THE MUNICIPAL COURT FOR THE EAST LOS ANGELES JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; RAMON MARTINEZ GONZALEZ, Real Party in Interest, 5 Cal. 4th 1126

Opinion BAXTER, J. J.— We granted review in this matter to determine whether a municipal court has standing to initiate an action in mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) against a superior court to set aside a ruling of the superior court, and, if so, whether a municipal court’s practice of using court commissioners to make the probable cause determination required by County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44 [114 L.Ed.2d 49, 111 S.Ct. 1661] is constitutionally and statutorily permissible.

The latter question arose when petitioner, the Municipal Court for the East Los Angeles Judicial District (Municipal Court) assigned commissioners to determine whether probable cause existed to detain defendants arrested without warrants for further proceedings. That determination was mandated by Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854], Because County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44, held that the determination must be made within 48 hours of the arrest, commissioners were assigned for this purpose on weekends.

Real party in interest challenged his continued detention following a finding of probable cause by a commissioner. Respondent superior court granted his petition for writ of habeas corpus after a hearing at which the Municipal Court was represented. When the People failed to appeal from that ruling, the Municipal Court initiated the instant proceeding. The petition was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal. This court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ.

After doing so, the Court of Appeal held that the Municipal Court lacked standing to prosecute the mandate proceeding, and denied the petition for writ of mandamus without reaching the second question. We again granted review. After review we conclude that the opinion of the Court of Appeal, authored by Acting Presiding Justice Herbert L. Ashby and concurred in by Justices Roger W. Boren and Margaret M. Grignon, correctly holds that the Municipal Court lacks standing to maintain this action. We therefore, adopt that opinion as the opinion of this court.

The opinion (with appropriate deletions and additions) is as follows: [] Discussion [] It is fundamental that an action must be prosecuted by one who has a beneficial interest in the outcome. In a mandamus proceeding, it is the parties [in the underlying proceeding], not the courts [whose rulings are challenged], which have a “beneficial interest” in the outcome of a case; the role of the respondent court is that of a neutral party. (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 189-190 [137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148]; Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Swenson) [(1988)] 202 Cal.App.3d [957,] 961 [249 Cal.Rptr. 182]; Municipal Court v. Superior Court (Sinclair) [(1988)] 199 Cal.App.3d [19,] 24-25 [244 Cal.Rptr. 591].) This is true even where the subject matter of the mandamus proceeding is a ruling which significantly affects the operations of the petitioning court. In [] [Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Sinclair), supra, 199 Cal.App.3d 19], for example, the superior court issued a writ of mandate, sought by defendants charged in municipal court with driving under the influence (DUI), directing the municipal court to discontinue its practice of requiring DUI defendants to reveal on a written waiver form uncharged prior DUI convictions and pending DUI charges in order to enter a guilty plea. The municipal court and the People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate its order.

Because the People (a party with a beneficial interest in the outcome) were one of the petitioners, the Court of Appeal decided the petition on the merits, holding that a court may not require a defendant to reveal uncharged priors as a condition of entering a guilty plea.

The court further held that the municipal court could not challenge the superior court’s ruling by petitioning for a writ of mandate in a higher court, because it was not “beneficially interested” within the meaning of [Code of Civil Procedure section] 1086: “Clearly the municipal court was not a party to the underlying actions— criminal actions in which the only parties were the People and the individual defendants charged with violations of the Vehicle Code.

The municipal court’s rejection of the guilty pleas was challenged by petition for writ of mandate, since the rejection of the pleas was a nonappealable order. Although in the petition process the municipal court whose action was challenged was named as respondent, that court has no other interest in the result than it would have if its ruling had been challenged by appeal. The reviewing court in this case held that the lower court had abridged the defendants’ privilege against self-incrimination by requiring them to divulge uncharged priors in order to plead guilty.

The lower court may not challenge this ruling by its own action in a higher court merely because one result of the ruling requires the lower court to change a waiver form.” ([Municipal Court v. Superior Court (Sinclair), supra,] 199 Cal.App.3d at pp. 24-25.) [Here, of course, the ruling of the superior court in the underlying habeas corpus proceeding had no impact on the ability of the Municipal Court to continue assigning commissioners to make Gerstein-McLaughlin (Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103; County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, supra, 500 U.S. 44) probable cause determinations.

The only party bound by the superior court judgment which granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus was the custodian of the habeas corpus petitioner, the Sheriff of Los Angeles County. The superior court did not order the municipal court to discontinue its practice. It ruled only that the habeas corpus petitioner was entitled to be released from custody because no valid determination of probable cause had been made.] The most extensive discussion of the standing issue is in [] [Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Swenson), supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 957]. [] The People filed an affidavit pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure

section 170.6 against a Monterey County municipal court judge. The judge honored the affidavit (which was timely under the [“] 10-day 5-day rule[”]), but did so under duress since he believed the municipal court’s calendaring system was identical to the “all-purpose” type assignment described in Woodman v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 407 [241 Cal.Rptr. 818] and Augustyn v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1221 [231 Cal.Rptr. 298]. The defendant (Swenson) petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate, which was denied.

Swenson did not pursue the matter further, but the municipal court filed a petition for writ of mandate (1) declaring the challenge untimely[,] and/or (2) compelling the superior court “to adopt a certain rule concerning Code of Civil Procedure

section 170.6 challenges in the municipal court . . . .” ([] [Municipal Court v. Superior Court (Swenson), 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 960.]) The Court of Appeal did not reach the merits of the petition because it concluded that the municipal court lacked standing to file it. The court’s reasoning [in Municipal Court v. Superior Court (Swenson), supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 957,] is equally persuasive here: “In our common law judicial system we rely upon a separation of roles to bring about proper results. The courts’ role is to decide cases; the parties’ role is to bring cases before the courts.

If a party is aggrieved by the ruling of a lower court, he is provided with an avenue of appeal to a higher tribunal by means of an orderly prescribed procedure, and that appellate tribunal may, within limits, alter the lower court’s ruling. The system does not provide a procedure for a lower court on its own impetus to ask a higher court to address general administrative or procedural problems within the system.

More germane to this case, there is no procedure authorized whereby a municipal court, disagreeing with a superior court’s decision on review, may come to the next court in the hierarchy, the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal, and ask it to set the superior court straight. A municipal court may have reason to complain of the treatment of one of its decisions, or its procedures, at the hands of the reviewing court.

Nevertheless, the premise under which the judiciary operates is straightforward: if no individual party finds it worth his or her while to champion the cause and seek judicial review, then review will not occur.” ([Municipal Court v. Superior Court (Swenson), supra,] 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 960.) In the ensuing discussion, the court noted that the case of a court suing another court was such a rare event that there were only two reported California decisions on the issue: Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Sinclair), supra, [199 Cal.App.3d 19] which “says such a lawsuit may not be brought,” and the second, Superior Court v. Dist. Court of Appeal (1966) 65 Cal.2d 293 [54 Cal.Rptr. 119, 419 P.2d 183], a request to vacate a writ of supersedeas issued in an adoption matter, which was distinguishable: “It was apparent that although brought in the name of the superior court, the suit was clearly between interested parties, the named real parties in interest, prospective adoptive parents, and the county bureau of adoption.” ([Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Swenson), supra,] 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 961.) The court also cited several federal cases in accord, including D’Amico v. Schweiker (7th Cir. 1983) 698 F.2d 903, in which the court held that administrative law judges in the Social Security Administration lacked standing to bring a lawsuit challenging an administrative ruling of the Administration which the judges were required to follow.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal stated: “ [‘]Although these administrative law judges have a big emotional stake in this case and have invested heavily of their time and money in its vigorous prosecution, they are the wrong people to be raising with us the question whether the challenged instruction is lawful. ...[][]... Their proper course is to obey the instruction and let any claimant injured by it ask the courts to set it aside.[’] ” (698 F.2d at p. 906, cited [] [in Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Swenson), supra,] 202 Cal.App.3d 963.) [The Municipal Court argues that this court should adopt a “commonsense” approach in assessing its beneficial interest in obtaining an appellate ruling on the propriety of its use of court commissioners. It seeks to analogize this petition to those brought for the purpose of vindicating a strong public interest. (See Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126 [172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256]; Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of LA. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 98, 100-101 [162 P.2d 627].) The rule it seeks to invoke is inapplicable here.

There is no public duty to use court commissioners to make probable cause determinations. No public right would be enforced should the Municipal Court prevail in the mandamus proceeding. (Cf. Bozung v.

Local Agency Formation Committee (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 272 [118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017].)] [In none of the cases on which petitioner relies was a municipal court seeking Court of Appeal review of a superior court judgment that tibe lower court had erred in the conduct of a case before it.] Having concluded that petitioner lacks standing to bring this petition, we decline to address the merits of the petition. “In general, California courts have no power in mandamus or otherwise to render advisory opinions or give declaratory relief.” (Municipal Court v.

Superior Court (Swenson), supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 961, citing People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 910, 912 [83 Cal.Rptr. 670, 464 P.2d 126], and Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 798 [166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276].) [] [We end our quotation from the Court of Appeal opinion.] Although this court has exercised its discretion to address an issue of great importance for the guidance of the trial court in future proceedings involving the same parties, both of whom seek resolution by the court (see, e.g., Dix v.

Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442 [279 Cal.Rptr. 834, 807 P.2d 1063]), real party in interest here has consistently challenged the petitioner’s standing and opposed appellate resolution of the merits of the petition. Moreover, the habeas corpus judgment is final and the matter is moot. For those reasons, and because the underlying issue can be raised by interested parties in another action, there is no reason to address it here. Disposition The Court of Appeal properly declined to address the merits and denied the petition for writ of mandate. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Lucas, C.

J., Panelli, J., Arabian, J., and George, J., concurred. Brackets together, in this manner [] without enclosing material, are used to indicate deletions from the opinion of the Court of Appeal; brackets enclosing material (other than publisher’s added parallel citations) are, unless otherwise indicated, used to denote our insertions or additions. (See O’Hare v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86, 90 [233 Cal.Rptr. 332, 729 P.2d 766].)