ALEXANDRA VAN HORN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ANTHONY GLEN WATSON et al., Defendants and Respondents; ANTHONY GLEN WATSON, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. LISA TORTI, Cross-defendant and Respondent, 45 Cal. 4th 322

Opinion MORENO, J. Under well-established common law principles, a person has no duty to come to the aid of another. (Artiglio v. Corning, Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 613 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 479, 957 P.2d 1313]; Williams v..

State of California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23 [192 Cal.Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137].) If, however, a person elects to come to someone’s aid, he or she has a duty to exercise due care. (Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 23.) Thus, a “good Samaritan” who attempts to help someone might be liable if he or she does not exercise due care and ends up causing harm. {Ibid.) The Legislature has enacted certain statutory exceptions to this due care requirement. One such statute, Health and Safety Code

section 1799.102, immunizes any “person who . . . renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency . . .” from liability for civil damages. In this case, defendant Lisa Torti removed plaintiff Alexandra Van Horn from a vehicle involved in an accident and, by so doing, allegedly caused Van Horn to become paralyzed. In the resultant suit for negligence, Torti argued that she had provided “emergency care at the scene of an emergency” and was immune under

section 1799.102. The trial court agreed and granted her motion for

summary judgment, but the Court of Appeal reversed. We granted review to determine the scope of

section 1799.102. We hold that the Legislature intended for

section 1799.102 to immunize from liability for civil damages any person who renders emergency medical care. Torti does not contend that she rendered emergency medical care and she may not, therefore, claim the immunity in

section 1799.102. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I. Background During the evening of October 31, 2004, plaintiff, Torti, and Jonelle Freed were relaxing at Torti’s home where plaintiff and Torti both smoked some marijuana. After defendants Anthony Glen Watson and Dion Ofoegbu arrived, they all went to a bar at around 10:00 p.m., where they consumed several drinks. They remained at the bar until about 1:30 a.m., at which point they left. Plaintiff and Freed rode in a vehicle driven by Watson; Torti rode in a vehicle driven by Ofoegbu.

Watson lost control of his vehicle and crashed into a curb and light pole at about 45 miles per hour, knocking a light pole over and causing the vehicle’s front air bags to deploy. Plaintiff was in the front passenger seat. When Watson’s vehicle crashed, Ofoegbu pulled off to the side of the road and he and Torti got out to help. Torti removed plaintiff from Watson’s vehicle. Watson was able to exit his vehicle by himself and Ofoegbu assisted Freed by opening a door for her.

There are conflicting recollections about several critical events: Torti testified at deposition that she saw smoke and liquid coming from Watson’s vehicle, and she removed plaintiff from the vehicle because she feared the vehicle would catch fire or “blow up.” Torti also testified that she removed plaintiff from the vehicle by placing one arm under plaintiff’s legs and the other behind plaintiffs back to lift her out. Others testified, on the other hand, that there was no smoke or any other indications that the vehicle might explode and that Torti put plaintiff down immediately next to the car.

Plaintiff testified that Torti pulled her from the vehicle by grabbing her by the arm and yanking her out “like a rag doll.” Emergency personnel arrived moments later and plaintiff and Freed were treated and transported to the hospital. Plaintiff suffered various injuries, including injury to her vertebrae and a lacerated liver that required surgery, and was permanently paralyzed. Plaintiff sued Watson, Ofoegbu, and Torti.

Plaintiff asserted a negligence cause of action against Torti, alleging that even though plaintiff was not in need of assistance from Torti after the accident and had only sustained injury to her vertebrae, Torti dragged plaintiff out of the vehicle, causing permanent damage to her spinal cord and rendering her a paraplegic. Torti and Watson cross-complained against each other for declaratory relief and indemnity. After some discovery, Torti moved for

summary judgment, arguing that she was immune under

section 1799.102. The trial court granted Torti’s motion. The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that the Legislature intended for

section 1799.102 to apply only to the rendering of emergency medical care at the scene of a medical emergency and that Torti did not, as a matter of law, render such care. Such a construction, the Court of Appeal explained, is consistent with the statutory scheme of which

section 1799.102 is a part. We granted review. II. Discussion Our primary duty when interpreting a statute is to “ ‘determine and effectuate’ ” the Legislature’s intent. (Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 885 P.2d 976].) To that end, our first task is to examine the words of the statute, giving them a commonsense meaning. (People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 878 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 997 P.2d 493].) If the language is clear and unambiguous, the inquiry ends. (Murphy v.

Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1103 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 155 P.3d 284].) However, a statute’s language must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) With these principles of statutory construction in mind, we turn to the language of the provision.

Section 1799.102 provides, “No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission. The scene of an emergency shall not include emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered.” The parties identify two possible constructions of this provision; Torti urges us to conclude that it broadly applies to both nonmedical and medical care rendered at the scene of any emergency; plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that

section 1799.102 applies only to the rendering of emergency medical care at the scene of a medical emergency. While

section 1799.102 is certainly susceptible of Torti’s plain language

interpretation, a “[ljiteral construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) We conclude for several reasons that, when the statutory language is viewed in context, the narrower construction identified by plaintiff is more consistent with the statutory scheme of which

section 1799.102 is a part. A. The Statutory Scheme and Related Provisions 1. Purpose of the Scheme in Which

Section 1799.102 Is Located

Section 1799.102 is located in division 2.5 of the Health and Safety Code. That division, titled “Emergency Medical Services” by the Legislature, was enacted as the Emergency Medical Services System and the Prehospital Emergency Medical Care Personnel Act (Act). (§ 1797 et seq.; Stats. 1980, ch. 1260, § 7, p. 4261.) One can infer from the location of

section 1799.102 in the Emergency Medical Services division, as well as from the title of the act of which it is a part, that the Legislature intended for

section 1799.102 to immunize the provision of emergency medical care at the scene of a medical emergency. (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal.4th 266, 272 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 820 P.2d 1036].) Additionally, apart from the name of the division and the Act, the Legislature made clear in numerous other statutes that it intended for the statutory scheme to address the provision of emergency medical care. For example, in

section 1797.1, the Legislature declared that it is the intent of the Act “to provide the state with a statewide system for emergency medical services . . . .” (Italics added.) In

section 1797.6, subdivision (a), the Legislature declared that it is “the policy of the State of California to ensure the provision of effective and efficient emergency medical care.” (Italics added.) Indeed, nowhere in the Act’s general provisions (Health & Saf. Code, div. 2.5, ch. 1, §§ 1797-1797.8) is there any indication that the Legislature intended to address or affect the provision of nonmedical care.

Section 1797.5 is even more illuminating. That statute explains that “It is the intent of the Legislature to promote the development, accessibility, and provision of emergency medical services to the people of the State of California, [f] Further, it is the policy of the State of California that people shall be encouraged and trained to assist others at the scene of a medical emergency. Local governments, agencies, and other organizations shall be encouraged to offer training in cardiopulmonary resuscitation and lifesaving first aid techniques so that people may be adequately trained, prepared, and encouraged to assist others immediately.” (Italics added.)

Section 1797.5 thus establishes that the Legislature intended to encourage people to learn and provide emergency medical care (such as the cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid specifically identified in § 1797.5) to those in need. The Act’s stated purpose supports construing

section 1799.102 to immunize only those who render such emergency medical care at the scene of a medical emergency. Construing

section 1799.102 to apply only to the rendering of emergency medical care is also in keeping with adjoining

section 1799.100 (there is no § 1799.101), another immunity provision.

Section 1799.100 provides: “In order to encourage local agencies and other organizations to train people in emergency medical services, no local agency, entity of state or local government, or other public or private organization which sponsors, authorizes, supports, finances, or supervises the training of people, or certifies those people . . . shall be liable for any civil damages alleged to result from those training programs.” Read together, sections 1799.100 and 1799.102 first immunize those who train persons in emergency medical care and then immunize the persons who actually render such care.

The strong inference to be drawn is that the Legislature intended for both statutes to apply to emergency medical care. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387 [explaining that courts should harmonize statutes related to the same subject].) 2. Definition of “Emergency ” in

Section 1797.70

Chapter 2 of division 2.5, Emergency Medical Services, contains

definitions which govern the provisions of the division. (§ 1797.50; see §§ 1797.52-1797.97.) Of particular relevance is

section 1797.70, which defines “emergency” as meaning “a condition or situation in which an individual has a need for immediate medical attention, or where the potential for such need is perceived by emergency personnel or a public safety agency.” (Italics added.)

Section 1799.102, the provision at issue here, immunizes persons who render “emergency care at the scene of an emergency . . . .” (Italics added.)

Section 1797.70 thus makes clear that the phrase “scene of an emergency” in

section 1799.102 refers to the scene of a medical emergency. Although the phrase “emergency care” is not separately defined,

section 1797.70’s definition of “emergency” certainly supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended for “emergency care” to be construed as meaning emergency medical care. After all, if the “scene of an emergency” (§ 1799.102) means a scene where “an individual has a need for immediate medical attention” (§ 1797.70, italics added), it logically follows that the Legislature intended for the phrase “emergency care” in

section 1799.102 to refer to the medical attention given to the individual who needs it. This construction also comports with the second sentence of

section 1799.102, which reads: “The scene of an emergency shall not include emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered.” While this sentence does not directly shed light on the intended meaning of the phrase “emergency care” in the previous sentence of

section 1799.102, the fact that the Legislature excluded “emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered” from

section 1799.102’s immunity supports construing “emergency care” as meaning emergency medical care—the exclusion suggests that “emergency departments and other places where medical care is usually offered” are locations where the Legislature did not need (or want) to encourage ordinary citizens to provide emergency medical care because trained medical personnel are available to better render such care. 3. Definition of “Emergency Services” in

Section 1799.107

Section 1799.107 encourages public entities and emergency rescue personnel to render emergency assistance by providing that “a qualified immunity from liability shall be provided for public entities and emergency rescue personnel providing emergency services.” (Id., subd. (a).) The Legislature defined the phrase “emergency services” in subdivision (

e) of the provision, stating that “\f\or purposes of this section, ‘emergency services’ includes, but is not limited to, first aid and medical services, rescue procedures and transportation, or other related activities necessary to insure the health or safety of a person in imminent peril.” (Italics added.)

Section 1799.107 thus explicitly immunizes from liability emergency rescue personnel who render medical and/or nonmedical care. While the Legislature broadly defined the phrase “emergency services” in

section 1799.107, subdivision (e), it explicitly limited the definition’s application to that provision. This implies for a number of reasons that the Legislature intended for “emergency services” in

section 1799.107 to be construed more broadly than “emergency care” in

section 1799.102. First, it would make little sense for the Legislature to explicitly limit the application of

section 1799.107’s broad definition if it intended for

section 1799.102 to be read in similarly expansive terms. Second, the Legislature demonstrated in

section 1799.107 that it understands how to broadly define a term when it so desires—and its decision not to define “emergency care” in

section 1799.102 in like fashion strongly implies it did not intend for the phrase to be so construed. Third, if the Legislature understood the phrase “emergency care” to self-evidently include both medical and nonmedical care, as Torti suggests, there would have been little need to explicitly define an analogous term (“emergency services”) in

section 1799.107 to include both types of care. Accordingly, we conclude that, when construed in context and harmonized with related provisions relating to the same subject matter,

section 1799.102 immunizes only those persons who render emergency medical care. B. Additional Reasons to Prefer a Narrower

Interpretation We briefly address three additional reasons to prefer plaintiff’s narrower constmction of

section 1799.102 to the broader one urged by Torti. 1. Legislative History of

Section 1799.102 Supports the Narrower

Interpretation of the Provision The legislative history of

section 1799.102 and its predecessor, former

section 1767 (Stats. 1978, ch. 130, § 8, p. 345), supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to immunize the provision of emergency medical care at the scene of medical emergencies. Assembly Bill No. 1301 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1301), the legislation that added former

section 1767, was intended to encourage citizen involvement in providing emergency assistance, such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation and first aid, to other citizens. (Assem. Com. on Health, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1301 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) May 2, 1977, p. 2.) To that end, as the Legislative Counsel’s Digest notes, the bill “add[ed] provisions giving . . . persons . . . who render emergency medical services, immunity from liability [for] civil damages . . . .” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1301 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1978,

Summary Dig., p. 35, italics added.) One such provision, former

section 1767, provided that “In order to encourage people to participate in emergency medical services training programs and to render emergency medical services to others, no person who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency shall be liable for any civil damages resulting from any act or omission. . . ,” (Stats. 1978, ch. 130, § 8, p. 345, italics added.) This legislative history supports our conclusion—that

section 1799.102 was only intended to apply to emergency medical care. First, according to the Legislative Counsel’s digest, the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the immunity provisions was to protect those “who render emergency medical services . . . . (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1301 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 1978,

Summary Dig., p. 35.) Second, former

section 1767 specifically provided that its purpose was to encourage people to particijpate “in emergency medical services training programs” and to “render emergency medical services to others . . . .” (Stats. 1978, ch. 130, § 8, p. 345.) Thus, it seems beyond dispute that, in passing Assembly Bill No. 1301, the Legislature intended for the term “emergency care” in former

section 1767 to refer to emergency medical care. Legislative history suggests the term “emergency care” in

section 1799.102 was intended to be interpreted in like fashion. The immunity set forth in

section 1799.102 is essentially identical to the immunity in former

section 1767, which implies the Legislature intended an identical scope. Additionally, while former

section 1767’s prefatory language explaining the immunity’s purpose does not appear in

section 1799.102, its absence does not suggest the Legislature intended to alter the immunity’s original purpose. The language was merely moved to the previously discussed

section 1797.5 (see ante, p. 328). Thus, the legislative history indicates that, as with former

section 1767, the Legislature intended

section 1799.102 to apply only to those who render emergency medical care. 2. Torti’s Broad

Interpretation Would Undermine Well-established Common Law Principles Torti’s expansive

interpretation of

section 1799.102 would undermine long-standing common law principles. As we previously noted, the general rule is that “one has no duty to come to the aid of another.” (Williams v.

State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 23.) As explained in the Restatement Second of Torts, “The origin of the rule lay in the early common law distinction between action and inaction, or ‘misfeasance’ and ‘nonfeasance.’ ” (Rest.2d Torts, § 314, com. c, p. 116.) Courts were more concerned with affirmative acts of misbehavior than they were with an individual “who merely did nothing, even though another might suffer serious harm because of his omission to act.” (Ibid.) While there is no general duty to help, a good Samaritan who nonetheless “undertakes to come to the aid of another ... is under a duty to exercise due care in performance . . . .” (Williams v.

State of California, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 23, citing Rest.2d Torts, § 323.) As we explained in Artiglio v. Corning, “ ‘[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to a duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all’ (Glanzer v. Shepard (1922) 233 N.Y. 236 [135 N.E. 275].)” (Artiglio v. Coming, Inc., supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 613.) The broad construction urged by Torti—that

section 1799.102 immunizes any person who provides any emergency care at the scene of any emergency—would largely gut this well-established common law rule. As we recently noted, “ ‘[w]e do not presume that the Legislature intends, when it enacts a statute, to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied.’ ” (Brodie v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1313, 1325 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 156 P.3d 1100].) Torti does not identify anything that would overcome the presumption that the Legislature did not intend to work such a radical departure. 3. Broad

Interpretation Would Render Other “Good Samaritan” Statutes Unnecessary Surplusage As the Court of Appeal points out, Torti’s sweeping construction of

section 1799.102 would render other “good Samaritan” statutes superfluous. For example, Government Code

section 50086 immunizes anyone with first aid training who is asked by authorities to assist in a search and rescue operation and who renders emergency services to a victim. The statute defines “emergency services” to include “first aid and medical services, rescue procedures, and transportation or other related activities.” (Ibid.) It is difficult to see what conduct Government Code

section 50086 immunizes that would not already be protected under

section 1799.102 as it is interpreted by Torti. Any person providing “emergency services” under Government Code

section 50086 would, according to Torti, also be rendering “emergency care” at the scene of an emergency under

section 1799.102, thereby Government Code

section 50086 would be unnecessary. Axioms of statutory

interpretation counsel us to avoid such constructions. (Englemann v. State Bd. of Education (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 47, 56 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 264].) Torti’s

interpretation would similarly affect Harbors and Navigation Code

section 656, subdivision (b). That provision immunizes any person who provides assistance “at the scene of a vessel collision, accident, or other casualty . . . .” Immunity extends to “any act or omission in providing or arranging salvage, towage, medical treatment, or other assistance.” {Ibid.) Torti’s broad construction of the terms “emergency care” and “scene of an emergency” in

section 1799.102 would appear to swallow Harbors and Navigation Code

section 656, while a narrower

interpretation of

section 1799.102 would avoid that problem. III. Disposition In light of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Legislature intended for

section 1799.102 to immunize from liability for civil damages only those persons who in good faith render emergency medical care at the scene of a medical emergency. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. George, C. J., Kennard, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred. All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code. The factual and procedural history is largely taken from the Court of Appeal’s opinion.

Although Torti’s motion addressed only plaintiff’s complaint, Torti and Watson stipulated that the trial court’s order had a res judicata and/or collateral estoppel effect on their cross-complaints against each other. Plaintiff and Watson both appealed, and their appeals were consolidated. As previously noted, Torti does not contend that her actions at the scene of the automobile accident constituted medical care. Although we hold that

section 1799.102 applies only to the rendering of emergency medical care, we express no opinion as to what constitutes such care. We conduct a de novo review of the Court of Appeal’s statutory construction of

section 1799.102. (Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 683 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 97, 13 P.3d 704].) The Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that “[a] general immunity statute would more likely be found in the Civil Code . . . .” Torti disagrees, noting that “the seminal Good Samaritan statute lies in . . . Business [and] Professions Code [section 2395].” However, that provision applies to licensed physicians and, as such, its placement in the Business and Professions Code is unsurprising.

On the other hand, one would not expect a statute broadly immunizing from liability any person who renders any type of care at the scene of any emergency to be located in the Health and Safety Code, let alone division 2.5, the Emergency Medical Services division of that code. At oral argument, counsel for Watson and Van Horn suggested that there was a factual dispute over whether Van Horn was at the “scene of an emergency.” We disagree.

The Court of Appeal concluded that Van Horn, “having been injured in a car accident, required immediate medical attention," and nowhere in their briefing did counsel take issue with the court’s conclusion. Nor, in their oppositions to Torti’s motion for

summary judgment, did counsel identify any factual disputes about whether Van Horn needed immediate medical attention. That the Legislature would have wanted to provide a broader immunity in

section 1799.107 than in

section 1799.102 is unsurprising—the former provision immunizes trained emergency rescue personnel while the latter applies to any person. Torti warns that construing “emergency care” in

section 1799.102 to mean only emergency medical care will circumscribe

section 1799.107’s immunity. Her concern is without basis. As she acknowledges,

section 1799.107, subdivision (

e) defines “emergency services” for purposes of that statute; thus, our construction of the phrase “emergency care” in

section 1799.102 does not affect 1799.107 in any way. The legislation enacting former

section 1767, as originally proposed, would have also immunized a person who “transports an injured person for emergency medical treatment” (Assem. Bill No. 1301, as introduced Mar. 31, 1977, p. 6.) The language was deleted (Assem. Bill No. 1301, as amended June 10, 1977, p. 6), implying the Legislature decided against immunizing the type of assistance Torti says she provided, namely, removing plaintiff from the vehicle so she could receive medical treatment. Although the Legislative Counsel’s

summary digests are not binding (State ex rel. Harris v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1220, 1233, fn. 9 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 144, 141 P.3d 256]), they are entitled to great weight. (California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1, 17 [270 Cal.Rptr. 796, 793 P.2d 2].) Indeed, one would expect that, had the Legislature intended to alter the scope of the immunity that previously existed in former

section 1767, some mention of its intent would have made it into the legislative history. The absence of any such discussion suggests the Legislature did not so intend. (See Ailanto Properties, Inc. v. City of Half Moon Bay (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 572, 589 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 340].)