intervention to ensure that fiscal problems do not deprive a local district’s students of basic educational equality. The court also accepted plaintiffs’ preliminary showing that the effect of the District’s crisis on its students’ educational rights was serious enough to trigger the State’s constitutional duty. The State, supported by amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation (Pacific), assails these conclusions on multiple grounds. At the outset, the State does not claim it lacks any and all constitutional role in local educational affairs.

Instead, its reasoning proceeds as follows: The State fulfills its financial responsibility for educational equality by subjecting all local districts, rich and poor, to an equalized statewide revenue base. Unless a district fails to provide the minimum six-month school term set forth in the “free school” clause (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5), the State has no duty to ensure prudent use of the equalized funds by local administrators.

Even if local mismanagement causes one district’s services to fall seriously below prevailing statewide standards, the resulting educational inequality is not grounded in district wealth, nor does it involve a “suspect classification” such as race. Thus, “strict scrutiny” of the disparity is not required, and the State’s refusal to intervene must be upheld as rationally related to its policy of local control and accountability. Even if strict scrutiny is appropriate, the local-control policy is “compelling” enough to justify the State’s inaction.

Under the unprecedented circumstances of this case, we cannot accept the State’s contentions. We set forth our reasons in detail. Since its admission to the Union, California has assumed specific responsibility for a statewide public education system open on equal terms to all. The Constitution of 1849 directed the Legislature to “provide for a system of common schools, by which a school shall be kept up and supported in each district . . . .” (Cal. Const, of 1849, art.

IX, § 3.) That constitutional command, with the additional proviso that the school maintained by each district be “free,” has persisted to the present day. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5.) In furtherance of the State system of free public education, the Constitution also creates State and county educational offices, including a Superintendent of Public Instruction and a State Board of Education. (Cal. Const., art.

IX, §§ 2-3.3, 7.) It authorizes the formation of local school districts (id., §§ 6Y2, 14), requires that all public elementary and secondary schools be administered within the Public School System (id., § 6), establishes a State School Fund (Fund) (id., § 4), reserves a minimum portion of State revenues for allocation to the Fund (id., art. XVI, §§ 8, 8.5), guarantees minimum allocations from the Fund for each public school (id., art.

IX, § 6), specifies minimum salaries for public school teachers (ibid.), authorizes the State Board of Education to approve public school textbooks (id., § 7.5), and permits the Legislature to grant local districts such authority over their affairs as does not “conflict with the laws and purposes for which school districts are established” (id., § 14). Accordingly, California courts have adhered to the following principles: Public education is an obligation which the State assumed by the adoption of the Constitution. (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v.

Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 951-952 [92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669]; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist. (1924) 193 Cal. 664, 669 [226 P. 926].) The system of public schools, although administered through local districts created by the Legislature, is “one system . . . applicable to all the common schools . . . .” (Kennedy v. Miller (1893) 97 Cal. 429, 432 [32 P. 558], italics in original.) “. . . In view of the importance of education to society and to the individual child, the opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be made available to all on an equal basis. . . .” (Jackson v.

Pasadena City School Dist. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 876, 880 [31 Cal.Rptr. 606, 382 P.2d 878].) “[Management and control of the public schools [is] a matter of state[, not local,] care and supervision. . . .” (Kennedy v. Miller, supra, 97 Cal. at p. 431; see also Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177, 181 [302 P.2d 574]; California Teachers Assn. v. Huff (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1523-1524 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 699].) The Legislature’s “plenary” power over public education is subject only to constitutional restrictions. (Hall v. City of Taft, supra, at pp. 180-181 [302 P.2d 574]; Tinsley v.

Palo Alto Unified School Dist. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 871, 903-904 [154 Cal.Rptr. 591].) Local districts are the State’s agents for local operation of the common school system (Hall v. City of Taft, supra, at p. 181; San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 952; California Teachers Assn., supra), and the State’s ultimate responsibility for public education cannot be delegated to any other entity (Hall v. City of Taft, supra; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., supra, 193 Cal. at p. 669).

It is true that the Legislature has assigned much of the governance of the public schools to the local districts (e.g., §§ 14000, 35160 et seq., 35160.1), which operate under officials who are locally elected and appointed (§§ 35020, 35100 et seq.). The districts are separate political entities for some purposes. (E.g., Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 698-700 [266 Cal.Rptr. 187] [general theory of respondeat superior does not make State liable for torts of local district or its employees]; Gonzales v.

State of California (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 585, 590-592 [105 Cal.Rptr. 804] [same]; First Interstate Bank v. State of California (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 627, 633-634 [243 Cal.Rptr. 8] [State not vicariously liable for district’s breach of contract]; Board of Education v.

Calderon (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 490, 496 [110 Cal.Rptr. 916] [local district is not the “state” or the “People,” so as to be civilly bound in dismissal proceedings by teacher’s acquittal of criminal sex offense under principles of res judicata].) Yet the existence of this local-district system has not prevented recognition that the State itself has broad responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the California Constitution.

Because access to a public education is a uniquely fundamental personal interest in California, our courts have consistently found that the State charter accords broader rights against State-maintained educational discrimination than does federal law. Despite contrary federal authority, California constitutional principles require State assistance to correct basic “interdistrict” disparities in the system of common schools, even when the discriminatory effect was not produced by the purposeful conduct of the State or its agents. In Serrano v.

Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601,487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187] (Serrano I), this court struck down the existing State public school financing scheme, which caused the amount of basic revenues per pupil to vary substantially among the respective districts depending on their taxable property values.

Serrano I concluded at length that such a scheme violated both state and federal equal protection guaranties because it discriminated against a fundamental interest—education—on the basis of a suspect classification—district wealth—and could not be justified by a compelling state interest under the strict scrutiny test thus applicable. (Pp. 596-619.) As the court concluded, “where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are at stake, a state’s general freedom to discriminate on a geographical basis will be significantly curtailed by the equal protection clause. [Citation.]” (P. 612, italics added.) Among other things, Serrano I rejected a claim that the wealth-based financing scheme was immune from challenge because the interdistrict revenue disparities it produced were not de jure, but merely de facto.

Our opinion detailed the purposeful state legislative action which had produced the geographically based wealth classifications. It also made clear, however, that under California principles developed in cases involving school racial segregation, the absence of purposeful conduct by the State would not prevent a finding that the State system for funding public education had produced unconstitutional results. (Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 603-604, citing Jackson v.

Pasadena City School Dist, supra, 59 Cal.2d 876, 881.) Serrano I also discussed two groups of federal cases suggesting that place of residence was an impermissible basis for State discrimination in the quality of education. Serrano I cited with approval Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board (E.D.La. 1961) 197 F.Supp. 649. This federal decision struck down a Louisiana statute permitting local parishes to close their schools rather than integrate them. As Serrano I noted, Hall v. St.

Helena Parish found an equal protection violation not only because of the statute’s racial consequences, but also “ ‘because its application in one parish, while the state provides public schools elsewhere, would unfairly discriminate against the residents of that parish, irrespective of race. . . . [A]bsent a reasonable basis for so classifying, a state cannot close the public schools in one area while, at the same time, it maintains schools elsewhere with public funds.’ ” (Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 612, quoting Hall v. St. Helena Parish, supra, 197 F.

Supp. at pp. 651, 656.) Serrano 1 further noted a “second group of cases, dealing with apportionment [of votes], [in which] the high court has held that accidents of geography and arbitrary boundary lines of local government can afford no ground for discrimination among a state’s citizens. [Citation.] ...

If a voter’s address may not determine the weight to which his ballot is entitled, surely it should not determine the quality of his child’s education. [Fn.]” (Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 613.) Finally, Serrano I rejected the State’s claim that plaintiffs’ wealth-discrimination theory would apply equally, and with disastrous effect, to all public services dependent in part on local property taxes. “[W]e are satisfied,” the majority concluded, that whatever the status of other public services, “its uniqueness among public activities clearly demonstrates that education must respond to the command of the equal protection clause.” (Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 614, italics in original.) In San Antonio School District v.

Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278], decided after Serrano /, the United States Supreme Court declined to subject Texas’s similar local-property-tax based school financing scheme to heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Rodriguez majority concluded that a school finance scheme dependent on district tax values does not discriminate against the poor as a distinct class; in any event, the majority observed, wealth alone had never been deemed a suspect classification for federal purposes.

Moreover, the majority reasoned, education is not a fundamental interest protected by the federal Constitution. Therefore finding the strict scrutiny standard of review inapplicable, the majority upheld Texas’s system as rationally related to that state’s policy of local control of schools. (411 U.S. at pp. 18-55.) Nonetheless, in Serrano v.

Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728 [135 Cal.Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929] (Serrano II), this court reaffirmed the reasoning and result of Serrano I as required by the separate equal protection guaranties of the California Constitution. (Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 760-768.) Among other things, Serrano II reiterated that for California purposes, education remains a fundamental interest “which [lies] at the core of our free and representative form of government [fn.] . . . .” (Id., at pp. 767-768.) Hence, Serrano II declared, “[i]n applying our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws we shall continue to apply strict and searching judicial scrutiny” to claims of discriminatory educational classifications. (Serrano II, supra, at p. 767.) More recent cases confirm that education is a fundamental interest under the California equal protection guaranties (e.g., Steffes v.

California Interscholastic Federation (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 739, 746 [222 Cal.Rptr. 355]) and that the unique importance of public education in California’s constitutional scheme requires careful scrutiny of state interference with basic educational rights (see, e.g., Hartzell v. Connell (1984) 35 Cal.3d 899, 906-909 [201 Cal.Rptr. 601, 679 P.2d 35] [scope of free school guarantee]). In Tinsley v.

Palo Alto Unified School Dist., supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 871, parents sought mandate requiring several neighboring San Mateo and Santa Clara County school districts, the State, and certain State school officials, to submit a plan for the redress of interdistrict racial segregation in the affected locality. The petitioners declined to allege any specific acts committed by State or local parties as the cause of the interdistrict imbalance. The State respondents answered the petition, but the districts successfully demurred, and the petition was dismissed as to them.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the California Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart as construed in Milliken v. Bradley (1974) 418 U.S. 717 [41 L.Ed.2d 1069, 94 S.Ct. 3112], contemplates interdistrict relief to remedy mere de facto racial imbalance which extends across district lines. (Tinsley, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at pp. 899-907.) Several aspects of the Tinsley decision emphasize the State’s ultimate responsibility for maintaining a nondiscriminatory common school system.

At the outset, the districts asserted that an appeal was premature under the “one final judgment” rule, because as mere agencies of the State, which had not demurred, they had no separate legal interests which an appeal from their dismissal could finally resolve. The Court of Appeal observed that if the districts’ claim of mere agency was correct, any relief ordered against the State would necessarily affect them, and the judgment dismissing them from the action should therefore be reversed.

In any event, the court concluded, the premise of identical interests did not bear scrutiny, because while “[t]he local districts, as agents, may have limited powers in interdistrict affairs, ... the state ... has plenary powers in all school district affairs. . . .” (Tinsley, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at pp. 880-881.) Turning to the merits, Tinsley dismissed the majority reasoning in Milliken insofar as based on the federal rule, long rejected in California (see Crawford v. Board of Education (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280 [130 Cal.Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28]; Jackson v.

Pasadena City School Dist, supra, 59 Cal.2d 876), that only de jure racial segregation is a constitutional violation. (Tinsley, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 903.) Tinsley also distinguished the Milliken majority’s concern that it “would disrupt and alter” Michigan’s entrenched system of local control of schools to impose an interdistrict remedy for Detroit city school segregation without proof that the state or affected suburban districts had engaged in intentional segregative conduct.

The Tinsley court noted, among other things, that in California, the State shares responsibility with “the local entities it has created” to provide “equal educational opportunity to the youth of the state” and “has a duty to intervene to prevent unconstitutional discrimination” in its schools. (Id., at pp. 903-904.) It therefore appears well settled that the California Constitution makes public education uniquely a fundamental concern of the State and prohibits maintenance and operation of the common public school system in a way which denies basic educational equality to the students of particular districts.

The State itself bears the ultimate authority and responsibility to ensure that its district-based system of common schools provides basic equality of educational opportunity. The State claims it need only ensure the six-month minimum term guaranteed by the free school clause (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5). This contention, however, misconstrues the basis of the trial court’s decision.

Whatever the requirements of the free school guaranty, the equal protection clause precludes the State from maintaining its common school system in a manner that denies the students of one district an education basically equivalent to that provided elsewhere throughout the State. The State argues that even if the District’s fiscal problems threatened its students’ basic educational equality, any State duty to redress the discrimination must be judged under the most lenient standard of equal protection review. The State reasons as follows: Plaintiffs do not claim discrimination on the suspect basis of race.

Nor is wealth-based discrimination at issue; as all parties concede, the District received the full benefit of the equalized funding system mandated by our Serrano decisions. At most, plaintiffs assert that a misuse of equalized funds by the District’s officials caused a geographical disparity in service. Because residence and geography are not suspect classifications, the State’s failure to prevent educational discrimination on those grounds is not subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, State inaction must be accepted as rationally related to the legitimate State policy of local control of schools.

However, both federal and California decisions make clear that heightened scrutiny applies to State-maintained discrimination whenever the disfavored class is suspect or the disparate treatment has a real and appreciable impact on a fundamental right or interest. (Plyler v. Doe (1982) 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 [72 L.Ed.2d 786, 102 S.Ct. 2382]; Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 634 [22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614-615, 89 S.Ct. 1322]; Darces v. Woods (1984) 35 Cal.3d 871, 885, 888 [201 Cal.Rptr. 807, 679 P.2d 458]; Fair Political Practices Com. v.

Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 47 [157 Cal.Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46]; Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728, 761, 767-768; Weber v. City Council (1973) 9 Cal.3d 950, 959 [109 Cal.Rptr. 553, 513 P.2d 601]; Serrano I, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584, 597; Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 784-785 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487].) As we have seen, education is such a fundamental interest for purposes of equal protection analysis under the California Constitution.

The State suggests there was no showing that the impact of the threatened closure on District students’ fundamental right to basic educational equality was real and appreciable. Of course, the Constitution does not prohibit all disparities in educational quality or service. Despite extensive State regulation and standardization (see discussion, post), the experience offered by our vast and diverse public school system undoubtedly differs to a considerable degree among districts, schools, and individual students.

These distinctions arise from inevitable variances in local programs, philosophies, and conditions. “[A] requirement that [the State] provide [strictly] ‘equal’ educational opportunities would thus seem to present an entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and comparisons. . . .” (Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley (1982) 458 U.S. 176, 198 [73 L.Ed.2d 690, 707, 102 S.Ct. 3034].) Moreover, principles of equal protection have never required the State to remedy all ills or eliminate all variances in service.

Accordingly, the California Constitution does not guarantee uniformity of term length for its own sake. While the current statutory system for allocating State educational funds strongly encourages a term of at least 175 days (see fn. 14, post, at p. 687), that system is not constitutionally based and is subject to change. In an uncertain future, local districts, faced with mounting fiscal pressures, may be forced to seek creative ways to gain maximum educational benefit from limited resources.

In such circumstances, a planned reduction of overall term length might be compensated by other means, such as extended daily hours, more intensive lesson plans, summer sessions, volunteer programs, and the like. An individual district’s efforts in this regard are entitled to considerable deference. Even unplanned truncation of the intended school term will not necessarily constitute a denial of “basic” educational equality. A finding of constitutional disparity depends on the individual facts.

Unless the actual quality of the district’s program, viewed as a whole, falls fundamentally below prevailing statewide standards, no constitutional violation occurs. Here, however, plaintiffs’ preliminary showing suggested that closure of the District’s schools on May 1, 1991, would cause an extreme and unprecedented disparity in educational service and progress. District students faced the sudden loss of the final six weeks, or almost one-fifth, of the standard school term originally intended by the District and provided everywhere else in California.

The record indicates that the decision to close early was a desperate, unplanned response to the District’s impending insolvency and the impasse in negotiations for further emergency State aid. Several District teachers declared that they were operating on standard-term lesson schedules made at the beginning of the school year. These declarants outlined in detail how the proposed early closure would prevent them from completing instruction and grading essential for academic promotion, high school graduation, and college entrance.

Faced with evidence of such extensive educational disruption, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the proposed closure would have a real and appreciable impact on the affected students’ fundamental California right to basic educational equality. The State asserts that its financial obligation to equal education is limited to the equalized system of interdistrict funding required by our Serrano decisions. Once revenues are fairly apportioned at the beginning of each school year, the State insists, it cannot be constitutionally liable for how local officials manage the funds.

Nothing in the Serrano cases themselves, or in other California decisions, supports the State’s argument. On the contrary, the cases suggest that the State’s responsibility for basic equality in its system of common schools extends beyond the detached role of fair funder or fair legislator.

In extreme circumstances at least, the State “has a duty to intervene to prevent unconstitutional discrimination” at the local level. (Tinsley, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 904.) The State’s most vigorous contention is that its nonintervention should have been upheld even under the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis. Allowing the District’s students to absorb the consequences of District mismanagement, the State urges, was necessary to preserve the State’s compelling educational policy of local autonomy and accountability.

However, the State fails to demonstrate a policy of local control so compelling as to justify State tolerance of the extreme local educational deprivation at issue here. In the first place, the local-district system of school administration, though recognized by the Constitution and deeply rooted in tradition, is not a constitutional mandate, but a legislative choice. (See Cal. Const., art.

IX, §§ 6 1/2, 14.) The Constitution has always vested “plenary” power over education not in the districts, but in the State, through its Legislature, which may create, dissolve, combine, modify, and regulate local districts at pleasure. (See Tinsley, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 904.) The legislative decision to emphasize local administration does not end the State’s constitutional responsibility for basic equality in the operation of its common school system. Nor does disagreement with the fiscal practices of a local district outweigh the rights of its blameless students to basic educational equality.

Moreover, though the Constitution and statutes encourage maximum local program and spending authority consistent with State law (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 14; Ed. Code, §§ 14000, 35160, 35160.1), the degree of supervision voluntarily retained by the State over the common school system is high indeed. The volume and scope of State regulation indicate the pervasive role the State itself has chosen to assume in order to ensure a fair, high quality public education for all California students.

School finance aside, the statutes address at length such matters as county and district organization, elections, and governance (§§ 4000-5450, 35000-35780); educational programs, instructional materials, and proficiency testing (§§ 51000-62008); sex discrimination and affirmative action (§§ 40-41, 200-263, 44100-44105); admission standards (§§ 48000-48053); compulsory attendance (§§ 48200-48416); school facilities (§§ 39000-40048); rights and responsibilities of students and parents (§§ 48900-49079); holidays (§§ 37220-37223); school health, safety, and nutrition (§§ 32000-32254, 49300-49570); teacher credentialing and certification (§§ 44200-44481); rights and duties of public school employees (§§ 44000-44104, 44800-45460; see also Gov.

Code §§ 3540-3549.3 [organizational and bargaining rights]); and the pension system for public school teachers (§§ 22000-24924). The statutory scheme has spawned further voluminous regulations administered by the State’s Department of Education and the SPI. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, §§ 1-23005.) This long-established level of State involvement in the public education system undermines any claim that local control is a paramount and compelling State policy for all purposes. Nor is there any indication that the State has had a compelling policy of absolute budgetary freedom and responsibility for local districts.

On the contrary, during the years in which the District’s deficit developed, districts were required to adopt budgets meeting State standards, and to submit them for oversight and approval by county and State authorities. (§§ 33127, former §§ 42120-42129.) Failure to adopt a conforming budget precluded State or county funding of the district (former § 42128), and a district was required to operate under its most recent approved budget (former § 42127.4).

The State argues that by saddling the District with long-term debt to cover short-term operations, the trial court’s orders undermine the District’s future financial health and compromise its ability to provide basic educational equivalency in years to come. The State also urges that other districts will feel free to overspend if encouraged to believe in the availability of State relief. These are indeed troubling concerns, but we cannot accept the implication that the State deems them compelling.

In fact, the State itself has endorsed a policy of emergency conditional loan assistance to districts in financial difficulty.

Under statutes in effect since 1977, distressed districts may, through the SPI, seek specific legislative apportionments for emergency loans. (§§ 41310, 41310.5,41320 etseq.) As a condition of such aid, a district must prepare a financial recovery plan and obtain approval of the plan from the county superintendent and the SPI. (§ 41320.) The district must also accept a temporary SPI-appointed trustee with veto power over financially significant actions of the local governing board. (§ 41320.1.) The District itself had received a $9,525,000 conditional State loan under this program in spring 1990 (Stats. 1990, ch. 171, § 3), and its operations were already being monitored by a State trustee at the time closure of District schools was threatened in April 1991.

The 1989 Legislature had also appropriated $10 million for a similar emergency loan-with-trustee to the OUSD. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, §§ 1-11.) Under these circumstances, the State cannot claim it follows a compelling policy of local control by declining to intervene when financial adversity threatens a district’s operations. Shortly before this lawsuit began, the District faced the prospect of further legislative intervention in its crisis.

Assembly Bill No. 128, 1991-1992 Regular Session (A.B. 128), as introduced in December 1990 and thereafter amended, would have appropriated an additional $29 million for emergency loans to the District. Acceptance of the proposed loan would have subjected the District to unprecedented restrictions on self-government. These included a temporary takeover of all District affairs by an SPI-appointed administrator pending approval and implementation of a plan for financial recovery and loan repayment.

The administrator would have had broad power, among others, to unilaterally determine wages and benefits for all District employees who, as of April 29, 1991, were not covered by ratified collective bargaining agreements meeting the requirements of an approved recovery plan. (A.B. 128, Sen. Amend, of Jan. 18, 1991, §§ 2, 5.) A.B. 128 failed passage, but that fact does not suggest a compelling policy against emergency State financial assistance to a local district.

On the contrary, the State has forged into the realm of emergency assistance and control, using the “specific appropriation” requirement (§ 41320) to decide on a case-by-case basis whether, and on what terms, it will intervene. The State claims that emergency assistance to mismanaged districts contravenes the compelling principle of equalized funding established in our Serrano decisions.

As we have seen, however, nothing in the Serrano cases, which addressed wealth-based disparities in district revenues, prohibits emergency State assistance to a particular district which is experiencing financial difficulties despite its receipt of equalized funding. Finally, nothing in our analysis is intended to immunize local school officials from accountability for mismanagement, or to suggest that they may indulge in fiscal irresponsibility without penalty. The State is constitutionally free to legislate against any recurrence of the Richmond crisis.

It may further tighten budgetary oversight, impose prudent, nondiscriminatory conditions on emergency State aid, and authorize intervention by State education officials to stabilize the management of local districts whose imprudent policies have threatened their fiscal integrity. To the extent such conditions compromise local autonomy and mortgage a district’s future, they are not calculated to persuade local officials or their constituents that mismanagement and profligacy will be rewarded.

Indeed, in response to this case, the Legislature and the Governor have already agreed to tighter county and State control of local district budgets and spending. Under certain circumstances, this new legislation requires the SPI’s complete takeover of an insolvent district as a precondition of an emergency State appropriation. Thus, the State has already made vast inroads on the principle that local control is paramount to State intervention in an insolvent district’s affairs.

The State’s plenary power over education includes ample means to discourage future mismanagement in the day-today operations of local districts. In sum, the California Constitution guarantees “basic” equality in public education, regardless of district residence. Because education is a fundamental interest in California, denials of basic educational equality on the basis of district residence are subject to strict scrutiny. The State is the entity with ultimate responsibility for equal operation of the common school system.

Accordingly, the State is obliged to intervene when a local district’s fiscal problems would otherwise deny its students basic educational equality, unless the State can demonstrate a compelling reason for failing to do so. The preliminary facts before the trial court support the inference that the District’s impending failure to complete the final six weeks of its scheduled school term would cause educational disruption sufficient to deprive District students of basic educational equality. The State has identified no compelling interest which negated its duty to intervene.

We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ constitutional claims had potential merit. 3. Interim harm. The trial court also expressly concluded that plaintiffs, District students and their parents, would suffer “substantial and irreparable harm” if a preliminary injunction were denied.

This harm, the court further found, would be “greater . . . than defendants will suffer if the injunction is granted.” These determinations were based upon the uncontradicted declarations of District teachers, local and regional public school officials, and academic specialists in the field of public education. Besides detailing the severe and immediate academic disruption which would arise from the pending closure (see discussion, ante, fn. 16, at p. 687), these declarations set forth at length the “ripple” effect on District parents and students.

For example, the declarations recounted, working parents, including the high percentage of needy families in the District, would be faced with expensive child care for the lost school hours; difficult efforts would be required to obtain other placement of the students for the remainder of the year; and special-need students would lose carefully nurtured progress. The State submitted no evidence that it would suffer comparable or greater harm by offering emergency loan assistance necessary to ensure completion of the District’s academic program for 1990-1991.

Instead, the State simply argued that court-ordered State aid would damage the State’s public school policies of local control and accountability. The State nonetheless claims plaintiffs’ “interim harm” showing was inadequate as a matter of law. In the State’s view, plaintiffs’ declarations failed to establish that the early closure was unforeseeable, or to explain persuasively why any adverse effects on student progress could not be ameliorated. We find the trial court’s interim-harm findings amply supported.

As previously noted, plaintiffs’ preliminary showing suggested that the District’s inability to complete its school year arose from its ever-worsening fiscal condition and from the deterioration of its negotiations for emergency aid. The declarations of District teachers uniformly indicated that their lesson plans did not provide for the contingency of early closure. Other declarations detailed the difficulties of alternate arrangements to maintain the educational progress of over 31,000 suddenly displaced District students, who included high school seniors poised for graduation.

The court could reasonably infer that orderly planning to minimize the resulting educational disruption had not taken place and was not realistically possible. In any event, the court was not obliged to deny a preliminary injunction simply because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that “irreparable” harm to students was unavoidable by other means. The preliminary record properly convinced the court both that plaintiffs had a reasonable probability of success on the merits, and that they would suffer more harm in the meantime if an injunction were denied than the State would suffer if it were granted.

This “mix” of the “interrelated” relevant factors fully justified the court’s decision to grant the injunction. (See Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442; King v. Meese, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1227.) No error appears. 4. Scope of remedial order.

In orders dated April 29, 1991, and May 2, 1991, the trial court directed the State, the SPI, and the Controller to ensure “by whatever means they deem appropriate” that District students would receive their educational rights; both orders made clear that “[h]ow these defendants accomplish this is up to the discretion of defendants. . . .” When no other State official proposed a solution, the SPI and the Controller, on May 2, 1991, offered a conditional loan plan for approval by the court.

After a hearing on that day, the court found that $19 million in aid funds proposed by the SPI and the Controller were presently available, and the court authorized the Controller to apportion such funds as an emergency loan to the District.

The court further determined that, given the State’s obligation to provide an equal education, the SPI’s statutory authority to “[superintend the schools of this state” (§ 33112, subd. (a)), and the “unique” emergency circumstances, “the [SPI] . . . has authority to relieve the [Board] of its legal duties and powers, appoint a trustee, develop a recovery plan and, subject to the approval of the Controller, [develop] a repayment plan on the [District's behalf as necessary to ensure the operation of the schools through June 14, 1991, the financial recovery of the [District, and the protection of State funds loaned to the [District.” The State and several amici curiae contend that even if the trial court could require State intervention to prevent violation of the District students’ constitutional rights, there was no legal or equitable basis for the court’s order authorizing the SPI to displace the Board, operate the District through his own administrator, and impose a plan for the District’s permanent financial recovery.

Under the circumstances presented by this case, however, we conclude that this portion of the court’s order did not exceed its powers. We agree that the statutes themselves provided no direct authority for the approach taken by the trial court.

In general, though they act as regulated State agents, local governing boards are vested by statute with immediate jurisdiction over day-to-day district affairs. (§§ 14000, 35000 et seq.) The SPI has important statutory responsibilities for allocating school funds (§§ 33118, 14000 et seq.), monitoring local budgets (§§42120 et seq., 41450), and administering the conditions of emergency loans appropriated by the Legislature (§§ 41310, 41320 et seq.; see also § 41325 et seq.), but no statute grants him emergency powers to operate a local district under other circumstances. The court relied in part on

section 33112, subdivision (a), which provides that the SPI shall “[s]uperintend the schools of this state.” But no case has interpreted this statute to vest the SPI with nonexpress powers, and an older decision construed similar language narrowly against a county superintendent. (McKenzie v. Board of Education (1905) 1 Cal.App. 406, 409 [82 P. 392].) Indeed, counsel for the SPI conceded in the trial court that the SPI had no statutory authority to take over the District’s government.

The trial court also believed its takeover order was within its inherent equitable power to enforce the State’s constitutional obligations in light of the “unique emergency financial conditions” presented by the case. In the court’s view, ratification of all loan conditions proposed by the SPI was necessary to ensure the District’s continued operation through June 14,1991, promote its permanent financial recovery, and protect the loan itself. We agree. In general, courts have equitable authority to enforce their constitutional judgments. (E.g., Crawford v.

Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.3d 280, 308.) Of course, principles of comity and separation of powers place significant restraints on courts’ authority to order or ratify acts normally committed to the discretion of other branches or officials. (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 49 Cal.3d 432, 445-446; Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 540 [174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935]; Serrano II, supra, 18 Cal.3d 728, 751; Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 305-306; cf. Missouri v.

Jenkins (1990) 495 U.S. 33, 50-58 [109 L.Ed.2d 31, 53-59, 110 S.Ct. 1651].) In particular, the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3) obliges the judiciary to respect the separate constitutional roles of the Executive and the Legislature. Moreover, a judicial remedy must be tailored to the harm at issue. (E.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC (1986) 478 U.S. 421, 476 [92 L.Ed.2d 344, 388, 106 S.Ct. 3019]; Dayton Board of Education v.

Brinkman (1977) 433 U.S. 406, 420 [53 L.Ed.2d 851, 863-864, 97 S.Ct. 2766].) A court should always strive for the least disruptive remedy adequate to its legitimate task. The trial court’s remedial order in this case fell within proper boundaries. Having correctly held the State constitutionally responsible for the students’ rights, the court could not deny the State and its officials effective means of fulfilling its obligation. Under the circumstances, the court was warranted in authorizing temporary transfer to the SPI of the Board’s statutory powers over District affairs.

The emergency the court confronted on May 2,1991, demanded a prompt State-assisted solution to prevent immediate closure of the District’s schools. The State was justified in satisfying its constitutional duty of aid by extending a loan that would impose the ultimate consequences of the District’s self-created predicament upon the District, rather than upon the State, its taxpayers, and the students of other districts.

The State was also entitled to conditions on the loan that would ensure its appropriate use for the intended constitutional purpose, and would minimize the risk of the District’s default in repayment. The District’s ability to administer the new loan under its existing systems and managers was uniquely suspect. As a matter of public record, the District’s worsening financial situation had recently led the Legislature to provide a loan in excess of $9 million.

A limited-powers State trustee appointed to monitor the District’s fiscal affairs in connection with that loan had not been able to stem a growing District deficit estimated by one declarant, a member of the Board, to exceed $23 million for the 1990-1991 school year alone. In response to these difficulties, the Board had caused the District to seek bankruptcy protection against its existing creditors. As counsel for the SPI explained on April 29,1991, the District’s unprecedented financial collapse indicated systemic management problems.

Hence, counsel reported, the SPI considered it foolhardy to extend further substantial State credit to the District unless its management was placed in competent hands, its administrative practices were reformed and restructured from the outside, and a long-term plan for its financial recovery was imposed. On behalf of the State, the Attorney General contested the legality of vesting such extraordinary powers in the SPI, but no party disputed the logic of the SPI’s position. Nor can we.

Given the emergency circumstances, and under the extreme and aggravated conditions disclosed by the evidence, the court below could properly conclude that orderly completion of the District’s 1990-1991 school term, and the sound financing essential to achieve that end, required temporary displacement of the sitting Board and the operation of the District by the SPI’s designee for the purpose of stabilizing its financial affairs. We conclude that the order approving temporary takeover of the District by the SPI was within the court’s inherent equitable power to remedy the constitutional crisis. 5.

Source of loan funds. In order to obtain the necessary $19 million in emergency loan funds, the trial court authorized the Controller to disburse (1) $9 million of unspent funds from a special contingency appropriation to the Department of Education for the GAIN program, and (2) the unused $10 million appropriated as an emergency loan to the OUSD. The State and amicus curiae Pacific argue that because the Legislature had not earmarked either of these sums for purposes “reasonably related” to resolving the District’s financial crisis, the court improperly invaded the nonjudicial power of appropriation. We agree.

In a valid exercise of its constitutional powers, the Legislature had directed each of these sums to specific agencies and narrow purposes which did not include the District and its financial emergency. Hence, the Legislature had not made these funds reasonably available for disbursement to the District. By diverting the funds from their earmarked destinations and purposes, the court invaded the Legislature’s constitutional authority.

Article III,

section 3 of the Califonia Constitution provides that “[t]he powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”

Article XVI,

section 7 provides that “[mjoney may be drawn from the Treasury only through an appropriation made by law and upon a Controller’s duly drawn warrant.”

Article IV, sections 10 and 12 set forth the respective powers of the Legislature and Governor over the enactment of appropriations. It has long been clear that these separation-of-powers principles limit judicial authority over appropriations. (Myers v. English (1858) 9 Cal. 341, 349; see Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Chambers (1915) 169 Cal. 131, 135 [145 P. 1025]; California State Employees’ Assn. v. Flournoy (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 219, 234 [108 Cal.Rptr. 251]; see also Payne v.

Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 920, fn. 6 [132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565].) In certain narrow circumstances, California courts have concluded that judicial orders for the disbursement of appropriated funds do not invade valid legislative functions. Mandel v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d 531, is the only decision by this court which found judicial power to “commandeer” appropriated funds. The facts and analysis of that case demonstrate the strict limits on the judicial authority it recognized.

The plaintiff in Mandel, a Department of Health Services (DHS) worker, had prevailed in litigation challenging DHS’s practice of allowing paid employee leave on Good Friday. The judgment against the State included an award of attorney fees. However, the Legislature removed appropriations for payment from successive claims and budget bills, including the 1978-1979 Budget Act (Act).

The Act included the usual appropriation to DHS for “general operating expenses and equipment,” which expressly included expenses for “services” and “all other proper purposes.” Such “catchall” budget categories for State agencies had traditionally been used to pay agency legal expenses. However, the Act expressly precluded use of any appropriation therein “to achieve any purpose which has been denied by any formal action of the Legislature.” We upheld the trial court’s order that the Controller pay the fee award from the general operating budget of DHS.

We noted first that the “catchall” appropriation was “reasonably” or “generally” available for payment of legal expenses incurred by DHS, because the broad terms of the appropriation, as well as its historical uses, indicated such a legislative intent. In effect, we concluded that the Legislature had voluntarily made an appropriation for payments of this general kind. (Mandel v.

Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 539-545.) We further explained that, once having made an appropriation generally available, the Legislature may not impose specific restrictions which are unconstitutionally discriminatory, or which constitute an impermissible legislative attempt to readjudicate the merits of a final court judgment. Hence, we reasoned, the Legislature’s attempt to avoid payment of the Mandel award in particular must be struck down. The DHS “catchall” appropriation thus remained “available” under its general terms for payment of the judgment. (Mandel v.

Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 545-551.) Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions adhered to these principles of Mandel. In Serrano v. Priest (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 188 [182 Cal.Rptr. 387], attorneys who had won the school-finance class action sought judicial help after the State rebuffed their informal efforts to collect a court-ordered fee award.

After Mandel was decided, the State conceded that the trial court had properly ordered payment from a “catchall” appropriation to the Department of Education, the SPI, and the State Board of Education for “operating expenses and equipment.” (Pp. 197-198.) In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Cory (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 852 [183 Cal.Rptr. 475], the court concluded, after disregarding an unconstitutional budget act provision against use of Medi-Cal funds for abortions (see Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.

Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 [172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779, 20 A.L.R.4th 1118]), that abortion funding could be ordered from monies appropriated for other Medi-Cal pregnancy services. (132 Cal.App.3d at pp. 857-858.) Plaintiffs and the SPI suggest that two more recent Court of Appeal decisions, Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. State of California (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 155 [275 Cal.Rptr. 449] and Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v.

State of California (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 521 [234 Cal.Rptr. 795], have expanded Mandel's concept of “reasonable [or] general availability.” The trial court in the instant case apparently relied on these decisions to conclude that it could divert the GAIN and OUSD appropriations to the District because they were “generally related” to education.

Long Beach and Carmel Valley do make occasional use of the term “generally related” to describe Mandel's principle of reasonable or general “availability.” (See Long Beach, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d at p. 181; Carmel Valley, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 541.) But nothing in those cases supports the trial court’s apparent view that funds appropriated for one specific educational purpose may be judicially diverted to another.

So far as the face of the opinions discloses, the stated intent of the target appropriation in each case, or its historical uses, indicated that the court’s application of the funds was plausibly within purposes the Legislature might have contemplated. No court has suggested that Mandel principles permit court-ordered diversion of an appropriation away from a clear, narrow, and valid purpose specified by the Legislature. We affirm that the words “generally related,” as used in Long Beach and Carmel Valley, do not countenance such judicial incursions into the legislative power over appropriations.

The instant trial court misapplied Mandel when it authorized the diversion of appropriated funds from the specific purposes and programs for which the Legislature had validly earmarked them. Nine million dollars was taken from an appropriation in the 1989-1990 Budget Act for the GAIN program. (Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00.) GAIN’S purpose is to provide employment, adult education, and job training to recipients of public assistance. (Welf. & Inst.

Code, § 11320 et seq.) Local school districts can receive GAIN funds for adult education and training classes (id., §§ 11320.8, 11322, 11323), and the Legislature intended that the 1989-1990 GAIN appropriation might include such funding subject to strict conditions (see Stats. 1989, ch. 93, § 22.00, subd. (b)). However, this appropriation was expressly designated for that program alone and was not intended to fund the needs of non-GAIN students. Nothing in the trial court’s order restricted use of the GAIN-derived funds to uses contemplated by the appropriation.

Similar considerations govern the remaining $10 million of the emergency loan, which was derived from the 1989 Legislature’s special appropriation for the OUSD. This appropriation, by its express terms, was “for the purpose of an emergency loan to [that] [district in compliance with

Article 2 (commencing with

Section 41320) of

Chapter 3 of

Part 24 of the Education Code.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, § 1, italics added.)

Section 41310 expresses the intent that emergency loans to distressed districts under

section 41320 et seq. not occur “unless funds have been specifically appropriated therefor by the Legislature.” (Italics added.) The statutory scheme imposes detailed conditions on emergency loans granted under its auspices (§§ 41320.1-41323), and the Legislature further refined the conditions on the OUSD appropriation to address the particular circumstances of that case (Stats. 1989, ch. 1438, §§ 2-9).

When it makes an appropriation to a specific district, under specific conditions addressed to the problems of that district, the Legislature clearly intends and contemplates that the appropriation will only be used for that purpose, and under those conditions. Hence, the appropriation is not reasonably available for court-ordered diversion to another district under different conditions.

The trial court, understandably anxious to resolve the crisis, concluded that it could fund its order from any monies previously appropriated “for a purpose that is reasonably related to educational purposes.” The court found that the GAIN and OUSD appropriations were “reasonably related to the State’s obligation to keep the Richmond schools open through June 14, 1991 As we have seen, however, the test of reasonable availability under Mandel does not extend to uses clearly outside the particular purpose for which an appropriation was reserved.

The GAIN and OUSD appropriations were earmarked for purposes entirely distinct from the subject matter of this lawsuit. They were not reasonably available for court diversion to finance the remainder of the District’s school term. In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard claims that by flatly disclaiming judicial power to divert appropriations from the purposes specified by the Legislature, we adopt a “formalistic” and outmoded view of the separation of powers. Citing language from two United States Supreme Court decisions (Mistretta v.

United States (1989) 488 U.S. 361 [102 L.Ed.2d 714, 109 S.Ct. 647]; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977) 433 U.S. 425 [53 L.Ed.2d 867, 97 S.Ct. 2777]), she proposes that interbranch conflicts of this kind be resolved under a “pragmatic” and “flexible” case-by-case balancing test, in which the derogation of one branch’s powers by another may be warranted to promote overriding objectives within the “constitutional authority” of the latter.

Because both the OUSD and GAIN appropriations were “generally related” to elementary and secondary education, she reasons, diversion of these funds to the District was not a “great” or “extreme” intrusion upon the appropriations power, and the court’s action was justified by its constitutional responsibility to District students. We cannot accept these contentions. Our adherence to Mandel can hardly be deemed rigid or formalistic; our decision in that case strained to find a practical, sensitive, and principled balance between legislative and judicial power over appropriations.

In effect, Justice Kennard urges abandonment of MandeVs careful analysis in favor of a rule giving the judiciary unchecked power to override the valid budgetary acts of coequal branches. However, nothing in the California or federal cases on which Justice Kennard relies even hints that a court may nullify a specific and valid exercise by the Legislature and the Executive of fundamental budgetary powers explicitly entrusted to those branches, simply for the purpose of satisfying a judgment or order that is unrelated to the appropriation. (Compare, e.g., Mistretta v.

United States, supra, 488 U.S. 361, 380-384 [102 L.Ed.2d 714, 735-738] [Congress’s creation of United States Sentencing Commission, a judicial-branch agency charged with establishing mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, did not usurp authority of individual judicial officers or grant forbidden legislative power to judicial branch]; Nixon v.

Administrator of General Services, supra, 433 U.S. 425, 441-446 [53 L.Ed.2d 867, 889-893] [legislation vesting Administrator of General Services with limited control over presidential papers of resigned chief executive did not undermine authority of executive branch]; Wilson v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 471, 473 [286 Cal.Rptr. 280, 816 P.2d 1306] [Legislature’s failure to reapportion justifies judicial adoption of reapportionment plan]; Davis v.

Municipal Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 64, 72-87 [249 Cal.Rptr. 300, 757 P.2d 11] [District attorney’s statutory power to disapprove local misdemeanor-diversion program was not improper delegation of legislative authority; prosecutor’s absolute discretion to prevent diversion by charging “wobbler” as felony did not constitute forbidden judicial power]; Younger v.

Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 115-118 [145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014] [statute requiring Department of Justice to destroy individual’s marijuana arrest and conviction records upon application after sentence is complete did not create impermissible conflict with executive clemency powers].) The balance proposed by Justice Kennard in this case would elevate the judiciary above its coequal brethren, upset the delicate system of checks and balances, and stand the separation of powers clause on its head.

Applying Mandel's well-settled principles, we remain satisfied that the trial court acted in excess of its authority when it funded the District’s loan with appropriations specifically earmarked by the Legislature for other purposes. Conclusion and Disposition The District’s financial inability to complete the final six weeks of its 1990-1991 school term threatened to deprive District students of their California constitutional right to basic educational equality with other public school students in this State.

As the court further concluded, discrimination of this nature against education, a fundamental interest, could only be justified as necessary to serve a compelling interest. The State itself, as the entity with plenary constitutional responsibility for operation of the common school system, had a duty to protect District students against loss of their right to basic educational equality. Local control of public schools was not a compelling interest which would justify the State’s failure to intervene. The trial court thus properly ordered the State and its officials to protect the students’ rights.

The court also acted within its remedial powers by authorizing the SPI to assume control of the District’s affairs, relieve the Board of its duties, and supervise the District’s financial recovery. However, the court invaded the exclusive legislative power of appropriation by approving the diversion of appropriations for GAIN and the OUSD to an emergency loan for the District.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s remedial order of May 2, 1991, insofar as it approves funding of an emergency loan to the District from appropriations for the Oakland Unified School District and the Greater Avenues for Independence program. In all other respects, the court’s orders of April 29 and May 2, 1991, are affirmed. The Court of Appeal is directed to remand the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate under the views expressed in this opinion. Panelli, J., Arabian, J., and George, J., concurred.

The State, as appellant, has elected to proceed by way of an appendix in lieu of the clerk’s transcript, as permitted by rule 5.1 of the California Rules of Court. Some of the documents contained in the appendix, though they include handwritten filing dates, bear no official file stamps and have no proofs of service attached. However, rule 5.1 expressly allows the use of unofficial conformed copies (subd. (c)(1)) and provides that the filing of an appendix “constitutes a representation by counsel that the appendix consists of true and correct copies of the papers in the superior court file” (subd. (i)(l)).

No party having urged otherwise, we adopt that assumption for purposes of this opinion. The named plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves, their children, and other parents and students of the District. Applications to appear as amici curiae were submitted by the Richmond Federation of Teachers (RFT) and jointly by the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute, the National Lawyers Guild, and Multi-Cultural Education, Training, and Advocacy, Inc. (collectively Meiklejohn).

Complaints in intervention and/or applications for leave to intervene were submitted by the Oakland Unified School District (OUSD), RFT, and United Teachers of Richmond (UTR). Though the court’s order recites that the SPI and the Controller “presented . . . , after notice to all parties, an agreement” to provide an emergency loan, neither the agreement itself, nor a description of its precise terms, has been made part of the record on appeal. A11 further statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.

The preliminary injunction motion was litigated with understandable haste, and evidence of the causes of the District’s apparent insolvency was not presented below. On appeal, the SPI invites us to take judicial notice of grand jury findings on this subject which were released after the preliminary injunction was granted. (See The Financial Affairs of the Richmond Unified School District, Rep. of 1990-1991 Contra Costa County Grand Jury (May 29, 1991) [hereafter Report].) Without objection, we may note the Report’s contents. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (d), 455, 459; see People v.

Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1259, fn. 54 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) Of course, we cannot accept its findings as evidence or its criticisms of the District and the Board as conclusively founded. We are particularly loath to do so when the District and the Board were disabled below from defending against claims of mismanagement and, except for a special appearance at oral argument, have not participated in the appeal.

Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the grand jury’s assessment that despite repeated warnings, an earnest but financially inexperienced Board permitted massive, accelerating deficit spending over a period of several years to expand staff, boost salaries and benefits, and support innovative programs installed by the District’s former superintendent. (Report, pp. 3-5.) According to the Report, the resulting deficit for the years 1986-1990 was $29.5 million, with an $18.1 million deficit for 1990 alone. (Id., at p. 4.) In 1990, the District had received a State emergency loan exceeding $9 million, in consequence of which a limited-powers trustee appointed by the SPI was overseeing District financial affairs during the 1990-1991 school term. (Id., at p. 5.) Our denial of a stay allowed implementation of the plan approved by the trial court, and the District’s school year was completed.

Though the State vigorously contends the court lacked power to invade the GAIN and OUSD appropriations, it does not demand actual rescission of the court-approved loan. Moreover, we judicially notice without objection that in June 1992, the SPI approved a repayment and recovery plan adopted by the District, restored the Board’s powers, and terminated the court-authorized appointment of the State administrator. (See Evid.

Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (h), 455, 459.) Although portions of the appeal may therefore be technically moot, we have discretion to decide the issues presented as potentially recurring questions of public importance. (E.g., O’Hare v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86, 91, fn. 1 [233 Cal.Rptr. 332, 729 P.2d 766]; DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. Dept, of Employment (1961) 56 Cal.2d 54, 58 [13 Cal.Rptr. 663, 362 P.2d 487]; People v.

West Coast Shows, Inc. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [89 Cal.Rptr. 290].) The Chief Justice objects in particular that we neither must nor should address whether the sources of funding approved by the trial court were proper. However, he fails to indicate why this important and sensitive issue is any more moot, or any less worthy of consideration, than other portions of the trial court’s order which have also been irretrievably implemented.

Indeed, in these uncertain times, the substantial possibility arises that similar fiiture crises will produce similar emergency orders for immediate diversion of State funds from expedient sources.

Hence, contrary to the Chief Justice’s suggestion, the issue is one capable of repetition but difficult to review, and this concern favors its prompt consideration under the “public interest” exception to the mootness doctrine. (DiGiorgio Fruit Corp., supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 58.) Moreover, the State has fully litigated the merits of the appropriations issue throughout, and any mootness in this or other aspects of the injunction stems from our denial of the State’s request for a stay pending appeal.

Under these circumstances, the State should not be penalized on appeal for conceding that State funds already expended by the District cannot practicably be recovered. The State insists that under the circumstances of this case, appellate review should not be limited to whether the trial court “abused its discretion” when weighing “interim” harm and “probable” merit. The State stresses that the unstayed injunction, though preliminary in form, was both final and unprecedented in fact.

Accordingly, the State suggests, we must decide, as on appeal from a final judgment, whether plaintiffs were entitled to the relief they received. We disagree. The abuse-of-discretion standard acknowledges that the propriety of preliminary relief turns upon difficult estimates and predictions from a record which is necessarily truncated and incomplete. Here, the urgency of the situation forced plaintiffs to produce, and the State to rebut, a hasty tentative showing of constitutional necessity.

The evidence on which the trial court was forced to act may thus be significantly different from that which would be available after a trial on the merits. Neither the trial court nor this court could undertake a final adjudication of plaintiffs’ lawsuit under such circumstances.

Article I,

section 7, subdivision (

a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws. . . .”

Article I,

section 7, subdivision (

b) provides in pertinent part that “[a] citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not granted on the same terms to all citizens. . . .”

Article IV,

section 16, subdivision (

a) provides that “[a]ll laws of a general nature have uniform operation.” The positions adopted by the various parties and numerous amici curiae in this appeal are diverse. The Attorney General, representing the State as defendant and appellant, opposes all aspects of the trial court orders. Though they were joined as defendants below, the SPI and the Controller, deeming themselves “respondents” on appeal, support plaintiffs’ view that the orders were proper in all respects. Amicus curiae Pacific supports the State’s position.

Amici curiae RFT and UTR approve State financial aid but object to displacement of the local governing board by a State administrator. Amici curiae Frank R. Calton and Howard P. Abelson urge that the Board acted correctly by deciding to close District schools and should not have been displaced. Calton and Abelson also suggest the injunction was improper because the Board had no opportunity to appear and defend against claims of mismanagement.

Amici curiae Mario Diaz and Rebecca Hazlewood Bezemek (Diaz and Bezemek) take no position on State financial assistance but argue that the SPI’s takeover of District government was improper. Amicus curiae briefs in support of plaintiffs have been filed by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Human Rights Advocates, and Meiklejohn. The funding scheme for public education is complex, but no party disputes the

summary description provided in the State’s brief: “The Legislature has attempted to equalize school district funding ... by the use of a ‘base revenue limit’ for each district. Each district is classified by size and type. ([Ed.] Code, [§] 42238.) Based upon this classification scheme, each district has a ‘base revenue limit’ per unit of average daily attendance.

The base revenue limit for any district includes the amount of property tax revenues a district can raise, with other specific local revenues, coupled with an equalization payment by the State, thus bringing each district into a rough equivalency of revenues. (Compare [Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, [§] 15371, et seq.[; Ed.] Code [§] 42238 et seq.) H] Because the student population is so diverse, the Legislature had to supplement the base revenue limit with specific augmentations targeted for categories of children with needs that require special attention. These supplements are designated as ‘categorical’ aid. . . .”

Article IX,

section 5 provides: “The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a school has been established.” In November 1979, the voters adopted a Senate amendment to the California Constitution’s equal protection clause,

article I,

section 7, subdivision (a). The amendment declares that nothing in the California Constitution imposes upon the State, or any local district or official, any obligations beyond those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution “with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.” The amendment further forbids California courts fro

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