IN RE JAIME P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAIME P., Defendant and Appellant, 40 Cal. 4th 128

Opinion CHIN, J. In this case, we consider the continued vitality of In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519] (Tyrel J.), upholding a warrantless search of a juvenile probationer by an officer who lacked reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity and was unaware that the juvenile had consented to such a search as a condition of his probation. We conclude that developments subsequent to Tyrell J., including the recent high court decision in Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843 [165 L.Ed.2d 250, 126 S.Ct. 2193] (Samson), our own decision in People v.

Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496] (Sanders), and lower court cases and scholarly comment critical of Tyrell J., have convinced us that it should be overruled. FACTS The following uncontradicted facts are taken from the Court of Appeal opinion in this case. Minor Jaime P. appeals from the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the court’s sustaining of the allegations that he drove a vehicle without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)) and carried a loaded firearm (Pen.

Code, § 12031, subd. (a)(1); further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated), while associated with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) On April 27, 2004, Fairfield Police Officer Moody detained minor and three other persons after observing what he believed to be traffic violations. The officer first observed the driver of the car turn comers without signaling and then pull over to the curb, again without signaling. (The People conceded these violations standing alone would not have justified a vehicle stop, as no other vehicles were affected; see Veh.

Code, § 22107.) Moody pulled in behind the car and saw two passengers exit. The officer detained and questioned them, testifying later that he did so because a home on the block had recently been the target of gang violence. Minor, who was driving the vehicle, and another person remained seated in the front seat. After a backup officer arrived, Moody turned his attention to the individuals remaining in the car. Minor could provide only a school identification and said he did not have a driver’s license. While talking to minor, Officer Moody observed a box of ammunition in plain view on the front floorboard.

Moody then ordered minor and his passenger to exit the vehicle and patsearched all four individuals. The only weapon located at that time was a padlock tied to a bandana, found on one of the passengers who initially exited the vehicle. After determining that none of the four individuals had a valid driver’s license, Moody called a tow truck to remove and store the car. An inventory search of the vehicle revealed a loaded .44-caliber handgun beneath the rear passenger seat.

Minor was arrested and, after being advised of his constitutional rights at the police station, he admitted that he was a member of the Calle San Marco (CSM) gang. He indicated that he had given a ride to the other three occupants of the vehicle and that one of them had produced the gun, which they passed around but did not take out of its holster. At the jurisdictional hearing, Detective Golez testified that CSM is a gang of 150-200 members in Fairfield and is a subset of the Sureño gang; its members are “foot soldiers” of the Mexican Mafia, a prison gang.

Golez indicated that she believed minor to be an active member of CSM, based upon his admission, his associates, his style of dress, and graffiti found at his residence. Based upon this and other evidence not relevant here, the juvenile court denied minor’s motion to suppress the firearm, relying upon minor’s probation search condition to justify the officer’s action.

The record shows minor was on probation with the condition, among others, that he submit his person and property, including his vehicle and residence, to a warrantless search and seizure by any peace officer at any time, with or without probable cause. The juvenile court then sustained the delinquency petition, finding true the allegations that minor drove a vehicle without a license, was a gang member and carried a loaded firearm. The juvenile court continued minor as a ward of the court and placed him on further probation.

Among other issues, minor contended on appeal that the juvenile court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeal, acknowledging the scholarly criticism of Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, but deeming itself “bound by its precedent,” rejected the contention and reached the remaining appellate issues. We will reverse. DISCUSSION Does a juvenile’s probationary search condition justify an otherwise illegal search and seizure if the officers conducting the search are then unaware that the juvenile is on probation and subject to the search condition?

Our decision in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, held that the officers’ prior knowledge of the probation condition was not necessary in a juvenile case. We reasoned, in part, that “imposing a strict requirement that the searching officer must always have advance knowledge of the search condition would be inconsistent with the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme.

That scheme embraces a goal of rehabilitating youngsters who have transgressed the law, a goal that is arguably stronger than in the adult context. [Citations.] . . . [T]he condition of probation permitting police ... to conduct warrantless searches is imposed by the juvenile court to serve the important goal of deterring future misconduct.” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 86-87, italics added.) We also relied upon the reduced expectation of privacy that probationers, as a general matter, hold, and reasoned that suppressing the evidence under the circumstances presented would not further the purpose of the exclusionary rule. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 86, 89.) Justice Kennard dissented in Tyrell J. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, 90 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Her dissent found no significant differences in the purposes for, and rationale supporting, search conditions imposed on adult parolees (see In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 646 [83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734]; People v.

Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176, 178 [41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397 P.2d 174]), and those imposed on juvenile probationers. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 96 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In the dissent’s view, the holdings in Gallegos and Martinez, “that a search may not be justified by a parole search condition of which the searching officer is unaware, should be dispositive of this case.” (Ibid.) We recently considered whether prior knowledge of a search condition is required to uphold an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult parolee, concluding the search “may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers were unaware when the search was conducted.” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. omitted.) This is so, we reasoned, because “whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted.” (Id. at pp. 332, 334, italics added.) Sanders explained that the “primary purpose of the exclusionary rule [is] to deter police misconduct” (id. at p. 332), and that to admit evidence seized during a search that the officer had no reason to believe was lawful, merely because a search condition had been imposed, “would legitimize unlawful police conduct” (id. at p. 335).

Much of the foregoing Sanders analysis would seemingly apply to searches of juvenile probationers. Although Sanders noted that a number of commentators had criticized our ruling in Tyrell J., nonetheless “[b]ecause this case does not involve a juvenile, we need not, and do not, decide” whether the reasoning of Tyrell J. is correct. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. 5.) We will address that question here.

We have recognized that reexamination of precedent may become necessary when subsequent developments indicate an earlier decision was unsound, or has become ripe for reconsideration. (E.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296-297 [250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58], and cases cited.) As we explain below, developments occurring subsequent to our Tyrell J. decision convince us that it was incorrectly decided, and that it has generated and will continue to generate inequitable and legally unjustified results unless we overrule it.

As noted, Tyrell J. justified its holding on three broad grounds: (1) “the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87); (2) “the important goal of deterring future misconduct” (ibid.)-, and (3) the reduced expectation of privacy that probationers, as a general matter, hold (id. at pp. 83-86).

In combination, these three factors convinced us that suppressing the evidence under the circumstances presented in that case would not further the purpose of the exclusionary rule. (Id. at p. 89.) But our subsequent decision in Sanders, coupled with the analysis in another appellate case, People v. Hester (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 398-405 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 377] (Hester), demonstrate that these grounds may no longer be entitled to much weight.

In Sanders, we relied on In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d 641, and its “rule that whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted and is consistent with the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct.” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 332, italics added.) An officer acting in reliance on a search condition may act reasonably, even in the absence of any particularized suspicion of criminal activity, and such a search does not violate the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (See People v.

Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445] [parole search condition].) With respect to the reasonable expectation of privacy of one subject to a search condition, Sanders observed that “[a] parolee’s expectation of privacy certainly is diminished, but it is not eliminated” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 332, fn. omitted), and “whether the parolee has a reasonable expectation of privacy is inextricably linked to whether the search was reasonable” (id. at p. 333).

Sanders continued by observing that despite a “diminished expectation of privacy” held by one subject to a search condition, the search cannot be justified if the officer is unaware of the condition. (Ibid.) Thus, in Sanders’s view, despite being subject to a search condition, a person retains a reasonable expectation the officers will not undertake a random search supported by neither reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor advance knowledge of the search condition. (Ibid., see also Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 96-97 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) As for deterrence of criminal acts, Sanders reviewed the decision in United States v.

Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112 [151 L.Ed.2d 497, 122 S.Ct. 587], allowing a search of an adult probationer’s house by an officer aware of the suspect’s search condition.

Sanders observed that Knights would not extend to the situation in Sanders, stating, “But if an officer is unaware that a suspect is on probation and subject to a search condition, the search is not justified by the state’s interest in supervising probationers or by the concern that probationers are more likely to commit criminal acts.” (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333, italics added.) As the dissent in Tyrell J. observed, requiring the officers be aware of the search condition would not itself affect the goal of deterrence: The very existence of a probation search condition, whether for adults or juveniles, should deter further criminal acts, and that deterrent effect would not be eroded merely by requiring that searching officers be aware of that condition. (See Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 96-97.) What of Tyrell J.’s reliance on “the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme”? (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87.) In Sanders, we left open the question whether such special needs indeed exist and would justify Tyrell J.’s holding. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 335, fn. 5.) Justice Kennard’s dissent in Tyrell J., doubted the validity of the majority’s reliance on such special needs, observing that in that case, as here, the search was conducted by a police officer acting without knowledge of the search condition, rather than by a probation officer having an ongoing supervisory relationship with the probationer, whose welfare he or she sought to promote. (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 92 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In other words, the dissent questioned whether the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme could be promoted by allowing a police search not premised on prior knowledge of that condition.

Before addressing further the “special needs” rationale, we note that Sanders identified a substantial body of scholarly commentary critical of our Tyrell J. analysis. (See Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.) The gist of these articles is that Tyrell J. eroded the Fourth Amendment protections for juveniles by giving police an incentive to conduct a warrantless search, unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, in the bare hope that a search condition may exist.

Published opinions of various Courts of Appeal, recognizing the inherent analytical inconsistencies between Tyrell J. and Sanders, have applied the reasoning of Sanders to cases involving adult probationers. (See, e.g., In re Joshua J. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 359, 363 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 502] [observing that Sanders “dismantled the foundation and cornerstones of Tyrell J.”]; Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1251-1256 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 369]; People v.

Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1191 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 258] [“the court has changed the analysis it uses to determine the propriety of a warrantless search in cases involving a search condition,” and has “abandoned Tyrell J.’s analysis”]; People v. Lazalde (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 858, 863-864 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 904]; Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 397-398 [applying Sanders rationale to both adult and juvenile offenders, and confining Tyrell J. to its facts]; People v.

Bowers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268-1270 [13 Cal.Rptr.3d 15] [noting Sanders's disapproval of most of Tyrell J.’s rationale].) In Hester, police acting without a warrant or reasonable suspicion stopped a vehicle possibly involved in criminal street gang activity. (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 382.) A car search uncovered a loaded firearm.

The People attempted to justify the search because three of the occupants (two adults and a juvenile) were on probation and had consented to warrantless searches. (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 392.) Hester ruled that the rationale of our decision in Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th 318, would invalidate the search as to both the adult and juvenile occupants. (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 404-405.) In Hester's view, Sanders had disapproved of each doctrinal underpinning supporting Tyrell J. except possibly for the “unique considerations related to the juvenile justice system.” (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.) Hester continued by finding that “[t]he People have failed to identify any juvenile justice system consideration that would require this court to sanction police conduct that otherwise violates the Fourth Amendment.” (Ibid.) Recognizing, however, that Tyrell J. remained as precedent binding on the lower courts until expressly overruled, Hester limited that case to its facts, “the stop of a juvenile in a public place,” rather than “the detention of a lawfully operated” (id. at p. 405) automobile: “To do otherwise would encourage police misconduct, especially in a high-crime neighborhood, such as the one in this case.” (Hester, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 404-405.) The foregoing cases agree that the only remaining Tyrell J. rationale possibly left untouched by Sanders is “the special needs of the juvenile probation scheme.” (Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87.) As noted above, the dissent in Tyrell J. doubted that those needs would be promoted by allowing a police search not premised on knowledge of the probation search condition. (Id. at p. 92 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) In the present case, the People initially insisted that because minor supposedly lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy, he was not “searched” in the constitutional sense.

But, as the Attorney General later conceded, the People’s major premise is incorrect, because under both Sanders and Tyrell J., a search condition may diminish, but does not entirely preclude, a reasonable expectation of privacy, i.e., a reasonable expectation that officers will not undertake a random search supported by neither evidence of criminal activity nor advance knowledge of the search condition. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 333; see Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87, fn. 5 (maj. opn. of Lucas, C.

J.); id. at pp. 96-97 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) This reasoning would apply with equal force to juvenile or adult probationers. Indeed, the high court’s decision in Samson, supra, 547 U.S. 843 [126 S.Ct. 2193], reinforces Sanders’s view that persons on probation or parole who are subject to a search condition nonetheless retain some residual expectation of privacy.

Samson involved a parolee search conducted by officers aware of the parolee’s consent-to-search condition, and held that, applying the usual “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” test to determine reasonableness, the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit such officers from conducting a suspicionless search of the parolee. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. _ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2197].) Samson reasoned that parolees have a greatly reduced expectation of privacy by reason of their parolee status and their prior consent to warrantless searches. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at pp._ -_ [126 S.Ct. at pp. 2198-2199].) In this respect, Samson is consistent with our own decision in People v.

Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th 743, allowing “suspicionless” searches of parolees with search consent conditions, as long as the search is not “arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” (Id. at p. 752.) But under Samson, both parolees and probationers retain some expectation of privacy, albeit a reduced one.

Indeed, Samson noted that “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p._[126 S.Ct. at p. 2198].) This reasoning severely undercuts Tyrell J.’s conclusion that juvenile probationers who are subject to a search condition have no reasonable expectation of privacy whatever. (See Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 87.) Samson also appears to support minor’s view that the high court approves of our Sanders holding requiring prior knowledge of the search condition as a protection against harassing searches.

In Samson, Justice Stevens in dissent accused the majority of allowing law enforcement officers in California “unfettered discretion” to conduct parolee searches. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. _ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2207] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) The Samson majority disagreed, responding that, under California law, suspicionless searches of parolees could not be conducted without prior knowledge of the person’s parole status. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p._, fn. 5 [126 S.Ct. at p. 2202, fn. 5], citing Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 331-332.) This language could reasonably be read as approving Sanders as a protection against arbitrary parolee searches.

Certainly, nothing in Samson suggests any disapproval of this aspect of Sanders. As noted above, the officers in Samson were well aware of the parole search condition. Responding to the question whether a search by an officer unaware of a probation condition would promote the special needs of the juvenile probation system, the People simply claim that the Tyrell J. rule would discourage criminal behavior by juvenile probationers who know they may be searched at any time. In Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 333, we rejected a similar “deterrence” justification for searching adult parolees or probationers.

We stated that “if an officer is unaware that a suspect is on probation and subject to a search condition, the search is not justified by the state’s interest in supervising probationers or by the concern that probationers are more likely to commit criminal acts.” (Ibid., italics added.) As Justice Kennard’s dissent in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pages 97-98, observed, the very existence of a probation search condition, whether for adults or juveniles, should amply deter further criminal acts, and that deterrent effect would not be eroded merely by requiring that searching officers be aware of that condition.

If there are other “special needs” of the juvenile probation system that would be undermined by the rule we propose, the People do not identify them, nor do we discern any.

The majority in Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 87, opined that the goal of rehabilitating juvenile offenders “is arguably stronger than in the adult context.” But it is certainly arguable that the state’s interest in reducing the unduly high recidivism rate among adult parolees is on a par with, if not greater than, the need to assure that juvenile probationers do not reoffend. (See Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p._ [126 S.Ct. at p. 2200] [quoting a statistical study indicating that “California’s parolee population has a 68-to-70 percent recidivism rate”].) Yet, as we have seen, despite the state’s interest in monitoring adult parolees, our decision in Sanders would invalidate the search of an adult parolee under the circumstances presented in this case.

Amicus curiae Los Angeles County District Attorney argues that under the doctrine of parens patriae, a special relationship exists between the juvenile probationer and the state such that a special need arises to supervise and monitor the juvenile, subject only to his or her right to be free from “arbitrary, capricious and harassing searches.” First, we believe that a search founded on neither reasonable suspicion of criminal activity nor advance knowledge of a probation search condition can aptly be characterized as arbitrary.

Second, we cannot permit application of the doctrine of parens patriae to defeat the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct. (See Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 324, 332.) Assuming, as amicus curiae does, that juveniles have a greater need for repeated random and routine searches and for supervision than adult offenders, that need would not be impaired by requiring that the officers conducting such searches be aware of the search condition.

Justice Baxter’s dissent largely repeats the points made in his dissent in Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at page 341, where he advocated a rule allowing suspicionless searches of adult parolees by officers unaware of their parole status or advance consent to search. Indeed, he urges us to “revisit” Sanders in light of Samson. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 147.) But as we have explained (ante, at p. 136), Samson involved officers who were aware of the search condition and thus adds nothing of import to our Sanders analysis.

Indeed, at one point Samson appears to endorse Sanders’s insistence that the searching officer have such knowledge, at least absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p. _, fn. 5 [126 S.Ct. at p. 2202, fn. 5].) The dissent stresses the fact that the searching officer here believed he had observed traffic violations warranting a stop, but as the Attorney General has conceded, that belief was a legally mistaken one that could not justify the detention.

To allow searches of probationers or parolees based solely on the officer’s supposed subjective “belief’ that legal cause existed for a search predictably would invite repeated harassment and arbitrary searches.

The dissent places great emphasis on Samson’s use of a “totality of circumstances” test in measuring the validity of a search of a probationer or pardee (see Samson, supra, 547 U.S. at p._[26 S.Ct. at p. 2197]), but as Sanders explains, the reasonableness of a search must be determined based on the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted. (Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 333-335.) Here, the arresting officer had neither reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity nor advance knowledge of a search condition that might have justified the search.

The totality of these circumstances amounts to very little and does not justify the officer’s search. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we overrule In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. George, C. J., Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.