THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARC EDWARD BROUSSARD, Defendant and Appellant, 5 Cal. 4th 1067

Opinion KENNARD, J. In 1982, California voters by initiative added a provision to the state Constitution establishing a new constitutional right: the right of every crime victim to obtain restitution from the person committing the crime for all losses suffered as a result of the criminal act. (Cal. Const., art.

I, § 28, subd. (b).) The constitutional provision directed the Legislature to enact laws empowering trial courts to make restitution orders when sentencing convicted criminals. (Ibid.) We granted review in this case to determine whether the Legislature has complied with this constitutional obligation to enact implementing legislation.

Defendant Marc Edward Broussard, whose sentence for the crimes of theft and receiving stolen property directs him to pay restitution to the victims of these crimes, contends that the legislation passed to implement the constitutional right of restitution did not fully implement that right. He argues, in brief, that under existing law a defendant convicted of a crime and denied probation may be ordered to pay restitution only when the criminal act caused physical injury to the crime victim. No restitution order is permitted, defendant maintains, when the loss to the crime victim is purely economic.

We reject defendant’s contention. The legislation implementing the constitutional right of restitution, interpreted reasonably in light of its evident purpose, authorizes trial courts to order criminals to compensate all crime victims, whether their loss results from a physical injury or from the theft or destruction of their property. Facts In February 1991, defendant, who was facing criminal charges in at least four separate cases, entered into a plea bargain. He pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, former subd. 1) and pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft (Pen.

Code, § 487, subd. 1). In return, all of the remaining charges were dismissed. On March 28, 1991, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve two years and eight months in prison, and ordered him to pay restitution totaling $5,545 to the victims of the three crimes of which he had been convicted. None of these crimes involved physical injury to the victim. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court lacked the power to order him to pay restitution to the victims. He argued that under the controlling statute, Government Code

section 13967, subdivision (c), the trial court lacked the power to order him to pay restitution to the victims because none suffered physical injury. The Court of Appeal rejected the contention, concluding that under

section 13967 restitution could be imposed for purely economic loss. We granted defendant’s petition for review. I Under

section 13967, subdivision (c), when a sentencing trial court denies probation to a criminal defendant, it must, unless there are “clear and compelling reasons” not to do so, order the defendant to pay restitution to any “victim” who “has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. . . .” On its face, the statute mandates restitution whenever a crime victim has incurred economic loss regardless of whether the victim suffered any physical injury.

Defendant, however, argues that economic loss alone is insufficient, and that in addition the statute requires the victim to have suffered physical injury as a result of the defendant’s criminal act. Defendant focuses on the word “victim” in the statute, turning to

section 13960 for a definition of “victim.”

Section 13960 states that “[a]s used in this article,” a victim is a “person who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime,” and further states that a victim does not suffer an “injury” unless he or she suffers a “physical injury.” Both

section 13960 and

section 13967 appear in the same

article of the Government Code. (Tit. 2, div. 3, pt. 4, ch. 5, art. I; hereafter referred to as

article 1.) Because of that placement, defendant argues that

section 13960’s narrow definition of “victim” governs that term as used in subdivision (

c) of

section 13967. Thus, defendant contends, to qualify under

section 13967, subdivision (

c) as a “victim” who “suffered economic loss,” a person must be both a “victim” (one who suffered physical injury) and a person who “suffered economic loss.” We disagree. In construing a statute, our principal task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. (Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 989 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327].) We do so by first turning to the words themselves, giving them their ordinary meaning. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843]; People v.

Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) Of course, “ ‘ “language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.” ’ ” (Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 [145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014].) In such circumstances, “[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299]; see also Consumer Product Safety Com’n v.

GTE Sylvania, Inc. (1980) 447 U.S. 102, 108 [64 L.Ed.2d 766, 772, 100 S.Ct. 2051] [statutory language is conclusive “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary”].) Defendant argues that when

section 13960 and subdivision (

c) of

section 13967 are read together, their “plain meaning” requires that the term “victim” contained in

section 13967, subdivision (

c) be defined as set forth in

section 13960, that is, as a person who has suffered a physical injury. As we just noted, the plain meaning of a statute should not be followed when to do so would lead to “absurd results.” (People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 15; see also People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420]; Younger v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 113.) Here, as we shall explain, the voters, when they added

article I,

section 28, subdivision (

b) to the California Constitution, placed the Legislature under a constitutional mandate to enact legislation directing trial courts to order defendants found guilty of criminal acts to pay restitution to all victims, not simply those who suffered a physical injury. If we were to conclude that the Legislature knowingly disregarded this constitutional imperative, it would indeed be an “absurd” construction of the statute, and one we need not adopt. The history of

section 13967 shows that the Legislature intended to implement, not violate, its constitutional mandate. II The history of

section 13967 begins in 1965. In that year, the Legislature created a special fund to provide compensation to victims of violent crimes. (Stats. 1965, ch. 1549, pp. 3641-3642; see also Stats. 1967, ch. 1546, pp. 3707-3709.) In 1973, the Legislature substantially revised the statutory scheme. (Stats. 1973, ch. 1144, pp. 2348-2352.) As revised, the statutory scheme provided, among other things, for financial assistance from the restitution fund for medical expenses and lost wages to victims of violent crimes, with a maximum of $10,000 in each category. (§ 13965.) A new statute,

section 13967, authorized a court-ordered fine of up to $10,000, to be paid into the restitution fund by any criminal defendant convicted of a violent crime that caused injury or death to the victim. The Legislature placed all of the provisions controlling the creation and administration of the restitution fund in

article 1. Because the fund provided compensation only to victims of violent crimes,

section 13960 defined the term “victim,” for purposes of

article 1, as one injured as a direct result of a violent crime. In 1982, the voters of California passed Proposition 8, an initiative to reform the state’s criminal justice system.

The initiative included this amendment to the California Constitution: “It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer. [1] Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary.” (Cal. Const., art.

I, § 28, subd. (b).) The amendment directed the Legislature to adopt implementing legislation. {Ibid.) The Legislature did so. The new legislation, enacted in 1983, included: Penal Code

section 1203.04, requiring trial courts to order restitution from defendants convicted of crimes and placed on probation; Welfare and Institutions Code

section 729.6, imposing a similar requirement in all juvenile delinquency matters; Penal Code

section 1202.4, requiring all persons convicted of a felony to pay a “restitution fine” of up to $10,000, payable into the restitution fiind for victims of violent crime; and several laws designed to aid victims filing civil actions against persons convicted of crimes (§ 26820.4, subd. (b); former § 72055, subd. (b) [now subd. (c)]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 37, 340.3 & 1021.4; Pen. Code, § 1191.2; former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 656.2 [see now Pen. Code, § 679.02]). The Legislature also amended

section 13967 to provide that in every criminal case a person convicted of a crime must pay “restitution in the form of a penalty assessment” to the state and the county in which the offense was committed. Curiously, the Legislature did not enact legislation either requiring or authorizing trial courts to order defendants who were convicted of crimes but were not given probation to make restitution to any of the victims of their crimes. In such cases, victims of violent crimes had an indirect restitutionary remedy through the restitution fund in

article 1, but victims of nonviolent crimes had no recourse other than to sue the person who committed the crime. This legislative omission was noted by the Court of Appeal in People v. Downing (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 667 [220 Cal.Rptr. 225]. In Downing, the defendant, convicted of grand theft, was sentenced to prison and ordered to pay restitution of $400,000 to the victim. The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order as statutorily unauthorized, and observed in passing that the Legislature had not adequately complied with the constitutional mandate, enunciated in

article I,

section 28, subdivision (b), to enact legislation directing trial courts to order restitution to the victim in all criminal cases. The court said: “[W]e question whether the Legislature fully implemented the constitutional mandate .... The electorate gave a clear directive requiring restitution to be ordered in every case involving a victim absent extraordinary reasons. We doubt it anticipated the current statutes, which in some cases still leave the victims to individually bear the costs and endure the rigors of seeking civil judgments.” (174 Cal.App.3d at p. 672.) To remedy this legislative oversight, Senator Gary Hart in 1986 proposed to add a new statute, Penal Code

section 1202b, that would require trial courts to order restitution “to the victim” (if the crime had a victim) in “any case where a person is convicted of a crime and probation is denied.” (Sen. Bill No. 2404 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.; hereafter SB 2404).) Because the new statute was to be in the Penal Code, it would be unaffected by the definition of the term “victim” in

article 1, which appears in the Government Code, and contains the definition at issue in this case. After the Senate’s adoption of SB 2404, the bill moved to the Assembly. There it was changed to provide for an amendment to

section 13967 of the Government Code, rather than an addition of a new statute to the Penal Code, as originally contemplated. The proposed amendment to Government Code

section 13967 retained those portions of the statute authorizing the imposition of a fine and penalty assessment. (See pp. 1072-1073, ante.) It added, however, subdivision (c), stating that when “a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, and the defendant is denied probation, ... the court shall order restitution to be paid to the victim.” (Italics added.) The Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained SB 2404’s purpose as follows: “Existing law provides that in every case in which a person is convicted of a crime and is granted probation the court is required to order as a condition of probation that he or she make restitution to the victim, if the crime involved a victim, or to the Restitution Fund, if the crime did not involve a victim.

Existing law also provides that in any case in which a defendant is convicted of a felony the court is required to order the defendant to pay a restitution fine, which is deposited into the Restitution Fund, as specified. [j[] This bill would provide that in cases in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, and the defendant is denied probation, in lieu of imposing all or a portion of the restitution fine, the court is required to order restitution to be paid to the victim, as specified.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 2404, 4 Stats. 1986 (Reg. Sess.)

Summary Dig., p. 557, italics added.) On September 30, 1986, SB 2404, as amended, was signed into law. (Stats. 1986, ch. 1438, pp. 5140-5141.) Although there have been several later alterations to

section 13967, they are not relevant here in determining the meaning of the term “victim” as used in that section. III We now turn to the issue before us: whether the Legislature intended the word “victim,” as used in subdivision (

c) of

section 13967, to include anyone who has not suffered physical injury but has sustained economic loss resulting from a defendant’s criminal acts. For reasons that follow, we conclude that the Legislature did so intend. First and most important, as we have seen, the Legislature is under an express constitutional mandate (Cal. Const., art.

I, § 28, subd. (b)) to enact laws requiring trial courts to order restitution “in every case ... in which a crime victim suffers a loss . . . .” This constitutional requirement makes no distinction between losses that result from physical injury and losses that are purely economic. Thus, unless the Legislature chose to ignore the obligation that the voters of California imposed on it through the passage of

article I,

section 28, subdivision (

b) of the Constitution, it must have intended that

section 13967 protect all crime victims, regardless of the nature of their loss. Second, the legislative history of

section 13967, subdivision (

c) shows that its purpose was to plug the gap that remained after 1983, when, as described earlier (ante, p. 1073), the Legislature attempted to comply with the constitutional mandate that it enact legislation requiring restitution in every criminal case. As we mentioned earlier, the bill creating

section 13967, subdivision (c), SB 2404, was proposed shortly after the Court of Appeal in People v.

Downing, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 667, pointed out that despite this constitutional requirement, when victims of crime suffered purely economic loss and the defendant who inflicted the loss was sentenced to prison, “the victims’ only avenue of relief for restitution is by civil remedy,” and questioned whether the Legislature had fully implemented the electorate’s “clear directive requiring restitution to be ordered in every case involving a victim absent extraordinary reasons.” (Id. at p. 672.) A Senate Floor Analysis of SB 2404, prepared after the bill had been amended by the Assembly, demonstrates that the Legislature intended that SB 2404 correct the anomaly in the statutory scheme noted by the court in People v.

Downing, supra, 174 Cal.App.3d 667, by authorizing trial courts to order defendants not given probation to pay restitution to all of their victims, including those who suffer purely economic injury.

The analysis explained the purpose of SB 2404 as follows: “[T]he courts recently declared that the Legislature has yet to implement fully Proposition 8 because it has not provided the courts with authority to order restitution in cases where the defendant is sentenced to prison. (People vs Downing (1985)) [*][] . . . [Tjhis leaves the anomalous result that the most serious offenders in the system . . . cannot be compelled to make restitution to their victims.” (Sen. Rules Com., Floor Analysis Sen. Bill No. 2404 (1985-1986 Reg.

Sess.), as amended Aug. 21, 1986; italics in original.) The Legislative Counsel’s analysis of SB 2404, which we quoted in full at page 1074, ante, provides further support for our conclusion that the Legislature intended it to authorize trial courts to order restitution to all victims, not just those who suffered physical injury. That analysis specifically noted that SB 2404 was intended to apply “in cases in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 2404, 4 Stats. 1986 (Reg. Sess.)

Summary Dig., p. 557.) To support his claim that the term “victim” as used in

section 13967 must be given the definition of that term set forth in

section 13960, that is, one who suffered a physical injury as a result of the defendant’s criminal actions, defendant relies on

section 13960.5. His reliance is unfounded.

Section 13960 defines “victim,” as the term is used in

article 1, as including only “residents of the State of California, or military personnel and their families stationed in California.” In 1985, the Legislature enacted

section 13960.5, which states that notwithstanding

section 13960, whenever federal funds are available to the state for the compensation of victims of crime, the term “victim” also includes “nonresidents of this state who suffer pecuniary losses as a direct result of criminal acts occurring within this state.” Defendant asserts that

section 13960.5 shows that the Legislature “recognized the limitations on the word ‘victim’ which had been made applicable throughout [article 1] by

section 13960,” and that it “knows how to phrase a statute so as to exempt it from the definition of ‘victim’ set forth in

section 13960.” Defendant argues that the Legislature’s failure to explicitly create such an exemption when it created

section 13967, subdivision (

c) demonstrates that it intended the words in that subdivision, including the term “victim,” to be defined as set forth in

section 13960. Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. As we have explained, the legislative history of

section 13967, subdivision (

c) shows that the Legislature did not contemplate that the statute would be subject to

section 13960’s limited definition of the term “victim.” Thus, there was no reason for the Legislature to create a special exemption of the type set forth in

section 13960.5. Its failure to create such an exemption does not demonstrate that the Legislature intended the term “victim,” as used in

section 13967, subdivision (c), to refer only to victims who suffer physical injury. Defendant’s construction of

section 13967, subdivision (

c) as authorizing trial courts to order restitution for economic loss only to crime victims who suffer physical injury and economic loss would lead to arbitrary and capricious results. Under defendant’s view of the statute, if a thief grabbed a purse from a woman without injuring her, the victim could not receive restitution for the money stolen, but if the thief bruised the victim’s arm in the process, the victim could receive restitution for the loss of the money. We can think of no explanation why the Legislature could have desired such an unlikely result, and defendant advances none. (See People v.

Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 15.) Conclusion Through the passage of Proposition 8, an initiative to reform the criminal justice system, the voters of the State of California amended the state Constitution to require the enactment of legislation providing that, unless “compelling and extraordinary reasons” exist, restitution be ordered from any person convicted of a crime “in every case ... in which a crime victim suffers a loss ...” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) Initial legislative efforts to comply with this constitutional mandate were incomplete; the Legislature filled the gap by enacting

section 13967, subdivision (c), which requires a trial court to order restitution in any criminal case in which a defendant is denied probation and in which the victim has suffered economic loss, irrespective of whether the defendant inflicted physical injury on the victim. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Lucas, C. J., and Arabian, J., and Baxter, J., and George, J., concurred. The abstracts of judgment from the three cases show that the trial court imposed restitution totaling $6,545.

Following the Attorney General’s concession of a $1,000 inaccuracy in one of the abstracts, the Court of Appeal reduced the total amount of restitution to $5,545. Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the Government Code. In relevant part,

section 13967, subdivision (

c) provides: “In cases in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, and the defendant is denied probation, in lieu of imposing all or a portion of the restitution fine, the court shall order restitution to be paid to the victim. If a defendant has been convicted of a felony violation of

Section 288 of the Penal Code, restitution to the victim may be ordered whether or not the defendant is denied probation. Notwithstanding subdivision (a), restitution shall be imposed in the amount of the losses, as determined. The court shall order full restitution unless it finds clear and compelling reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. A restitution order imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall identify the losses to which it pertains, and shall be enforceable as a civil judgment.

The making of a restitution order pursuant to this subdivision shall not affect the right of a victim to recovery from the Restitution Fund in the manner provided elsewhere, except to the extent that restitution is actually collected pursuant to the order. Restitution collected pursuant to this subdivision shall be credited to any other judgments for the same losses obtained by the victim against the defendant arising out of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.” (Italics added.) When defendant committed the offenses giving rise to the restitution order in this case,

section 13960 provided in relevant part: “As used in this article: “(a) ‘Victim’ means any of the following residents of the State of California, or military personnel and their families stationed in California: “

(1) A person who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime. “

(2) Anyone legally dependent for support upon a person who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime. “

(3) Any member of the family of a victim specified by paragraph (1) or any person in close relationship to such a victim, if that member or person was present during the actual commission of the crime, or any member or person herein described whose treatment or presence during treatment of the victim is medically required for the successful treatment of the victim. “

(4) Any member of the family of a person who sustains injury or death as a direct result of a crime when the family member has incurred emotional injury as a result of the crime. Pecuniary loss to these victims shall be limited to only medical expenses, mental health counseling expenses, or both, of which the maximum award shall not exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000). “

(5) In the event of a death caused by a crime, any individual who legally assumes the obligation, or who voluntarily pays the medical or burial expenses incurred as a direct result thereof. “(b) ‘Injury’ includes physical or emotional injury, or both. However, this

article does not apply to emotional injury unless such an injury is incurred by a person who also sustains physical injury or threat of personal injury or by a member or person as defined in paragraph (3) or (4) of subdivision (a). For purposes of this article, a victim of a crime committed in violation of

Section 261, 270, 270a, 270c, 271, 272, 273a, 273b, 273d, 285, 286, 288, 288.1, 288a, or 289 of the Penal Code, who sustains emotional injury is presumed to have sustained physical injury.” Although

section 13960 includes within its definition of “victim” persons who have various close relationships to a person who suffered a physical injury (see subd. (a)(2)-(5), and includes within its definition of “injury” those who suffered emotional injury as a result of an actual or threatened physical injury (see subd. (b)), this has no bearing on the issue before us. For convenience, the remainder of this opinion will omit reference to the fact that the statute also defines such persons as victims. The legislative history sheds no light on the reason for this change.